No, I am denying spooky action at a distance. Instead, I'm saying all detectors, anywhere in the universe, are constrained by transtemporal symmetry. In effect, this means that detectors are pre-syncronized. When you set the orientation of a spin detector, you change one and only one degree of freedom, but the multi-electron wave function has an uncountable number of degrees of freedom (as do all continuous forms). If the detector system has n electrons, the anti-symmetry condition imposes n!-n constraining equations (each of which spans all space-time) on the system wave function. (Note that n is typically in the order of Avagadro's number, ~10^23). This links the "separate" detectors, so they are anything but independent -- vitiating an essential premise of theorems like Bell's.

if the settings on one of the detectors is changed randomly, before a particle has reached it, but not soon enough for any subluminal signal to have reached the other detector...what? — i aM

When we change the macroscopic setting of a detector, the microscopic details of its multi-electron wave function (our ignorance of which we call "randomness") remain constrained by transtemporal symmetry -- and that wavefunction interacts with the incident quanta to produce the detection event.

The "control" you object to is to prevent the unjust from violating the just rights of others. — Dfpolis

You mean preemptively? Because no one's rights are being violated simply because someone says something, or dresses a particular way, etc. Not that I really frame anything in terms of rights, but I'm just sayin'. — Terrapin Station

The Social Justice Movement is not a movement against free speech or free expression -- unless it is expression as part of criminal action. In characterizing it so, you demonstrate that you do not understand what social justice is.

The "control" you object to is to prevent the unjust from violating the just rights of others.

The best to you.

1) Information (a decoded message) is the result of communication (data encoding, transmission, conveyance, reception, and decoding). And,
2) I communicate my hopes, beliefs, and desires to others.
Then:
My hopes, beliefs, and desires are information possessed by those recipients who have decoded my message(s). — Galuchat

That does not mean that hopes, beliefs, and desires are information, only that they are intelligible -- part of the state of the world we can be informed about, just as we can be informed whether a rock is sandstone or limestone.

A definition of information in terms of possibility can only be a definition of mathematical information. It is unsuitable for use as a general definition which also pertains to physical and semantic information. — Galuchat

Clearly knowing about physical or semantic realities does reduce what is logically possible. As I just indicated, when we know a stone is limestone, the possibility that it is granite is gone. When we know a sentence is in Russian and speaks of the soul, the possibility that it is in English and does not speak of the soul no longer exists.

Yet, physical and/or semantic information is produced every time the message is decoded. — Galuchat

No, what is produced is the intelligible fact that the message is so decoded. Something being intelligible means that it can be informative, but it is not actually informative until someone is actually informed.

Your example does not rebut my position. The pressure wave produced but the doorbell is not information until its heard and understood. Before that it is merely audible and intelligible. Once the subject is informed, the logical possibility that bell is not ringing no longer exists. As a result the subject can combine the new information with prior learning and infer that someone is ringing the bell.

Than ALL structures of human thought are by their own nature information limiting in total. For instance the scientific method is a wonder structure for investigating the universe, ordering thought, and determining a more reliably consistent cause effect relationship. Far better than the Theology led structure of the catholic church — Aadee

Of course, knowledge is informative, limiting the possibility of contrary states, but hopes, believes and desires are not informative, as they assume noting about extramental reality.

I do not see that your position stands in opposition to theology. As you may know, Christian theology sees the Second Person of the Trinity as the Logos -- the principle of rationality and order in nature, the Tao of Eastern thought.

The citation for the actual experiment is: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.05080

As bulk matter (such as cats and quantum detectors) is held together by nonlinear electron-electron interactions, the superposition principle does not apply to them. So, Schroedinger's cat is either alive or dead and never both.

Thanks to calling my attention to this thread. I note that the cited article does not fully describe the experiment, and says in one paragraph that the experimenter is Caslav Brukner, and in the next that the experiment is the work of Proietti and co. Thus, one must not rely on the article too heavily.

As Mark Twain said of reports of his death, the conclusion that reality is inconsistent is greatly exaggerated. Let us begin with a simple observation. Assuming that the experiment has been adequately described, there is no dispute over the observed facts. Everyone reading of the experiment will agree that the observations on each side are exactly as reported. There is no evidence supporting the claim that reality is self-contradictory -- because no one has observed that what is, is not.. The contradiction lies in the conclusions drawn from the two sides of the experiment. As these conclusions are based on interpretive assumptions made about self-consistent facts, it is these assumptions, and not reality, that is drawn into question.

As I have not yet read the original work, but only the cited MIT Technology Report article, I can offer no detailed analysis of the experiment -- as I have for experiments allegedly supporting the "Delayed Choice" and "Quantum Erasers" myths. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-PAjJcRVCs). I suspect that my response to the detailed experiment would rest on the fact that quantum observations do not reveal the prior state of the "observed" system, but the interaction of that system with the experimental apparatus. Thus, in Wigner's Friend experiments, neither Wigner nor his friend obtain unambiguous information about the prior state of the system. Rather, each obtains information about the interaction of that system with their (different) local measurement apparatus.

In response to a recent question on my quantum erasure video, I outlined by views on quantum entanglement, which may be relevant here:

Let us begin by saying what quantum entanglement is not. It is not any kind of causality or spooky, instantaneous action at a distance. How do we know this? Because, theoretically, entanglement is a consequence of relativistic quantum theory, and relativity precludes this sort of interaction.

Yes, I know that there is no information transmitted faster than the speed of light in entanglement experiments, but that is not way relativity precludes spooky action at a distance. Imagine a EPRB-type experiment with two observers, A and B, equidistant from the entangling event. In our frame of reference A and B detect the spin simultaneously, so, if action at a distance were involved, it is indeterminate whether A's detection event is acting on B's, or B's on A's.

However, that is not the worst of it -- for if we consider the problem in a frame of reference in which A is moving toward the initial event, then A will detect the spin first and, if action at a distance were involved, necessarily, the detection event at A would have to act on that at B. If we consider the experiment in a frame in which B is moving toward the origin, the reverse is true. Thus, neither can be acting on the other and there is no sort of action at a distance.

So, what is going on here? Two factors are neglected by the usual analysis: (1) Detection dynamics and (2) transtemporal symmetry.

First, the result of a spin observation is not the spin of the quantum prior to observation. Consider a spin-0 quantum that decays into two quanta with spin. Let the EPRB detectors be set at right angles. Then, no matter what spins are detected, the sum of the detected spins cannot be zero! So, the detected spins are not initial spin (which was zero). This would seem to violate conservation of angular momentum, but not if we consider the detectors as well as the observed system. Obviously, the extra spin comes from the detectors. Thus, the detectors must be considered as well as the observed system, and the observed spin is not the the prior spin of the system, but the result of the interaction of the system with the detectors.

There is no time limit on quantum entanglement, so, we must acknowledge that EPRB detectors are not isolated and independent, but synchronized and entangled -- and the material in them has been entangled since the Big Bang. Thus, part of the answer Aspect-type experiments is to apply the idea of quantum entanglement on a cosmic, rather than a local, scale.

Second, none of the analyses I've seen consider transtemporal symmetry. Every case of entanglement involves some conservation law. The original EPR paper involved conservation of momentum. EPRB and Aspect-type experiments involve conservation of angular momentum. By Noether's theorem, all conservation laws reflect dynamic symmetries. Conservation of momentum reflects translational invariance and conservation of angular momentum reflects rotational symmetry. This suggests a deeper reflection on symmetry.

When we consider translational and rotational symmetry in different relativistic frames of reference, we wind up connecting points at different times, because the points that are symmetric in different frames have different times.

The most relevant application of transtemporal symmetry involves the Pauli exchange principle. In non-relativistic quantum theory, when we exchange the spatial coordinates of two Fermions (such as electrons), the multi-Fermion wave function changes sign. In the relativistic formulation, we must consider the Fermions not only at the same time, but each Fermion at its own time (this is Dirac's multi-time formulation). That means that world wave function, the joint wave function of every similar Fermion, has symmetries that link it not only at a given time, but at all times since the Big Bang.

This confirms what I said earlier about the non-independence of detectors in Aspect-type experiments. The detector wave functions are related and constrained by a transtemporal symmetry extending through all space-time. So, entanglement does not involve action at a distance, but transtemporal symmetry.

If a message is transmitted but not fully received means only a more contained unit of information was either transmitted or received than was requested or offered. — Aadee

It meant in my example that the reception is not yet complete and has little to do with the choices of those communicating.

Logic and semantics are simply the agreed upon structure with which information exchange can occur. — Aadee

Logic is not a convention, but reflects the nature of reality. If we want our conclusion to describe reality, then the premises must be true and our logical moves must reflect the nature of existence/being.

Semantics is conventional, because language is.

Are you talking about the Conservation of Energy law? Then that is a law that has been proven to be true in all cases of Scientific experiemnts and observations that have ever been done. That isn't to say that an exception will not be found someday. In anycase the Stone is never the same Stone it was just an instant ago. It is always changing, heating up under the Sun or cooling down at night. Just these simple Phenomena slightly change the Stone every day. So what actually is constant? — SteveKlinko

The fact that the law of conservation of energy is empirically verified makes it (the conservation of mass-energy) a phenomenon to be explained. If, at come later time, we find that the law, as we now articulate it, is only an approximation, then the true law still needs to be explained.

Persistence is not immutability. It just means that the stone continues in being as an observable object. To say that an object is "the same" object as it was a moment ago is to say it is has the same essential character and is dynamically continuous with the object a moment ago, not that it is identical. It is an equivocation to confuse these two meanings of "the same."

Why does the Energy in the Universe keep on existing? But a Deeper question is: What is this Energy in the first place? — SteveKlinko

The first question is that which I pursue in the argument and answer by saying that we must ultimately come to a self-conserving meta-law which answers the dictionary definition of God.

The second question is answered by the rather complex operational definition of energy. It is that measured by the specified operations.

Exactly how do you define a Meta-Law? — SteveKlinko

A meta-law is a law applying to a law. As I know no law requiring the existence of energy, I also know of no corresponding meta-law.

I don't see why it all necessarily has to lead to some sort of God. — SteveKlinko

The dictionary defines "God" as "the supreme being, creator and ruler of the universe." Surely what ultimately holds the universe in being is supreme. What is responsible for the laws yielding the cosmos is its creator, and the source of its laws is properly called its ruler. So, what the reflection discovers meets the dictionary definition of God.

Also if God is directing Evolution then it seems absurd that we had 200 million years of Dinosaurs. What was he thinking? — SteveKlinko

That dinosaurs are worthy of existence.

It has been pretty clear that we've been discussing proving God's existence and to do that you need to apply scientific facts and theories. — Christoffer

No, we don't. If you had read either of the proofs I suggested, you would know this.

The laws of physics govern everything. Do you mean to say that everything is causally connected? I once read a book on logic that showed, as an example of coincidence, the correlation between priesthood and murder rates - both seemed to have increased. The author then went on to say that this is simple coincidence i.e. there was no causality in the data. — TheMadFool

Recall that I asked you to define "coincidence," and you replied that "Coincidence means an absence of causality." So, we're discussing what "coincidence" means.

Since you brought up correlation, I assume that you do not mean that no causality is involved, but that two events are coincident if neither causes the other. I don't think that's enough. Many species of flowers bloom in the Spring with no species causing another to bloom. Still, this is not a coincidence because they all bloom in response to common causal factors. So, for events to be coincident, it is not enough for them not to cause each other, they can't result from a common cause.

The problem is, all purely physical events are the result of the laws of nature operating on the initial state of the cosmos. Futher, quantum entanglement shows that they continue to be related. So, strictly speaking, there are no coincidences. Still, it is meaningful to speak of "coincidences" because we do not mean to trace events back to their ultimate causes, but to more proximate cases that are apparent to us.

This means that being "coincident" is inescapably subjective. We decide how far back we wish to trace the causal chain. If the common causes are not apparent to us, then we call events "coincident." While this is fine for common purposes, it is inadequate for philosophical analysis -- for we know that all purely physical events are the result of common causal factors.

You've heard of the maxim "correlation doesn't mean causation" — TheMadFool

Yes, I have. We do not have mere statistical correlation between initial and final states in physics. They are completely determined (caused) by the laws of motion.

Coincidence means an absence of causality. Teleology requires a causal connection. — TheMadFool

As physical determinism requires that all purely physical events be caused, by this definition, there are no coincidences.

Physics has proven theories and they haven't proven anything to support any unification theory. — Christoffer

What has this to do with what we are discussing? Nothing!

If you can't combine physics with your conclusion, you are essentially ditching science for your own belief. — Christoffer

You continue to wander in the wilderness of self-imposed confusion. My meta-law argument is based on the laws of nature studied by physics, but you do not realize that because you are not open enough to even read a proof.

I am tied of wasting my time on someone who refuses to make any effort to inform themselves.

You are making conclusions based on data that proves you "to know the truth", when in physics we still don't have data to complete a unification theory. — Christoffer

This is a very confused claim. First, physics uses the hypothetico-deductive method, not strict deduction. So, physics never knows with the kind of certainty that strict deduction brings. Second, we are not doing physics, so what physics does or does not know is totally irrelevant.

As I keep repeating, there are only two valid forms of objection to a strict deduction: (1) show that a premise is false, or (2) show that a logical move is invalid.

We know that the universe expanded quickly, referred to the Big Bang, we don't know what came before, we have no data to conclude what the cause was so we don't know what was before. — Christoffer

Again, if you read the proofs, you would know that this entire line of objection is equally irrelevant. As I said last time, these proofs use concurrent, not time-sequenced, causality. So, as I also said last time, the nature of time and the history of the cosmos are irrelevant. If you actually read the proofs you would see that no assumption is made about how the universe began, or even that it did begin.

Since you are still not making proper objections because you have not read the proofs, I will wait until you have read the proofs to continue.

I'm not disputing your point, I'm disputing its relevance. I think that your interpretation of Rovelli was uncharitable. — S

That is possible. What would a charitable reading be?

You would have seen this if you read a few more sentences in the SEP article. Somehow, you missed the part of the article rebutting Rovelli. — Dfpolis

More uncharitable assumptions. Thanks. But you're mistaken. I did read further, and I didn't miss anything. — S

I was being charitable -- assuming you did not read Andrea Falcon's rebuttal of Rovelli's claim.

Other than saying that I am uncharitable, in some unspecified way, in my interpretation of Rovelli, what point do you wish to make?

My intention wasn't to discuss the general ideas of each philosopher, but only those ideas relevant to the topic of teleology. — S

I understand that that was your intention, but your execution was much broader. The Rovelli quotation did not focus on teleology, but on broad and unnamed errors, somehow related to the rejection of Democritus, that slowed, in some unspecified way, the advance of knowledge. And, as it turns out, Democritus was wrong, and Aristotle right.

Within philosophy, the connection between teleology and Aristotle is well known, and its faults are well known also. — S

Alleged faults. I dealt with many in my OP. If you wish to argue some, have at it.

So, it is unclear which, if any, of Aristotle's ideas created "obstacles to the growth of knowledge." — Dfpolis

The misguided emphasis on seeking teleological, or "final cause", explanations. The key word here is "explanation", by the way. — S

An actual, historical example of which would be? I am fairly conversant with the history of medieval and modern science and I can think of no glaring example. Rather, what I see is that with once the non-logical works of Aristotle became available in West in the latter 12th c., there were rapid advances in physics. Grosseteste studied optics and laid down the canons of the scientific method by 1235. Others developed the ideas of inertia and instantaneous velocity, developed the vector decomposition of forces, discovered what we now call Newton's first law and wrote standard texts on mathematical physics.

So, precisely who was delayed by this alleged "obstacle"?

Now imagine a person A who comes across T's. What would be the rational thing to do? To consider two explanations:

1. Coincidence
2. Teleology

You're ignoring option 1 in favor of 2 and that's a mistake. Isn't it? — TheMadFool

I am not ignoring coincidence. I agree that there are coincidences in nature. The question is, what constitutes a coincidence? If we are to apply the term objectively, we need a good, empirically applicable definition.

It is clear, both in your example and in nature that the coincidences we see are not ontologically random, but deterministic. In nature, physics is deterministic with the possible except ion of quantum observations -- and they could not occur before the advent of intelligent observers. In your example, the machine is constrained to act according to the set of rules y. Thus, in neither case are the "coincidences" ontologically random.

Another possible approach to distinguishing coincidences from end-driven events might be to look at success rates. This also fails. In the generate and test strategy of AI, "random" solutions are generated, many of which fail. Still the generation of every solution serves the end of finding one that will satisfy the test criteria.

So, what makes events coincidences? It seems to me that what makes an event a coincidence is quite subjective, namely that we are unable to predict them. Our inability to predict them is not an objective property, and does not mean that they are not part of a larger plan. It is logically possible, for example, that the engineer who wrote the set of rules y did so intending that some pieces would fit and others not.

So, unless you can provide an objective definition of "coincidence" that logically excludes the possibility of more complex ends, it is unclear that being a "coincidence" is logically incompatible with serving an end.

Well so conferring new value via re-purposing is something different than instrinsic purpose/teleology. Are you implying here that the ends of things [e.g. the end of an enzyme - to catalyze reaction, the end of a seed is to become a plant] are human designated? — aporiap

Yes, it is different because insensate nature acts deterministically, while free-will creatures do not. Still, the new purpose also instantiates final causality

No, I am saying that we can take something with an intrinsic purpose, like an eagle, which has its own finality, and make it a symbol serving the end of natural unity; or sexuality, which is naturally ordered to reproduction, and make it an expression of love.

Of course. That is one reason free will is possible. There are multiple paths to human self-realization.

I don't understand this since we are speaking about objects here and not people. — aporiap

I am speaking of natural, empirically accessible, beings. Some have a deterministic finality, others do not.

I also think, if anything, a teleological framework would necessarily be limiting compared to a teleologically blank humanity since it rigidly identifies some set of ends as natural to an object/person. Humans wouldn't have the freedom to not self realize if their nature was to self-realize, for example. — aporiap

It is not that we can't reject our natural end, it is that doing so is ultimately self-destructive. Some people choose self-destructive behavior, which can be implicitly or explicitly suicidal.

As an aside, I see the notion of self-realization as fundamental to a natural law based ethics. What contributes to self-realization is morally good, what runs counter is morally bad. As social animals, self-realization has a strong social component.

I'm unsure what free will has to do with teleology. Secondly this is a human specific thing, free will doesn't have anything to do with physical systems, they cannot choose actions because they lack brains — aporiap

They are intimately related. Purely physical systems acting deterministically means that they are ordered to a single end. Free agents have a choice of ends. Most of the ends we choose are means to further ends, but ultimately we have a fundamental option that our intermediate ends are ordered to. We can opt for our natural (God-given) end of self-realization -- or we can opt against it, choosing an end that is (naturally) disordered -- for example, to acquire the greatest possible wealth.

A brain is a physical organ, subject to the deterministic universal laws of nature unless it is augmented by a subsystem capable of intentional operations such as awareness and commitment. (See my OP in https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4732/intentional-vs-material-reality-and-the-hard-problem.) So, animals that have brains, but lack an intentional subsystem also act deterministically.

Let's think about this in a different way. Teleology has been criticized for supposedly seeing a future state (the telos) as acting backward in time, pulling the present state into its future realization. Of course, that is not how it works. Rather, it works concurrently. My intention to get to the store acts at each moment of progress to guide my action in that moment. In the same way, the telos of a seed is a potential, not an actual state, and so not yet operational. So, it can not act here and now. Rather, the telos is immanent in the laws of nature operating on the present state. So, the laws of nature act like committed intentions.

The parallel structure of laws of nature tending to a determinate end and human intentionality tending to its committed end is the key to understanding problems ranging from the mind-body problem to Divine Providence.

Well my point in that excerpt was to just highlight that ends are not intrinsic to objects alone. A gene, for example, can NOT give rise to a protein all by itself, despite the function [or end] of a gene being to give rise to a protein. It's the gene plus the cellular machinery which gives rise to a protein. — aporiap

Of course. Not to put too fine a point on it, but Aristotle would seen substances (ostensible unities) as having ends, not their potential parts. He would see the potential parts of organisms as being ordered to the good of the whole.

But I think teleology definitely entails determinism or at least 'probabilistic determinism' [given initial conditions + context A --> 80% chance of P]. How else would ends be reproducibly met? — aporiap

As intrinsic, the accomplishment of ends are subject to the vagaries of accidental interactions with other beings working toward their own ends. Aristotle makes this point in his discussion of accidental events, using the example of a lender and debtor meeting, not because they intend to, but as the result of each going to the market for his own ends.

That said, a common objection to teleology is that it is anthropomorphic -- projecting human experience into mindless nature. You seem to be taking a contrary position, seeing ends in nature, but not in free human positions. Am I misreading you?

You are attaching attributes to what's at the end which is assuming you know what it is and how it works, — Christoffer

No, I am deducing attributes from the little that the proof shows us about the end of the line. We know that it is, In Aristotle's proof, the ultimate cause of change, or, in my meta-law argument, the ultimate conserver of the laws of nature. We also know that, to be the end of the line, it must explain itself. These are things the respective proofs allow us to know for a fact. So, no assumptions are involved.

And if there's a possibility that time is circular, if the cosmic collapse has a probability of being true, then there is no first mover or cause. — Christoffer

You seem to have no idea that the proofs involve concurrent, not time-sequenced causality, so that the nature of time and/or the history of the universe are totally irrelevant. If you read the proofs, you may be able to make relevant objections.

A deductive logical argument cannot be false and if it can be false you cannot claim it as truth, evidence or logic. — Christoffer

I have no idea what this sentence means. Deductive arguments can be unsound if (1) they have false premises, or (2) they involve invalid logical moves. If they have true premises and valid logic, their conclusions are invariable true. So, if you think the proofs fail you need to show either (1) they have false premises, or (2) they involve invalid logical moves. As you refuse to read the proofs, you can do neither.

Please get back to me when you've read at least one of the proofs and think you can do (1) or (2).

"Aristotle is adamant that, for a full range of cases, all four causes must be given in order to give an explanation. More explicitly, for a full range of cases, an explanation which fails to invoke all four causes is no explanation at all". Moreover, "Aristotle recognizes the explanatory primacy of the final cause over the efficient and material cause". — S

It is quite true that, when there is a final cause, it is, as the Scholastics insist, the cause of causes. If I chose to build a house, all of the other explanatory factors (form, materials and workers) are contingent on my end.

None of this contradicts the point I made, namely, that Aristotle explicitly states that some events have no final cause. He gives as examples an eclipse, and the meeting of a lender and debtor in the market where each has come for other reasons. You would have seen this if you read a few more sentences in the SEP article:

Aristotle is not committed to the view that everything has all four causes, let alone that everything has a final/formal cause. In the Metaphysics, for example, Aristotle says that an eclipse of the moon does not have a final cause (Metaph.1044 b 12). What happens when there is no final/formal cause like in the case of an eclipse of the moon? ... The interposition of the earth, that is, its coming in between the sun and the moon, is to be regarded as the efficient cause of the eclipse. Interestingly enough, Aristotle offers this efficient cause as the cause of the eclipse and that which has to be given in reply to the question “why?” (Metaph. 1044 b 13–15).

Somehow, you missed the part of the article rebutting Rovelli. Note also that this corrects the misimpression created when Andrea Falcon wrote (without textual reference), that "an explanation which fails to invoke all four causes is no explanation at all." Clearly, this is not to be taken literally, but in the sense that such an explanation is defective.

That's consistent with what Carlo Rovelli was talking about. He was talking about explanations. Both Plato and Aristotle were wrong on this one. — S

You have not made your case. Let's revisit Rovelli's text.

Plato and Aristotle were familiar with Democritus's ideas, and fought against them. They did so on behalf of other ideas, some of which were later, for centuries, to create obstacles to the growth of knowledge. — Reality Is Not What It Seems, by Carlo Rovelli

I have no desire to defend Plato, only to show that Rovelli's view of Aristotle is quite mistaken. Democritus was wrong, and wrong, inter alia, for the reasons Aristotle gave. Democritus argues against Zeno that we cannot divide distances in half indefinitely because there are atoma, "uncutable" particles. This confuses a mathematical operation, which Zeno is considering, with a physical operation. Even is there were atoma, they would not prevent us from reflecting on line segments shorter than their diameter. So, Democritus hypothesis fails in its primary function, which was to rebut Zeno.

Having made the atoma hypothesis, Democritus goes on to postulate that atoma are separated by nothing. Aristotle correctly showed that (1) Zeno's problem was mathematical rather than physical, and (2) that if there were atoma separated by nothing, they would be in contact.

Modern physics has vindicated Aristotle and rejected Democritus. The locality postulate of quantum field theory is a restatement of Aristotle's principle that remote action requires mediation because agents only act where they are. There are no indivisible atoma. The atoms of modern chemistry are composed of divisible parts. All of the elementary quanta of high energy physics can be transformed into other kinds of quanta. Space is not nothing. Rather, it is, in Dirac's electron theory, a plenum of negative energy electrons; in quantum field theory, filled with all possible quantum fields; and in general relativity the bearer of observable fields described by the energy-momentum and the metric tensors.

Thus, Democritus was wrong on every essential point, while the continuous media and local action views of Aristotle command the field.

Now for Rovelli's claim that some of Aristotle's ideas "were later, for centuries, to create obstacles to the growth of knowledge." The text you cite gives no examples, so I will address the commonly cited example, which is the idea that bodies fall with a speed proportional to their mass. A fair reading of the text shows that the context for this claim was the behavior of bodies in viscous media -- not in a vacuum. Further, the equilibrium speed of a similarly shaped body in a viscous medium is, according to Stoke's law, proportional to its mass -- just as Aristotle said.

Of course, later physicists over generalized Aristotle's physics just as they later over generalized Newton's.

So, it is unclear which, if any, of Aristotle's ideas created "obstacles to the growth of knowledge."

But if my attribution of motives to others is considered to be objective , then the motives of others must be describable in terms of behavioural regularity, for the personal feelings I have regarding other people's behaviour is subjective. — sime

That is the stance that behaviorists took. It shows the limits imposed on natural science by its Fundamental Abstraction. I discussed the FA in detail in https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4732/intentional-vs-material-reality-and-the-hard-problem.

We know subjectivity in others by analogy with our own experience, not by any sort of direct observation. Observing their behavior leads us to hypothesize their intentional state in analogy with our own. The problem with this is that there may be no analog for mental aberrations in our own subjective experience, and so we may utterly fail to understand irrational behavior.

So I can accept the reason/cause/motive distinction, but only if the subjective-objective distinction is rejected. Otherwise I cannot see how these distinctions can be maintained. — sime

Knowledge is inescapably a subject-object relation. There is invariably a knowing subject and a known object. However, the object is more complex than one might think. In experience we are informed not only of the objective object, of what we are we are looking at, but of the subjective object, of ourselves as looking at the objective object. For example, in seeing an apple. we are not only informed by and about the apple, but by and about ourselves, e.g. that we can see, be aware of what we see, etc. These are facts about the knowing subject, given to us as objective.

This is a point completely missed by Ryle in The Concept of Mind when he criticizes the notion of introspection. He fails to see that there are not two separate acts in knowing the other and in knowing our self knowing the other. Rather there is one act of knowing with a complex object that can be resolved by subsequent reflection.

Or, have I completely missed your point?

Both insisted on rejecting Democritus's naturalistic explanations, in favour of trying to understand the world in finalistic terms - believing, that is, that everything that happens has a purpose; a way of thinking that would reveal itself to be very misleading for understanding the ways of nature - or in terms of good and evil, confusing human issues with matters which do not relate to us. — Reality Is Not What It Seems, by Carlo Rovelli

Obviously, Carlo Rovelli is not very familiar with Aristotle. Aristotle explicitly states that not everything that happens, happens for an end. Rather he sees final causality as one of four distinct modes of explanation, and does not shy away from any of them. Among his many achievements was being the first mathematical physicist. (He correctly formulated the power law, P=Fv, and had a better understanding of motion in viscous media than Newton.)

The conclusion of the uncaused cause could mean anything, it could be a substance of particles that are unbound by spacetime and in that higher dimension produce our dimensional universe. — Christoffer

Not if you are logical. To be the end of the line of explanation, something must be self-explaining. That means that what it is entails that it is. Consequently, its essence cannot limit the unspecified ability to act which its existence. So, the end of the line must be omnipotent, which means it is not limited by space and time, or in any other way. It must be able to perform any possible act.

It could therefore just be a dead "nothing". — Christoffer

This is an irrational hypothesis. To be an explanation, it must act to effect what is explained.

So, for God to do any possible act, He must know all reality -- including us. — Dfpolis

Therefore, by the most logical conclusions of the only arguments that try to point to a God with pure deduction, the ontological argument, it doesn't point to there being any God aware of us. — Christoffer

You are confused. When we speak of lines of explanation, there is an empirical datum to be explained. For example, Aristotle's unmoved mover is the end of the line of explanation for observed change. My meta-law argument explains the observed persistence of physical objects.

Ontological arguments use no data, and therefore can only show how we must think of something to be consistent, and not that what is thought of actually exists.

There is no other evidence for any interaction between God and us or God and the universe. — Christoffer

You may repeat your faith claim as often as you wish, but doing so is irrational unless you are going to argue you case.

You did not look at either Aristotle's argument for an unmoved mover or mine for a self-conserving meta-law. Thus, you objections do not address either the truth of the premises or the validity of the logical moves. These are the only two ways to show that a proof fails. When you address one or the other, I will continue the discussion.

Consider the sentence "Animals eat in order to survive". How is this different from saying "survival tends to follow eating"? — sime

Each formulation projects the same fact set into a different conceptual subspace. As these conceptualizations do not contradict each other, there is no reason to reject one in favor of the other.

Is there a reason to keep both? I think there is. It is not merely that "survival tends to follow eating," there is a dynamic reason that not eating leads to death. "Tends to follow" speaks of correlation, not causality -- ignoring the dynamics of starvation. What it adds is the fact that survival is a correlate of nutrition.

"Animals eat in order to survive" speaks to a dynamic relation between eating and survival, telling us why eating is a "good thing." What it does not make explicit is that survival is an actual correlate of nutrition.

a given situation, to predict a person's motives is to predict their behaviour. — sime

I must disagree. We may have desires whose satisfaction we choose either to defer or not to satisfy at all. So, while motives and behavior my be correlated, there is no determinate relation between them.

Also, I am unsure how one would even start to predict all of a person's motives.

Teleology should therefore be considered true, or at least meaningless. — sime

I do not understand this sentence. Is there a misprint?

How does teleology without God work? — TheMadFool

There is a difference between the epistemological and ontological orders. We need make no assumption that God exists in order to understand that agents act for ends. On the other hand, as Aquinas argues in his Fifth Way, the fact that mindless agents act for ends is evidence for the existence of a guiding mind.

So, epistemologically, it is quite possible to conclude that agents act for ends without assuming God, but ontologically, mindless agents cannot act for ends without the existence of a guiding mind. So, you don't need to assume that God exists, but you can, but may not actually, conclude that God exists.

I also think you're conflating coincidence with teleology. Let me refer to the example of the spider web you gave in the last post. To say that spiders build webs to catch insects would be question begging - you're already assuming telos in that statement. — TheMadFool

No, there is an observable invariant connection, not a variable coincidence. When spiders weave webs, they don't then go away and do something else. The stay near by, usually in contact with the web, and respond to entangled insects by treating them as prey. If they have no webs, the web weaving species will die of starvation. Aristotle points out that one sign of teleological action is the preparation of means in advance of ends. Here the weaving of webs, the means of catching insects, is done in advance.

Of course, we understand the end of webs by analogy with our own experience of human ends. We see how we prepare means in order to accomplish ends, and understand that spiders are doing the same kind of thing. Those who reject teleology will say that this is anthropomorphic thinking, but why should that be objectionable? We and spiders are equally natural, so why should we not act in analogous ways? It would be anthropomorphic in a bad way if we concluded that spiders think in that same way as we do, but that is not our conclusion. To have an analogy is to have a situation that is partly the same and partly different. Here what is the same is acting for ends, and what is different is the mental wherewithal of the agents.

One explanation for spider webs and their ability to catch insects is simple coincidence. — TheMadFool

I think you are confusing how a means-end relation comes to be with the actual existence of the relation. It is not a coincidence that, however it came to pass, right now the building of webs is for the sake of catching insects.

Maybe some early spiders developed a mutation that caused them to secret a sticky substance and some insects were slowed by it long enough to be eaten. That might be seen as a "coincidence," but it is not. It is completely deterministic that the laws of nature, acting on the initial state of the cosmos, caused that mutation and give it survival value.

Dfpolis, thanks for this OP — aporiap

You are welcome.

For the simple reason that it just seems short sighted to ascribe one specific goal [or even a set of goals] to a physical object or biological entity [it's something like functional fixedness]. — aporiap

I don't think that the idea that agents act for ends requires that they only act for one end.

Also, I think part being a free agent is our ability to confer new value by re-purposing objects and capabilities. It is part of what Aquinas calls our participation in Divine Providence by reason. That is why I object to a narrow natural law ethics that does not allow for the legitimate creation of new ends.

Secondly, different objects can perform the same function — aporiap

Of course. That is one reason free will is possible. There are multiple paths to human self-realization.

It's not the object that intrinsically has an end or goal, its the context with the object and their relationships that makes the object repeatedly reach a particular end. — aporiap

This has to do with physical determinism vs. intentional freedom. If no free agent is involved, physical systems have only a single immanent line of action and so act deterministically. If there are agents able to conceive alternative lines of action, then multiple lines of action are immanent in the agents, and so we need not have deterministic time development.

I think I'd be fine with the idea of ends if they're restricted to a given contextual relationship [given the context: the setting of cold weather, the man who is cold, the blanket in the room -- the blanket will reach end of keeping man warm]. — aporiap

Are you thinking that the existence of ends entails determinism? I don't.

What I was referring to is that if I were to play devil's advocate with the idea of a god, it would in that case, most probably, be one who has no idea of our existence. — Christoffer

As the unmoved mover, uncaused cause, ultimate meta-law, etc., philosophically, God is the-end-of-the-line of explanation. To be the-end-of-the-line, God needs to be self-explaining. As things are explanations in virtue of what they are (their essences), what God is must entail that God is. Essences are the specification of what a thing can do, of its possible acts, while existence is the unspecified ability to act. So, God's essence can only entail His existence if the specification of His possible acts (His essence) places no limit on His possible acts. Thus, God, as the-end-of-the-line of explanation, must have an unlimited ability to act. If God were ignorant of some reality He could not execute well-informed acts on that reality. So, for God to do any possible act, He must know all reality -- including us.

I do not believe in god since there is no evidence for there to be — Christoffer

That is a very peculiar claim, given that we can only know that there is no evidence for x is to know that there is no x. Before we understood finger prints and DNA, a crime scene might be rife with evidence identifying the culprit, but investigators were unaware of it. Evidence is only evidence for those able to recognize and use it. So, if you know of no evidence for x, and do not know, independently, that there is no x, the most you can only claim rationally, "I see no reason for believing in x." Thus, using the non-recognition of evidence to categorical deny x is an argumentum in cirulares.

In the present case, the continuing existence of any and all reality is definitive evidence for the existence of God for those able to see its implications. What is here and now cannot actualize its potential existence at another space-time point, because it is here, not there. Thus, on-going existence requires a concurrent, on-going source of actualization for its explanation. This source is either explained by another or is self-explaining -- the end of the line of explanation. If it is explained by another, then, to avoid an infinite regress, we must have a self-explaining end of the line. This has been explicitly known for two and a half millennia -- since Aristotle formulated the unmoved mover argument in his Metaphysics.

But, the optimal function of a system or object can still reach its optimal form within the system it exists within at the moment. That, however, doesn't mean it has reached its final form. — Christoffer

The concept of a telos (end) is that of the reason a process is undertaken. This could be a final state, or it could be for someting that occurs before the final state, with the final state occurring only incidentally. Thus, spiders spin webs to catch prey, not to have the broken by random events.

As we do not have a workable quantum theory of gravity, it is premature to say, definitively, what the final physical state of the cosmos will be; however, if present indications are right, physically, the cosmos will end in a state of heat death. Still, knowing creation's final physical state says nothing of what will become of its intentional aspects. I have shown in another thread that physics has nothing to say about intentionality.

we, as we are now, are not the final form and not intended because we are still evolving. — Christoffer

This makes the assumption that intermediate states are unintended. Do you have an argument for this?

It seems clear to me, from reflecting on the art of story telling, that as much thought and intentionality can be put into the early and intermediate chapters and acts as into the climax. In fact, when I write, I am more interested in the psychology and dynamics that set the characters on a track than I am in where that track leads them. As a result, I have many unfinished stories.

An even more telling example is the work of a machine designer. She may well know that, eventually, her machine will on the scrap heap, but that is not her purpose in designing it. Her purpose revolves around what the machine can do between its production and its decommissioning.

Thus, there is no reason to think the purpose (telos) of the cosmos is its physical heat death.

But, the optimal function of a system or object can still reach its optimal form within the system it exists within at the moment — Christoffer

Yes, this is the point of the Punctuated Equilibrium view of evolution.

I recommend that you try and understand the conclusion drawn from my entire text instead of deconstructing singular sentences, that is not how the text should be read. — Christoffer

I agree, texts should be read as a whole. Still, the reasoning behind a holistic movement of thought is found in individual sentences. So, we need to examine its parts.

If a god has the all-power knowledge to create at an instant, knowing what is the optimal form of anything, that god would have created that form directly and not allow for evolutionary processes both in biology, — Christoffer

I think that this assumes something you are the verge of rejecting -- namely, the existence of an optimal state. The generate and test strategy finds solutions that satisfy multiple criteria programmed into its tests. This is what H. A. Simmons calls "satisficing," and is generally how humans decide given our bounded rationality. We have a number of independent, incommensurate requirements to satisfy in finding a course of action. There is no guarantee that multiple criteria can be traded-offs -- or even that they are commensurate. How much vitamin C is a liter of oxygen worth? This is a meaningless question because vitamin C cannot do what oxygen does. If we are unable to make such trade-offs. we cannot define an optimal solution.

(This is the problem with all forms of utilitarianism -- the assumption that there exists a well-defined utility function that can be optimized.)

So, in order to make sense of this claim, there must exist an single optimum. What, precisely, is being optimized? And, how are the required trade-offs done?

There are no sound arguments for god in the first place. — Christoffer

How did you reach this conclusion?

I conclude that there are sound proofs by working though their data and logic, answering all the objections I read as well as my own.

But people seem to be too biased in their own faith and will only argue within their realm of comfort. — Christoffer

This is an ad hominem. You have presented no rational objection to any specific proof, let alone a methodological argument that would rule out any possible proof. You have only made the faith claim that there is no evidence for the existence of God.

Openness is not the same as being skeptical of the answers given or the observations made. To be skeptical is more scientific than any other way of thinking. Just being "open" means you are never critical and if not, you never try and test your own ideas. — Christoffer

To be skeptical is to require adequate reasons for believing a proposition true. To be open is to require adequate reasons for believing a proposition false. So, to any fair minded person, they are one and the same mental habit -- what is called a scientific mindset. Such a mindset requires us to reject a priori commitments such as your faith claim that there is no God.

In relation to the existence of God, I will never accept the existence of a god if we can't prove it. — Christoffer

It has been proven for two and a half millennia. What rational objection do you have to Aristotle's unmoved mover argument? What objection do you have for the meta-law argument in my evolution paper?

So, the fact that a bulk of a pyramid's substance is not in its capstone is an argument that the capstone is not intentionally placed? — Dfpolis

I see no relation with this example since I was talking about the massive scale of the universe compared to our existence. — Christoffer

The analogy is:
Mass of humans : Mass of supporting cosmos :: Mass of capstone : Mass of the supporting pyramid.

If we were the point of the universe, by a creator, there's a big lack of logic in creating that scale of the universe just to have us in it. — Christoffer

There are two errors here: (1) there is no claim that we are the sole point of creation and (2) there is no reason to think that God needs to skimp on existence to effect His ends.

Many see the elegance of a few simple laws causing a singularity to blossom into the complex beauty of the cosmos.

You compare that scale to the foundation of a pyramid. If you add nearly an infinite scale to that foundation, then it would show just how irrational that shape would be. — Christoffer

You miss the point: mass ratios are not an argument against intentionality.

Historians, anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists all point to how gods, God, religion and so on, formed based upon an inability to explain the world around us at the time we couldn't explain through facts and science. — Christoffer

There is no doubt that this is a reason some people believe in gods. There is no evidence that it is either the sole or the main reason. The prophet Jeremiah believed in fixed laws of nature as well as a God relating to humans. Aristotle based his philosophy on empirical observation, but saw the logical necessity of an unmoved mover or self-thinking thought. Cherry picking explanations, instead of acknowledging the complexity of human thought, is an indication of bias.

It took us to the 20th century to truly be able to explain the world through the methods we came up with. — Christoffer

Really? What is so unique about the 20th century? Was not the recognition of fixed laws by Jeremiah, the foundation of mathematical physics by Aristotle, the discovery of inertia and instantaneous velocity by the medieval physicists, the astronomical work of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and Laplace, and Darwin's theory real contributions to our understanding of nature? Or are you claiming that we now have a final understanding of physics? How can we when we have no theory of quantum gravity and do not understand ~95% of the mass of the cosmos?

it's easy to see how people still try and argue for the existence of God. But it's irrational, illogical, unsupported by evidence and in psychology, it's easy to see how the concept of no purpose or external meaning to our lives frightens us into holding on to a belief that gives us purpose and meaning. But that doesn't mean it's the truth. — Christoffer

So, you think matters of fact should be decided by examining the motives leading people to study a subject? While you claim that "the existence of God ... [is] irrational, illogical, unsupported by evidence," you have offered no rational argument, logical objection or shred of evidence to support your faith claim.

No data-based arguments show anything that prove God in any way. Sloppy logic in all these arguments that does not work when deconstructed. — Christoffer

I'm still waiting for an actual logical objection. Where and what is yours? I have suggested two simple arguments for you to "deconstruct" -- Aristotle's unmoved mover, and the argument in my evolution paper. Have at it and forget the ad hominem hand waving you seem to find comforting.

In the next bit you falsely accuse me of giving no logical argument for the existence of God. I give one in my evolution paper, and add another in my book. I have also referred you to a number of arguments by other thinkers.

To call my breakdown of the concept of God within the realm of science to be a strawman because it doesn't include your personal perception of the concept of God is seriously flawed as an argument. — Christoffer

You are confused. I called the concept of God you reject a straw man because it is not that of classical theism, but your personal construct -- which I reject as well. A straw man argument occurs when one ignores the actual opposing position and substitutes one more easily attacked. That is what you have done.

The theistic concept of the classical God has changed over and over every time science proved something to be something else than what that religious belief thought at the time. — Christoffer

Really? Have you any documented examples of this? You seem operate in a Trumpian faerie land in which facts don't matter or are manufactured on whim. When I studied natural theology, God had the same attributes Aquinas demonstrated in his Summa Theologiae. How has the understanding of God as given by Aquinas changed over time?

Philosophers before we established scientific methods, worked within the belief of those times and within the history of science, there was a lot of progress shut down by the church if they couldn't apply the science onto the religious concepts at that time. — Christoffer

Here is another example of manufactured facts. The scientific method, including the need for controlled experiments, was fully and explicitly outlined and applied by Robert Grosseteste (1175-1253), Oxford professor, teacher of Roger Bacon, and later bishop of Lincoln, in his works on optics (c 1220-35). He emphasized that we needed to compare theory with experiment. So, Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) did his work long after the scientific method was established.

In his The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution, James Hannam makes clear that that the Church not only tolerated but promoted science -- seeing God as revealing Himself not only in Scripture, but in the Book of Nature. Thus, by better understanding nature, we better understand God.

I can easily reject any concepts of god through a proper philosophical deconstruction of those arguments. Which has been done by many philosophers throughout history. But it's convenient to ignore them in order to support your already established beliefs, right? Isn't that a biased point of view? — Christoffer

My, my. The ad hominems continue. In my evolution paper I cite well over 50 authors, many of whom are atheists -- some quite militant. The bibliography of my book is 24 pages of 10 pt. type and contains works by many who strongly disagree with me. You would be more credible if you verified your facts before attacking my character and methods.

so they programmed the physics of its function and let a computer test them on a form over and over, just like evolution. — Christoffer

This is the well-known generate and test strategy of AI, which I discuss in my paper.

If there was a God, that god would most likely just have "started the universe", the simulation argument. We haven't been specifically created, we would be the result of the evolution of the universe. — Christoffer

The problem is that physics tells us that there are no random processes except possibly quantum measurement. That means that before the advent of intelligent life, the evolution of the cosmos and its biological species was completely deterministic (as is the design program you cite). The generate and test strategy only works because the range of acceptable designs is implicit in the preprogrammed test criteria. So, there is no question of having ends, there is only a question of how those ends are encoded.

As for the simulation argument, it has many logical flaws. One of the most glaring is that whether or not the universe will evolve life depends on the precise values of its physical constants. The chance of a simulation having the right combination is minuscule (cf. the physics behind the fine-tuning argument.)

In that case, our known universe, in which our laws of physics etc. exist, would be its own and the existence of a God is irrelevant to us because we are most likely irrelevant to that god. — Christoffer

This is a faith claim, the truth of which is, at best, unclear.

it's illogical that a God would specifically design something over letting it evolve itself. — Christoffer

On what assumptions? Please note that I see evolution as an excellent and well-founded scientific theory. My question if why it would be illogical for God to choose other means to effect His ends? This seems like the kind of a priori reasoning that is antithetical to empirical science.

If there was a god, it would exist outside of this universe and wouldn't care for the internals of this universe. — Christoffer

Sound arguments demonstrating the existence of God do so on the basis of His concurrent, ongoing operation within the universe --on His immanence rather than on His transcendence.

I'm a constant skeptic so I would never accept the idea that there is a god even outside our universe, — Christoffer

I find this attitude troubling, for it is unscientific. A scientific mindset requires openness to the data of experience -- to what is given -- not being closed to possibilities a priori.

In general, logic still points to there being a physical reaction or change that made the big bang since the mathematical statistics points to dead matter being the majority of our universe and organic matter or thinking creatures/beings to be in so low quantity that it's illogical that its likely there to be an intentional creation and more of a reaction. — Christoffer

So, the fact that a bulk of a pyramid's substance is not in its capstone is an argument that the capstone is not intentionally placed?

This concept is why I reject any notion that God has any link or guidance towards us humans because it's a self-indulgent, narcissistic delusion of grandeur about ourselves and our meaning to the universe. — Christoffer

I do not think that seeing God as relevant to human existence requires a grandiose self image. First, data-based arguments show that God continually maintains our existence. Thus, it is merely acknowledging truth to see ourselves as utterly dependent on God. Second, as human self-realization can only occur under laws of nature maintained by God, any successful human ethics must be based on an adequate understanding of that reality. It is not that God makes up arbitrary laws for us to follow, but that God has authored our entire ontology

Your view would seem to require a God Who cannot but attend to a single species -- so that attending to us would occupy God's entire attention and make us the center of reality. Mine sees God as capable of more than such tunnel vision and concern. In short, you have constructed and rejected a straw man.

If there was a god, he logically and statistically wouldn't know about us, at all and he wouldn't care. — Christoffer

Again, this only applies to your straw man god, not to the infinite and omniscient God of classical theism. You method seems to be to replace the God whose existence has been proven by Aristotle, Ibn Sina, the Buddhist Logicians and Aquinas with one that virtually no one believes in, but which you can easily reject.

Imagine two worlds of fish and water, A and B. World B has a God but world A doesn't. World A corresponds to only mechanism and world B corresponds to teleology. — TheMadFool

You are still confused about the nature of teleology.

First, teleology does not assume the existence of God, though it can be used as evidence for the existence of God. We observe spiders building webs and using them to catch insects, and conclude that spiders build webs to catch insects to eat. We plant grains of wheat and observe that they germinate into wheat plants, not oaks. So, we conclude the the natural end of wheat grains is the propagation of wheat. This reasoning does not assume the existence of God.

Second, if the mechanisms in a world are deterministic (as those in ours are), they will result in determinate ends, Therefore, you cannot separate mechanism and teleology as you are trying to do. Ends require means and means culminate in ends.

Third, on-going existence is an adequate factual basis for the proving the existence of God. So, the assumption of a world without God is logically inconsistent.

In world A, random mutations in genes colliding with the environment would be able to produce streamlined bodies for fish.

In world B, God would purposefully make fish bodies streamlined. — TheMadFool

What do you mean by "random"? If you mean that the mutations are not the result of ontologically random laws, then there would be no determinate laws by which streamlined forms could be selected. Clearly, this was not the kind of "randomness" contemplated by Darwin, who lived in an age of Laplacian determinism and explicitly subscribed to the notion of "designed laws." The other meaning of "random," and the one underlying Darwin's theory, is that genetic mutations are unpredictable. Predictability is related to the limitations of human cognition, so that randomness as unpredictability does not imply a lack of determinism.

So, there is no conflict between the assumption of deterministic mechanisms and that of determinate, even mentally intended, ends. On the other hand, there is a conflict between the assumption of ontological randomness and that of natural selection.

To an observer from outside the two worlds would appear indistinguishable but, in the absence of knowledge about God's existence or non existence, the observer would choose the simpler theory and say mechanism, not teleology. — TheMadFool

First, the principle of parsimony only applies when one must choose between hypotheses, which is not the case here. Teleology and mechanism are related as ends and means. Second, the existence of God is not an assumption of teleology. Third, the existence of God is not a hypothesis, but the conclusion of a strict deduction.

There is no claim that the goal of the cosmos is a single species. — Dfpolis

That means the universe has no teleology. Shouldn’t it be having one if your theory is true? — TheMadFool

The goal of the universe is its to develop holistically as it does. It is not confined to a single species.

So, if every living thing has its own goal then isn't the one single purpose, which I think would vindicate your claim, missing? — TheMadFool

I discuss the evidence for the existence of goals in evolution in my paper. There is no claim that the goal of the cosmos is a single species.

Here you are: https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution

Very small and irrelevant point. In a vacuum. In media light travels slower. Cherenkov radiation is an example of something traveling faster than light in that medium. Mix the media and under the right circumstances, I travel faster than the speed of light! — tim wood

Yes. To be precise, the principle is that no signal can travel faster than the speed of light in a vacuum. The term "speed of light" means speed of light in a vacuum unless it is qualified in some contrary way.

Then why are you putting mechanism and teleology in the blender - trying to mix it so we can't tell the difference? — TheMadFool

I do not see that I have. No one else seems confused. Is there some specific thing I said that you think confuses the two?

No but teleology = mechanism + purpose — TheMadFool

No, it does not. The concept of teleology is that agents act for ends. It does not presuppose any specific mechanisms (say classical or modern physics). So, it does not entail what is required to give a mechanistic explanation.

If this theory predicts that some set of physical circumstances will produce intentionality in neurons, and we cannot observe intentionality in neurons, doesn't that make the theory unfalsifiable, and so unscientific? In short, I have difficulty in seeing how such a theory can be part of science. — Dfpolis

That's how bad our understanding of Consciousness is. We can't even conceive that there could be a Scientific explanation for it. But I think there probably is a Scientific explanation. We just need some smart Mind to figure it out someday in the future. — SteveKlinko

This is like responding to Goedel's proof that arithmetic cannot be proven consistent by means formalizable in arithmetic, by saying we have not formalized enough means. What the argument shows is that there can be no falsifiable theory for consciousness in neurons. Our ability to conceive possibilities does not enter the argument, and so is totally irrelevant.

Nothing here indicates a poor understanding of consciousness. On the contrary, our understanding is deep enough to rule out whole classes of hypotheses. Being able to do that shows that our understanding is quite good -- just not what people with mechanistic prejudices want.

The appeal to future science is an argument of desperation.

We pretty much know what various kinds of intentions do. So, in what way do we not know what they are? — Dfpolis

We know what they are from our subjective Conscious experience of them. But since we don't know what Consciousness is, in the first place, being Conscious of them is not an explanation. — SteveKlinko

We do know what consciousness is: It is the capacity to actualize present intelligibility. All we do not "know" is the pipe dream of materialists, viz., how to reduce consciousness to a material basis.

You continue to confuse the hope of materialists with some unknown reality. Hopes are an inadequate to establish existence.

I guess you are making a distinction now between Laws of Nature that apply to Intentional Phenomenon and Laws of Nature that apply to Material Phenomenon. So you should not say the Laws of Nature are Intentional but only a subset of the Laws of Nature that apply to Intentionality are Intentional. — SteveKlinko

I am making a distinction between the base, unperturbed laws of nature (Newton's universal laws) and those laws as perturbed by human committed intentions. Perturbations in physics do not change the general character of the base laws, they only cause them to act in a slightly different way in the case under consideration.

That human intentions really can perturb the laws of nature has been confirmed by hundreds of experiments and is know to be the case beyond a statistical doubt. These experiments and their metanalyses consistently show a small effect (~10E-5 to ~10E-4) with a high statistical certainty (z = 4.1, 18.2, 16.1, 7 in various studies).

Apparently you have not read the arguments for the intentionality of the laws of nature in my paper. If you do, you will see that they address the base laws studied by physics, unperturbed by human intentions.

I don't think the Brain is the Consciousness aspect. But rather I think the Brain connects to a Consciousness aspect. — SteveKlinko

Of course it does. The brain processes the information we are aware of. To have an act of consciousness we need two things: an object and a subject, contents (processed by the brain) and awareness of those concepts (provided by the agent intellect).

I think every instance of Consciousness actually does involve some sort of Quale. — SteveKlinko

What is the quale of being conscious of the fact that the irrational numbers are uncountable? Or that arithmetic cannot be proven to be consistent by means formalizable in arithmetic?

We may think of the sound of words in thinking these things, but those sounds are not the quale of what is known, because we can think the same propositions in French, German or Greek. So, there is no fixed relation between the content and the thought sound, as there is a fixed relation between the spectral distribution and the quale of red.

There are all kinds of Qualia besides sensory Qualia. — SteveKlinko

You may broaden the definition of "quale" to make it apply beyond sensory experience, but that is not how most people use the word. When you broaden the meaning in this way, "quale" becomes indistinguishable from "experience."

Teleology = mechanism + purpose (extra weight) — TheMadFool

Teleology does not entail mechanism. Given an end, there are a whole range of means (mechanisms) available. That is one reason free will is possible.

I'm not asking the general question. I'm asking the specific one: why teleological explanations at all? I'm not talking about a universal skeptic, just a teleological one. For there could be the possibility of someone inventing a fifth form of causation. One compatible with the others, yet used specifically because the other forms of causation under-determine it's form of explanation. However, the form of causation is used ad-hoc. The person then can't appeal to "I'm just asking questions! Just the facts, please!" — Marty

I think you do have to be very skeptical indeed to deny that some things are done for the sake of other things. Trump shut down the government for the sake of getting funding for his wall, which he did for the sake of maintaining the support of his base, which he did for the sake of protecting himself ...

So, are you taking the position of an eliminative materialist and denying that there are intentions? if not, I am unsure what point you are making.

Nor do I understand how any form of explanation does, or even can, undermine the others. I worked at Lockheed in the Spring of 1970 when the L-1011 prototype was being constructed. I saw in detail the mechanics and logistics of its construction. Did, or could, that detailed knowledge of means substitute for a knowledge of the end of constructing a prototype -- which I also saw when I worked in Corporate Planning?

So, it is not a matter of asking pointless questions, but of seeking different aspects of reality. Ends require means and means effect ends.

I'm also looking for a reason why future mechanical explanations could not replace teleological predictions. — Marty

Mechanically, there are at least two sound reasons: the impossibility of adequate data acquisition and the intractability of the required calculations. If we assume that the brain is fully determined by physics (which I do not), then you might think that you could predict its outputs from a detailed knowledge of brain state. To do this you would need to know the initial state of every neuron. I show in my book (pp. 11ff) that to acquire the raw data in reasonable time would fry the brain, and to calculate the actual state from the raw data would take many times the age of the universe.

Ones you have the brain state, you need to make a predictive calculation. We know that the brain is has nonlinear dynamics and so neural models are subject to chaos theory. This means that small errors in input data can lead to wildly divergent outputs. Further, digitization errors, which are inescapable with digital computers, can have the same effect.

Non-mechanistically, it is statistically certain that human intentions can exert a small, but measurable, control effect on physical processes. So the deterministic premise of the preceding two paragraphs has been falsified. the brain evolved as a control system, and the nature of control systems is to generate large-scale responses from small-scale inputs.

Why does under-determination stand as an argument at all? — Marty

An argument for what? It is not under-determination that is central, but determination to an end. Take the spider example. Over a wide range of initial states the spider will respond in the same way to a fly in its web. So, the explanatory invariant is not the mechanical initial state, but the end of eating the fly.

Yes, but then one could just tailor teleological causation to things agents have and not the entire world. — Marty

But isn't the entire would subject to the laws of nature and/or the committed intentions of intelligent beings?

The further question is whether or not we should apply this to the natural world. — Marty

Yes. This is the main disputed question. But we do see goals in nature. Seeds generate plants of their species and not another. Squid eject ink to escape. Spiders construct webs to catch flies. Animals secrete pheromones to facilitate mating and reproduction. One can deny these facts, but unless one has some dogmatic agenda, there is no rational basis for doing so.

The counter strategy is not to rebut the existence of goals, but to invent (largely hypothetical) origin stories. Rationally, this is no more than a distraction -- for there is noting in the nature of goals that says they cant have an origin story. If they have such a story, they exist -- and that is the central question with regard to teleology: do there exist means-ends relations in nature. If there are, then teleological reasoning is adequately based.

How do we form a criterion to know which one is teleological and the other one not to be? — Marty

A good question. Aristotle suggests three signs:
1. The existence of Means-ends relationships (Physics ii, 8, 199a8ff).
2. The existence of target states (Physics ii, 8, 199b15-18).
3. The preparation of means in advance of need (Physics ii, 8, 199a10ff).