A thrown state, perhaps. — tim wood

"Thrown state" is a new term for me.

We know that one of the main causes of depression is neurochemical -- problems with the balance of our neurotransmitters. I'm thinking angst may be similar.

"This is material" in no way implies "This is able to be explained" first off. — Terrapin Station

I did not claim that it did. I am saying that material properties alone cannot be the explanation of intentional properties.

"This is able to be explained" is a claim about individuals considering some set of words (or equations or whatever) to provide psychological satisfaction in a way that quells a "this is a mystery" feeling that they otherwise had — Terrapin Station

No, it is not about psychological satisfaction, even though that is usually involved. It is about having a logical structure in which the premises entail the datum to be explained.

Something being a particular sort of existent has no implications for whether individuals will find some set of words psychologically satisfactory. — Terrapin Station

Even if I grant that, it is irrelevant to the question of logical adequacy.

Could you explain Whitehead’s Fallacy? I’m not familiar with it. — Noah Te Stroete

Whitehead discusses the fallacy in Science and the Modern World. as part of his defense of his theory of organism. The specific context is the fact that an electron acts in a certain way when considered in isolation, does not mean that it acts exactly the same way in its natural context. This is certainly true, as to know that electrons repel each other, you need to break the isolation by bringing in another electron, and, to describe the behavior of bulk matter, we need to consider the non-linear interactions and anti-symmetry relations between all the electrons.

But, the fallacy has a broader application. Whenever we abstract any content from experience, we leave contextual data on the table. Forgetting this is a logical error. For example, in abstracting the data of physics, we leave on the table the fact that matter occurs in living as well as nonliving beings. As a result, even if we do physics right, we cannot deduce specifically biological conclusions. We cannot logically reduce biology to physics. All that we can know from the best physics is that biology is possible. The reason is that the information which biology seeks is not what is physically possible (which physics might tell us), but the actual morphology, physiology and behavior of organisms in their actual evolutionary and ecological contents -- and that is precisely the information we leave on the table in abstracting physics. If we did not leave it on the table, we would be biologists, not physicists.

So, my application here is that, in doing natural science in general, we fix on physicality to the exclusion of intentionality, and so leave data essential to the understanding of consciousness on the table.

Also, could you explain what you mean by “information is not physically invariant”? — Noah Te Stroete

I mean that the identical information can be encoded in any number of physical forms, and so is not explained by the data describing its physical matrix. In any case of conventional signing (speaking, writing, Morse code, digital representations, etc.) the information depends not on its physical form, but on the shared convention agreed to, implicitly or explicitly, by the users.

Then you shouldn’t have agreed to it. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't think I did.

Anyway, which part of “needn’t exist or be real in any context other than its own” don’t you understand? — Michael Ossipoff

I have no idea what the limitation "any context other than its own" means. Obviously, if we exclude the datum of actual existence, we have no basis for talking about actual existence, but that hardly seems fruitful

But yes, if you don’t know what “real” and “exist” mean, don’t feel bad — Michael Ossipoff

I have a good idea of what it means to exist. To exist is to be able to act in some, in any, way. Whatever can act necessarily exists, and what cannot act cannot act to make its existence known. If a putative thing can not act in any way, it is indistinguishable from nothing, and so is nothing. Clearly acting on us in experience is acting, so whatever acts on us exists, and is not merely hypothetical. How it exists depends on the details of the revelatory act(s).

We definitely agree about the questionable-ness and dubiousness of the meaning of “real” and “exist”. — Michael Ossipoff

No we do not.

A posteriori, it is necessary.

Well, it’s necessary component of your life-experience story, of which you and your physical surroundings are the two complementary parts. So yes. — Michael Ossipoff

While not denying that I have a life-experience story, "story" is an ambiguous term, for stories can be real or fictional. As life experience involves inter-actions, it necessarily places us in touch with existents, which alone are capable of acting.

I don’t make any claim about logic “existing”, whatever that would mean. — Michael Ossipoff

It's your call to make or not make claims, as it is mine. Logic exists, not as a separate being, but as a set of mental norms, in the minds of rational agents.

Though you aren’t a Materialist proper, you, along with the Materialists, believe that this physical universe is fundamental, prior and primary with respect to the logically-interdependent realm. It’s a Materialist belief, though you aren’t entirely a Materialist. — Michael Ossipoff

No, that is not my position. I hold that the the universe has a derivative, dependent and participatory existence -- deriving its existence, on a continuing basis, form God Who alone is "fundamental, prior and primary with respect to the logically-interdependent realm" (creatio continuo).

starting with “If there were experience of a life…”, the starting antecedent in the logically-interdependent realm. — Michael Ossipoff

Since there is the experience, we are no longer dealing with a hypothetical. Once the antecedent is affirmed, the conclusion is categorical by the modus ponens.

The question is one of the order of dependence. In that order, logic comes after the physical universe.
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I get that that’s the belief of you and the Materialists. You believe that this physical universe has some kind of unspecified precedence, priority, primary-ness in the logically-interdependent realm. — Michael Ossipoff

I think you are mis-reading me. Logic is a human tool, existing in human minds, and abstracted from the nature of being as found in the experienced universe, which is ontologically dependent on God. God, knowing all reality at once and eternally, has no need of ratiocinative thought, and so no need of logic. Of course God does know the nature of being, and it is from that nature that we humans abstract logic.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts and positions.

I don't entirely follow the argument in #1 — tim wood

Thanks for the heads-up. I edited it to make it clearer.

(To specify a desire, we have to say what is desired.) — Dfpolis

If we substitute "fear" for "desire," the result is the claim that to fear is always to fear something. Yet angst is usually understood as a kind of fear that is the fear of nothing in particular - 'though I accept the proposition that in this context the "nothing" is indeed a something. Not an argument, just a thought. — tim wood

Yes, a thought certainly worthy of reflection. I wonder if angst should be called an "intention." I think that angst might be a physiological state, while our awareness is of that state is the intentional reality.

Mentality is physiological, by the way. But I wouldn't say that there's any reason to believe that a desire, per se, can be nonmental. I don't buy the notion of unconscious mental content in general.

Also, needs always hinge on wants. — Terrapin Station

Mentality is physiological in the sense that it is normally supported by the neurophysiological processing of informative contents. It is equally clear that it is inadequate to explain awareness of contents.

1. Neurophysiological data processing cannot be the explanatory invariant of our awareness of contents. If A => B, then every case of A entails a case of B. So, if there is any case of neurophysiological data processing, and it explains our awareness of the processed data (consciousness) then we would be aware of all the data we process. Clearly, we are not aware of all the data we process.

2. All knowledge is a subject-object relation. There is always a knowing subject and a known object. At the beginning of natural science, we abstract the object from the subject -- we choose to attend to physical objects to the exclusion of the mental acts by which the subject knows those objects. In natural science care what Ptolemy, Brahe, Galileo, and Hubble saw, not the act by which the intelligibility of what they saw became actually known. Thus, natural science is, by design, bereft of data and concepts relating to the knowing subject and her acts of awareness. Lacking these data and concepts, it has no way of connecting what it does know of the physical world, including neurophysiology, to the act of awareness. Thus it is logically impossible for natural science, as limited by its Fundamental Abstraction, to explain the act of awareness. Forgetting this is a prime example of Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness (thinking what exists only in abstraction is the concrete reality in its fullness).

3. The material and intentional aspects of reality are logically orthogonal. That is to say, that, though they co-occur and interact, they do not share essential, defining notes. Matter is essentially extended and changeable. It is what it is because of intrinsic characteristics. As extended, matter has parts outside of parts, and so is measurable. As changeable, the same matter can take on different forms. As defined by intrinsic characteristics, we need not look beyond a sample to understand its nature.

Intentions do not have these characteristics. They are unextended, having no parts outside of parts. Instead they are indivisible unities. Further, there is no objective means of measuring them. They are not changeable. If you change your intent, you no longer the same intention, but a different intention. As Franz Brentano noted, an essential characteristic of intentionality is its aboutness, which is to to say that they involve some target that they are about. We do not just know, will or hope, we know, will and hope something. Thus, to fully understand/specify an intention we have to go beyond its intrinsic nature, and say what it is about. (To specify a desire, we have to say what is desired.) This is clearly different from what is needed to specify a sample of matter.

4. Intentional realities are information based. What we know, will, desire, etc. is specified by actual, not potential, information. By definition, information is the reduction of (logical) possibility. If a message is transmitted, but not yet fully received, then it is not physical possibility that is reduced in the course of its reception, but logical possibility. As each bit is received, the logical possibility that it could be other than it is, is reduced.

The explanatory invariant of information is not physical. The same information can be encoded in a panoply of physical forms that have only increased in number with the advance of technology. Thus, information is not physically invariant. So, we have to look beyond physicality to understand information, and so the intentional realities that are essentially dependent on information.

(I am posting most of this as a new thread.)

Thank you for the informative post. The citations are quite helpful.

Reflecting on them, we have used "desire" ambiguously. I was focusing on desire as based on a natural need, (call it "intrinsic desire"), while the passage you cite, and your subsequent discussion focuses on desire for a specific object (call it "directed desire"). If I thirst, I have a need for hydration, but that does not mean that I fixed on a particular beverage as the object to meet my need. So, we have intrinsic desire as a state of being (thirst) that we can be aware of, and an analogous use of "desire" as an intentional relation directed to an object, universal or specific, that we believe can meet that need in whole or in part.

Aristotle anticipates me on relation of desire and telos at 433a15: "And every appetite is directed to an end (to telei)."

The following passages also caused me to reflect:

Now thought is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong.

I find this quite problematic as translated. Clearly, even in careful reflection, there is a chance for error. My Liddel and Soctt says orthos can also mean "norm." I can agree that the norm should be to follow thought over impulse.

To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being.

This relates to what I sad about potential. Objects of desire have to have real potential if they are to advance the realization of our natural ends.

That then such a power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties of desire and passion.

These well-founded distinctions are lost in the projection of naturalist and purely neurophysiological thinking.

No, desires are generally physiological needs, accompanied by mental awareness of the need. — Dfpolis

I don't think that's quite right. According to Aristotle, desires are appearances of the good. If something is good because it fulfills a need, then desiring it betrays awareness that it indeed fulfills that need; if an agent is rational and self-conscious, she can self-ascribe the need that is being fulfilled by the desired object. But the intentional content of the desire is the proposition (true or false) that the desired object is good. — Pierre-Normand

I recall Aquinas saying that whatever we choose, we choose under the aspect (appearance?) of good. I would not be surprised to find that he derived this claim form Aristotle, but I do not recall the text. Do you?

While "aspect" and "appearance" can have the same denotation, their connotations are quite different. To see according to an aspect is to say that we see reality, but only partially, from a certain perspective. To say that we see an appearance leaves open the possibility that we are deceived -- that what we think see is not really there. Of course, we do err in judgements of perception, so we could choose something we think is good, but really is not. For example, one partner can deceive another in love, so the deceived commits for a sound, but false, reason.

If one has exercised due diligence, committing for a sound, but false reason, is not a culpable act, and culpability for sin is the context of Aquinas' discussion. So, "appearance" is not how I read Aquinas' (and presumably Aristotle's) main point. I think his main point is, that we do not choose evil acts because of their privative (evil) nature, but because of the actual, but lesser good, incorporating the privation. A suicide, for example, wishes the cessation of pain, which is a good, at the cost of deprivation of life, which is evil.

So, to return to my point, desires reflect states of need -- goods required for the realization of our potential that we lack. Thus, needs are based on our end-directed nature, some are physiological in origin, others intellectual or spritual. We know these by connaturality (as Maritain notes), by attending to the natural responses of our being to presented situations. Physiologically, the brain is informed of needs by neural and endocrine signals. Our awareness of this information, of the need for action directed to our natural self-realization, is, in my view, desire.

So, desire is an intentional state, but, as Brentano points out, the nature of intentional states it to point beyond themselves -- here to the need for action to continue toward our natural end (telos).

No, desires are generally physiological needs, accompanied by mental awareness of the need.

If you need a desire for that then there's nothing objective about it. — Terrapin Station

So, desires are not empirically knowable?

I am not saying that the experience of having a desire is intersubjectively available. I an saying that the desire itself is. Recently, a 7-year-old girl died of dehydration while in the custody of Trump's immigration goons. Was her desire for water not an objective fact?

I was trying to make the point that brain encoding, an objective phenomenon, gives rise to mental states as an emergent property. — Noah Te Stroete

The notion of "emergence" is that of an unexplained consequence and has no place in an explanatory or causal theory. It is clear that neural processing is a necessary part of most mental operations. It is unclear that such operations alone are an adequate explanation for them. Emergence is a claim that it is, while ducking the burden of an actual explanation.

I think the basis for norms is to be sought in what is known, rather in the mechanisms by which it is known. Thus, we know that we have natural needs and desires which are satisfied by determinate means. That is where I look for the basis of norms.

I was further discussing the objective fact that brains and their emergent mental states model reality through sense data, giving order to the chaotic natural world. Normatives are also an attempt to order human conduct, also a part of the natural world. — Noah Te Stroete

Does mean that you are looking to the means of knowing rather than what is known as the basis of norms? Perhaps in some neo-Kantian way?

Don't you have to desire to thrive rather than not thrive? — Terrapin Station

Of course, and we know that we do by what Jacques Maritain calls "knowledge by connaturality" -- by being aware of how we naturally respond in various situations. This knowledge of our objective nature is part of the basis in reality for norms of behavior.

Of course brains encode the contents we are aware of, but neither contents nor the processing of contents entails awareness of contents.

I am not sure how the brain encoding relates to whether norms have a basis in extramental reality, which was the point we were discussing.

Do they objectively justify the application of norms? — Terrapin Station

Yes. To thrive, you need to follow norms, not as rigid rules, but as defaults to be observed in the absence of overriding considerations.

You can't refer to or grasp the objective reality of anything that's only mental, because it's only mental--by definition not objective.

Are you claiming that normatives are referring to something non-mental that's anything like a normative? What objective thing? — Terrapin Station

No, I an saying norms have an objective foundation in reality, which though not themselves norms, justify the application of norms. For example, there is a biological basis for not eating 2-week old cream pie.

Any assessment has to be done by a mind, so, it seems that what you want, "a mind-independent assessment," is a contradiction in terms. — Dfpolis

Hence "If normatives are only mental, then there are no facts about them aside from the fact that a particular mind is thinking about them however that mind is thinking about them." — Terrapin Station

This is a non sequitur. The fact that thoughts depend on the mind for their being does not prevent them from referring to and grasping objective reality.

Thanks. There is nothing wrong with an open mind.

Any assessment has to be done by a mind, so, it seems that what you want, "a mind-independent assessment," is a contradiction in terms.

I may be missing something, but a more mature, educated, moral, healthier person, seems objectively more fully realized to me than one who is not. What am I missing?

Thank you.

I must object that the scientific method does not turn off belief, but seeks to justify it. The hypothetico-deductive method can only yield justified belief, never apodictic knowledge of our hypothesis. Consider the deep belief in the Newtonian system, expressed by LaPlace's statement of determinism, which was subsequently overturned by advances in physics. If we read Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions we see just how prevalent the sociology of belief is in the acceptance of scientific theory. None of this denigrates the value of science. It generally provides us the best understanding available in its area of application at any point of time. Still it is a system of belief, not knowledge in the sense of awareness of present intelligibility.

he way we are is not our choice. Hmmm. — TheMadFool

This is not my position. I think that we are able to choose the kind of person we wish to be. I am unsure why you are addressing your questions to me, as I think we agree.

I agree that it was a horror, but I do not think that the definition of "anarchy" fits the kind of horror it was.

What's an example of mentally-independent advancement or retardation of self-realization? — Terrapin Station

For retardation: being killed, being inadequately fed, sheltered, clothed, educated, etc.

For advancement: having adequate food, shelter, medical care, education, etc.

I am thinking of Maslow's hierarchy of values as reflecting the ordering of intermediate goals toward the attainment of self-realization. The values in Maslow's hierarchy can be examined empirically for their relevance to bio-personal development. As for self-realization as the high order goal, it is recognized in a number of traditions, Eastern and Western, as the goal of a well-lived life.

If normatives are only mental, then there are no facts about them aside from the fact that a particular mind is thinking about them however that mind is thinking about them. — Terrapin Station

This forgets that thoughts are formal signs, often pointing to actual states of affairs. Here, what is signified is the potential fact that some physical state would not be, save for the initiation of a line of action by the responsible person. The norm's basis in reality is that the state of affairs so engendered would either advance or retard the self-realization of various people.

I am not comparing anyone to the Nazis. I am simply pointing to a well-known counterexample to the thesis that lack of responsibility implies anarchy.

No, it's not just beliefs - it's also due to dispositions and can be influenced by impulsiveness. These are also consistent with determination. Questionable? It's questionable either way. — Relativist

It seems to me that your view precludes metanoia/conversion experiences. I am thinking of one of the great proponents of free will, St. Augustine. Before his conversion, he lived a very hedonistic life -- one driven by disposition and impulse, I think you would say if you'd met him. Then he decided that was not the kind of person he wished to be, and entirely re-ordered his life -- breaking with his former disposition and impulsive, hedonistic behavior. His is not a solitary case. Thus, experience shows that the past need not determine the future.

The coherence of compatibilism shows that a determinist's ontological commitment is not falsified. — Relativist

Coherence is not the primary criterion of truth. Adequacy to reality is. We need to look beyond self-consistency to see whether a position agrees with experience -- whether it "saves the phenomena" as Aristotle said. Redefining free will to make it compatible with determinism is little more than a bait and switch tactic. What experience tells is that mutually exclusive lines of action are equally in our power. What analysis shows us (I am thinking of Hume) is that there is no reason to believe that successive events follow necessarily.

I suggest that you are defining responsibility from a libertarian's point of view, and observing that my account is inconsistent with it. The account I gave has the explanatory scope needed to show that moral accountability is still a coherent concept under compatibilism, even though it is not the identical concept to that of LFW. — Relativist

The fact that one can re-define "responsibility," "free will" or any other term is not in question. Of course you may. They problem is that the concepts expressed by the common (pre-redefinition) use of these terms are elicited by the shared experience of those having those concepts. The redefined terms do not have this basis in common experience/reality.

Yes, it did.

I am sorry, but I do not see loving animals while killing innocent people as "taking responsibility seriously."

Anarchy is defined as "a state of disorder due to absence or nonrecognition of authority." We may not like the authority wielded in Nazi Germany, but it is a hallmark of all forms of fascism.

Society without responsibility is anarchy — Jamesk

Is it? I think that's a separate issue. In Nazi Germany we had a highly structured society in which no one seemed to take responsibility. Famously, most were "just following orders."

Thank you for the kind words. I will look into Wiggins.

It seems to me that after you do all that can be done, the only thing left is to cope the best you can. As I said there is value in that because others are in similar situations, and are encouraged by your strength. I know a couple of cases in which incurable suffering, patiently borne, had a life-changing effect on caregivers.

As I asked in the beginning, what is the alternative?

Norms are intentional, for they are goals. So, they are not independent of mind in the sense of being physical states; however, they they exist in nature, as actual intentional states found in other natural persons, independently of us knowing or positing them.

It seems as though you have a scenario in which there is no choice but to cope as well as you can. There is value in being an example for others, even if there is no hope for yourself.

Then, in this case, is coping justified? — Wallows

I am unsure why or how it would be unjustified. What is the alternative and what do you see as the down side?

You are welcome.

Yeah, really. Because that's the way the world is. No matter where you look in the mind-independent world, you'll not find any normatives. — Terrapin Station

But, we do find them in society, which is objective and observable. So, I deny your claim. Perhaps it would help if you define what you mean by a "norm."

And if we change the wording from social animals to social mammals would that make it clearer for you? — Jamesk

It would certainly rule out social insects, but it would not explain why being social would require a responsibility dynamic in the sense we experience it. As I said, if we were not free, we might need re-programming, but that does not require a concept of responsibility. We see such reprogramming in the training of animals, which are not held responsible for the behaviors we are trying to modify.

Are brain waves emitted photons? — Noah Te Stroete

Brain waves are electrical voltage variations detected on the scalp. They result from the collective firing of neurons, which is an electrochemical process. As all electromagnetic field changes are associated with photons, so are brain waves, but their frequency is so low they have virtually no energy.

I wasn't using "or" in the sense of "here's another word for the same thing." I was using it in the sense of "cats or dogs"--two different things we could be talking about.

At any rate, conventions aren't arbitrary. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. As for conventions being arbitrary, some are, like what an ABBABABA computer state means. Others may be a bit less so, but the fact that they require agreement means they are not predetermined, and so are arbitrary in that sense.