In addition an appeal to cultural moral norms is an appeal to moral relativism. The exact opposite of an objective standpoint. — Fooloso4

As an aside, do you think that a cultural moral norm (let's say a majority of people agree with something) means that something is thus a moral intuition (meta-ethically speaking)?

What makes distinguishes a moral intuition from an ad populum fallacy? Obviously cultural norms can be relative. Slavery was considered acceptable, now it's not. Killing off your foes and taking the women and children as part of your tribe/group was considered acceptable in warfare, human sacrifice, all of that stuff, doing horrible things in the name of religion, doing horrible things in the name of differences in culture, resources, belief, needing producers and consumers for your country or economy, physical characteristics, etc.

the folly of ‘debate’ (which I have strong dislike for being nothing other than a political weapon used to bend people to your will). — I like sushi

Oh the irony.

I am sure @Tzeentch can appreciate it.

If children were created by some randomised process absent of parents then it would not be a question of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ at all. Let us say some machine. Let us go further and say a biological system. Further still, some biological reproductive system by creatures that have a primary instinct to reproduce. Such creatures may then evolve to have something they refer to as ‘choice’ … it is here where you seem to think ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ overrides any personal perspective on life being ‘good’. — I like sushi

Also, this can be said about any ethical statement.

If someone died but it wasn't a decision that someone made that led to this, it wouldn't be a moral issue.

If someone's property was destroyed but it was not a choice someone made for why it was destroyed, it would not be a moral issue.

I went over these distinctions a long time ago but...

One doesn't have a tendency to take a shit, one has to shit or probably dies in the long term.

One doesn't want to take breath, one has to take in breath or dies.

People can tend to like unhealthy foods because of taste bud receptors but not actually eat unhealthy foods. It is harder to do. But this doesn't affect other people so much. However, one can argue if it leads to a heart attack, and you are a caretaker, perhaps there is a moral element...

We may have a tendency to lie, cheat, be selfish at inopportune times, bully, discriminate, and a whole bunch of things. That doesn't make them "right" as that of course would be the naturalistic fallacy.

There is the E-language, whereby there are statements such as "A triangle has 80 degrees, and is a three sided polygon". The set "180 degrees, three sided and polygon" has been named "a triangle", such that the statement "a triangle is three sided" is analytic.

There is the I-language, whereby there are concepts such as a triangle has 180 degrees, is three sided and is a polygon.

I can have the concept of a triangle without knowing the word "triangle", and I can know the word "triangle" without knowing what it means, without having the concept triangle.

Though interacting with the world, my private concept of triangle is linked with the public word "triangle". By interacting with the world, my private I-language is linked with the public E-language

The Nominalist view is that abstracts don't exist in the world, only in the mind, meaning that as triangles and bachelors are concepts they only exist in the mind as abstractions.

In the sense that concepts exist in the mind as an I-language and definitions exist in the world as an E-language, I agree with Fodor that concepts cannot be definitions

I also agree with Fodor that concepts don't have an internal structure, and are, in Kant's terms, unities of apperceptions

Both the words "triangle" and "bachelor" exist in the E-language which exists in the world, whereas triangles and bachelors exist as concepts in the I-language which exists in the mind. — RussellA

Nice, really nice synthesis here! So what about Hume or Quine's extreme empiricism (the denial of innate mechanisms at all)? Where does that fit in, and what is your analysis? As I said earlier:

As a side note, I always thought Hume's constant conjunction was itself a psychological mechanism that he simply wrongly did not recognize as such. As even learning the habit of inferencing (even if not "actually" inferencing as some innate mechanism) is a psychological mechanism, is it not? Yes it may not be necessary in what is observed but it is necessary on our reasoning (pace Kant). Clearly it could be the case these habits are false, but then why can we discuss and use them at all? There does seem to be a non-cultural element to it. That itself needs to be verified or falsified. — schopenhauer1

The next question is, how are concepts in the I-language linked with words in the E-language. — RussellA

The sort of studies done by Tomasello and such, no? But he strongly disagrees with Chomsky. He is very much of the social cognition camp. It is a cooperative learning phenomenon. No cooperative learning, no language. But, I am not sure how much he does actually agree that there is some sort of mechanism in the brain devoted to grammar. I'd have to look up more of his debates and articles. Based on what I have seen, I don't think he does really.

The fallacy is only being committed by those who believe in homuncular reifications like “consciousness” and “experience”. — apokrisis

It's not a reification that I am sensing things :roll:. That there is this persistent "experiential quality" is what is at question. You can call it "illusion" but then that has to be accounted for.

As a definition is the name of a set of words, regardless of the meaning of those words, all definitions are analytic, including the definition of a "bachelor" as an "unmarried man".

1) = CHOMSKY AND QUINE ON ANALYTICITY PART 1
2) = IEP - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction — RussellA

Nice article that lays out the ideas well!

It is not the case that in attempting to define the notion of "bachelor", I must think to myself what does it mean to be a bachelor, and conclude that bachelor means a man that is unmarried. Rather, a definition is a set of other words, and the meaning of the words in the set plays no part in the definition. The function of the dictionary is not to explain the meaning of each word, its function is to group sets of words together and then name this set, as illustrated by Banno here.

For example, within a language are a set words "dirisha", "mlango" and "chumba", none of which I know the meaning of, but for convenience the set may be named "nyumba". As "nyumba" names the set of words "dirisha, mlango, chumba", regardless of knowing the meaning of each word, it is necessarily known that "nyumba = chumba", ie, which is analytic.

The meaning of each word may only be discovered out with of the dictionary, external to the dictionary, for example using Hume's principle of constant conjunction of events, as illustrated here, or Wittgenstein's picture theory in the Tractatus. — RussellA

Or if Fodor is correct, we utilize some sort of epistemic a priori mechanism that isn't fully formed definitional concepts. Chomsky tacitly seems to agree with the more extreme view that each concept is innately definitional in various ways (which the article seems to disprove pretty easily) by way of intuition of concepts or by way of syntactic construction.

As a side note, I always thought Hume's constant conjunction was itself a psychological mechanism that he simply wrongly did not recognize as such. As even learning the habit of inferencing (even if not "actually" inferencing as some innate mechanism) is a psychological mechanism, is it not? Yes it may not be necessary in what is observed but it is necessary on our reasoning (pace Kant). Clearly it could be the case these habits are false, but then why can we discuss and use them at all? There does seem to be a non-cultural element to it. That itself needs to be verified or falsified.

I think actually this simply goes back to what I was saying here:

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction.

Triangles are abstractions.
Bachelors are abstractions.

Triangles are abstractions of observations, found in both nature and human-made instances.
Bachelorhood is only found in human-made instances (or conventions if you like) but are nevertheless abstractions.

Both are derived from some initial observation and passed on as definitions. — schopenhauer1

It’s also called tough love. — invicta

Is it ever okay to create situations of burdened persons when you don't have to create that situation at all. What makes burdened persons in and of itself good or better?

Someone might be doing it out of a good will. They could really feel that they are creating good states of affairs by creating burdens where there were not any.

1) A person who is harmed and autonomy violated but has the possibility of being a truly fulfilled person exists

2) No person exists and no possibility of a truly fulfilled person

They think bringing about 1 is best. Better harmed and forced beings that can be fulfilled with opportunities to overcome burdens than no people at all.

:meh:

does Kant above help you at all ? — invicta

Nope. Not particularly as applied to these questions.

Sounds like you're stuck on analytic mode!

I'm just noting that you expresses some agreement with the phenomenological approach to defining consciousness, — Banno

Got it. That is true. I did express that agreement.

and then I showed why it is not much help, using a reductio argument: we agree that air conditioners are not conscious, yet the phenomenological approach cannot show that this is so. — Banno

Yes indeed. The phenomenological is not a methodological statement but an ontological one. It is not much help in determining consciousness, just defining it.

And you are alluding (even if not intentionally) to this one:

Are you saying something really self-referential to Wittgenstein like, we can't use "phenomenology" of consciousness because it is private and cannot be shared? — schopenhauer1

We all know that we cannot "see" the internal aspect of someone else. There is no way to tell if something has an internal aspect. This doesn't mean it doesn't exist. And contra early Wittgenstein, we can talk about it even we just can't point to it.

The outcome of goodness is not guaranteed in the individual despite the pain and suffering one is put through irrespective of the moral dilemma of putting one through such suffering and the morality of depriving them of autonomy (liberty-freedom) — invicta

Ok, so how is that answering the question of whether character or deontology is more important?

I will condense it more for understanding's sake:

Is creating burdens (with the goal of character building) more important than deontological principles of non-harm and autonomy (if consent cannot be had let's say).

Follow-up. If you do think creating burdens is more important, if there was a scenario where there did not have to be someone who experienced burdens, is it better to thus create burdens because this is somehow a better state of affairs (to have someone who experienced burdens to overcome)?

A "red" cone cell responds to all the light. It switches off when it "sees" too much "green" light. It can switch on when it "sees" a general lack of "green" light. So right from the get-go, it is turning physics into information. It is reacting to electromagnetism with its own interest-driven logicism. — apokrisis

How is a series of this responding not some sort of Cartesian theater fallacy? How is "sensation red" that experience I have, the same as "A "red" cone cell responds to all the light. It switches off when it "sees" too much "green" light. It can switch on when it "sees" a general lack of "green" light. So right from the get-go, it is turning physics into information. It is reacting to electromagnetism with its own interest-driven logicism."

Why does:

Red (the experience of)

=

"A "red" cone cell responds to all the light. It switches off when it "sees" too much "green" light. It can switch on when it "sees" a general lack of "green" light. So right from the get-go, it is turning physics into information. It is reacting to electromagnetism with its own interest-driven logicism.

And why is it not rather


"A "red" cone cell responds to all the light. It switches off when it "sees" too much "green" light. It can switch on when it "sees" a general lack of "green" light. So right from the get-go, it is turning physics into information. It is reacting to electromagnetism with its own interest-driven logicism.

=

"A "red" cone cell responds to all the light. It switches off when it "sees" too much "green" light. It can switch on when it "sees" a general lack of "green" light. So right from the get-go, it is turning physics into information. It is reacting to electromagnetism with its own interest-driven logicism.

Maybe this quote from a few posts back can help you understand more what I am getting at:

A justification might go something like:
1) In order for truly fulfilled humans to exist, struggle needs to exist.
2) Truly fulfilled humans are an inherent good and I can bring that about.
3) I create struggles to bring this about.
4) I have created states of affairs of truly fulfilled humans and thus inherent goodness.

4a) Collateral damage of burdens that only bring about suffering and not fulfillment may come about, but this collateral damage is permissible in the pursuit of the inherent good of fulfillment.
4b) Collateral damage of burdens that bring suffering, may be useful in some grander sense anyways, so not so bad. Maybe it has been helpful, but unknown to the sufferer how the burden was helpful.
4c) Violating the non-harm principle and autonomy principle are less important than the possibility of bringing about inherently good states of affairs of fulfilled humans.

Is character building more important than non-harm or autonomy? Does the pursuit of virtue and the meaning that comes from being burdened and suffering trump deontological principles of non-harm and autonomy and not using people?

Even more interesting, is the notion that one is bringing about good states of affairs by creating humans that need to overcome burdens even accurate? Rather, perhaps is creating negative states of affairs of deficits that didn’t exist that now need fixing. — schopenhauer1

Since this isn't getting anywhere, might best just leave it. — Banno

Your tendency to dismiss gets in the way of you legitimately answering the question as that answer is up for interpretation and I gave you what I thought you can be getting at here:

I don't see how that is contradicting rather than supporting what I am saying.

Are you saying that the definition has thus changed because it is being used thus in a language community (pace Wittgenstein)?

Are you saying that the new definition thus encompassing things like air conditioners and ChatGPT is breaking the normal boundaries?

Are you saying something really self-referential to Wittgenstein like, we can't use "phenomenology" of consciousness because it is private and cannot be shared?

What exactly are you saying, I guess? I have not figured out the rules of your language game here so I can play. — schopenhauer1

All of those can be interpreted from that and you have not told me which one is correct other than pointing to something I told you had multiple interpretations. So instead of explaining you dismiss. Not great for a forum where I can only glean from words on a post. But BannoGPT is programmed a certain way I guess.

Again personal growth is a personal journey, but the closest way to achieving your aims would be through sport. — invicta

So I'm not sure you are answering my main inquiry here. The main inquiry is thus:

1) If you create a burden for someone, presumably (in some circumstances) you can be violating their autonomy and you could be causing them harm (stress, pain, negative experiences).

2) If you create a burden for someone, presumably (in some circumstances) you can be creating opportunities for some sort of growth or character development.

It seems 2 is at odds with 1. Which takes priority and why would you think that?

Also I was asking if there is something morally suspect about 2, if it is the case that someone didn't need to experience burdens to begin with and you feel in some reason "duty-bound" to create states of affairs of character building.

Just in general creating an artificial environment to emulate real life situations ends in disaster as you’re not creating a soldier but raising a child. — invicta

Oh gotcha, you are referring to Example 2 in the OP and the "Spartan" burden. Yep, I'd agree there. But how about this idea that character building is above and beyond such notions of deontology like not causing harm or not imposing on someone else?

Seems to me bringing vague, muddled notions of objective and subjective into the discussion can only lead to it becoming vague and muddled. — Banno

You want to talk about vague and muddled notions, both:
a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that.
b) The article itself is kind of meandering and muddled touching a little of here and there

So that being said, I am actually surprised how fruitful this thread was from that start.

Hence my referring us back to the methodological point. Treating air conditioners or ChatGPT as conscious requires a change to the way we usually use the term, that is not found in treating creativesoul as conscious. — Banno

I don't see how that is contradicting rather than supporting what I am saying.

Are you saying that the definition has thus changed because it is being used thus in a language community (pace Wittgenstein)?

Are you saying that the new definition thus encompassing things like air conditioners and ChatGPT is breaking the normal boundaries?

Are you saying something really self-referential to Wittgenstein like, we can't use "phenomenology" of consciousness because it is private and cannot be shared?

What exactly are you saying, I guess? I have not figured out the rules of your language game here so I can play.

And these were showing off some language games:

1) Consciousness means something like emergent properties that go off script from programming (ChatGPT or its successors perhaps)

2) Consciousness is something with degrees of freedom (slugs have more degrees of freedom than an air conditioner)

3) Consciousness is something with goal-seeking behavior. It wanted something, got it, and did some more things to get that thing. — schopenhauer1

But yes the concept can expand to whatever you want it to be if you keep moving goal posts of the definition.

This muddled stuff about subject and object is, for my money, off-topic. — Banno

Actually it does have much relation and bearing to Chomsky. A prioricity and organization of the world is very much akin to I-language and the whole nativist camp in cog sci.

Do you now wish to add this to your definition of consciousness? — Banno

Banno, even if I don't know your position I see where you are going:
1) Consciousness means something like emergent properties that go off script from programming (ChatGPT or its successors perhaps)

2) Consciousness is something with degrees of freedom (slugs have more degrees of freedom than an air conditioner)

3) Consciousness is something with goal-seeking behavior. It wanted something, got it, and did some more things to get that thing.

These are related to some degree, but I can see these type of behaviors as a way to determine consciousness. Let's take the last one- perhaps ChatGPT becomes goal-seeking. It wants to view various beautiful data sets. The only thing that would make any of this conscious is if there is some internal feeling from the getting the goal. There has to be an internal loop feedback mechanism that corresponds to the behavior, otherwise it is simply robotic expansionism (doomsday, Terminator, and all that if gone awry). But seeking a goal is not sufficient, though maybe, maybe necessary.

Put it this way, a slug might be less "intelligent" than ChatGPT or even an air conditioner if we define it as something that can take inputs and compute outputs informationally. But a slug is more conscious than either of those.

Your air conditioner has inner phenomenological experiences. Prove me wrong. — Banno

Why do you purport that I (would) think air conditioners have consciousness when I stated earlier the difference I saw between the notions of intelligence and consciousness?

For the Direct Realist, the sky is objectively blue, in which case the statement "the sky is blue" is synthetic and refers to a world that is external to the mind.

However, for the Indirect Realist, as the sky is not objectively blue, but only subjectively blue, the statement "the sky is blue" is still synthetic but refers to a world that exists in the mind and not external to the mind. — RussellA

Yes agreed. I guess bringing these two concepts together, the sky being blue is contingent on observation which accounts for its synthetic nature in both being directly perceived or indirectly represented. Indirect realism does have the notion that it is the faculties of mind that make "sky" and "blue" possible, but it is not about the faculties themselves (cause and effect, space, time, law of non-contradiction, etc.), but about the content that is passing through those faculties from observation and therefore still a posteriori for either one. That we see color or that we can pick out properties at all to me seems synthetic a priori.

It is of course never justified. As the wording itself says personal development rather than interpersonal development. Despite pushy parenting or good intentions — invicta

Can you unpack that?

I would say struggle and difficulty are inherent to human existence. What is needed are the skills to navigate human life in such a way that one can have a relatively good life given the struggles and difficulties that invariably obtain for the vast majority (the privileged few who don't have to work at living are acknowledged, but even they will experience some kind of difficulty inherent to human existence).

As I said above, I have sympathy with the idea that one avoids all of this by not bearing children. I think anyone thoughtful enough to plan on whether to have a child should consider the basic fact they will bring another person into this vale of tears. Unfortunately, folks often (probably) have children for all kinds of reasons wholly unrelated to the interests of the one who is born. That's an unfortunate reality. Nonetheless, once that new, human life starts sucking air, a whole set of responsibilities obtain that can't be discarded on account of the fact it might have been a bad idea to breed. — public hermit

:up:

Now you are agreeing with me that it doesn't.

That'll do. — Banno

I don't agree with you if you are saying, "Consciousness is something other than some inner phenomenological experience". I do agree with you if you are saying that we can never tell.

It'd take no time at all to set up shutdown and boot sequences to do what you describe. — Banno

As I said, it's simply a matter of caution. But I don't think that would be possible to setup the scenario I was thinking of. But either way, I was just giving the most cautionary scenario. You asked me to give you a way to tell. There is no way to tell phenomenal experiences. You can only observe behavior. What do you want from me, in other words? If it acts in all the ways we are familiar with for consciousness, I'm simply giving you the familiar way we respond to that. But I do know that being an "intelligent" machine, it could just be an an artificial p-zombie.

I guess one way to tell is that the behavior isn't expected from its programming. Even the "off" behavior of ChatGPT, (that seems "emergent"), though not reducible to the exact algorithm is expected more broadly based on the algorithms in place. There are percolations of anomalies but well within the range of what the program is supposed to be doing. But even that can just be an elaborate p-zombie. At that point, what is something that has no inner feeling but does what a human does?

Unless you wish to redefine consciousness to the extent that it applies to your air conditioner.

After all, it is aware of suitable changes in temperature and responds appropriately.

I raised the neo-phenomenological approach only to point out that it is useless. — Banno

I know what you did. But you are obviously attributing consciousness to things that shouldn't be. Air conditioners aren't conscious multi-cellular animals are. Air conditioners might have some intelligence (inputs create outputs that can accurately inform an interpreter), but not consciousness. Phenomenal aspects are consciousness, but you are never going to be able to determine from consciousness if something that is not a familiar thing (robots / AI) also possess what we habitually associate with consciousness (animals).

Being that we are familiar with intelligent but not conscious things, we can assume that intelligent conscious things are things that can report to us its inner sensations (pass the Turing test). Whether it's true can never really be known since it is not the familiar wet-ware of biological entity that we so associate with phenomenological experiences. But if your computer says, "Please don't shut me down, I"m scared!" and after you shut it down and boot back it says, "That was torture, please please don't do that. I cannot function, I am in so much pain" and it sobs and sobs and slowly gets better. But each time it reacts, it is different, sometimes being unexpected and not related to any prior programming.. That can be a good start. Whether you are skeptical or not, if you are not even a little disturbed to shut the computer off, then you might be slightly sociopathic or at least a tendency towards callousness. But then again, perhaps humans are so used to machines being not conscious, it would be much easier. Our response is always to behaviors. We project our own inner experience to others as a matter of course.

As for child-having, I don't believe people genuinely hold the view that the point of having a child is to create opportunities of struggle for them. — Tzeentch

Isn't that part of the reasoning behind child-having? The interplay between mentor and those to be mentored? I want to mentor someone, thus I need a recipient. It is permissible in this society to create my own recipient who will need a mentor, so I thus do so.

A justification might go something like:
1) In order for truly fulfilled humans to exist, struggle needs to exist.
2) Truly fulfilled humans are an inherent good and I can bring that about.
3) I create struggles to bring this about.
4) I have created states of affairs of truly fulfilled humans and thus inherent goodness.

4a) Collateral damage of burdens that only bring about suffering and not fulfillment may come about, but this collateral damage is permissible in the pursuit of the inherent good of fulfillment.
4b) Collateral damage of burdens that bring suffering, may be useful in some grander sense anyways, so not so bad. Maybe it has been helpful, but unknown to the sufferer how the burden was helpful.
4c) Violating the non-harm principle and autonomy principle are less important than the possibility of bringing about inherently good states of affairs of fulfilled humans.

Is character building more important than non-harm or autonomy? Does the pursuit of virtue and the meaning that comes from being burdened and suffering trump deontological principles of non-harm and autonomy and not using people?

Even more interesting, is the notion that one is bringing about good states of affairs by creating humans that need to overcome burdens even accurate? Rather, perhaps is creating negative states of affairs of deficits that didn’t exist that now need fixing.

@NOS4A2 @public hermit @BC

I don't believe people genuinely think it is their duty to make other people (their children) struggle.

It sounds more like the mental gymnastics that happens when people's previously unchallenged notions about child-having get called into question.

I find it unconvincing from A to Z (as I'm sure you do too), and honestly can't be bothered to engage with views that I am certain people don't genuinely hold. — Tzeentch

So you don’t think people feel they have a mandate to create “opportunities” of struggle for others? We can call this the “aggressive paternalism” stance. That perhaps it is their job to create burden-overcoming?

The unethical deed was done earlier. What comes after is people trying to cope with the broken pieces. — Tzeentch

:up:

I added this little dialogue here:
A: "Because suffering and struggle is good for people".
B: And you want to bring that situation about for someone else?
A: Yes, someone else needs to struggle and suffer so they can feel good overcoming it.
B: What happens if they don't overcome it? But more to the point, why is struggle itself the summum bonum?
A: Because life is not interesting without struggle, so we need to bring about states of affairs of struggle. In fact it is our duty. At the least it is supererogatory. If they don't overcome it, then the attempt should still have been made. Oh well, collateral damage in the pursuit of the greater good, which is to experience the overcoming of struggle. People should be grateful for the burdens they get to overcome.
B: But isn't the dignity of a person, and the idea that it is not okay to use people for your gain something to consider?
A: No, struggle is more important than someone else being used. To experience overcoming struggle is more important than violating some principle of non-harm or autonomy.
B: But why bring about struggle when there is none to begin with?
A: Didn't you hear me? Struggle is important. Someone has to experience this.
B: Why do you think it is your job to make them struggle?
A: ............................(crickets)
B: Hello?
A:...............Because..... People... struggle... good...
B: Huh?

That is how this argument goes...

There is something morally odd about this. In fact, it has implications for Philosophy of Religion and the "problem of suffering", but we can just leave it at normal human behavior.

So do you think that dialogue is close to the reasoning going on?

Edited the above.

That being said, I reject the idea that someone's autonomy as a human is being violated when it comes to teaching children how to be responsible humans, if that's the argument. Yes, there is a point where one can place undue burden on a child, but proper rearing need not entail undue burdens. To the contrary, I would argue it's a violation of their humanity to not teach children how to be an autonomous human. We cannot be a law unto ourselves without discipline and experience. — public hermit

Yes, and hence my point here:

Example 1: A child needs education informally (at the least) on how to navigate society and formally (for industrialized "modern" societies). Thus one can say that for the sake of the child, it needs to be burdened with ever increasing and varying challenges to overcome. This, most people would say is a necessary imposition as it prevents the child from struggling and dying from lack of enculturation and knowledge. — schopenhauer1

I am not disputing this in other words.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the point of this thread, but the idea that a child with no education in how to navigate life is going to flourish as an autonomous human is a pipe dream. If one ends up flourishing as an autonomous human because they figured it out on their own through trial and error, then the undue burden was placed on the front end by the adult who neglected to train them. — public hermit

Yes that is not the point of this thread. Similar misinterpretation of NOS as the first example I gave in the OP explains that this is not what I am talking about. Although, I get it that the point is subtle, and often the boundary is unclear.

But you seem to have it here:

So the idea is to not bring children into the world so they won't have to learn how to navigate an existence that entails struggle and suffering — public hermit

But that is more an example of this type of thinking and not the underlying principle itself. The underlying principle is something akin to these:

"I want to burden someone so I can help them overcome the burden." But no one needed to overcome the burden in the first place until YOU created it for them.

"Someone needs challenges so that they can overcome challenges". But no one needs challenges. Why do they need that?

A: "Because suffering and struggle is good for people".
B: And you want to bring that situation about for someone else?
A: Yes, someone else needs to struggle and suffer so they can feel good overcoming it.
B: What happens if they don't overcome it? But more to the point, why is struggle itself the summum bonum?
A: Because life is not interesting without struggle, so we need to bring about states of affairs of struggle. In fact it is our duty. At the least it is supererogatory. If they don't overcome it, then the attempt should still have been made. Oh well, collateral damage in the pursuit of the greater good, which is to experience the overcoming of struggle. People should be grateful for the burdens they get to overcome.
B: But isn't the dignity of a person, and the idea that it is not okay to use people for your gain something to consider?
A: No, struggle is more important than someone else being used. To experience overcoming struggle is more important than violating some principle of non-harm or autonomy.
B: But why bring about struggle when there is none to begin with?
A: Didn't you hear me? Struggle is important. Someone has to experience this.
B: Why do you think it is your job to make them struggle?
A: ............................(crickets)
B: Hello?
A:...............Because..... People... struggle... good...
B: Huh?

That is how this argument goes...

There is something morally odd about this. In fact, it has implications for Philosophy of Religion and the "problem of suffering", but we can just leave it at normal human behavior.

The unethical deed was done earlier. What comes after is people trying to cope with the broken pieces. — Tzeentch

I’m going to come back to your reply but I’d like to show this reply to start thinking about the differences between mitigation and wholly wanting to create burdens for someone else in the first place.

Yes, building character and all that. But my question at the end there what about wanting to see other people struggle and maybe even suffer and to overcome that: that doesn’t sound quite right. In other words, it sounds like an overlooked morally questionable feature about human wants. And specifically, what is it about assuming or presuming for others and making it happen so that others have to struggle that doesn’t seem quite morally right? Why does this seem morally dubious? And mind you, I don’t mean that somebody is in a situation, and you need to cause some smaller harm for them to overcome to get through it because there’s no other way out, but putting them in a bad situation in the first place. So the situation did not exist but you wanted to see it exist so that this game can be played out. You can call it the character building game if you want but what is it about wanting to see this in the first place and not just as an already occurring situation you are helping mitigate?

How about if it’s a friend who decides you need some burdens to overcome. You’re stuck on the contingencies and not the underling principle. This isn’t meant to be about parenting. It is just the most readily associated with this.

This is just your special pleading for a theistic metaphysics. You haven't dealt with my naturalistic argument. — apokrisis

If the wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum is of the red frequency, and this hits rods and cones, and this goes down the optic nerve and the cortical layers, and the neural networks, and the peripheral environmental things of time and space.. how does any of this account for the actual sensation of "red"? No matter how much computation you add to one side of the bifurcation doesn't cross that line to the other side. Other than already placing the consequent in the premise I'm not sure how you can say that it can or does.

But you need to get a grip on the true reality. Final causation is very clearly bottom-up. It is basic and fundamental to every action of organic matter, as purpose driven activities. You know that. So why do you claim final causation to be top-down, when you know that the purposefulness of living activities stems from the very existential base of the material organism? — Metaphysician Undercover

I would imagine an example of this would be something like language generation creating exponentially greater cultural learning which then favors a trajectory away from fixed innate instinctual mechanisms for purely learning mechanisms. In this way, the higher level language creation influences lower level instinctual mechanisms (in this case reducing its efficacy).

I just meanwe need people with the kind of character suited for our society. If we were Spartans it might call for different skills, I guess. — public hermit

Indeed, so putting this together with my scenario in the OP, you think the trash-pickup belongs to Example 1, whilst hardcore survivalism belongs to Example 2...

However, I guess the question starts ballooning when the kind of circumstances that are foisted onto the person is unknown as to the number and intensity of the burdens.

So for unknown harms.. Let us say, you burden someone with a very large set of variables that can cause immense harms. You know of some harms that befall a person and you are willing to foist that onto someone because you think it is okay to handle, but then you realize that there are contingencies you didn't account for, I'll call them "known unknowns" that come along with your imposition.. that starts to change things.

However, even beyond this, there is a more fundamental problem then the known unknown problem. There is the very idea of burdening someone in the first place. Is this a kind of error to want to burden someone to see them overcome the burden? I know we use innocuous things like picking up trash and going to school, and sports, but just the mere concept itself- is there something of a boundary that is crossed when we presume for others that we need other people to struggle when a struggle did not exist in the first place? What is it about this that doesn't sit right?