If you can’t tell if Way is a P-zombie or not, how will the notion help with an AI? — Banno

Artificial intelligence does not entail artificial consciousness. But, how to tell is indeed tricky. My point was to simply explain when it is conscious, not how to tell. If your expectation is artificial consciousness,(if it is possible at all) and it perfectly mimics humans (or human-like), you mine as well treat it as one in case it indeed does feel something internal.

Another notion of consciousness is the neo-phenomenological one, in which to be conscious is to experience - qualia and all that. — Banno

This is the one. Thermometers and p-zombies are not conscious. A robot that does everything like a human but does not have any internal "feels like" is just an automata and not a conscious. It behaves like someone who is conscious though. It computes, it acts, it behaves, it predicts. It doesn't actually perceive, suffer, etc.

Quine's point is that all analytic statements are superficially so. — Banno

Yes, I agree with that. Hume might say the same. The law of non-contradiction was a kind of bone I was throwing out. It seems like something whereby the very definition is entailed in itself. This is NOT not this seems more foundational and necessary because it is our very way of seeing the world...

However, this is more getting to a priori than analyticity. I get that analyticity is about definitions, but if we agree that definitions start out synthetic first, then that is why Bachelors is synthetic and context dependent whereas law of non-contradiction very much shows its entailment in how we operate more than it is derived. Again, this is more akin to a priori.

I might even say it is superficially analytic, using modal logic as its determination.

Even if the world contained no notion of marriage, the notion of marriage would remain possible, and hence bachelors would still be possible. It gets complicated. — Banno

I get that. It is a traditional notion. But, maybe not Kripke, but I can see there being a difference between X is NOT ~x and bachelors are unmarried males. That is to say, bachelors is possible but not necessary in all possible worlds. Bachelors seems to pick out something in this world that makes it true. It is not quite "the sky is blue" synthetic but it is not quite the law of non-contradiction level analyticity.

a) the ethics of imposing burdens on others for one's own personal growth
b) the ethics of imposing burdens on others for their personal growth
c) the ethics of imposing burdens on children by producing them in the first place — BC

Yes, with all of these do ethical considerations of using people's as ends come into the equation? What of the idea of "aggressive" paternalism? Is that itself inherently a wrong stance to take towards others? I want to see BC go through X, Y, Z burdens as I want to see someone, perhaps someone I have a hand in molding, overcome such burdens. Put that way, it doesn't seem so innocuous....

Sporting and play and exploration often have some burdens to them. I remember being taken rafting, hunting, sailing, surfing, hiking, fishing, all while surrounded by many dangers, often without wanting to, and I wouldn’t trade any of it for the minor comfort of non-harm. — NOS4A2

So much to unpack knowing your political stance regarding non-interference and impositions...

But first off, does the outcome matter when considering whether it's permissible to violate someone's autonomy and puts someone else at risk? Let's say that you knew that the activity was going to cause some harm. It wasn't even doubtful?

I doubt he would, since existence is not bound to individual worlds. — Banno

If you are referring to the bachelor- a world without marriage has no use for the term bachelor. Strictly speaking, bachelorhood might not obtain in all possible worlds because it is very much dependent on the contingent historical facts and convention of this world. It is very much context dependent.

Where I think Kripke's "innovation" was, was to point out that objects and individuals can obtain in all possible worlds, in relation to their name and in scientific kinds, their identities.

The name "mug" as identifier for "cup with handle" is context-dependent and contingent. This mug next to me, I will dub it, "BrownMug" somehow can make it through though as that name is some sort of essential identifier that is not context dependent on that particular mug.

I would suppose Kant would say something like triangles are discovered yet true by our faculties that observe this so a priori synthetic perhaps?

The sky is blue is synthetic a posteriori because it is discovered but true only by way of the content we pick out and not by way of how our faculties must operate.

An X is NOT not X is analytic a priori as not only is it true by our faculties but the very terms don’t need to be discovered but are true immediately based on how logic operates a priori.

In the beginning, someone discovered something that had three sides and it had no name. They didn't discover a "triangle", they discovered something that had three sides. The statement "triangles have three sides" would have been meaningless, as the word "triangle" didn't exist. — RussellA

They named this something with three sides "a triangle", though they could equally well have named it "a circle".

Once named, as the statement "triangles have three sides" is true by virtue of the meanings of the words alone, it is therefore an analytic statement.

IE, when the statement "triangles have three sides" first occurred, it was already an analytic statement. — RussellA

Right, but the key idea here is they discovered something about the concept first. I guess it's two different questions:

1. The name is attached to the concept thus given a label to that concept.

2. The way that the concept is derived is still synthetic, as it is observed (This is synthetic by way of observation). How would you know that some things have three-sided shapes without observing the world first in some empirical way?

Once the labels are in place it becomes analytic, sure. But that still relies on the initial understanding of the concept which is synthetic. Also, even the dubbing of the name "triangle" is synthetic (if by this we mean some event in the world needed to happen first). (nevermind, this is a posteriori)

Hm, not sure about all that.

But I’ll leave it there for now. I have enough mental plates to juggle. — Jamal

You can't do that! Leaving me hanging! :smile:

Further, Kripke might say something like:

I guess you can say that if there are a world without bachelors, then bachelors wouldn't exist and therefore a posteriori and contingently true. However in all possible worlds, X is NOT not X, and therefore is necessarily true or something of this nature.

So the overriding question becomes, "Is it ever morally right to cause someone a burden just so that they can overcome the burden, in the name of some positive like "growth"? In other words, At point X, no burden took place for Johnny. At point Y, Sammy came along and created a burden for Johnny because he thought Johnny would have some "good" come from this burden he has placed in Johnny's lap. Johnny cannot escape the burden Sammy has placed for him at point Y, and must overcome the burden. He may or may not overcome the burden, there is no choice except overcome the burden or fail to overcome it. Is there ever cases where Sammy is justified in causing Jonny a burden that does not violate some notion of ethics (mainly deontological ethics of autonomy, non-harm, etc.)?

A case where this might be justified would be what I referred to in the OP as necessary burdens. These are ones where a person cannot survive without them. Education might be one of these. Also there seems to be an element of "already existing" to the burden. That is to say, circumstances made the burden "already exist" for the person, and you are offering a lesser burden for them so they can overcome the greater burden placed on them.

However, this is not the case in the example above scenario. In this case, it is not the case that the person is already in that circumstance already. Johnny didn't have the burden before Sammy came along. Sammy created the burden for Johnny based on his (Sammy's) own desire and will to see Johnny overcome it. Rather, the circumstance of the burden was created wholly by someone else, just to see that person overcome the burden (for some reason or another). This seems unnecessary, and thus intuitively wrong.

@BC, @unenlightened @plaque flag, @Jamal, you're it!

Yeah, but there was no such discovery for bachelors. — Jamal

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction.

Triangles are abstractions.
Bachelors are abstractions.

Triangles are abstractions of observations, found in both nature and human-made instances.
Bachelorhood is only found in human-made instances (or conventions if you like) but are nevertheless abstractions.

Both are derived from some initial observation and passed on as definitions.

Was there a time when it wasn’t common knowledge that all bachelors were unmarried men? You know, before it was discovered?

Maybe “all bachelors are unmarried men” seems synthetic when it informs someone who doesn’t know what a bachelor is. So it could be reworded to show that the statement in this case is about the word rather than about bachelors: “‘bachelor’ means ‘unmarried man’”. This is synthetic (as I’m supposing all definitions are) and it follows from it that “all bachelors are unmarried men” is analytically true. — Jamal

Yes! Exactly what I am suggesting. And I know others have posited something like this, like Quine. It seems to have been a holdover from 17th and 18th century statements about truths to make the distinction so clean cut. Kripke was getting to its nature by emphasizing necessity above all else. That is to say, a triangle necessitates it being three sides and 2 +2 =4 is true in all possible worlds. However, the discovery of this truth is in some way synthetic when first discovered. The passing on of this discovery as a convention that we learn very early on, makes it "analytic", but this is only the way we discover the information. Logic truths might be entailed by necessity, but these are still things for which have to be discovered. That is the main point. Someone worked that out through observation and computation and inference and comparison and all that.

Where X, with deep irony, stands for anything at all. And what is this "not"? It must be an unsaying, like the all clear after an air-raid warning. Panic over! — unenlightened

It could be the case that all analytic statements were simply one-time synthetic statements that were conventionalized.

Analiticity surely comes much later, when wolves are not much problem any more, and we can start measuring the length of their tails. Certainly one does not begin with Euclid's Elements. — unenlightened

The idea becomes muddled as analyticity is often associated with a prioricity. The idea being that logic is both analytic and a priori (needs no investigation of instances of the world to be true). For example, if something is fully X then it is not not X.

The argument answers itself. There would be no humans if people were following what is good, as to burden the next generation with life, is itself not good. Rather, principles like not causing unnecessary harm and autonomy of those being so imposed upon, would take precedent.

It is also questionable whither it is good to give burdens to people to overcome, like the enthalpy needed to survive in the first place. This can all be prevented unto another. But the very reflex to say, "But they would learn through their experiences", means that the deontological principles are not common or easily digested by many people.

A neural network need not, and usually does not, work things out using symbols to represent the things on which it is working. — Banno

Yes this has been a classic debate of connectionism versus computationalism which this article provides a good overview of: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/#ArgForCon.

It seems that Chomsky thinks grammar more computationalist, and conceptualization can be either. According to Chomsky, grammar is too hierarchical for it to be distributed.

7min "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property"

Perhaps Chomsky would say that as concepts cannot exist without language, if there is analyticity in language then there must also be analyticity in concepts. — RussellA

This very much aligns with what I was discussing here:

Yeah, concepts are tricky. I think in fact, much of analytic philosophy's general confusion (starting with people like Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein and going from there) goes back to this problem of concepts and being baffled by what exactly concepts are. The ancient Greeks of course had their notions- Plato had pre-existing Forms, and Aristotle had essences. But I would gather to say that something that ties these "concepts" together is a sort of abstraction; it isn't just recognizing a pattern (i.e. associative learning), but having a level of remove from the association whereby it becomes "tokenized" like a mental "object" that one's memory can refer back to. And it is precisely the nature of this "tokenization" that creates the question of whether some sort of linguistic ability has to be there for conceptual thought to take place. In other words, it begs the question of whether concepts entail language. It might not be equivalent, but perhaps where you see smoke (concepts) you see fire (language). — schopenhauer1

I'll take some small issue with this. Wittgenstein's private language is used to refer to supposedly private sensations, to that feeling you have when your blood pressure is high, to that pain. That's different to what is being described in your quote.

The last speaker of a natural language, and Robinson Crusoe, do not provide examples of such a private language. — Banno

So I think it's half-and-half. In terms of grammar generation, Chomsky seems to believe language can be wholly internal (I-language not E-language) and therefore, some sense private (if we mean innate by this) and does not need a language community to generate the rules. For E-languages, sure, the conventions have to be there. As to the conceptual/semantic aspect, that doesn't seem to be the focus for Chomsky either way, so not sure about that one.

So it seems for public E-language, the community is needed for convention, but I-language could suffice without a community. What this means for inner talk, I'm not sure though. It still seems to use E-language, just internally, so would probably not count as a private language. I'm not sure though to what extent I-language can be considered a private language prior to its usage in generating E-language.

So, if deep-structure thought (I-language thought?) can proceed without words, what stands in for words in such a situation? What's the relationship between wordless thought and the constructed word-sequence? — Dawnstorm

Good question, which is why it's interesting to me that Chomsky doesn't seem as interested in concept formation (the content or representation of what is being generated). Because the assumption seems to be that if concepts are in place, and if inner talk is the primary target of language, the internal grammar should be consistently used for that purpose. This article and others seem to indicate that internal talk is varied and oftentimes truncated and only formalized when externalizing it in external language. So yeah, I'm just trying to throw some ideas out defending inner talk as the target whilst not seeming to have generative grammar internally. I can only think as a defense, that grammar is there in internal thoughts but it's hidden and working in the background. It's running in the background, but the person doesn't realize its efficacy in mental efficiency until it is fully actualized in external language perhaps? Again, this would be much easier if Chomsky's focus was conceptual networking and association, but it is generative grammar which is rule-based. So that makes it harder to defend I would think. However, I still think there is actually a case for conceptual representation and networking being something much more efficient in human brain structures that is innate and targeting inner mental activity and not simply a hodgepodge of other mechanisms or targeting communication. But that is pure conjecture on my part.

How do you explain association without concepts? A dog associates what with what? A leash and a walk need to be something associatable; I'm fine with using the word "concept" for that. I don't think it's all that different from a person demonstrating knowledge about role of chairs in waiting rooms by sitting down on one. (You don't need to think the word "chair" to do that.) Whether or not the association itself is also a concept, I don't know. Maybe the dog sees it as some sort of ritual? Likely not, but how would you rule this out? — Dawnstorm

Yeah, concepts are tricky. I think in fact, much of analytic philosophy's general confusion (starting with people like Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein and going from there) goes back to this problem of concepts and being baffled by what exactly concepts are. The ancient Greeks of course had their notions- Plato had pre-existing Forms, and Aristotle had essences. But I would gather to say that something that ties these "concepts" together is a sort of abstraction; it isn't just recognizing a pattern (i.e. associative learning), but having a level of remove from the association whereby it becomes "tokenized" like a mental "object" that one's memory can refer back to. And it is precisely the nature of this "tokenization" that creates the question of whether some sort of linguistic ability has to be there for conceptual thought to take place. In other words, it begs the question of whether concepts entail language. It might not be equivalent, but perhaps where you see smoke (concepts) you see fire (language).

Do analytical sentences exist, and if so are they a feature of the I-language, or are they judgements we port over from non-linguistic cognition to fully formed e-language sentences? (I might need to read more Chomsky to phrase this properly.) — Dawnstorm

I think he doesn't have much to say on it, as that's not what he's interested in. Rather, I think people like Kripke wrote some influential theories in the philosophy of language community, specifically regarding the idea of "causal link theory" whereby someone "baptizes" a word and there is a link of that name to that object that obtains in all possible worlds. Mind you, I believe this theory was meant for proper names and expanded to scientific kinds and some other instances. Perhaps it only applies to objects that are actual instances and not universals. So, BrownMug is what I dub this mug next to me. It is thus causally linked as long as it is continually being used in the community. BrownMug is always linked now to that particular mug. However, I don't think this is the same for the universal "mug", as "mug" could have been something else in all possible worlds.

This relates tangentially to @Banno OP.

I haven't worked out my approach to the problem. It's on my list of chestnuts that I would like to get my head around one day. But I would start by making sure that the problem isn't in the way it is formulated. My suspicion is that it is not capable of solution and merely demonstrates that Wittgenstein was right about subjective experiences (which is what, I think, "qualia" are supposed to be). I will concede, however, that his response to the expostulation that there is a difference between you experiencing a pain and me experiencing the same pain. He asks what greater difference there could be. I don't think that's enough.

I apologize if I seem dismissive. I don't mean to be. People who deserve respect take the hard problem very seriously. — Ludwig V

So my response is based on the fact that describing the mechanisms of how phenomenal experience evolved, doesn't account for the phenomenal experience itself. It gives an origin story, but not an ontological account of the inner aspect itself. Here are keywords that become a sort of "hidden Cartesian theater" from the article:

"Response becomes Privatized...

"Phenomenolization" "recursive activity".

"Sentition evolves to be a virtual form of bodily expression"

These are all pointing to the easier problems/ideas of the mechanics but not what this virtual, recursive, phenomenolization is as to its ontological nature as compared with the other parts of nature.

If there is a bifurcation of "mental" and "physical" it still only gets at the physical mechanisms underpinning the mental. You lose the bifurcation, fine but then what? Proto-panpsychism? Most people can't tolerate that view. Pan-semiotics? Great, but you simply accounted for the computation and not the thing-itself (the phenomenal inner aspect).

But any theory that requires positing a "mental representation" which implies an internal observer (visible in the diagrams of the brain after the paragraph beginning "The key to acquiring phenomenal properties..."} is postponing the hard problem and for that reason seems implausible to me. — Ludwig V

Homunculus fallacy — Wiki

Easy problems can be quite elaborate and even proven accurate, but still don’t actually touch upon the hard problem itself.

I know intuitively what I want to say, but there aren't any words. I need to find a way to approximate this with language. It's different from the tip-of-the-tongue experience, where I know there's a word I seem to have misplaced. It's an intuition that I don't know how to formulate. — Dawnstorm

Yet, this might point more to Chomsykean ideas of a "mentalese" (I-language), not that there is no language at all. It complicates things that Chomsky seems agnostic about concepts and very in favor of a generative grammar. As far as concepts, do animals that don't have language have concepts? What is a non-linguistic concept? A dog associating a leash with a walk, is that a concept? It's association sure. Concepts seem to be something beyond just association. Concepts seem to join with a mechanism whereby they are "used" and that can be something akin to a grammar. I can see I-languages being a mentalese that accounts for our shorthand internal language maybe.

At least that was generative grammar; I'm not sure how much of this still applies to his minimalist program — Dawnstorm

The minimalist program is just "merge" now I think.

But isn't it entirely possible that the little voice is a sort of back-construction, the internalisation, as it were, of our external language? — Banno

After reading the article, I am uncertain about its implications. Although it is possible that some individuals have a lower frequency of inner speech, further research is needed to investigate whether non-linguistic thoughts are indirectly connected to a language system, even if they are not explicitly experienced by those rare individuals who do not have any inner speech.

However, it seems that many researchers believe that Chomsky's ideas about inner speech (and language in general) are unfounded and lack evidence. Chomsky's theory suggests that language evolved through an accidental exaptation that led to increased mental efficiency, rather than for communication purposes.

Interestingly, I found this paper: https://ijds.lemoyne.edu/journal/8_1/pdf/ijds.8.1.01.wiley.pdf

Norbert Wiley discounts Chomsky's notion thus:

I will show that these commitments create serious problems for Chomsky’s
linguistics. Inner speech is quite irregular, much more so than interpersonal or outer
speech. It is also difficult to say there is a “competence” or “langue” dimension for
inner speech. The competence aspect is primarily rules, but inner speech, being private,
has no audience to carry or enforce the rules. In fact its major rule is efficiency,
whatever that might imply for any given individual — Norbert Wiley

It even appears that Chomsky is directly challenging Wittgenstein's concept of a private language.

Actually you can use language even if you are the only person in the universe
with language, and in fact it would even have an adaptive advantage. If one
person suddenly got the language faculty, that person would have great
advantages; the person could think, could articulate to itself its thoughts,
could plan, could sharpen, and develop thinking as we do in inner speech,
which has a big effect on our lives. Inner speech is most of speech. Almost all
the use of language is to oneself. (Chomsky, 2002, p. 148) — Chomsky quoted by Wiley

Wiley attempts to refute Chomsky's perspective that language was meant for internal speech first, by presenting evidence that inner speech is often a simplified form of language consisting of basic concepts, words, and imagery. This seems to contradict Chomsky's emphasis on fully syntactical language and the generative grammar module.

Here is one of his examples of abbreviated (non-syntactic) inner talk:

This is a waitress reporting on her thoughts going to work. Her inner speech is
presented linguistically along with brief sketches of her imagery.
“Only eight minutes, takes five to change. I’ve got to
book (hurry).” Imagery: A disgustingly filthy locker
room. Visions of me running from table to kitchen
table. Sounds. Forks and knives scraping plates,
customers yelling over each other. “ I have to make
money. At least it’s not as bad as last summer.” Memory
imagery: A tiny dumpy diner. Visions of me sweating.
Sensations of being hot. Visions of thirty marines eating
and drinking. Sounds: country music on a blaring
juke box . “I’ll be right there, just a minute
please.” Sensations of burning my arm in a pizza oven.
Visions of dropping glasses. Sounds: Glass breaking,
manager yelling, marines cheering. “Oh God, get me out of
here.” Sensation: Cringe, humiliation. “I hate
waitressing. Can’t wait to graduate and get a decent
job.“ Visions of a paneled, brightly carpeted office with
scenic pictures and healthy plants. Visions of me fifteen
pounds thinner in a new skirt suit from Lord and Taylor.
WILEY
4
A great-looking coworker is pouring us coffee. Sounds of
a clock chiming five o’clock. “Sure I’d love to go out
Friday night” (Caughey, 1984, p. 135. Italics mine.) — Wiley Quoting Caughey

So he is trying to make an argument that if the internal structure of generative grammar was mainly for self-talk and mental efficiency, then this should be seen in fully syntactical sentences in inner talk before it is used as communication.

I am sure there are arguments that can be made against this, that you don't need fully syntactic usage for generative grammar to create the mental efficiency. I'd have to see if an argument like that has been made. Too many Ph.D students for there not to be. Certainly, computers have compression abilities.

The embeddedness of language concepts can work as such. As Wiley notes from Vygotsky,

For Vygotsky the syntax of inner speech is, in his words, “predicated”
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 267). By this he does not mean the predicate of a sentence in the
usual sense. He means the thought which answers a question and supplies only the
needed information. If the question concerns a time of departure, the predicate might be
“eight o’clock.” That would be the whole sentence. If one said (to oneself) “the best
time to leave would be eight o’clock” the first seven words would be unnecessary. — Wiley quoting Vygotsky

He mentions Saussure:

Saussure’s associative axis is helpful here (1959, pp. 122-127). He had two axes
for a sentence. The one he called syntagmatic was merely the syntactical unfolding of a
sentence, going from subject to predicate. But what he called the associative axis was
the set of meanings that might be suggested by the actual words in a sentence, even
though these words were not chosen and remained in the background. This axis was a
collection of related meanings, i.e. both similar and contrastive, that hovered over a
sentence’s core meanings. He thought only in terms of similar meanings, those that
could be substituted for the meanings actually used. But I think contrasting or opposite
terms also belong on this axis. “I’m tired and want to go to bed” could have an
associative axis in which words like “weary, exhausted, beat and bushed” might
surround the word “tired.” Also such contrasting words as “energetic, alive and fresh” might be present as opposites. This embedding gives the inner speech semantics a
fluttery, epistemologically labile quality — Wiley Quoting Saussure

This theory indicates that on top of syntax is concept formation and their embeddedness in a network. This Saussure idea of language possessing both a syntax and conceptual axis also could be the missing link I wasn't seeing when Chomsky was discussing a "conceptual" system that was learned and outside the scope of his generative grammar. That being said, that is just evidence against Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar origins in self talk but possibly points to the non-Chomskyan domain of concept formation evolving for self talk.

7min - "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property" — RussellA

16min - "Sometimes language is used for communication, but that is a very peripheral use . Almost all our use of language goes on all our waking hours , most of our language is just thinking, we can't just stop , it almost impossible to stop . it takes an incredible act of will to stop thinking" — RussellA

I think this is the most interesting theory he holds, and at least prima facie, seem true. Much of language is basically self-talk. It is our thoughts to ourselves: our own reasons, moods, ideas, strategies, everything that is "discursive" in nature.

Tomasello and others might disagree and say that language development is too social to be mainly for just thinking or internal mentation, but rather is meant to be communication first. I think it could be a little bit of both perhaps? But Chomsky would be at odds even with this smorgasbord approach of communication and mentation. I think he has an underlying theory of language development that it was an exaptation, I believe discussed earlier in this thread, whereby the very software of the brain was re-organized in such a way that language and concepts were created by necessity of this one-time "gestalt" brain re-organization.

Biologists generally do not agree with Chomsky, as far as I have read. Most take the anthropological approach that it was a slow development, and mainly based on communication needs.

I can see the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. I can't imagine human beings with anything other than a device that produces thought in linguistic-type forms, inextricably tied with concepts and self-talk.

True, I agree that Kripke limited his causal theory of reference to proper names. Putnam extended the theory to other sorts of terms, such as water, whereas in general the theory may be used for many referring terms.

From Wikipedia Causal Theory of Reference:

A causal theory of reference or historical chain theory of reference is a theory of how terms acquire specific referents based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms.

In lectures later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names.......... Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory.

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection. — RussellA

Right but that article still seemed to not mention other terms (not proper names or natural kinds) as being an outcome of that theory. It seems to always be mentioned in conjunction with proper names et al. I am not sure if it has been explicitly broadened to all terms.

The initial baptism establishes the analytic nature of an expression. — RussellA

Am I mistaken or was Kripke only accounting for meaning in regards to proper names and scientific kinds (like water is H20) which unlike other terms, the meaning and term is always linked in all possible worlds?

Tucker, is that you?

But it seems to me that you're making my model even more powerful. Not only I don't miss anything, but my model has an extra thing that we could discard namely ''strong emergence". Right? — Eugen

Perhaps. I was suggesting that strong emergence is really just a synonym for the question at hand. Something like qualia is something that exists. It "appears" on the scene. There are physical substrates that correlate with it.

IF you are a naturalist of any variety, the physical correlates and the "appears on the scene" phenomenon needs to be thus tied together in some way.

Weak emergence would somehow have to account for the color blue by the substrates. But it doesn't thus far. It only accounts for the mechanisms of the color blue, not the actual sensation qua sensation. Wavelengths hitting retinas with rods and cones and optic nerve and pre-frontal cortex, and the layers of the cortex, etc. This kind of theory, of course, would also account for all the indirect/periphery embeddedness of space/time/environment/other bodily functions that need to be in place. In theory, this can be done. Yet "sensing blue" itself is not actually accounted for as to why it is this emergent phenomenon.

Mind you, this can still get you far! You can possibly account for hardware/software computation in the brain with weak emergence. However, once you get to things like qualia and subjective interiority of a person, it loses its power.

So I would say that it is possible to account for all the "physical" phenomena that is combined (computational/informational) without ever getting at the actual "sensing blue". This is akin to Chalmers' idea of p-zombies. We can account for p-zombies but not for actual people with sensations and interiority of a point of view.

That is the Gordian knot. To say "strong emergence" is thus to say, "yeah, and somehow sensing blue is thus appearing in correlation of this computational/informational aspect of physical correlates". That isn't helpful in answering the question.

So what other approaches are there at this impasse? It would take a change in metaphysical approach. Instead of discrete physical combinations, it would be questioning what it is to be an event. What does it mean for an event to be occurring anyways? Perspective seems to be an important point here.

Being able to see the colour red and being able to see a link based on constant conjunction,
as inherent functions of the structure of the brain, and products of genetic coding, are possible without the need of conscious a priori concepts of red or constant conjunction. Concepts are subsequent to the event. — RussellA

Yeah that makes sense, but I guess the argument is whether he thinks there is a definite specified structure for things as you describe (constant conjunction) in the brain, or some sort of general "learning". And that is where I am confused as to what he is saying or if that is indeed even the argument he is discussing in some of these passages about concepts.

One thing I am pretty sure he is saying is that concept formation is a separate issue than his generative grammar, and his LAD does not apply necessarily to a concept formation mechanism (e.g. something like a constant conjunction function).

A natural reaction might also be to question why he so easily separates these two. Being that concepts are important to language, perhaps the two things are intertwined inextricably and thus, a generative grammar mechanism by itself cannot exist, or needs to at least account for concept formation in the account of the generation of syntax and combinations of words into strings of coherency.

Yeah I get it, but my point was to show an example of fully reducible (weak emergence) and something that is not known either way.

There are processes amenable to reducibility, and these are ones whereby interactions can form combinations like feedback loops, leading to larger processes (where everything can be mapped to prior processes that made it). Examples of this might include DNA sequences, cellular metabolism, atomic interactions, energy dissipation etc.

There are processes not amenable to reducibility, like qualia (sensing a color, hearing a sound, etc.), and "properties" in general (are properties "there" without a mind?.. separate question but related... the quality of soft/hard/wet/cold doesn't seem to be without a subject). These seem to just "emerge" into the picture (strong emergence) without prior mapping reducibility.

I think that strong emergence itself is a kind of place holder (similar to the homuncular fallacy) to just say "and it thus appears", which is to say, not an explanation at all. But a lot of words have been spilt in its defense. A lot of words in defense of something doesn't thus mean the concept is thus valid.

And as far as ideas related to strong emergence like "downward causation"- I don't know if this really answers the question because the very thing that is interacting with the lower levels still has to be explained. I get that there could be downward causation, but I don't get how this answers the question of how that initial downward causation occurred.

But it also goes beyond presuming a mechanism such as behaviorism does where different outcomes can be reduced to particular inputs. — Paine

I think it’s simply unclear what’s being described. As I said “learning” is a vague notion and has its own cognitive and brain mechanisms. So it becomes learning vs a linguistic mechanism. But what learning is versus a linguistic mechanism isn’t spelled out there. “Is it a specific mechanism specialized for concepts or some other process” is what he’s getting at I guess. He doesn’t seem phased either way which indicates generative grammar and concept formation are separate domains and his theory only accounts for generative grammar.

The first object a name established during a Performative Act and the second object a picture, thereby linking the linguistic with the extralinguistic. — RussellA

Chomsky doesn’t seem to know if there is a conceptual apparatus so apparently that aspect isn’t part of his LAD?

This narrative only works if it’s going to something better. The rebel alliance banding together to defend various forms of authoritarianism isn’t that.

It might be useful to parse out computational aspects from sensory aspects. There is a difference between:

1. *sensing* blue
and
2. a single cell is attracted to a molecule because of the properties of the outside molecules interacting with the organism's molecules to cause the organism to move towards the outside molecule.

2 can be fully reducible and 1 seems ever elusive.

You start adding in "illusions" then you have the classic "mind" / "body" problem (the sensation of blue being the illusion which is mind apparently). Then THIS has to be explained, infinitum (homuncular fallacy).

Good quote. I'd have to read what he says before and after this to get full picture probably. However, it seems that he thinks that there are beliefs about the world that are necessary for concepts to form. I'm not sure what that means one way or another except that it looks that he doesn't think there is something akin to a "concept module" in the brain. However, I think he is still in favor of syntactic recursion being a specific module that is innate and necessary for language.

These debates seem odd to me because I don't see what the opposition is. It sounds like these things are debates to the extent at what is learned and what is automatically generated (or rather, automatically being computed in some sort of cognitive apparatus). I just think that is weird because even learning has a cognitive apparatus (long term potentiation and things such as this), so is it the kind of apparatus (complete and specialized versus generalized brain apparatus)? This is too vague for me to really take seriously. It would have to be mapped one-to-one to cognitive neuroscience results, or at the least provide some psychological experiments on concept formation in infants, children, and adults for it to have teeth. And of course, even with this, there are so many scientific papers that what is really THE theory and what is relevant gets lost in the noise.. What counts as significant answers to these questions even in scientific conclusions? Hundreds and thousands of papers each year, and what counts as getting a close consensus seems to be harder to decipher. It's not the same as a new element discovered, or understanding of particle interaction.

So the question arrises as to how Chomsky could avoid the inscrutability of reference and hence the indeterminacy of translation. — Banno

I think one criticism of his general tendency is to change the goal posts as to what the innate structures are and how innate they are. For example, I think the generative grammar project (universal grammar) became less specific overtime. Where you had various functions you now have one, merge (or recursion). This may play into the hedging..

So with that in mind, I do know that Chomsky had two kinds of "devices" at play in his theories. There was the syntactic (how words combine) and the semantic (how words mean). He can preserve the syntactic as being a device that is more fixed (the merge concept) whilst still declaring the semantic as more plastic (learn from language use in the environment). Thus, he might get on board with Kripkean-esque idea that words are "annointed" and then changed-over-time in a community. Thus I still stick with RussellA on how this might look as for how words get their definitions.

My own spin here is that non-proper names and non-scientific kinds aren't so much "annointed" in the same way scientists and parents dub names in a very specific instance, but rather there is some start somewhere and then moves forward.. Thus a tribe sees the practice of marriage and adapts it. They had a word for "wild and free" called "boople" and someone in the tribe said, "the ones who are not married are kind of boople" eh? And then the next use of it is, "look at that boople over there not attached to anyone." And then it becomes something like "All booples are unmarried males".

I think this might be what is really at issue for you, at least in part, although it does not explain your apparent animosity. You like speculative philosophy. — Fooloso4

My animosity mainly comes from the very project of the Tractatus itself which is ultimately speculative, but poorly done speculation, as it doesn't even explain itself. Schopenhauer is very speculative (all of existence is striving, and this striving is an indication of a philosophical principle, etc.). But he explained himself. He explained it, put it in context with previous and contemporary philosophers. In fact, he over-explained it. He put all the ideas, and all the reasoning out there to be criticized. Tractatus doesn't do this. It is a long opinion piece with common sense ideas about facts being true propositions.

How can we compare a proposition to reality without empirical observation? — Fooloso4

That's for HIM as the PHILOSOPHER (not Fooloso4) to explain.

This needs to be read against what he says about metaphysical propositions. The former have a sense the latter do not. — Fooloso4

No, I get. God, free will, the green idea that sleeps by the dreamy number 3, etc. is "non-sense" because they are not observed (and is a misuse of atomic facts and category errors and all that). But this is the very idea that needs to be EXPLAINED. He is just asserting it.

Right, and how do we determine which is an accurate picture of reality? There are facts about the world, but no facts about God. — Fooloso4

It is Accurate Picture of Reality that needs to be explained. What IS this idea of an "accurate picture of reality"? He doesn't explain what makes true propositions true, so he's not helpful there. He is just a reality ELITIST. And like elitists who have no reason to be elitist except for their behavior towards the undesirables, he simply asserts his preferences as the world-writ-large. He is simply stating (but not really stating like the cool hipster he was because he was "showing" it by not stating anything :roll: ) that "observation is more important than speculation". But this is just, like, his opinion man.. He liked concrete things about the world (at that time in his life), and thought this was just the bees knees.

Plato fanatics like the idea of Forms. Some people like speculating on the Hard Problem, which cannot be observed itself, but is the very foundation of the observation, so not amenable to simply pointing at. What fruitful investigation comes from this, I don't know. But what is "fruitful" here? Does it explain something? At a certain level of explanatory power, it might be. But to cut off speculation and non-observable ideas from the start as "not reality", is a huge assertion that itself IS THE THING TO BE EXPLAINED. But it isn't. It's assertion all the way down.