So, then it’s justifiable to harm someone (sociopath/potential parent), even cause greater harm to that person, if it prevents that person from unnecessarily harming others (sociopath’s victims/children)? Is that right? I feel like I have to be missing something, because if that’s the case then you are justified in physically intervening in order to prevent childbirth, which essentially justifies eugenics. It also means the same for other scenarios; preventing a doctor from giving a vaccine, the use of lethal force for petty crimes like shoplifting, etc. But maybe that is what you mean? As long as you’re preventing someone from harming someone else your actions, regardless of severity, are justified. — Pinprick
My point is that bringing about enlightenment does prevent harm (the enlightened person will no doubt experience less harm since he’s enlightened, no?), yet you’re unwilling to cause harm (by putting him in crutches) to bring about this reduction of harm (enlightenment). Yet with AN you’re willing to cause harm in order to prevent future potential harm. I think you said something to the effect that the harm you cause someone in order to prevent a greater harm is a necessary harm. Since you make a moral distinction between these two events, I’m asking you why. Not being a crass utilitarian isn’t an answer. It still doesn’t explain what specifically about these two cases warrants them to be approached differently. — Pinprick
Is it your position that parents have wronged their children? That's a simple yes or no question.
If the answer is 'yes', how do you square that with our moral intuitions? — Srap Tasmaner
no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good". — khaled
Suspend these laws and cover up traffic lights and signs. Whoever dies while the traffic light was red (but the driver couldn't see it) is the person who would benefit form traffic laws. — khaled
But in the case of birth, not having a child that would suffer benefits no one. It's not even a matter of "we can't tell who it benefits" no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good".
"Good" in the asymmetry is defined as "good for someone" in each quadrant except the one causing the asymmetry. There, it is defined as a "better state of affairs than the alternative". That's why the asymmetry makes no sense. And why I never believed it even as an AN. — khaled
So your problem seems to not be purely with how long the imposition lasts or how badly it can go, since both of those variables are the same in the real world and in world X. So those two variables are insufficient, as here is an example where they make something that seems fine to you wrong. So you tell me, what difference between the real world and world X makes having kids in world X fine but having kids in the real world wrong? — khaled
It does, but you said it's not wrong to impose. If I had to guess, it's because said strife is very easy to escape (snap of a finger). That seems to be the variable you're missing. It's not just about duration and amount of suffering, but how easy it is to escape said suffering. — khaled
The "at least you're not living in X" argument is used to tell you to quit complaining. I am not saying something like that. I'm giving an example to illustrate that you care about more than just whether or not the suffering is unnecessary or how long it's imposed for.
And is "snapping fingers is equivalent to what we do here" supposed to indicate that it's wrong to have kids under those circumstances?
I keep telling you, that by these examples I'm not trying to say "This imposition is fine so having kids is fine". So could you stop interpreting it that way? It's getting tiring repeating that "No, I am not implying that this imposition is fine therefore having kids is fine" every time. — khaled
Yes. And you think so too for the Utopia example and surprise parties. Neither are needed impositions. The disagreement here is about the size of the “baggage” — khaled
Even if they would want you to? Ok. Now why should we think so? You want to convince others if this so how would you go about doing that? — khaled
But you’re going back to the standard definition of utopia, not the example I gave. Let’s call it world X then. It’s a world where you can remove all suffering at the snap of a finger. But you will suffer all the same if you refuse to snap your finger. And there is no way of escaping easily (euthanasia). Would it be fine to have kids in world X? — khaled
It DOES fit what you’re saying. It’s an example where the condition for something being wrong is satisfied yet you don’t think the thing is wrong. Showing that the conditions you set out for making something wrong are insufficient. — khaled
No. I deny that life can be characterized as a series of negative experiences as you imply. — khaled
You’re willing to go to what most consider extreme measures to prevent harming a future person, even if it means harming a living person to do so. And that’s meant to be just a statement of fact. I’m not judging whether or not that’s morally permissible. — Pinprick
The contradiction I see is that in this instance you’re fine with causing harm because you see it as justified, necessary perhaps, but not willing to harm someone in order to bring about enlightenment (which is presumed to decrease/prevent suffering as well). — Pinprick
Why is it ok to harm one, but not the other? The outcome is the at least comparable. Admittedly the enlightened person will not be able to completely eliminate suffering, but then we’re splitting hairs on how much suffering needs to be prevented to make it ok to cause harm to prevent it. Either the ends justify the means, or they don’t, right? If you’re going to make exceptions, then you need to explain why the particular case of AN warrants that, when other, very similar as I see it, cases do not. — Pinprick
I don't think I agree with it on everything, but I've always found pessimism in the philosophical sense to be an interesting tradition. Might I ask how you came to those conclusions? I don't want to psychoanalyze or troll, I'm just generally interested. You don't have to answer if it's too personal either. It's not like Schopenhauer is very popular, even for his own time — Albero
Well, it’s not really about who/what is being used, it’s about how you justify your actions.
But, if you insist, then whomever you’re trying to convince not to have children is being used to further your agenda. Your success in doing so creates the potential for harm. — Pinprick
No the point isn’t to say “getting pricked by a pin is fine so having kids is fine”. The point is to show that “someone could hate it” is not sufficient reason to make an imposition wrong. For that would make every imposition wrong. — khaled
At every point. I don’t believe there is a scenario where someone can find something worthwhile and it be wrong to impose on them. It’s fine to have a happy slave. — khaled
Yes. And if they change their mind that would also be a post facto report. — khaled
You think it’s good sometimes (being born in a utopia will last a lifetime and be inescapable) so let’s not question things we agree on. — khaled
Again insufficient. What you’re saying here is that it’s wrong to start harms especially when someone will miss out. Using just that qualification, having a surprise party would be wrong. Yes I am aware it is very different from life. The point is, the above standard is insufficient to tell right and wrong. You need to add more conditions. — khaled
Once you have a set of conditions that make the statement “Acts that *insert conditions here* are wrong” true such that it isolates only what you actually think is wrong then you’d have a consistent case. You’d still need to convince people why they should abide by those conditions, but so far I haven’t seen what that full set of conditions is. The only time I’ve seen it it was something like “a lifetime of negative experiences” which doesn’t seem to apply to life, you need to show that life actually falls under that category. — khaled
Life. I thought you were characterizing life purely as negative. — khaled
But, if you insist, then whomever you’re trying to convince not to have children is being used to further your agenda. Your success in doing so creates the potential for harm. — Pinprick
How does it not? Your justification for AN rests on a potential future event; an end. It regards taking action now (the means) to prevent a certain end justifiable. IOW’s the end is so horrible that it justifies taking action now to prevent it. — Pinprick
If so, AN appears to violate that premise. The end (a life of essentially unknown potential for pleasure/suffering) is used to justify the means (not procreating). — Pinprick
Excuse me, but if no person exists to miss out on the goods of life, why is that immoral if no one exists to be deprived? How is missed goods immoral, especially if there is no actual person deprived thus? However by carrying out birth, SOMEONE will suffer, there the moral issue lies. Indeed, procreating forces the hand for someone not procreating literally forced no ones hand. — schopenhauer1
Something I have been ruminating on a lot recently are the hoops and ladders that people will go through to justify things. — _db
The fact that it is so difficult to give a simple and decent argument against antinatalism is prima facie evidence that antinatalism is correct. Like come on, we've had countless threads on this topic, that if it were false, you'd think by now that somebody would have finally vanquished the idea. Yet here we are.
People cobble together these bizarre rationalizations for things that are not rational. The responses we keep hearing against antinatalism seem to me to be fundamentally nothing more than post hoc justifications for emotional attachments to things that would go away if everyone stopped having kids. — _db
And one thing that could happen is that that future person might live a more dignified life than you, and certainly a more dignified life than you imagine they could have. And this is a possibility that you're not only willing to cast away, no, you think it's a must to do so. — baker
Excuse me, but if no person exists to miss out on the goods of life, why is that immoral if no one exists to be deprived? How is missed goods immoral, especially if there is no actual person deprived thus? However by carrying out birth, SOMEONE will suffer, there the moral issue lies. Indeed, procreating forces the hand for someone not procreating literally forced no ones hand. — schopenhauer1
Exactly. The concern for on the diginity of those who will never be makes for a nonexistent concern for on the diginity. It's like caring about the dignitiy of a character in a novel. — baker
You don't respect someone's dignity by deciding for them whether their life, and whatever they find of value in it, is worth the suffering they endure for it. — Srap Tasmaner
Do people who can read regret having the ability? There may be one, now and then; I can imagine someone having a spiritual objection to symbolism of all sorts, to language as such. But overwhelmingly people who can read are glad they can, and people who can't read desperately want to. And overwhelmingly people who can read were taught to read because someone else decided for them, when they were young, but that decision has this specific form: you will think later that it was worth the trouble of learning. I don't teach a kid to read because I think it will be worth it; it's not a case of inflicting this suffering on them "for their own good", as I judge it, but because I believe they will think, later, when they're able, that it's worthwhile. It's still their feelings that matter. If I don't teach them to read, on the chance they'll wish I hadn't, I cut them off from countless opportunities for experience they might value deeply, I constrain the possibilities of their life cruelly. — Srap Tasmaner
We don't. This whole line of reasoning is patently false. No one justifies everything they do. No one thinks they need to justify everything they do. In fact, there's something a lot of people do unthinkingly that you want to convince them they should stop doing unthinkingly and try to justify. You have this so backwards, it's bizarre. — Srap Tasmaner
Yeah, we can, and we do, all the time. We do some stuff other animals don't, but we're still animals the whole time and we still reproduce just like animals, without justifying this behavior. — Srap Tasmaner
But not to consider you at all, in fact to refuse categorically to consider how you will feel about my actions, is not to grant you a status equal to my own as a fellow moral agent deserving such consideration, is, in short, not to treat you as a person. — Srap Tasmaner
You could say I must have children because they'll be glad I did; I could say you must not because they won't be. Is one of us right? — Srap Tasmaner
If I'm buying you a gift, I subordinate my tastes to yours: the question is not whether I would like this, or whether I think you *should* like this, but whether I think you will. With potential children, we have plenty of reason to expect they will think life worthwhile. — Srap Tasmaner
Reversing that: if we're right thinking, against the odds, that our children wouldn't think life worth it, then we've spared them that experience; if we're wrong, and they would've thought life worth it, we needn't feel guilty because by not existing they don't experience missing out. — Srap Tasmaner
Ok. But does Z get to cause X to alleviate Y if Y>X? That's what I'm asking (for the third time). — khaled
That's what it means by definition... You ever heard someone say "It was worthwhile and fulfilling, but I wish I never did it"? Worthwhile literally means that the negative experiences were worth it.
Definition according to google: worth the time, money, or effort spent; of value or importance. — khaled
A report. On whether or not the project was worth it despite the pain. Or on whether or not it is mostly comprised of negative or positive experiences. Depends on who you're talking to. — khaled
But it doesn't comprise only one aspect, it comprises most at the same time. But when we look at all of them combined it spells something like "Do not cause hellish suffering for a lifetime on someone else" which is perfectly reasonable, now you need to show that life will likely be hellish suffering for this or that child. — khaled
"This starts another persons condition for a set of negative experiences" is insufficient, and so to get you to show your ridiculous position by requiring you to use the whole list. — khaled
And I can list a litany of positive or worthwhile ones. — khaled
"Life is all of the above at the same time, and that's wrong to impose" I'll disagree with the second half (utopia example), it's hard to disagree with the first. — khaled
"Life is comprised of a lifetime of hellish suffering with no escape and we're all doomed, and those are always wrong to impose" I'll disagree with the first half, it's hard to disagree with the second. — khaled
Because you are trying to convince others that disagree with your judgement that their judgement is wrong and your is correct. You need evidence to do so. Your judgement is that life is mostly comprised of negative experiences, and that those experiences are not worth it and so do not justify existing. Basically everyone disagrees with one or both parts. You think they're wrong and want to convince them of that. You need evidence. — khaled
It does seem that way. Philosophy to some just means debate.That might seem strange because, going by this forum, people seem to think philosophy is almost entirely a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with someone else, or with some statement, or with some argument. — Srap Tasmaner
It's because antinatalism operates out of such bad faith about existence that it isn't and cannot be persuasive.
On the other hand, Buddhism operates on the premise that despite all the misery, the universe does offer a viable path out of suffering. So Buddhism operates out of good faith. — baker
It comes down to whether or not harming someone to alleviate harm from someone else is ethical which you still haven't answered. You could easily argue that having children is necessary harm depending on how you actually answer the question.... — khaled
I think it's perfectly fine to bring in people to the game you describe and I already stated my standard clearly:
"It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)" — khaled
Oh, so "life is mostly good" is very abstract and difficult to understand but:
is a literally a lifetime of a set of negative experiences
— schopenhauer1
Is immediately obvious and clear. — khaled
You cite A as the property that make an imposition bad, and A is present in having kids, so having kids is bad. I reply with a situation where A is the case, but you think the imposition is not bad. You respond by "that situation is not like life at all, life also has B!" (after realizing that "life isn't A enough!" is going nowhere and takes away objectivity from your position) So I respond with a situation where B and A are the case yet you think it's fine. You respond by "that situation is not like life at all, life also has C!" and so on. But when we examine the whole set of properties that make an imposition bad for you, they are actually pretty reasonable. — khaled
So why this clinical, bit by bit approach, where you pretend that one or two variables are the end all be all of what makes an imposition wrong? Why not just spill out the whole list? Well, because it sounds ridiculous! The whole list basically reads: "It's wrong to impose a lifetime of hellish suffering on someone" which is perfectly reasonable of course. Everyone agrees with that, but they don't think life is such hellish suffering, that's ridiculous. You realize that trying to convince them that life is hellish suffering doesn't work, so instead you try to pretend to follow some simplistic moral standard such as "Actions that are A and B are wrong". So when I show that you don't actually follow that simplistic standard, you have to revert back to the full set which is:
a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen.
— schopenhauer1
is wrong to impose. That's what you see life as. Life is purely just negative experience after negative experience with the sweet release of death being the only cure. A "Sexually transmitted terminal disease" and no more as the memes would have it. But when I try to ask you what evidence you have for thinking this, you cannot provide.
So your problem is, when you cite a standard it either:
1- Contradicts your other beliefs by not being sufficiently specific in scope and resulting in things you think are right coming out wrong
2- Is unlike life and so doesn't actually say anything about childbirth.
Of course, you think it's like life, but you don't want to say this, because you know it sounds ridiculous to everyone else. So instead you prefer to have (1) be the case rather than reveal that really, the only reason you're AN, is because you find life: "a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen". Yours isn't a rational argument, it's purely emotional, as the claim that life is like this is completely unsubstantiated and there is mountains of evidence against it, yet you believe it. I find it hard to believe that comes from rational consideration. — khaled
"You can harm people when it alleviates more harm" is a perfect example of crass utilitarianism.... But no, crass utilitarianism is bad because....reasons. — khaled
I'll take this as a "no" you can't harm someone to ameliorate greater harm form someone else. Now you have problems with the sleeping lifeguard again. You can't wake up the sleeping lifeguard to save a drowning person by this formulation. So again, a terrible standard for you that contradicts your beliefs. — khaled
A world where at the snap of your fingers (or a similarly easy activity if you're disabled) any suffering will go away. Also there is no euthanasia option, you cannot leave the game, and refusal to snap your fingers will subject you to suffering exactly as it would IRL.
Let's go with that one. — khaled
But this is a terrible argument. Because it would make surprise parties wrong (you never know, they might absolutely hate them) but they're not wrong, according to you. — khaled
You keep coming up with standards for why birth is wrong that also lead to things you think are right being wrong, and it's getting very tiring pointing them out. It would be very helpful if before you post another standard you ask yourself "Can this lead to a contradiction in my beliefs". You'll find it basically always does. Because you're just cycling between 5 or so standards, all of which contradict your beliefs. — khaled
Literally every imposition fits this description to different extents. And you think some impositions are fine. Again, terrible standard. Sigh.... — khaled
"Your analogies to life are not life itself", excuse me what? I assume you mean that my analogies aren't like life in any way. Prove that. Don't just state it. If any analogous imposition I come up with to life , automatically becomes not analogous when you realize you think it's ok to impose, then you're begging the question. — khaled
Agreed. Problem is, most people would tell you that life is mostly good with the dislike, annoyance, and negative experiences being the side effect. In other words, life is not like that. You think it is, but have provided no reasoning or evidence for why it is. — khaled
That would be ameliorating greater harm with lesser harm clearly, so is this wrong or not? — khaled
Also, importantly, is this "greater harm" you're ameliorating just a general measure of utility, or must you ameliorate greater harm from the person in question with lesser harm? So would it be wrong to punch someone so that someone else gains enlightenment? Because depending on your answer this:
Prior to birth you can prevent harm, period. Once birth happens, you have to immediately start ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms
— schopenhauer1
May or may not follow. If you think it's fine to harm someone to ameliorate greater harm from someone else, you can argue that having children is already ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms. — khaled
So doing this is not morally right and fair? But this also applies to having children in a utopia, which you said you're fine with. So which is it? — khaled
Agreed, but I don't see where you did so. All you do is cite specific features of life, that are also present in a utopia, or in other impositions you think are fine. — khaled
HA, nice switch. First off, I don't see how it's significant what I think counts as a utopia and what doesn't, I'm pretty sure what you mean to ask is: "What to you makes it ok to impose". Answer: "It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)". You don't like this standard, clearly. And you try to convince me that it's bad somehow. — khaled
I don't use my standard when arguing with you, I try to get you to spell out a standard that doesn't lead to ridiculous consequences. So far, every time you've said "Life is X, and X is wrong", X is in common with utopias, or gifts, or other things you consider moral to impose, meaning X isn't a good standard for you. You did this in the last comment too: — khaled
Not a very good standard considering this is also the case in the utopia and you find it ok to impose life there. — khaled
in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else" — schopenhauer1
What is "unnecessary suffering" as opposed to "necessary suffering"? — khaled
What is an "unjust position" as opposed to a "just position"? — khaled
Separates the "laws for imposing" into two categories. "Laws of imposing after you're born" and "laws of imposing before you're born". This completely destroys your project. You are trying to show that people's "laws of imposing" would preclude birth if applied rigorously. By separating it into two categories you open the door for someone to say: "Every other kind of harm needs justification when the person is born. Not so in this case. Since the person is not born, no justification is needed to do something that could harm them, so yes I am justified in genetically modifyin ma kid to be blind!" With exactly as much validity as your claim above. — khaled
You claim that the happiness of the person in the position doesn't have much to do with the justice or injustice of imposing that position. So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard? — khaled
It is not applying justice in an unbiased way. It is not just to cause X negative experience onto someone else UNLESS it is the time honored practice of Y. Do you see how that could be biased? Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else".. But it gets clouded in this case because, because, becuase, why? — schopenhauer1
What does "unnecessary" mean here? What is "necessary harm"? I thought an example of "necessary harm" is when it prevents an even larger harm on the person in question (what's what I remember your definition was), but you contradict that here: — khaled
I find it plausible that we experience our own instinct for self-preservation largely as an attitude that life is fundamentally a good thing. There are of course extreme experiences when we just want it to stop, — Srap Tasmaner
sometimes the antinatalist claim will align with the purported victim's own feelings or attitudes, and sometimes it won't. — Srap Tasmaner
Another option is that the wrong is something like exposure to risk of suffering; in that case, the risk is persistent from the beginning of your life until its end, and you are wronged in this sense every moment you are alive, whether you are suffering at the moment or not. — Srap Tasmaner
What's the point of all this? Twofold. On the one hand, insofar as I incline to any theory of morality, it's based in the moral sentiments, but I don't want to make too much of that, because I don't have much of a theory. On the other hand, most successful moral arguments succeed precisely by arousing the moral sentiments. It's no good telling someone that they should think something is wrong that they don't; you change their view by showing it to them in such a way that they feel it is wrong. (And obviously there's just as little point in telling people how they should feel.) I think this is what you are attempting with your favorite analogy lately, the "forced game": you want to elicit from your audience a feeling that placing someone in such a situation is wrong. — Srap Tasmaner
; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them. — baker
