Well, it's mostly by removing yourself from the problem by not entertaining it by doing so that you address the problem. Hence, yes, the Zen part. — Posty McPostface
Yeah, I meant to say that by focusing on the problem you eliminate it by not entertaining it. Kinda Zen? — Posty McPostface
Pragmatism would say something like, distract yourself with more enjoyable things, with a taste of utilitarianism. Otherwise, focus on the problem and don't entertain it... Would be my take. — Posty McPostface
What's the alternative though? — Posty McPostface
But it is good, no? — Posty McPostface
You can limit their amount though... — Posty McPostface
Sure, those are small goals that are attainable like going to see your doctor or a visit at the dentist. What's so insurmountable about such goals? — Posty McPostface
Like what? My only goal is not to be sad or unhappy. Meaning the less goals I have the better off I will be as per Buddhism. — Posty McPostface
Yes, though some people seem to just want to get by in life. What do you tell those types? — Posty McPostface
What does that even mean? — Posty McPostface
No. Work is becoming redundant with the advent of AI. So, no. — Posty McPostface
You don't rebut nonsense. You laugh at it. — apokrisis
Nervous laughter that I'm right? :razz: . If you have a rebuttal, let's hear it.LOL. — apokrisis
So have you given up your Cartesian framing of the question - the one where the view would emanate from some now unlocated "mind" having "feelings of what it is like to be a third person"? — apokrisis
The third person objective point of view is the one that can afford to ignore every particular fact, every contingent fluctuation ... at least to the degree that is efficient for constructing a lived model of the world. — apokrisis
There is not much point knowing about neutrinos and quarks unless you can potentially do something with them. And there is absolutely no point in knowing the individual state of every neutrino and quark in the history of the Cosmos as what possible good purpose would that serve? Efficient modelling prefers to get by on making the least effort. So it is how much we can ignore - by summing reality up in t-shirt equations - which is the useful measure of our "objectivity". — apokrisis
The third person point of view then becomes some actual physical model of the world - an equation plus some set of measurements that will pump out a prediction. — apokrisis
And we find this third person model useful even if it doesn't itself contain anything but the most generalised kind of reason or telos - the thermodynamic imperative that is its maximally generic "point of view", the anchoring locus from which its description of the Cosmos emanates. — apokrisis
And understand that to be the epistemic game is the way to avoid falling into your idealist trap of forever complaining that "mind" doesn't get explained by science. Science does explain mind to the degree that is anthropomorphically useful.
And if you are not too much worried about that level of neurocognitive detail, then in fact standard theistic/romantic conceptions of the "mind" are the only model you need for day to day life. Cartesianism works as the standard model of everyday living for the ordinary person. Why make things more complicated? — apokrisis
But the models are about something which is outside all subjective views, or at least human/animal ones, because as Apo mentioned, it's invariant across all such views. The mass of a table is not relative to any view. It's true that the concept of mass is human, but the property mass is about is not. It's real. — Marchesk
Yeah sure. But would you conclude from that that brains model worlds or that there is a realm of mind that is somehow getting it all wrong about how the world actually is? — apokrisis
Torturous pain is the acceleration of the structural pain of living. In a sense, the structural pain is almost imperceptible torture. It's a sigh, rather than a scream. — darthbarracuda
That the lack of agency and awareness of oneself in a dream is a respite from the tyranny of waking life. Yes? — Posty McPostface
Yes, this is the absolute truth. Sleep is my favorite activity or rather inactivity. I get to relinquish any form of agency, in a safe and controlled manner.
Sleep anytime you can. — Posty McPostface
A lot of the time, consciousness is simply waiting. Enduring. Since we can't just turn ourselves off.
Consciousness is an ever-vigilant insomnia — darthbarracuda
It's just like the after images seen by the eye. The nervous system is set up on the principle of constructing sharp counterfactual contrasts. It applies to feelings like all other forms of perception. — apokrisis
A joke ribbing the NYT's biases: The world is going to end tomorrow.
Wall street Journal's headline: World ends tomorrow; markets will be closed.
New York Times' headline: World ends tomorrow; women and minorities will be disproportionately affected. — Bitter Crank
Personally, I would think that raising children would be a better job than a lot of the dull work that people end up doing in offices, never mind factories or farms. It's a choice I don't have to consider. — Bitter Crank
So what is a first person point of view in your metaphysical scheme? — apokrisis
So what is a first person point of view in your metaphysical scheme? Give us a useful definition that excludes interpretance as something models do. Let's see you shake that dualism one more time, tell us how the mind is some kind of unphysical thing rather than some kind of natural process. — apokrisis
What has physical space got to do with it? The model is about an organism in a world. So it is an abstraction as far as that physical space is concerned.
Then I should hardly need to point out that your talk about "physical space" is itself a modelling interpretation. So you are simply doubling down on the epistemological missteps. — apokrisis
Experience can be understood as en embodied physical process if you don't have an eliminative or mechanically reductive notion of the physical, thus obviating the need to posit a separate mental substance. — Janus
It is not the behaviour that has "internalness" here. It is the modelling. So again, stop deflecting and focus on the question as it was asked of you. Discover for yourself that you really don't have any concrete reason to deny an "internalness" to a modelling relation between the brain and the world. You might in fact realise that the semiotic story is all about the organismic construction of an "internal and meaningful point-of-view". — apokrisis
If an entity could respond in different ways to the same stimulus, what other than some self-regulative "internalness" could give rise to that possibility? — Janus
