A 'person' is a legal human entity. — noAxioms

So there were no persons before the formation of societies advanced enough to have legal definitions of persons?

No that can't be it either.

So a person isn't a being?

Did you read the rest of my comment?

I said that all the important questions are answered.

I'd say there are important questions unanswered. — Art48

Such as?

Also do you consider "Why is pi 3.14 and not another number" an important question?

What more would you need to know though? If you can explain what every physical state means mentally, then you've answered all the important questions.

Do you ever question why gravity exists? Or why pi is 3.14 and not some other number? Questions like "How can consciousness exist" seem to be in a similar vein to those.

And even if we answer it, what practical difference does it make? Or is it just pure curiousity?

Also, the Hard problem of consciousness presumes a dualist standpoint which comes loaded with plenty of problems (this being one). Perhaps then the issue is in dualism.

Grice? — Banno

Apparently. Didn't know who that was.

So that's not uncontroversial. — Banno

The problem seems to stem from "language use in thought" but I thought we were talking about utterances. Aka language use in communication. In that case the difference between intended and interpreted meaning seems clear no?

What an author intends by an utterance can vary over time, as that utterance is put to other uses. — Banno

What the author intended at a certain instance of using an utterance doesn't change though.

So for example, when I first read "grice" at the start of your comment I thought you were making some sort of pun about rice, so checked the previous comments in case there was any context I was missing. In this case the interpreted meaning was clearly different from the intended meaning.

If in the future you use "grice" to make some sort of pun about rice, the fact that this current instance of grice use was intended to refer to a british philosopher does not change.

Instead of asking whether the “meaning” of an utterance persists over time or not I think we can simplify the situation by splitting “intended meaning” from “interpreted meaning”

The intended meaning persists (though maybe no one other than the first speaker knows what it is), the interpreted meaning doesn’t (varies from person to person and across time).

Some people seem to be talking about intended meaning and some people seem to be talking about interpreted meaning.

Do we get an award or at least a certificate of completion?! :smile: — punos

It's an unprecedented situation, I don't think they have anything like that yet

I you think free-will is emergent then to understand a little better your stance can you tell me if you believe it's soft or hard emergence? — punos

Soft. Though I think you mean weak vs strong.

Observe how our freeways resemble and function like veins and arteries transporting all manner of things around the system. Notice how our electrical transmission lines resemble a nervous system along with the internet as a giant distributed neural network (brain), or how our mining operations are like the digestive system, and the factories are like the organs that produce commercial products like an organism might produce organic products for the body of the organism. — punos

I always had daydreams where I'd imagine parts of my mind as people, like in Inside Out. The other way seems interesting too.

But it seems we've reached agreement! A rare sight on this site. I don't see anything in your reply that I disagree with.

The only time when the ineffable has been mentioned in this page is between hyphens (and here). I think we're approaching a point where we stop effing the ineffable!

It feels that this is a general philosophy thread at this point with no particular topic. No offense @Banno

Not to necro my own thread, but I had a thought recently and wanted to see how someone with a similar view dealt with it.

Since yours is a monist view, I assume all people in your view are also patterns at the end of the day correct? Wouldn't that result in fictional people "existing" in the same way you and I exist?

My working solution is that we use the word "exist" on patterns sometimes say the pattern exists, and sometimes to say that there is a material instantiation of it. Not sure if that's a good one.

For example, "the number 4 exists" does not imply the existence of 4 of something, but "Jeff exists" implies the existence of a person named Jeff irl, not just as a fictional character.

How would you deal with it without a material basis though?

"free will" means "indeterminate determinism" — punos

Idk why you keep giving me your definition of free will in bits and pieces. Can you just define free will for me?

Not everyone assumes that free will requires indeterminism. I don't, for one.

Etymologically 'coerce' means to restrain by another. — punos

Yes, another creature. A physical force is not "another" in this context.

The meaning can be used in other contexts much as poets do — punos

But we're not doing poetry.

Are you saying that free-will only happens in humans or animals. — punos

It will happen in anything intelligent/complex enough.

If i were to teleport to another location it would not be the exact same me before teleporting, but the new me wouldn't be able to tell any difference (unless something drastic happens). What the new me doesn't know is that i was just copied and the original remains at the original location; so which is me the copy or the original? Remember to consider Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in that the teleported version of me is not exactly a perfect copy. Even if it were an exact copy, the difference in location of my original still being around would give us instantly different quantum 'signatures' aka different identities in respect to the universe. Also, as soon as my copy walks off the teleporter he will acquire a unique identity by virtue that from that point on he has different experiences. — punos

Ok. Because I would say it is the exact same me, since I think the "person" is the pattern (or informatino as you put it). Though I don't deny both a pattern and matter are required to exist.

But either way, we oftentimes assign actions to these patterns. For example: "The republican party destoryed the white house", even though it was spefic people that destroyed the white house, nay, specific pieces of flesh moving at the whims of chemical reactions in more complex pieces of flesh, nay.... you get the point. We can keep digging to lower levels, but oftentimes we assign agency to higher level things.

Similarly, I see the "pattern" that is a person, as responsible for said person's acts. In that sense, the person has free will, when said an action occurs because of said pattern.

It is essentially a view where "Your arm was raised because *insert chemical reaction sequence*" is the exact same sentence "Your arm was raised because of you".

It's similar to your view about how everything is the "free will of the universe" but more localized.

What is happening fundamentally differently in beings that have low intelligence like bacteria and higher intelligence like an arthropod. What is fundamentally different about arthropods that is not happening in the intelligence of lower life forms. — punos

Complexity. They don't have enough of it. Though how much exactly is enough is arbitrary of course. I said I think some anthropods are complex enough for us to say they have a will.

Notice how AI gets more intelligent the more parameters and hidden layers are added; nothing really new but more nodes for the neural network. If this trend continues then according to your definition of free-will; AI will reach a level of intelligence that would result in the formation of free-will. — punos

Yes.

Wouldn't it be reasonable to say at that point that free-will is an emergent property dependent on the components directly below it? — punos

Yes. And this is the fundamental difference between us. You seem to think that free will has to be some sort of voodoo black magic capable of disobeying the laws of physics, I just think it is an emergent property (or "pattern") that certain things have.

Obviously if you're looking for physics breaking voodoo black magic, you won't find it anywhere.

The only difference that it can possibly be is just a more complex way of processing information, a more integrated way of processing information, than is possible with lower intelligence. — punos

Yes.

I don't believe you had a free choice in what you wrote, your choice was determined by the specific activation weights and thresholds in your nerve cells as your sensory signals propagate through the system. — punos

The issue is that you think free will exists outside of activations of nerve cells. That since I did something because of said nerve cells that must mean I had no free will. I do not know why you think that unless you actually tell me what you mean by free will. Because I believe that "What you just did was due to nerve cell activation entirely" and "You freely willed what you just did" can both be true.

All of this is "coerced", even though you don't feel coerced — punos

The fact that you put it in quotes shows you know that's not how people use coerced. No one ever said "I am coerced by gravity to stay on the ground". Coercion is done by other intelligent creatures through force or threats.

Do you have a simpler lower level example of free-will? — punos

I raised my arm right now. That was freely willed. You will say "Ah but that was because of nerves and yada yada". I will say that those two are not incompatible, since it was an uncoerced act. You will ask for another example.

This is a loop. I can't debate whether or not free will exists with someone unless we first agree what is meant by free will. So unless you answer my question, we won't get anywhere. What do you mean by free will?

Try doing this: Stop breathing for 30 minutes, and tell me if you feel coerced to breath at some threshold limit? — punos

Sure. I failed. But I was never coerced by anyone to breathe, so my breathing was freely willed. Again, that's not how people use the word "coerced". Inanimate objects and physics processes don't coerce. You know what "coerce" means, use it as intended please.

A "person" is a physical system made of atoms and molecules like everything else, and cells, tissues, and organs like every other organism. — punos

Ok let's dig into that a bit.

So, are you saying the person IS his atoms and molecules, or is "the system" or "pattern" of atoms and molecules? A classic thought experiment to highlight the difference: If a teleportation device dematerialized your body, then rematerialized it elsewhere identically, is that new body "you"?

A definition of free-will doesn't automatically make it real, it simply allows us to recognize it. Children define Santa Claus all the time, but it doesn't mean he's real. — punos

No one said that. The definition doesn't make anything real. However if there was a fat guy that lives in the north pole and hands out presents every chrismas everywhere in the world, then yes, santa claus would be real by that definition.

Similarly, if humans were able to do things without coercion, free will would be real by the definition of "uncoerced will"

Do you think AI has free-will, or if not yet will it ever? — punos

Not yet, eventually probably.

But again, we are working with two different definitions of free will here. You haven't told me yours.

As for atoms and cells and so on, no, because they don't have a will for it to be free. Wills are property of intelligent beings. How intelligent? Not sure, but more intelligent than bacteria. Somewhere in the arthropods is where I'd put it.

But again, is this all there is to life? existence? It still feels pointless, in the end, in the grand scheme of things. — niki wonoto

Why must it have a point?

Nothing special. It's the same with human life. — niki wonoto

Why must it be special?

I generally don't get these kinds of questions. Like do people seriously wake up and think "Damn, I will not have enough of an impact to alter the entire universe irreversibly this is so sad".

Provide me with an example so i know exactly what we are talking about, not just a definition. — punos

Ok? With the definition of "uncoerced will" me typing this reply is an example of me exercising my free will, since no one is coercing me into typing it.

I believe in 'will' not 'free-will', and will is constrained by the laws of physics like anything else — punos

This "will" is that of a person right? What is a person, in your view. Because from this:

Does it use another force from somewhere else outside our universe — punos

It seems that you take a dualist stance. I think the issue stems from dualism, not free will. For instance, do you think the "person" ever causes any physical change? Is you typing a reply a result of blind physical processes, or is it because the "person" that is you wills it? Or are those compatible.

I seem to have the same definition for free-will that you do. — punos

Seemingly not, since I think free will exists.

The stuff of thoughts are the patterns of electro-chemical activity in the brain — punos

Unrelated to OP but :up: :up: . Though I'm not sure it's patterns of activity in JUST the brain, that is the stuff of thoughts.

I have never in my life even heard of anyone that has ever given a logical, and reasonable account of how free-will actually works. — punos

Perhaps then your conception of free will is in itself impossible, like a square circle.

One simple way to give an account for free will for instance is to define it as "uncoerced will". Then yes, we have free will most of the time, as we are uncoerced.

What definition of free will are you working with?

our "free will" cannot interrupt the determinist chain. — Edmund

The wording of this implies that "we" are something outside this causal chain trying desperately to violate conservation of energy and interfere with the causal chain, but alas are unable to. Like we're some ghost that inhabits our own bodies.

That view (dualism) is the source of a lot of troubles, this being one of them.

Since a universal or abstract object would not string to any particular object in the world, it is without a referent or is self-referential, and has little bearing on my ontology beyond the marks on paper and the guttural sounds that spell out the universal. — NOS4A2

In my case, I’m not satisfied with that. “Boiling point” clearly doesn’t refer to the word “boiling point” and it clearly has SOME referent. It’s not a word like “a”, “for” or “the”, we mean something when we say boiling point.

And I think an ontology that has a word which refers to something it cannot account for is incomplete. It sounds like when some materialists say “Emotion is self referential or has no referent”.

It just seems to me more trouble to deny than it’s worth. We talk in universals ALL the time, and there are many things we cannot express at all without them (like the entire fields of mathematics), and their existence doesn’t seem to offer any internal inconsistencies, or inconsistencies in coexisting with matter/minds, so why deny them? They’re harmless

The idea that an abstract object must refer to some concrete object because we can speak about it and treat it with noun-phrases doesn’t suffice for me to accept its reality. — NOS4A2

Well that’s not the only idea that could lead to the belief, but I see where you’re coming from.

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear: — khaled

Yes, that occurred before you showed up:

A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists" — khaled

Afterwards, you proceeded to deny B, without ever clarifying that you disagree with my initial definition. Likely because you never saw it. Which led to us wasting 2 pages before it finally became clear that you think A is different from B.

It is not that you defined A and B differently and I insisted they are the same, as you accuse me of.

Just when I thought we were starting to make some progress — Metaphysician Undercover

I would not think spending 2 pages to get to a point where we agree what is being talked about “progress”. I made more progress in a single reply to NO4 or Michael. Why would I waste my time typing to you when it yields nothing but unprovoked nonsensical accusations?

The abjective “wet” describes the noun “condition”. — NOS4A2

No it doesn't. In this case it's not an adjective, it's a value. In the same way that "the boiling point of water is 100C". But "condition" instead of "boiling point" and "wet" instead of "100C".

It’s just another way of saying the water is wet. — NOS4A2

I think you have it the other way around. In order to say that water is wet, we have to have some idea of what "wet" is. That definition, will be an abstract.

The condition comes first, then the adjective, otherwise no one knows what the adjective means.

We’ve devised the units of measurement, the languages, the formulas, the metaphors, the laws — NOS4A2

What kind of things are all of these things in your ontology though? Formulas certainly refer to something right? I'm not asking what it is, just what kind of thing it is. If you're a materialist you'd be forced to say"matter" for example (which seems clearly false to me, formulas are not matter).

Because they all seem like abstracts to me.

hold it up to nature and make sure it’s an as accurate representation as possible. — NOS4A2

What determines its accuracy is how well it can predict the liquid's behavior yes? And for us to even bother with all of this, we must believe that the liquid behaves with some regularity correct? This regular behavior of the liquid, what kind of thing it? Or is it nothing at all?

I thought of perhaps a better way to put it.

"decapitation" can exist abstractly even if it was impossible for things with heads to have their heads cut off. If all necks were made from an uncuttable material, "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" would be false, but "decapitation" as a concept would still exist. If enough people imagine it and find it amusing enough, we may even create a word for it.

As to what it means for something to exist abstractly, another way of putting it is that it conceivable. So not something like a "square circle". Even in a world were necks are uncuttable, decapitation is conceivable. Just like Santa is conceivable in our world despite the impossiblity of flying raindeer.

And what does "decapitations exist in the abstract" even mean? — Michael

That there exists a "pattern" or "arrangement" that "decapitations" is pointing to.

I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects. — Michael

It doesn't prove it but it also doesn't deny it, so I'm not sure of its relevence. "decapitations can exist in the abstract" and "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" can both be true.

The existence of abstract objects is needed because "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" is not enough. There are things it can't account for. Such as HOW we know that a death by a gunshot is not a decapitation. Or what we refer to when we say "decapitation".

you just define one so that it is the same as the other, deny the difference, and argue your point from a position of denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quote when I did this.

No what happened was I said "A is B" (A is boiling point, B is "temperature at which something boils") before you even posted on this thread, then you proceeded to deny the existence of B. I was confused the entire time because you didn't deny the existence of A. Then you created the difference you accuse me of denying, and once created I said:

Again, those were intended as the same claim. But I understand the difference you drew between. — khaled

And then proceeded to discuss the existence of "values" next as you wanted.

If you disagree that that is what happened, then quote when I did what you accuse. Or quote where any part of the above didn't happen. I was already spending 99% of my typing on dealing with your misunderstandings, I don't intend to spend 99% of the remaining 1%, denying nonsensical accusations.

Until you show that your accusation has any basis in reality, I do not intend on continuing this discussion.

I've been cordial with you despite thinking what you're saying is wrong. I don't intend to continue an already unproductive discussion if you can't return the favor.

"John would die were he to be decapitated, therefore his death exists." — Michael

"this water would boil were it to be heated to 100 degrees celsius, therefore its boiling point exists." — Michael

Wouldn't it be "therefore decapitations exist" if we're keeping the same form? I don't find that ridiculous, for "decaptiations" to exist in the abstract in the same way as boiling point.

If there was no such abstract, how can we tell that someone is wrong when they call death by a gun wound a "decapitation"?

Could you elaborate?

Also could you engage with what I'm typing instead of 1 line responses that don't illuminate anything?

is there a difference between saying that the boiling point is real and saying that things really do boil? — Michael

Note: When I say "boiling point of water" I mean under normal conditions.

I think the boiling point can exist even if things don't really boil. If we lived in a world where the maximum temperature ever detected or achievable by us was 60 degrees celcius, the boiling point of water would still be 100 degrees celcius.

We would find that other things boil (there are things that boil at less than 60 degrees) and then theoretically calculate the boiling point of water. In that case, even if water doesn't really boil, the boiling point exists.

Additionally, even if we never discovered anything boiling and had no conception of what boiling is, the boiling point of water would still exist and be 100C (as it is still water), or do you disagree? There you have a case where water doesn't really boil, yet the boiling point exists.

And that things really do boil does not entail that some universal or abstract object exists. — Michael

Sure, but that wasn't the motivation behind saying those objects exist. The motivation was that things like "boiling point" cannot simply be relegated to "mental stuff". The boiling point is not a purely mental concept, if it was, it would be pure imagination. We do not say a fictional story is "wrong" or "right", but we do say that the boiling point of water under normal conditions is 100C, not 110C, and you would be wrong to say it is 110C. The explanation for this, I believe, is that there are abstract objects that we discover.

It's clearer in the case of math. Without the belief in abstract objects, then I do not see how you can believe that mathematical questions can have right and wrong answers. If we make up math and its rules, we should be able to say the answer is whatever we want. But REGARDLESS of what system of mathematics we employ, there are always right and wrong answers within it. Boolean math has right and wrong answers, linear algebra has right and wrong answers, etc. If it's all made up then why is that?

I'll repeat my question from last time. Is "Newton's second law" just mental stuff? If it is, then how come the universe was abiding by it even before it existed (before it was made up by newton)?

I think the principal issue is that there are different ways to derive "the value", as I described. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think so. Because if there are multiple ways to derive something that doesn't lead to it not existing, but you seem to have been working with that assumption so far though I don't know why.

So for example, if we think that 100 degrees Celsius is a "real" value for the boiling point of water, then we would tend to believe that the real cause of the water boiling is that it reached that temperature. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is certainly something people do, but it is a fallacy, not proof that the value "isn't real". At this point I really don't understand how you use that term. People also believe that positively charged objects have gained protons, rather than being deficient in electrons often because of the way we represent it. That doesn't mean that protons and electrons aren't real.

Do you think math is discovered or created? That might shed some light for me on the enigma that is what you're saying.

So your analogy needs to premise that the evaluation has not yet been made, then you can see that evaluation is similar to a work of fiction.. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. Let's first assume that all the items are boxes without a doubt, for simplificiation. Regardless of what system we make up, there will be a correct answer within it, not so for pure fiction.

For santa, I can make up any story I want. I can make up a story about a vampire santa, I can make up a story about a lesbian female santa, I can do whatever, and these stories will not be "wrong". They will just be different stories from the original.

But if we make up a system where instead of "one box" we have "aosidjf" and instead of "two boxes" we have "psidbu", if there is one box (by our traditional system) we would be wrong to say "psidbu". Regardless of how arbitrary or convoluted our system for counting boxes is, at the end of the day there will be a right and a wrong evaluation.

Point is: For pure fiction, we are not wrong for making up or changing stories. But for the evaluation of the number of boxes, REGARDLESS of what system we pick it will contain right and wrong answers.

Because santa is purely made up :sad: we can do anything with him, but we cannot alter the number of boxes with our mind. So regardless of how we count them, there will be a right and wrong answer for each counting method. But there will never be a "right fictional story" and a "wrong fictional story". That's the fundamental difference.

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real?

I think there is a problem with saying values are fictitious, being that if they are fictitious, then changing them should not mean we are wrong.

Take the Santa Clause story. That's fictitious because even if you change the story so that Santa uses flying horses, you're not "wrong". It's a work of fiction after all you can do whatever you want. Santa could be a vampire.

However if you have 5 boxes lined up in front of you and you say there are 4 boxes, you are wrong. That tells me that values aren't works of fiction.

First off, I want to ask what you're trying to do here exactly. Because I don't see a critique of the OP so much as proof that I cannot say what I'm saying with 110% certainty. Sure, I don't think I've just solved philosophy, but just debating on whether or not one can be sure their ontological system is "correct" isn't exactly what I had in mind for this post.

What you're saying seems to just boil down to this:

Perhaps you are correct, perhaps not. — Bylaw

If this was supposed to be taken as on a par with conclusions held generally in consensus in science, that would be unscientific. — Bylaw

It wasn't:

I will now present my ontological view for everyone to have fun tearing down. — khaled

As far as the law of conservation of energy, this has not been proved, it's just we have never found a counterexample. — Bylaw

You're approaching the point of unreasonable doubt. At that point I can say something like "The idea that you need proof for something to be proven has not been proved, it's just that we have never found a counterexample" and it wouldn't be too far off from what you're doing.

We have to assume SOME things to say anything at all, and conservation of energy is not that big of an assumption relatively.

'now that is ruled out period'..well, I disagree. — Bylaw

Again, I do not believe my post on thephilosophyforum has single handedly ended thousands of years of debate about ontology. But I'd rather discuss problems with the OP rather than continuously prove that I have not single handedly solved philosophy which I never claimed to have done.

that sounds like you might be a dualist, or....? What belief would you have to scrap`? — Bylaw

The one that says that "mental stuff" is patterns in the op. If scientists find it to be some sort of matter I'll have to change that.

No one has shown that the universe cannot be dualist — Bylaw

Nor did I claim anyone has.

You claimed that scientists do not rule out anything. I gave a counter example.

We can of course say there is insufficient or no evidence at this time. But we have no grounds to rule it out based on substance (in the philosophical sense). — Bylaw

If there is mental stuff that is different from physical stuff that does anything at all, then it violates conservation of energy, allowing us to rule it out.

If said mental stuff doesn't do anything at all then you get epiphenomenalism which comes with its own issues (like how do you know mental stuff exists if it does literally nothing)

But sometimes it seems like a good starting point in these kinds of dialogue since often the position you seemed to have that I first responded is one that is often batched with science. — Bylaw

Sure and I have done nothing unscientific here. You said that scientists don't rule anything out, but that's clearly false, and all I've done is rule out the dualist conception of mental stuff. Where have I been unscientific (again, not that I intend to be scientific or think that the scientific method is even applicable to philosophy)

"there exists a temperature at which something boils". This is completely different from the statement "the boiling point exists". The former, "a temperature" is a value assigned to the latter, the named thing, "boiling point". — Metaphysician Undercover

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear:

That you then proceed to argue against what you mistakenly thought I said even after the misunderstanding has been cleared up is pointless.

Please do not keep saying that you only want to talk about the pile of paper, implying that you think that if the pile of paper is determined to be existing, we can somehow infer from this, that the value is also existing — Metaphysician Undercover

That implication is in your head only. You seem to have a habit of misunderstanding me.

instead of your original claim that "the temperature at which something boils exists" — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, those were intended as the same claim. But I understand the difference you drew between.

But if you honestly want to discuss whether the value which we assign to that thing named "the boiling point" exists, the thing which you call "the temperature at which something boils", then I'm ready to proceed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I believe they still exist. And to be clear we are discussing values correct? Like "100 degrees Celsius". I must say that seeing a realist that believes that "boiling point" exists but that its value doesn't exist is a first time for me.

I'll start with asking you, if you think these values don't exist, then what are we referring to when we use them?

"Ah but you see all the words we use are X so what I said makes sense". Regardless of what X is (in this case metaphor) I can't see this as anything other than bullshit.

Actually due to the limitations of using language that is inherently apowiehnfao I am right and you are wrong. Sorry! Not very convincing is it?

@RussellA

Though I'll ask, what is "laws of nature" a metaphor for then?

That's an expanding set of 'things' and openended as far as qualities. — Bylaw

Yes. But any dualist you find will insist that there is mental stuff on top of this set of things as a whole seperate set of things. That's what's ruled out.

But within science you don't rule out things. — Bylaw

Yes you do, when they contradict what you find. Galileo ruled out the geocentric system for example. Mental stuff (if it has any agency) will contradict conservation of energy.

And also this is thephilosophyforum not thescienceforum. I don't intend to strictly adhere to the scientific method.

If, later, the consensus is that X exists, regardless of its qualities or lacks thereof, it is included in what is considered real. — Bylaw

Sure and if scientists find "consciousness" or "emotion" as some sort of matter then I'll scrap my beliefs on the spot. Until then, this is how I make sense of things.

The value of the gravitational force depends on gravitational constant, the masses of the object, and the distance between them. Which for some reason makes it so that the value of the gravitational force doesn't exist

And yet the gravitational force exists.

The value of the boiling point depends on pressure, the type of liquid, and a bunch of other things. Which for somea reason makes it so that the value of the boiling point doesn't exist.

And yet the boiling point exists.

It's the exact same situation with the exact same logic. I don't know where you got this distinction:

"Gravitational force" is something general and does not represent any specific value. But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. — Metaphysician Undercover

but (and excuse my french) it is complete nonsense.

which is what you were saying, the temperature at which something boils) is a specific value — Metaphysician Undercover

Not what I was saying. I was not referring to the value "100C" (in case of water) as the boiling point.

But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what boiling point means. Boiling point is every bit as general and condition dependent as gravitational force. See:

Yes, the boiling point of water is not a property. In the same way that the height of the empire state building is not a property. But height is a property.

The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. The boiling point of water is a specific value. — khaled

You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist.
— Michael

Yes. — khaled

No, there is not a temperature at which something boils. That is the point. There is no such thing as the temperature at which something boils. That's what I've been telling you. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems like you misunderstand what boiling point means which is why you say this. Hopefully the above clears it up.

I would say the main issue is that it needs to be ‘a thing that exists’ in order to feature in the system. Ontology doesn’t preclude being sans ‘thing’ness. If pattern or arrangement subsists (which relates to your earlier discussion with RussellA), then so too does absence - of matter and of pattern. — Possibility

Well, this seems to be a critique to basically every ontological system, and one that's easily fixable by including "absence" in whatever ontological system is missing it, so I don't believe it's exactly a problem with mine specifically or that it's a hard problem to fix.

I think this needs a separate op talking about whether "absence exists".

"Gravitational force" is just another way of saying "gravity" — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. I was referring specifically to the value that represents the strength of gravitational pull, but sure, let's say they're the same.

No, by my logic, the value assigned to any specific instance of gravitational force does not exist — Metaphysician Undercover

So the value of gravitational force does not exist since it varies based on what units/formulas we use? Is that what you're saying?

I am making no claims about whether gravitational force exists, or whether boiling water exists, I am making claims about the measured value of such things. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the "boiling point" is on exactly the same level as "gravitational force". We use both in formulas abstractly. And neither are talking about a specific value.

Likewise, the value assigned to the boiling point of water at average seal level air pressure might be 100 degrees, or 212 degrees, or even 373 degrees, depending on the formula employed — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but in all of these cases, the boiling point exists yes? There exists a temperature at which something boils, although we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values. Similar to how there exists a gravitational force between two objects, even though we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values.

Patterns we see in nature are inevitable if things move and the laws of nature are constant. — RussellA

And what are these "laws of nature" exactly in your view? Given that you do not believe patterns exist ontologically.

So what? Boiling water exists too. But that wasn't your claim — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, my claim was that the boiling point exists. That a "temperature at which something boils" exists. You said it doesn't because that temperature varies with a lot of factors.

I then said taxes exist. You said they don't because they vary with a lot of factors.

So the existence of gravity — Metaphysician Undercover

But I didn't say the existence of gravity. I said "gravitational force". Specifically because it is also a value that varies with a lot of factors. But it exists.

But by your logic, since the gravitational force depends on distance, and the mass of the two objects, it doesn't exist. Similar to how since the "temperature at which something boils" depends on the something and the pressure, therefore it doesn't exist. Similar to how since the "amount of money you owe the government" varies based on a lot of factors it doesn't exist (again, I wish it was that easy to dismiss taxes).

A question for you. If the "temperature at which something boils" doesn't exist, then when chemists use the boiling point in a formula, what are they talking about?

That's right, because it's arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet taxes exist....

You're wrong here though, it's not easy, but more difficult. The easy way is to just give in to what they say, give them what they ask for. The more difficult way is to find all the deductions you are eligible for, and reduce that amount of taxation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see what this has to do with anything.

My point is simple. The amount you have to pay in tax varies a lot. And yet taxes exist. Hence just because the value of it varies does not mean the thing does not exist.

Same with gravitational force. Gravitational force exists even though the gravitional force changes based on distance.

Taxes aren't real!"
.
— khaled

That's right — Metaphysician Undercover

(I hope this isn't an unfair quote, it seems to me to be what you mean)

there is no such thing as "the temperature at which something boils" — Metaphysician Undercover

A system where "taxes do not exist", "the boiling point does not exist" and "gravitaional forces do not exist" are true just sounds silly to me.

if you were to describe the condition of any given liquid, do you believe the liquid possesses something called a “condition” by virtue of using such possessive language? — NOS4A2

It wasn't just me that used said possessive laguage:

You’re just describing the state of the liquid. — NOS4A2

But yes, the liquid possesses a condition.

If so, which is wet? the condition or the liquid? — NOS4A2

The liquid. Why would it be the condition? A condition doesn't possess any of the qualities that would make up "wet". It can't as it's not material.

No, you cannot change the capabilities of a given liquid by thinking about it. But you can imagine different values in its properties and get a fairly accurate idea of what it will do in that state. — NOS4A2

Alright but that can't be mere coincidence right? Why does it happen to be the case that what we imagine matches up with the behavior of the liquid every time?

That's why I posit that the liquid itself has "laws" that determine its "states". We merely discover those laws. We don't make them up. If they were entirely mental constructs, then how come when we alter them, the things bound by them don't change behavior accordingly?

Also I am curious what the "gravitational constant" is in your view. Is it a mental thing, a physical thing, or something else? Unlike temperature and such, it's not really a property, just a value (6.6743 × 10^-11), but an important one. Where does that land?

We’re not talking about any particular liquid here so it’s entirely a product of the mind. — NOS4A2

Ok. So the state of the liquid is entirely a product of the mind yes? (as long as we're not talking about a particular liquid)

We also know that when liquids change states they change their capabilities too correct? So if the liquid changes states such that its temperature is 90 degrees Celsius, it starts being able to cook food for example.

So if on top of that states were entirely products of the mind, then one would be able to change the capabilities of a given liquid by convincing themselves its at a different state. But we cannot do so. If I try to cook a piece of meat in liquid (water/broth/etc) with 30C temperature, it won't cook, even if every single person on earth convinced themselves that the liquid (water/broth/etc) is 100C temperature.

So it seems to me you either deny that a change in states changes the capabilities of a liquid, OR states are not entirely mental constructs.