It's just about recognising that there are numerous influences on beliefs. I'm not even rejecting the idea that things like parsimony, coherence and the like are in the mix.

The problem is reliably isolating them by introspection is very difficult — Isaac

Right but what do we do instead of introspection?

Does it matter? If we're not really arriving at our beliefs that way anyway, then we don't really need an answer to that question. — Isaac

I would think the answer is “No” then. Doubting your beliefs isn’t fun usually. And if it’s not how you arrive at beliefs anyways then why bother with it?

Doesn’t sound right. But maybe it is.

The question then is: Now what? Is this reason to doubt more, or less?

Then again, doesn't this also apply for the reasons you believe this:

We'd no doubt like to imagine they're foundational. The phenomenal influence of culture, social group, peer belief, subliminal data etc on our beliefs pretty much conclusively shows otherwise. — Isaac

We seem to be stuck here. If we throw everything out as "Oh you just believe that because you've been conditioned to believe that" we'd have to throw THAT out too.

So we are still left with the question: How much should you doubt? What counts as "reasonable"? etc

To be able to consider a thought, i need to be able to perceive it — Olivier5

Give me an example of a thought you don't perceive.

You can perceive a thought by definition.

to hold it in some sort of short-term memory accessible to my consciousness. — Olivier5

I would flip that. You don't hold the thought in memory. The holding in memory (and whatever else the brain does) produces the thought.

And therefore they must have some effect on something — Olivier5

Non sequitor.

When it comes to investigating the existence of something yes, it must make a difference for us to detect it. But our own thoughts are clearly apparent to us from the outset. They are not something we are trying to find. "Sensing" your own thoughts implies that it is possible to have a thought that is not sensed. That makes no sense.

Your thoughts aren't apparent to me though. Precisely because they make no physical difference. If they did, I would be able to measure them. Yet, I can conceive of you doing all the actions you're doing right now without them. It's the whole point behind solipsism.

Is the way you detect your thoughts the difference they make? What about thoughts that you do not act on? Ones that seemingly make no difference?

we would have no way of noticing them, by definition of what an epiphenomenon is supposed to be: some stuff that has no effect on anything. — Olivier5

How does that follow? Where is the contradiction in noticing something that has no effect?

if an epiphenomenon existed out there, how would we know of it? — Olivier5

Yup. Because it is meaningless to speak of epiphenomena that you do know know of. Just as meaningless as experiences that you don’t notice.

“You don’t know hardship” or “You don’t know heartbreak” and other such (melodramatic?) uses are common.

In other words: No u :joke:

The minute detail of difference renders your experience private. — Isaac

Yea I thought it was clear I dropped that.

There's nothing special about the first which makes grouping them by loose affiliation OK but the second not. — Isaac

Yup.

Sort of feel bad that this is all I say after you wrote all that :rofl:

When you say a blind person can't know what red is, you just mean that a blind person cannot see red. Not that they know nothing about red. — Banno

Of course! Anyone can know the wavelength for one.

I’m beginning to think this whole thread is a disagreement over nothing for the most part. We just seem to be using different words but meaning largely the same things upon closer inspection.

That just seems like a silly question. How do you notice the experience of seeing a red apple? You grant that experiences exist right?

Calling something an experience (or epiphenomena) presumes you noticed it. What does it even mean to have an experience (or epiphenomena) and not notice it?

because life doesn't build things for no reason. — Olivier5

If there is a cost to building them. But the whole point of epiphenomena is that they’re costless. And not impactful.

not logically possible — Olivier5

At best you mean evolutionarily. And even then you’re wrong.

(on top of being not noticeable so nobody would know if they existed). — Olivier5

Where’d you get that epiphenomena aren’t noticeable?

You don't seem too keen on the TOPIC — schopenhauer1

How come I’m on every AN thread then?

If you wanna play the victim go right ahead. It isn’t personal. I replied to your OP because I found it interesting nothing more. And you took it as an attack. I don’t understand why you prefer to spend more time psychoanalysing my intentions than respond to my actual critiques. Culture not being the main reason we reproduce for example being one.

And even when I dropped the whole “Why are you responding to me” line you specifically brought it back up in a separate comment saying “I’m still waiting for a reply to this”. For what? And you accuse me of not engaging with your arguments and not trying to find common ground, while being more interested in debating my intentions than the actual arguments I put forward? What a joke.

You choose to see a personal attack. I even apologized first thing for my unintended passive aggressiveness. But no, that’s still not enough for you. You seek to prove, indisputably, that khaled has no reason to be commenting here. That khaled is targeting you because he’s a mean bully. And no matter how many times I tell you it’s not personal, and no matter how many times I try to respond to anything new you’re saying, you choose to see it as an attack, while ignoring the actual responses. And you would rather prove this than actually address what khaled is saying.

I’m not going to waste my time debating my intentions for commenting on a public forum with someone who would rather argue (in bad faith) about said intentions rather than address the arguments against the positions they put forward. Have a good one.

And did you read the NYT article and how it frames humans as a some agenda of productivity? — schopenhauer1

No. Why would I read a random opinion article that does something as ridiculous as treat people as an agenda of productivity. “We should have more kids to make more stuff” is exactly the kind of “harm to concepts” argument that I despise.

I'm still waiting for your response to this:
I just don't get why you want to respond anymore. What do you care? Obviously I care a great deal on this topic, but why do you care so much to rebut it? — schopenhauer1

Sigh. You know what you’re right. You keep making the same argument, and you don’t want to hear the same response. Ok have fun in your echo chamber. As you dismiss any objection to your position as “I’ve heard that before, you should be trying to agree with me here!”

Why must I justify to you why I respond to a post on a public forum in the first place? Why must I justify caring to rebut your post but you don’t have to justify caring to make it over and over?

But AN constantly must be on the defensive (as we speak actually), and yet the other side does not — schopenhauer1

Who said that?

it seems like there's no justification necessary for the other side because we are so used to it being the given. — schopenhauer1

Keyword: Seems

What was your argument then? — schopenhauer1

These 2:

Highly doubt it. All animals reproduce. And none of them have culture except us. I think it’s more reasonable to assume then to assume it’s not culture. Or at least not purely culture.

Another reason it’s not purely culture: If it was purely cultural we wouldn’t have gotten off the ground. You need thousands of people, a couple generations, and a couple decades at least before you get culture. How do you reckon we got all that sorted if culture is what tells people to have kids? — khaled

Sure, but that's because AN thinking wasn't even on the radar in any significant way. — schopenhauer1

I'd say it was just about on the radar as it is now, in the sense that the "percentage of antinatalists" hasn't changed. Heck it might have gone down. Antinatalism dates way back. It's just that with the internet, more people than ever are exposed to it.

“Know” has more uses than “Justified true belief”. For instance “Know programming”. Which means be competent at it.

I meant it in the colloquial sense. When a veteran tells you “You don’t know what war is” for example. Although you clearly know how to use the word (or else he wouldn’t have used it when talking to you as you wouldn’t understand)

It means you never had the experience. Or anything within the range of experiences we would describe as “red” or what have you.

Ok. And he doesn’t know what red is. Because he hasn’t experienced anything within the range. In the same way that Unenlightened’s friend can go on without knowing what red is.

Ok. Do you happen to be a panpsychist by chance?

You mean, continuous as in it is the same kind of stuff as rocks? I thought you meant it in the sense that we have an integrated “seamless” experience.

Cool but I wasn’t asking whether or not the mind is “continuous”. Not sure if this is addressed to me.

There is nothing self-justifying of the agenda of life itself. — schopenhauer1

Or of the agenda of AN. There is nothing self justifying of any agenda.

but the implications for us the living as we hash this political yay/nay out. — schopenhauer1

It won’t be hashed out because the nays will die out much faster than the yays

Procreation is caught up in so many things.. relationships, marriage, tribal relations. It is symbolic as much as it is some physical thing. There is a social dance, there is expectations, etc. It isn't akin to a bowel movement, breathing, the palmer reflex, the suckling reflex, etc. It is learned in development. — schopenhauer1

Sure there is a whole lot of cultural accessory around it. But it is still an instinct. This doesn’t address my argument as to why.

The debate of whether to have a society at all is even more fundamental and shouldn't be assumed that the answer is a resounding YES — schopenhauer1

Sure. But at any given point in history the answer will always be yes.

I know there are, I asked what those constraints are. And whether or not you think “minds” are physical.

brain creates this 'virtual mental space' that the mind seems to be, we might also discover that the deliberations and decisions made within that mental space are needed, indispensable for the organism, not optional. Not frivolous, not an epiphenomenon, but something useful — Olivier5

Sailing awfully close to dualist lines here.

It’s brown. But I can’t get the image out of my mind of you responding with an entire essay about how there is no “one experience of brown” when asked what the color of a table is :rofl:

As if there is only one real "knowing what red is". — Banno

There is a range. And he will experience none of it. Because he’s blind.

Well how come a mind can move an arm but can’t move anything outside of the body? So there is some limit here. How does that work? I know Olivier isn’t a dualist so he’s fine but what about you? Would you be willing to put minds and rocks as the same kind of stuff?

The other side must show how a feeling can move an arm.

I mean political as in there is some sort of agenda one wants to enact for other people in the world — schopenhauer1

Then antinatalism is also political.

Having agendas isn’t inherently bad. It depends on the agenda.

Yes, how can this be changed? — schopenhauer1

It couldn’t. The society that has people shun the members that disagree with the status quo will last longer than the society that doesn’t. Shunning in this way is evolutionarily advantageous so there’s no changing it. It’s gonna keep happening. Too much of it is evolutionarily disadvantageous though.

But in any case, it will never be evolutionarily advantageous NOT to shun the belief that will lead to extinction. By definition. This is assuming shunning is effecting at deterring the spread of ideas, which I think is a reasonable assumption.

This shouldn't be any different just because it seems more intractable from our current vantage point. — schopenhauer1

AN is on a whole new scale. Every time there has been a massive social movement, it was because an old belief was found harmful to the social order as a whole. It was because changing a belief results in a better society. Having children will never be found that way. Changing that belief results in no society.

My hunch is that the preference for continuing this socio-eco-cultural structure is more of a cultural reinforcement.. group-think rather than anything inbuilt. — schopenhauer1

Highly doubt it. All animals reproduce. And none of them have culture except us. I think it’s more reasonable to assume then to assume it’s not culture. Or at least not purely culture.

Another reason it’s not purely culture: If it was purely cultural we wouldn’t have gotten off the ground. You need thousands of people, a couple generations, and a couple decades at least before you get culture. How do you reckon we got all that sorted if culture is what tells people to have kids?

I do not deny people have some weird irrational fear of universe-retribution for eschewing the universe that has been so "benevolently" bestowed upon them. — schopenhauer1

Maybe a part of it. But not a large part. All animals reproduce. None of them fear universe-retribution while doing it I’d wager.

If you don't see it as a new angle, are you then writing in this thread to put me in my place and tell me how it is? — schopenhauer1

Well that’s an odd way to frame it...

You argue the same thing. I respond the same way. You accuse me of rehashing. If anyone is rehashing it’s you.

If you don’t want to hear the same response, don’t write the same argument. I’m responding to anything you write. Old or not. I don’t see what’s unfair or combative about that. If you don’t want me to respond at all, you shouldn’t have started a thread.

How does it really harm you if I want to post about this? — schopenhauer1

How does it harm you if I wanna respond to it?

Rather, the superstructure itself involves tasks which can be negatively evaluated as stated in OP — schopenhauer1

Such as? I don’t understand how a “superstructure” has tasks. Not sure what you mean.

even though it seems to be diminished into more of a lifestyle choice or just a preference? — schopenhauer1

Not in my experience. When I told people “Having kids is wrong” they reacted very differently to when others told them “I don’t want to have kids”. I think people do understand it’s a stance. Just they think it’s invalid. And repulsive.

The best I would concede is a feeling that represents what you think of as your response to red, right now. It may be different in the next few seconds and you may be wrong about it being in response to red (using the public definition of 'red'). — Isaac

Good enough. Not exactly sure what you mean here but it has "feeling" in it so that will do. Everyone who has tried to define qualia or experience has called it something along the lines of "What it feels to X"

So if there is an epiphenomenological qualia of 'red', no-one knows what it is. — Isaac

Of course you know what it is silly! It is:

a feeling that represents what you think of as your response to red, right now. — Isaac

If you're making the argument that what comes to mind when we think of "red" is not constant, sure, no disagreement there. From anyone I think. But it is largely similar. The banner for this site is not red for instance. What it feels like to drink orange juice radically changes after brushing my teeth is perhaps a better example.

They can see exactly what is in response to 'red' (tracing the main neural cascade from the cone cells), but they can't link that the the detail of how you're feeling because the links are too complex. — Isaac

The only point of disagreement here would probably be that I would add: Nor will they ever grasp that detail until they experience it.

What "red looks like to you" right now is something they can only know by making sure they have an identical brain state for the most part. The only way you get the same epiphenomena is by getting the same relevant physical conditions. Note here I'm assuming to "Know" the epiphenomena is to experience it.

A blind neurologist will never know that red is. Though he will know the physical condition under which the epiphenomena manifests.

Literally every single AN thread had the 3 of us :rofl:

Maybe we're just interested in the same topics.

How do you know? — Isaac

Well I managed to skip school a few times by faking pain.

what is the property of the content which makes A not B? — Isaac

Then it is the same as Unenlightened's question: "What is does red look like". I can't answer that. Not for lack of properties but for an inability to express the difference. You tell a me what red looks like first. The contents of our experience never enter the conversation so we have no words for them.

However what causes A to be different from B is a difference in physical causes.

I could tell by looking at them. I could tell by examining their eyes — Isaac

Remember:

And these color inverting glasses we couldn't detect for some reason. — khaled

But another question while you're at it: Would the person with the color inverting glasses act any differently to the person without them? Assuming they've had them on their whole life and they don't take them off.

That's just not true in the sense we use the term. That's what I mean by a 'leaky' cascade. Despite the small streams of signal chains which enter and leave the main route, it's absolutely obvious which is the main route. Obvious enough to label. If you don't accept fuzzy edges to labels, then you're not going to be able to use the vast majority of language. It's like saying we can't use the word 'cup' because there are a few edge cases were it's not clear if it's a cup or a vase.

The neural signal cascade is clear enough, and has distinct enough boundaries for use to legitimately say what neural processes are part of it and which aren't, to the same degree (if not better) than you could say experience X is and experience 'of red' and not just 'of everything'. — Isaac

Ok. I'll take your word for it.

I did a bit more thinking and: I concede. We can specify what physical differences are responsible for both content determining and structure determining differences. Though we haven't done so yet. So practically private. For now.

Your passive-aggressive comments aren't appreciated. — schopenhauer1

I apologize, I truly don't mean to be. Honestly.

I just don't get why pick the same fight? — schopenhauer1

You started the thread! If you make the same arguments of course I'm going to give the same reply!

unless you yourself can find a way past yourself, and no that is not my job that is yours. — schopenhauer1

So if I disagree with you it is my job to find a way to agree with you? C'mon now.

If so then you should have the same job so:

to respect the fact that we have argued this same thing before, and to honor the fact that a new thread does not wipe away previous conversations, can you at least think of an argument I might give in the hypothetical thousand pages that would try to counter what you are saying, and frame it in a respectable way? — schopenhauer1

What we can focus on maybe to keep it more elevated (and not zero-sum) is see if whether keeping this structure going, is whether it is a political decision and why this political decision is seen as good, necessary, and cannot be criticized. — schopenhauer1

But I've talked about this.

"Is it worth it to keep this structure going"?

My answer: I don't care about evaluations of the structure as a whole, I only care about specific people. If you can't show me someone who gets harmed then I couldn't care less what "structures" are "harmed"

"Is it a political decision"?

My answer: If you mean a decision taken by looking at aggregates, not necessarily. You can have children because of the specific people they are likely to help. I'm not sure exactly if you would count that as "aggregate" or political but then again I'm not sure we're using the terms the same way.

"Why is it seen as good, necessary and cannot be criticized"?

My answer: Evolutionary reasons. And it's not so much "cannot be criticized" as "You will be shunned if you criticize it". Which is the case for any popular belief.

But then you tell me that you heard this before and so I should come up with ways to agree with you instead? Well of course you've heard it before because we've talked about this before a 1000 times.

If you think there's something new here then you gotta tell me what it is because I'm not seeing it. And I'm not trying to be rude, I just genuinely don't see how this is a new angle.

As I said, I am still not sure why tossing dice has anything to do with personal agency. Consider the thought experiment I proposed earlier. All murderers in some hypothetical deterministic world are completely governed in their actions by natural law, save one that has a dice that they use to decide if they should shoot someone. Are they more free? Are they more responsible? — simeonz

Well said. I think the whole determinism indeterminism debate is a red herring. That’s not actually what people care about when they think of freedom and agency. I don’t think you need the possibility of doing otherwise to be free or morally responsible. All you need is uncertainty of the future, and lack of external impositions.

Yes I am well aware of your argument. What do you want me to say to you that would make us both come away feeling this was a productive conversation? You know we disagree, so shall we take another thousand pages to go over this argument? Are you saying this so your record is noted on the books? What would you like me to do with the information you provide me? Do you think that this has convinced me of your case? I only say this to you in particular because we have done this before. — schopenhauer1

You argue the same thing you get the same reply. Why are you surprised?

can you at least think of an argument I might give in the hypothetical thousand pages that would try to counter what you are saying, and frame it in a respectable way? — schopenhauer1

Not one that I’d find convincing. If I could think of an argument that could convince me to change my mind I would, well, change my mind! But I can’t so I don’t. And anyways that’s your job. You’re the one starting a new thread with the same old arguments. So expect to get the same old replies.

Not trying to rehash. Just pointing out that you have an assumption that I don’t think many share behind what you’re saying. It’s not objectively the case that ANs have a moral high ground because they don’t impose, since there are plenty of situations where we find imposing fine, heck, the right thing to do. And there are plenty of ways in which the non ANs are also striving not to impose.

You define content as if it were a single property, yet later talk about different content. In order for two 'contents' to differ, they must themselves be composed of properties which differ. I'm asking what these properties are. — Isaac

I'm sorry but this legitimately read like word salad. I have no clue what you're saying.

Yet here the content is caused by cone cells - part of the neural cascade I described. That's how we know it's a change in the content of colour experience and not a change in the content of some other experience. — Isaac

Not just the cone cells. The cone cells and the glasses and the object outside, and the whole body for that matter. We narrow down what is an "experience of red" by what the V4 area is doing. But, as my example shows, the content of experience can change even if the V4 area doesn't at all. All it takes is some glasses.

If what you mean to say is: The example I gave still has the change taking place in the visual system so is not evidence that any physical change (such as toes) can be responsible for content determining difference: I would agree. I would also add however that the human body is very integrated. Almost anything will cause a change in the visual system.

Now for the thought experiment: If someone were to put on color inverting glasses from birth. And these color inverting glasses we couldn't detect for some reason. Would we be able to tell they had them on?

I asked you what properties of experience were changed and what preserved in your isomorphisms — Isaac

The content is changed. The use (structure) is preserved.

but you just changed the subject. — Isaac

I didn't. I even gave an example. Color inverting glasses. Color inverting glasses would be an example of a structure preserving, content altering physical change. I thought the example makes it clear what I mean.

When you put on color inverting glasses, your experience of color is, well, inverted in terms of content. Everything you would have called red you now want to call green. However the structure is the same. Blood and grass are still different. Everything you were able to distinguish and label a certain color you can still distinguish and label just as before.

Glaucoma is not like that. If you get glaucoma you lose the ability to distinguish. The structure changes.

Another way to explain it:

If you were to sort things by color. As in make a "set of red things" and "set of blue things" etc... A structure preserving change would only switch the label of the sets. So the "set of red things" becomes the "set of blue things" and the vice versa. But the contents of the sets remain the same. So before let's say the "set of red things" were apples and blood and the "set of blue things" was the sky and the sea.

After a structure preserving change: now it becomes the "set of blue things" containing apples and blood and the "set of red things" containing the sky and the sea.

A structure altering change would for example make it so that the "set of red things" is apples, blood and the sky.

If any of it's properties are derived from something other than that stream it's no longer the epiphenomena 'of red'. — Isaac

False.

The content can be derived from something else. As long as the structure is the same then it is "of red". The structure is decided by activity in the V4 area.

What is "of red" is decided by the activity in the V4 area. However the content of the experience can still be decided by something else. There is no problem in that. If you think there is then what is it?

The 'of red' bit. In order for it to be an experience of red and not just an experience you happen to be having at the same time as seeing an object emitting 600nm wavelength, it has to be tied somehow to either the detection of the wavelength (if you want to take a very neurological approach), or to the public definition of 'red' (if you want to take a more linguistic approach). — Isaac

Those are the same thing. As in, the objects that fit the linguistic definition are exactly the objects that fit the neurological definition. The things we call red all emit around 600 nm wavelength light.

As I explained earlier, there is a 'leaky'* cascade of neural activity which leads from your cone cells to you preparedness to say/write/identify the colour red, right? — Isaac

Correct.

So it's properties (structure or content doesn't matter - all it's properties) result from this loosely identified neural stream by definition. — Isaac

No. You know that definition of madness right?

We have no evidence that all its properties are caused by these neural streams. We have evidence that its structure is caused by these neural streams. That is all the evidence we have. Because structure is all we can study. Because a content difference that preserves structure makes absolutely no difference (since epiphenomena are not causal)

We have no evidence that the V4 area is responsible for everything related to the epiphenomena of color. We only have evidence that it is responsible for the structure. As in, when people show similar activity in the V4 area they are both having experiences they would describe by using the word "red" not having the same experience.

So what you think of as your experience 'of red' is a post hoc collection of re-activated neural activity generated by existing neural circuits themselves moulded and pruned by your cultural environment. — Isaac

Sounds a lot like introspection....

You cannot have an experience 'of red' that is not selected and (to some extent) even completed made up, by the cultural definition of red. — Isaac

Correct. The language decides the structure of experience to a large degree.

But not the content.

You asked why it's the default not why it's justified. It's the default because it is intuitive and the majority believe it. And so naturally they will shun those who don’t. As to why it’s justified? I’ve given a couple possibilities.

the antinatalist does not force anything on anyone, the procreationist sympathizer does. — schopenhauer1

You could argue the antinatalist forces people to not procreate. Most schools of thought don’t see procreation as an unjustified imposition. For instance: you would be forcing christians to go directly against their beliefs, as they’re told to have children.

We force things on people all the time if they’re justified. For instance education. So just because a position doesn’t force anything on anyone doesn’t make it better right off the bat. Not having kids go to school is definitely worse than having them go to school.

Or you could argue that the antinatalist also forces things on people. If you choose not to have children, then the people the children would have helped are worse off. You could argue that’s as much an imposition as having the child itself would be.