Wow. You would be about the first person I've ever debated with on here that's even considered the possibility of changing their position in response to an argument put by the other side. Regardless of what you come up with in response, I'm impressed you'd have the intellectual honesty to do so. — Isaac

I wasn't always AN. I moved to AN from the standard view and haven't really had a reason to move back. But hey, good to know that I'm not an intellectually dishonest spawn of Satan :blush:

I remember hearing a similar objection a year ago, but it didn't quite click. Now it does. Consider my mind changed. Though I'm sort of at a "cusp" here and might change back easily. I try not to grow attached to my ideas.

But yea I am not quite at "standard" level yet. I would still want to see some proof that the parent can actually parent before considering having kids to be right. That they actually are likely to produce ethically good children. But this has always been the case. Even before AN I thought people should have to take a "parenting certificate". Nothing too difficult to get, just don't be a cunt basically. Though I have no idea what the practical ramifications of that would be or how it would be enforced.

I think the main reason it didn't click the first time was that in the other cases (parenting, surgery, laws) the effects of not doing them were immediate. It never occurred to me that that was the ONLY difference and it's not one that I think should be significant. In the case of not having children, people will still be harmed, just way later, and way more indirectly. I was only considering the parent and the child as part of the "system".

But then how do you deal with a The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas situation? By this logic, it would be fine to do what was done in the book. Imagine for instance, that you knew your next child will be absolutely miserable, to a point where normally you would consider it wrong to have them, but would cure cancer. Is it ok to have them?

Kinda glad I procrastinated and didn't leave when I did actually. Didn't think you'd be able to change my mind.

I actually see the inconsistency now. Will get back to you later. This might just do it.

Well who cares, as long as you both agree with X, whether or not X is actually the case. For the purposes of discussion, it is. And you can get plenty done what way. Everything, really.

Yes, I gather that. Which is inconsistent with your response to surgery, laws and parenting where in those cases you use the net harm reduction to justify the action to take on another's behalf. — Isaac

How is it inconsistent?

With surgery: NOT doing the surgery is the more harmful option.
With laws: NOT having the laws is the more harmful option.
With parenting: NOT sending your kids to school is the more harmful option.

With having kids: Having kids is the more harmful option. EVEN IF it is likely that it won't be harmful. It CAN be. Because NOT having kids guarantees 0 harm. Except to yourself that is (and only if you don't adopt).

How do you judge what someone "can predict"? — Echarmion

This again? We already went over this.

But it is knowingly if you understand the logic. It's a certainty that the actions you take cause indefinite causal chains and therefore also cause harm. — Echarmion

I'm saying it's surely better not to do something that you know is way more likely to cause more harm than its alternatives.

How is it possible to "do my best" if I know I'll inadvertently cause harm by seekingly innocuous acts? Like if I celebrate my birthday, there is a significant possibility that by having a party, I cause not just one, but possibly several children to be born. I know this to be the case, it's not some outlandish scenario. So no parties? — Echarmion

You likely haven't increased the number of children in the world in any way, so no. But there is also a chance that by not holding a party, your depressed friend kills themselves. But there is also a chance that by not holding the party, one of the people you would have invited gets killed in a house robbery as opposed to just being robbed. But but but.

Point is, you're being ridiculous by taking a single possibility and based on that concluding that the thing is wrong. At the level you're talking at, with things that have incredibly low chances of happening, no amount of processing the possibilities will yield a very clear answer. Which is why I don't think having the party is wrong. It doesn't do any clear damage. You can think of a million ways it can harm and I can think of a million ways NOT having it can harm. So don't be outlandish and try to only highlight the bad.

With birth, there is no way not doing it can harm. That's the point.

I am asking how you arrive at the conclusion that preventing people from existing is morally equivalent to preventing some particular instance of suffering, since you agree they're not one and the same. — Echarmion

It isn't. Because in the once case (preventing an instance of suffering) that's usually seen as a good thing. You helped someone. But not having kids is not a good thing. Not a bad thing. The point is "Not a good thing, not a bad thing" is better than "A bad thing" which is the alternative.

But if just potential avoidance of future harm is sufficient, how does this not apply to children? — Echarmion

I don't get what you mean here.

Does it matter here how strong the feelings are? Maybe you don't don't find the other person objectionable, you just don't think you'll be as happy as with someone else. But of course you don't know that. So why cause the immediate, certain harm? — Echarmion

Because otherwise you'll be causing certain harm later to yourself since you're not with the person you like.

Noone is good enough not to risk harming others. — Echarmion

I said "not really risk harming others". You know what I mean.

And we determine this breaking point how? What's the mental operation here? Because from the outside, it looks like you're just taking the status quo and then saying "this is what causes the least harm". — Echarmion

It's more like, I find the point at which it becomes acceptable around the point of the status quo.

Net harm reduction is the measure you use elsewhere. Net harm reduction. The net harm reduced by having a child is something which is at least arguable. Certainly requires actual empirical data and is not this ridiculously simplistic equation you would have everyone use. — Isaac

And that's the one I used here. What are you on about?

Likely will not be overall harmful to himself or others — khaled

I am saying that EVEN IF the child is likely to have a net harm reduction effect, that does not make procreation right.

This is gonna be my last reply for now. Don't have any more time for you.

Most people are satisfied with their lives. So overall people's harm-reduction activities must be sufficient to render an overall satisfaction. — Isaac

Non-sequitur. You make it sound like the only factor at play in people's happiness is the actions of those around them. That is ridiculous. If it were true, it would be impossible to find someone who is happy in spite the negative actions of others.

Are most people happier alone? No. So it follows from this fact alone that most people's happiness is generated by others. — Isaac

Most? I don't really buy that but sure. Let's assume your child is likely to have a net positive impact, on himself and others. It still is not enough to make it right. Because "alleviation of harm" and "happiness" are different. Let's just compare alternatives:

Have child:
Likely will not be overall harmful to himself or others

Do not have child:
Definitely will not be overall harmful to himself or others.

This is because you can't really argue that I have harmed someone by not having a child even if my child would have helped them. Even though my child helping them would have made them happy. In the same way that if, say, you had my Paypal account, and you chose not to send me 100 dollars daily, you're not really harming me are you? In any traditional sense of the word. Even though I would certainly be happy to receive 100 dollars daily, since I have no entitlement or need for those 100 dollars, I would not be harmed not to get them.

So in this case you should not have a child. Because that is definitely not harmful. Whereas the alternative is only likely not to be harmful. And there is no need to take the risk. This is why I say "alleviation of harm" and not just "benefit"

Of course you haven't, if three caveats in you throw your hands up and say "oh it's all too complicated for me". — Isaac

You threw your hands up first with "I'm not just going to do this everytime"

If you want to do this: State your system. Clearly. All the factors. Just dump a wall of text. Then we'll see if it doesn't break. It probably doesn't, but on the account of having something like "The survival of the human race is paramount".

Neither does mine. — Isaac

You haven't presented yours. So I'll wait to see it.

. And when I do you complain about the multiplication of factors. — Isaac

As I said, you do first.

It basically does. It's a fairly strict rule of evolution. — Isaac

False. The answer to mathematical problems can be incredibly simple. Yet the calculation can be grueling.

No, it doesn't. Unless you are an exception to every other brain studied. — Isaac

Jesus. Even my own system is computationally expensive. Determining which act does the least harm is expensive. I am proposing that when my brain is doing any moral calculation, that is effectively what it is doing. Factors such as "the good of mankind" don't appeal to me. They are processed just the same, but are never enough to overturn the most important factors.

Possibly, but why are all those other brain regions involved? — Isaac

They are still involved. But they never manage to overturn the main factors.

And, again, computationally expensive =/= cannot be reduced to a simpler answer. Just because all those brain regions are involved does not mean you cannot come up with a system that yields the same answer as your natural brain processing, that is a lot simpler. In the same way that the function ((x + x^(3/2)*x^(3/2)/x^3)^(3/2))^2 is very computationally expensive but can be reduced to: (x+1)^3

You can't get outside of it and make it want something else. Where would you get the motivation to do so from? — Isaac

When did I do that? I am not going outside my brain when I intuitively find that employing intuitive morality, without any analysis or attempt at systematizing your view, is moronic and dangerous. It's why we make laws. Because with intuitive morality, there is no real rhyme or reason to do anything, you just do what you feel like.

It is only necessary that your child is above average for it to be the case that their net action is to reduce harm. — Isaac

When have I said otherwise? Did you actually read my reply to pinrick?

Previously when uncertainty was raised as a critique, you rallied to "we can be sure of the overall picture". Why are you now avoiding that? — Isaac

Because we can't be sure of the overall picture of the child's impact on others. Learn to read please. This is tiring.

I am saying that the child's impact on others cannot be predicted as net positive or net negative throughout his life. Though we have enough data to conclude that in all likelihood a child will have a net positive life, we do not have enough data to conclude that in all likelihood he will not be an asshat.

We can be sure - from the general life satisfaction measured in every survey on the matter - that people's general harm-reduction activity must be substantial, certainly net positive. — Isaac

How does a survey about how happy people are lead to the conclusion that my child will not be an asshole? Assholes can be happy. This is a non-sequitur. It does not follow from a general satisfaction measure that people's general harm-reduction activity is net positive.

If any of life's trivial burdens counts as a harm, then just smiling at someone to make then feel better counts as reducing that harm. — Isaac

Agreed. But I do not see the data to conclude that your child will have a net positive effect on others. This is not to suggest that they will have a net negative effect. Just that there is not enough evidence to conclude that, in total, your child will alleviate more suffering than is caused by having them. So let's just focus on the system including the child, and yourself. In that system, having a child is certainly the more harmful option.

This makes no sense at all. If I've just explained how circumstances and caveats are essential to understanding morality, it's nonsense to maintain that their presence can be described as 'breaking' it. — Isaac

Huh? "Breaking" is when your supposed maxim, caveats and all, results in something you find ridiculous. For example "Do not deny pleasure" results in you being obligated to give me 100 bucks if I ever ask. So you amend it by adding caveat X. "Do not deny pleasure unless X" may or may not break elsewhere. Add as many caveats and maxims as you want. Point is to arrive at a system that is surgical enough to make MGE wrong, birth ok, and not break elsewhere. I haven't seen anyone do that so far.

Your maxim has caveats too. Is it 'broken'? — Isaac

No because with the caveats it produces no inconsistencies.

To say factor A needs to be taken into consideration in case X but it's not so relevant in case Y is not a 'critique'. — Isaac

But to say that you have no way to distinguish between X and Y is a critique. So you have to introduce some factor B that is present in X and not in Y, that together with A makes X wrong and Y ok or what have you.

That's what actually happens, and it happens in your brain, schop's brain, my brain regardless of whatever pubescent philosophy you want to claim you follow. — Isaac

Sure. Yet in my brain it always seems to come down to a few important factors that make almost all else irrelevant.

Again, just because it is computationally expensive does not mean the answer has to be complicated. It is computationally expensive to determine which action results in the least harm as well.

If fifteen factors to consider is really too complicated for you then I can see exactly how you've ended up with the arguments you have - it explains a lot. — Isaac

It's 15 unrelated factors with no indication about which can be applied when and why that is too complicated. Because at that point you're just doing intuitive morality, with no real system.

So how is it that in conceiving a child (who, by your own notion of ethics will spend a good deal of their time reducing harm), I can somehow be certain that the net effect would not be to actually reduce harm? — Isaac

Check my reply to pinrick for this. It’s mathematical. Assuming you don’t assume your child will cure cancer or do any such amazing feat. Which is just as unreasonable to assume as it is to assume they will do some large harmful feat like become a criminal.

but it only takes one accidental birth and you could argue that your own child could then justifiably reduce the net harms in the world — Isaac

How so? Again, check my reply to pinrick. It is very difficult to say that having a child will reduce net harm.

Continuing to have children (who work to reduce harm) is the only way to ensure the net harm in the world is reduced short of actual 100% immediate genocide. — Isaac

Problem is, it is just as unreasonable to assume that they will work to reduce harm as it is to assume that they will work to increase it. Which is why I don’t consider the child’s effect on others. Too many unknowns to accurately predict either way.

If and when life becomes a curse, there's a very simple and radical solution to it: death. — Olivier5

“It’s fine to hurt them cuz if they don’t like it they can just kill themselves”

Do I need to say more? What does this NOT justify?

This weird kind of logic would mean you're responsible if the person whose life you save ends up a serial killer. — Echarmion

If you knew the person whose life you save will end up a serial killer, then yes it's absolutely your responsibility. I already told you how I deal with this: By taking into consideration what you can predict. You could not have predicted that the person whose life you save will end up a serial killer. If you could have then you shouldn't have saved them.

Not to mention that causal chains are indefinite, so whatever you do, you're basically guaranteed to cause something horrible eventually. — Echarmion

But better not to do so knowingly, surely?

So you necessarily need to add caveats like there needs to be a certain probability, which are ultimately arbitrary. — Echarmion

Or the caveat that it depends on what you know. In other words: Try your best to not cause harm. Doesn't sound crazy does it?

But if you agree that not existing isn't the same as not suffering, how can you then be certain that it's nevertheless preferable to suffering? — Echarmion

You agreed that there are certain situations where one shouldn't have kids if they will likely suffer too much. So does it matter how I can be certain? We agree here. Non-existence is preferable to suffering.

Certainly most people wouldn't say that they'd rather not exist than exist and suffer. So where do you take this idea from? — Echarmion

What does this have to do with anything. You were the one that just said "I prefer not to have been born" makes no sense. Neither does "I prefer to exist and suffer". Because at no point were they in a position to choose.

If someone kills their partner in a one-time emotional meltdown, do we still punish them? — Echarmion

You don't know it's one time. And that we do punish them by law doesn't necessarily make it right (I agree it's right in this case though)

Are we allowed to cause people emotional pain by rejecting their love, regardless of our reasoning? We are, but this also cannot be justified as prevention of harm, — Echarmion

If you don't want to be in a relationship and you are obligated to be in one that would fall under "Having things done to you that you wouldn't want done to you" I think, no? So it is prevention of harm. From yourself.

Do we allow people to ride motorcycles for fun? We do. But clearly this creates the conditions for harm. — Echarmion

Depends on how good they are at them. If they're good enough that they will not really risk harming others then it's fine. If they are riding for the first time for fun in a public area, that's wrong, clearly. Point is, there is a breaking point at which you cannot seriously say that they are causing harm by riding. A point at which frustrating their desire to ride a motorcycle arbitrarily can be predicted to cause as much harm as actually riding the motorcycle. Until that point, yes it is wrong to ride the motorcycle. That point is around where they get a license

This part:

And based on that fact some justification should be required to do the thing that could lead to this negative subjective evaluation in the future.
— khaled

It strikes me as completely absurd. — Echarmion

Huh? Does it now?

However, would you willingly try to cause unnecessary harm (assuming you knew what you were doing was indeed harmful rather than something else like "just punishment" or corrective action)?
— schopenhauer1

This is essentially asking "are you evil"? — Echarmion

So why did you call doing harm without justification "evil"?

as freedom (of choice?) needs to exist for some reason in the first place and is more important than the negative duty to not cause unnecessary harm somehow. — schopenhauer1

This. He has yet to give an example where “maximizing freedom” trumps not causing harm either. Which makes me doubt if he actually believes this or is just using it as an exception in this one case arbitrarily.

you do really seem to treat harm as an objective fact as opposed to a human judgement. — Echarmion

What I do is: I treat it as an objective fact that there is a chance my child will subjectively judge a majority of his life to be bad. Because that is an objective fact. And based on that fact some justification should be required to do the thing that could lead to this negative subjective evaluation in the future. That justification is missing. So having kids is wrong. Where exactly do you have a problem?

Sure, it's part of a causal chain that includes harm at some point. — Echarmion

And does this not entail some responsibility? It's not like you couldn't have predicted your child would be harmed, no you knew it would happen. And continued with the course of action that would lead to it anyways. Why? Normally we'd need some justification when doing something harmful to others.

What about that not having B does not cause harm? I think we agree there as well.
— khaled

No, I don't agree, as I have explained. If harm is "doing something to someone they do not want to do", then the absence of harm is "doing something that is not going against anyone's will". The amount of people doesn't seem to matter here. — Echarmion

What? If "Not having B does not cause harm" is false then "Not having B causes harm" is necessarily true. Who, exactly, is harmed due to someone not having a child?

I'm saying precisely that "Not having children" is "Not going against anyone's will". Do you agree? If you disagree tell me whose will it is going against.

And concerning suffering, which you seem to use interchangeably with harm: if suffering is "something you don't want is done to you", then not suffering is "nothing you don't want is done to you" — Echarmion

Or nothing is done to you. Period. When nothing is done to you "something you don't want done to you" is certainly not done to you. So you are not suffering. In that case I agree that it makes no sense to really say "you are not suffering" since there is no "you". But whatever is happening here, it is certainly preferable to causing harm knowingly.

This is what I find so weird about this specific nitpick. We agree that "having children causes harm" is true. I think we agree that causing harm would normally require some justification for the act. But your critique is with the statement "Not having children does not cause suffering". It is based on the fact that there is no one that suffering is "alleviated from" in this case.

Ok, assuming this is valid..... Who cares? You have not by saying this removed the need for justification when considering doing something that will result in harm. This is such a pointless critique, because whether or not it is valid doesn't even matter. Even if it is valid, it is not enough for having children to come out right. Because you haven't dealt with the main issue. Having children causes harm. We need some sort of justification to do this. The claim is that that justification is not present. Saying "But not having children is not alleviating harm from anyone" is not justification, and I agree with it. So what's the point of saying that at all?

We've been over this, and I already gave you my arguments for how it can nevertheless be wrong. — Echarmion

You weren’t using this highly limiting definition for the word “harm”.

And we're back to repeating the same sentences over and over again. Maybe if you say it another 100 times, it'll suddenly be convincing. — Echarmion

Do you want to argue that having B does not cause harm? Because I think we agree that it does. What about that not having B does not cause harm? I think we agree there as well. So what is there that is not convincing?

I literally just explained to you, and you agreed. So I am confused why you're now turning around and telling me that, no, we don't need a comparison of different states of affairs that B experiences. — Echarmion

It depends on what you mean by “we are comparing B’s feeling to nothingness”. I was making sure you don’t mean this:

“if B is not born B will feel neutral” — khaled

But yes, we do NOT need a comparison of different states of affairs that B experiences. That is NOT what is being done here. Because in one case there is no B to experience anything. So what is happening is clearly not a comparison of two different states of affairs that B experiences. It is simply the recognition that a state of affairs includes harm. So don’t bring it about.

In the second, we're comparing Bs feeling to nothingness. — Echarmion

False. We are finding that in one option B will have negative feelings. In the other he won’t. So we pick the one where he won’t. We are not saying that “if B is not born B will feel neutral”. Or anything to that effect.

You can't very well arrive at the conclusion that B would rather never have existed, because that's inherently contradictory. — Echarmion

“Rather never have existed” makes no sense. B was never in a position to choose. He couldn’t have rathered never existed, or rathered existed at that. That is not what is being used as justification for not having B. What is being used is that having B caused unjustified harm, whereas not having B doesn’t. It is irrelevant HOW it doesn’t cause unjustified harm, only that it doesn’t whereas the alternative does.

As to the "hard line", it's between saying something like "one has to always minimize suffering" and saying something like "you're responsible for protection this person from suffering caused by getting lost because you're their tour guide". — Echarmion

If you only care about suffering that requires: A- a specific person who exists now and B- a specific harm then you will run into a lot of trouble.

This has malicious genetic engineering come out as fine. Since there is no person who exists now that you could harm. Nor is there a specific harm. Blindness in itself isn’t harmful, it just makes it more likely you’ll run into harm.

So how do you have MGE come out to be wrong in light of these requirements?

But then doesn't preventing harm here turn into preventing the conditions that allow harm to be assessed? — Echarmion

It is both. Still, better to prevent harm than not to. In absence of a justification to do otherwise. What’s difficult about this.

The "conditions that allow harm to be assessed" are precisely that someone is harmed for you. Which I find so weird. This quote amounts to "But then doesn't preventing harm here turn into preventing harm here?"

"Harm assessment" happens when you wish for a different state of affairs because of what just happened to you. In other words, ANY prevention of harm would amount to "preventing the conditions that allow for harm to be assessed" by this definition. Let me give an example:

A considers punching B, then chooses not to. IFF A had punched B, B would have thought "damn this sucks, I wish this didn't happen". But A did not punch B. Therefore A eliminated the conditions that allow harm to be assessed. Since B will no longer go into "harm assessment phase". Since B did not get harmed. This is because, again, the way you define the"conditions" is precisely that someone is harmed.

There is no general responsibility for all possible harm. Rather, there are specific responsibilities towards the people you interact with. — Echarmion

What do you mean here exactly? Because I like to point out that there is no such thing as “guaranteed harm”. There is only ever “possible harm”. Pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger is not guaranteed harm, as the gun might jam. It’s still all “possible harm”. So if you mean to say that you need harm to be guaranteed for the act to be wrong then that’s ridiculous.

Where is the hard line between "general" and "specific" responsibilities? Also what happened to "special suffering" whatever that was?

But they don't 'break it'. That;s the point. What you're doing is presenting situations for one maxim in which it is insufficient on its own to explain the result. That's entirely to be expected if we use more than one maxim. Nothing's being 'broken'. — Isaac

Call it what you will. In my book that's called "breaking". Because until caveats are introduced your system is insufficient.

Why? Why would you expect there to not ever be any single exceptions. We've established that differnet scenarios introduce different factors to consider. What's so special about the number 1 that it can't be the sum total of cases with some given set of factors? — Isaac

Nothing weird about it. But I haven't seen a combination of factors that actually succeeds in doing this that don't break elsewhere.

That is exactly what you are de facto arguing by using examples of the form "but you wouldn't...". — Isaac

False. I only say the "but you wouldn't..." when critiquing the premises you present me. So you say something like "Denying pleasure is wrong" and I reply with "But you wouldn't just give me 100 bucks if I asked you even though that would be denying pleasure". You then have to go back and add caveats to the original premise of "Denying pleasure is wrong". Etc. Until you can actually come up with something that is surgical enough that it makes birth ok and MGE not and doesn't have weird side effects elsewhere.

But you add 3 different caveats every time I give a point at which they don't work. Like a hydra, you cut one head off and 3 more pop out. At this point you have like 15 different completely unrelated factors that go into what makes something right and neither of us can be bothered to clean them up. So I'll just take your word for it that you have some consistent system or other there that somehow incorporates all these factors and makes birth ok without coming up with weird results like "but eating skittles on Christmas eve is wrong".

Apart from managing our body, working out social/moral dilemmas is the biggest job our brain does. It's occupied with it almost all the time at a tremendous rate of calculations per second. The effort is literally exhausting (one of our biggest calorie demands) and is most probably the reason why our brains barely fit through the birth canal (at huge survival cost). That anyone would expect the answers to be writable in a few pithy maxims is absurd. It's fiendishly complicated. Luckily for us we have the most integrated supercomputer the world has ever seen working on the problem almost every second of our waking day. The problem arises when, instead of trusting the results of that network, we ignore all but one region and expect the results to be anywhere near as good. — Isaac

And when the network is indecisive what do we do? Or when it produces different results for different people like it is here? We try to find the most important factors. I have done so and come up with a system that I haven't seen critiqued successfully so far. You have started to do so but stopped because you keep adding factors on factors on factors and it is too much to keep up with.

And I think it's fallacious to say that because the problem is computationally costly, that the answer has to be complicated. Maybe a few pithy maxims IS all it comes down to for a certain individual. And the other factors in the network are just never prevalent enough to overcome those few important maxims. It's not that they're being ignored it's that they're insufficient to change anything.

The comparison is hard to notice, because it's such a natural thing to do. But when you say "I wish this didn't happen to me", you're not wishing for an absence, an empty set, because you cannot actually imagine the absence of a state of affairs. What you do instead is imagine a different state of affairs that the event isn't part of. Absence is always relative. — Echarmion

And when I say "My child will suffer" I am saying "My child will do this comparison you are speaking of and wish for a different state of affairs". That's it. No metaphysical mumbo jumbo.

Seriously, do you think the sentence "My child will suffer" makes no sense?

And the one where we establish harm/suffering in the first place does require us to compare two different versions of Timmy. — Echarmion

Huh? In order to say “My child will suffer” I have to compare two different “versions” of him? No.

Use the reply function please so I get notifications

If they’re not prepared, I doubt they want them. — Pinprick

You'd be surprised. For the record I'm not referring to my own parents I had a normal childhood.

But you can’t be certain about this. The next family may very well be starving to death. — Pinprick

But that is incredibly unlikely. In other words, the chances that I cause more harm than I alleviate from myself here are very slim. It is far more likely that not buying is the more harmful choice.

And if they were starving they’d just buy any other food. It doesn’t have to be what I’m considering

I don’t see how you can be sure that whatever unknown harm may befall the child will be less than the harm the hopeful parents (as well as hopeful grandparents, siblings, etc.) will experience. — Pinprick

Very simple: Would Adam and Eve suffering from childlessness compare to the suffering of all mankind thus far? No. Clearly not. Heck they caused more suffering due to childlessness alone than the suffering due to childlessness than they would have experienced themselves.

There is no mathematical way that not having children is the less harmful alternative.

But in this situation, you prefer to compare potential harms. Why is that? — Pinprick

I am doing so in both situations. Try comparing potential harms in the case of birth. There is no way having children is the less harmful alternative.

Why is it ok to risk harming others while building a pipeline without their consent, but not ok to risk harming another person by having a child? — Pinprick

It is NOT always okay to risk harming others by building a pipeline that was my point. It matters what that pipeline accomplishes. If it alleviates more harm than it is likely to cause then it's fine. If it doesn't (say, because it connects to nowhere and some rich guy is building it for literally no reason) then it's wrong.

and it can’t be because of the amount of harm not doing so could cause (we’ve lived this long without a pipeline, so building one is more for convenience than anything else). — Pinprick

The benefit isn't for you. But I doubt that pipeline is useless. That it is not needed by someone else. But if it is purely for convenience then I'm not sure it should be right. We pay a lot more attention and condemn people when a forest fire occurs due to a gender reveal party than if it occurs because of a construction mistake when building an orphanage. Why? Because in the former there was no need for the party, but in the latter it was an accident that happened while doing something that alleviates harm from someone else. People would not blame the construction worker for the damages as much as people would blame the people holding the party.

If it's purely for convenience I think they would need consent from the people living in the neighborhood.

However, not having a child will cause more people to suffer. At the very least there are two parents, even more if you consider grandparents, siblings, etc. that may be negatively affected by the parents not having a child. — Pinprick

Still shouldn't even be close.

Putting exact numbers on things is ridiculous, but to illustrate the point, let’s say if I have a child it’s likely that he/she will suffer 20% of his/her life. Let’s say that by not having a child, I, my wife, and our parents will each suffer 5% more than we would if we had a child. Cumulatively, this amounts to an increase of suffering of 30%. Which is the better option in your opinion, and why? — Pinprick

The calculation is incomplete. Think about it. Parents (2 people) and their parents (4 people) each suffer 5%.

We know the child suffers 20%. Let's assume THEY don't have kids. After they grow up, we can assume 5% of that 20 comes from them not having children. Then we take into account their spouse, another 5%, and the parents of the couple (in this case you are part of them), another 20%. So it comes out to: 20% + 5% + 20% for a total of 45% total for having a child that then doesn't have a child.

Let's assume they DO have a child. Then the percentage is still bad. 15% from the person themselves (since I counted childlessness as 5% and that won't be the case here) and 20% from their child. 35% right there. Not even considering whether or not this child will have kids or not (both will increase the percentage)

Both cases are larger than not having a child and taking the 30%.

And this is WITH counting childlessness as 25% of a person's suffering throughout their life which I find inaccurate in the first place. Never mind the fact that if you adopt you don't even have to deal with the 30% and you don't cause any extra harm.

So it’s ok to do because you think it will benefit them? — Pinprick

Because I think the alternative is even worse for them*

Presumably because they find life valuable, right? — Pinprick

Yea.

Personally, I think my life is worth more than $1000, but everyone has their price. — Pinprick

But your principle would imply that if I think I know your price I MUST press the button for you. I don't think either of us thinks so.

So, if these two parents are considering having a child, and one parent states that they will kill their self if they have a child, then they shouldn’t have the child, regardless of how beneficial doing so may be for the child. — Pinprick

A bit extreme eh? What if the parent says "I kinda don't wanna have a kid". By your principle that would not be enough to outweigh the "benefits to the child" (still think this doesn't make sense but ok). So in that case they should be FORCED to have the child. That's the consequence of requiring that people don't deny pleasure.

What I wanted to point out is that you figure out whether something was necessary by making another comparison. — Echarmion

The comparison is between: Harm done when doing the act vs Harm done by not doing the act. Not between existent and non-existent Timmy whatever that is. That's the point. There is no weird metaphysical mumbo jumbo going on here.

again you seem to be going down this weird line that if two things are similar in one aspect, they must be the same thing. — Isaac

Until the difference is stated explicitly they are.

It's like you look to normal attitudes as a measure of what's convincing morally but then refuse to allow conception into that set of normal attitudes. — Isaac

Because it is the topic of debate....

That you phrase these as greater harms is irrelevant. — Isaac

False. That they can all be phrased as avoiding greater harms makes it dubious that “greater benefits” is the significant variable here.

In MGE there are no greater harms being avoided, with birth there are. — Isaac

What is the greater harm being avoided in birth?

Because as I've said for like the hundredth time we do not decide moral dilemmas by applying a single maxim. — Isaac

For fucks sake I know. I am giving examples that break it so that you continue to add caveats until you have a self consistent system with no side effects. Then I look to see if I agree or disagree with that system. That’s the point of these examples. I am fully aware that there are a 100 caveats you can use to resolve this. However I want to see which you actually use.

With exercise, the benefits of coercion would not outweigh the harms, given the methods we'd have to use. — Isaac

Now you have to lay out exactly when this is the case and when it isn’t.

With exercise, there's and alternative method (persuasion). — Isaac

And when that fails it’s justified to force?

With exercise, failure to achieve the benefits is remediable. — Isaac

No? What?

I'll do one more of these, but I'm not going to just point out the actual differences all the time when the whole "this is a bit like that so it must be the same thing..." argument is flawed. — Isaac

Even though you constantly point out flaws in my argument until I add enough caveats until you’re unable to. But when I do the same you stop.

But yea I’m getting tired or this too. All your caveats I can easily think of exceptions to. You seem to just be making up caveats as you go, relevant or not. What do you do when these caveats clash? When there is a reason to do something, but no desire to mitigate harm or when the benefits outweigh the costs, but there is intent to do harm, etc. It’s getting too complicated to keep track of.

Like saying "there are just no examples -apart from the example you just gave". What kind of counter-argument is that? — Isaac

It points out that maybe you’re using the wrong principle. For the case of “benefits outweighing costs” for example I’ve already given examples where we do not follow this. We do not force people to exercise or diet, even though by this principle alone we should. So you introduce 3 more caveats. Point is you introduce so many caveats and do not show how they relate or what to do when they clash. You don’t show which are actually more or less relevant. And it’s getting to be too many to keep track of so I don’t care anymore.

Most has been taken up trying to show that it is commonly held but inconsistently not applied to birth. Those arguments are flawed, and it is those I've been mainly opposing. — Isaac

I’ll take your word for it that you actually have some consistent system that can make birth ok and MGE not. But I will point out that, again, “This principle would lead to this or that ridiculous conclusion if applied in this other situation” is the argument used by BOTH sides. I have gone through the motions and given a system that works (or at least that people stop challenging) every time.

But no one here has argued that the AN premises are commonly held. That would be stupid. They’re clearly not. All that’s been argued is that the premises and their caveats result in a succinct and self consistent system that leads to birth being wrong with no weird side effects elsewhere. And that no one has presented an alternative from the other side that can differentiate between MGE and birth well. You at least tried but it’s getting way too complicated for me to follow.

But it is ridiculous in some circumstances. That's the whole point. We do not simply have one unadulterated maxim which we apply in all cases. — Isaac

Sure. And I don't intend to defend that line further. Because it's not really the argument I use. I stated which one I use.

only that it was disingenuous of you to ignore differences. — Isaac

Or maybe I don't find the differences you cite important? Like spelling for example, if you were to cite it.

Only we can't agree. Not even you agree. When pressed on "we should not cause harm" as a maxim you add a load of caveats, we all do — Isaac

Sure and I already said what those caveats are. I am not opposed to adding caveats either.

Non-malicious intent — Isaac

Malicious intent has been shown to apply to both. Since in both cases you intend to do harm. Just in one you intend to mitigate it as much as you can.

reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits — Isaac

I don't find convincing. Because I find that in every day life this is never used. When dealing with others we only concern ourselves with how much harm doing the thing vs not doing the thing will bring about then pick the one that does less. We don't force people to exercise for example, even though we have a reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits. Nor do we force people to eat foods that we like because we think it will be good for them. Etc. Don't bring up children, I have a way of dealing with that if you were to actually apply my system.

intent to mitigate forseeable harms — Isaac

I don't find convincing because it is never used in daily life either. I can't break your leg because I intend to pay your hospital bills later...

mutual goal — Isaac

With who? The child? That would make no sense. If you mean the mutual goal of keeping humanity afloat you already know my position on that.

expectation of duty — Isaac

Sounds like "intent to mitigate forseeable harms". Same treatment. I can't break your leg because I intend to take responsibility and fix it later.

So it's not that your caveats aren't working, it's that I find none of them convincing. You probably do have a self consistent system, that has premises I don't agree with. I don't intend to change anything about that.

You're simply confusing sufficient with necessary. The fact that it alone cannot account for the difference does not mean it's not a contributory factor. — Isaac

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that both birth and MGE are examples of malicious intent. Because they both have the willing intention to do harm. What differentiates?

To say the birth will cause harm in the same way MGE will is again monumentally disingenuous. — Isaac

I don't actually think so obviously I just want to see how you resolve it without side effects.

I've never claimed there is anything wrong with that argument, so I don't know why you might have done that. — Isaac

Oh, I just realized I misread. I thought you meant "I think that's abundantly apparent" that there is something wrong with the argument.

If your goal isn't to say that there is something wrong with AN then what are you replying for?

The argument that "'we should not cause any harm under any circumstances, birth causes harm' - is not a ridiculous premise because we generally agree to something similar" is not valid. It assumes a similarity with other moral dilemmas without taking any account of the circumstances which make them different. — Isaac

I don't care to make that argument. I don't care to convince you.

It feels far more like you're trying to sneak in an argument in favour of AN by suggesting some inconsistency between our response to your examples and our response to birth. — Isaac

Not to sneak in an argument, just to see how you resolve the inconsistency.

But no such inconsistency can be shown once you allow for caveats to the maxim, and you have already agreed that caveats are required. — Isaac

Yup. I just want to see what caveats you use. If someone can come up with caveats I don't find ridiculous that can deal with the examples then I probably wouldn't be an AN anymore.

No intent to mitigate non-trivial harm, no reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits, no reasonable expectation of consent. — Isaac

Who's adding caveats now?

So not an example comparable to conception. — Isaac

I didn't mention conception. I was just saying that setting a low bar when it comes to "how likely it is that our acts will harm someone" is the norm, and not ridiculous in any way.

That's yet to be established as you've not yet offered any counter-argument — Isaac

That you think this is the case is not sufficient for it to be the case. Your claim was that any difference between the two acts in question can be used to make one ok and the other not. I showed that this is ridiculous with the "Birth starts with B" example. I only give these examples to try to find a premise that leads to having kids being ok without any bad side effects. Not even to make my premises seem less ridiculous, but to find how you can keep yours together. Because oftentimes I find that the differences you cite between birth and MGE (malicious genetic engineering) ridiculous.

The difference between malicious genetic engineering and birth is trivially easy to show once you allow the kinds of caveat to a single maxim which you allow. That is what I showed in my example. — Isaac

You did a terrible job at it then. Let me re-examine this for a second because I meant to reply but I completely forgot:

Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed".
— khaled

Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. I think everyone's agreed that we can imagine a future child and mitigate harms that might befall them. — Isaac

So if we can imagine a future child and recognize that an act done now, that will result in harm later, is considered "harmful" and therefore shouldn't be done, that would apply to both. If the only reason MGE is wrong is that it is harmful then by the same token having the child in the first place is wrong because it is harmful. So what caveat will you add now? I am not saying this smugly or anything, I am curious as to how you resolve this. Because, as usual, the argument as to why MGE is wrong is applying to both MGE and birth in general, you haven't actually said what it is about MGE that makes it different from birth.

Intent doesn't work, because:

Then you have the recklessness argument, as I stated in my actual definition of the differences which you've just ignored. It is insufficient to have good intentions, one must also have just cause to believe those intentions will yield the expected result. An arbitrary and unevidenced belief in the benefits of blindness does not satisfy this requirement. — Isaac

The recklessness argument also applies to birth in general. Birth will cause harm in the same way MGE does. So it can't just be harm or intent to do harm, because both are present in both cases. What's the difference still? Amounts? Pleasure caused? Something else?

I suspect you will in the end resolve it with "The survival of the human race makes it worth it" as usual.

instead choosing to switch lanes again, back to the ridiculous premise. — Isaac

I did so to demonstrate your inability to find anything wrong with the form of the argument. You still have not provided anything wrong with the form of the argument.

But I didn't mean to switch lanes I genuinely forgot about your reply because it didn't differentiate between MGE and birth in any way. Everything you said applies to both.

Most people consider ending the human race as an ethical outcome prima facie ridiculous. — Isaac

Not me. Or else I obviously would not have had a system that leads to it. Look, if you're not a moral realist, which you're not, you can only argue against an ethical position in two ways.

1- The argument logically makes no sense. For example: Saying that not having kids is good for the kids. Makes no sense as there is no one for it to be good for.

2- It results in outcomes that the proposing party finds ridiculous. For example, if my system brings about that "Murder is fine on Wednesdays" then something is wrong with it and I cannot use it to argue for AN. Because I find that that is a ridiculous outcome, so I have a contradiction on my hands that needs to be resolved, either with more caveats or a complete overhaul.

You are not doing either.

When I give an example I am trying to do 2.

It's ridiculous. No-one normally sets the bar that low. — Isaac

Really? I would say we set the bar pretty low when dealing with others. We certainly don't need "near certainty" that our actions will cause more harm than good to do them normally. So let's take the example of shooting someone for entertainment. At what percentage chance that the gun would jam does it become acceptable? And assume they don't know you're doing this so you can't say "they get shocked and that's a harm in itself" or anything. If the gun has a 1% chance of jamming is it acceptable? What about 30%? 80%?

I'd say we need the gun to have a 100% chance of jamming for the act to be considered neutral. Extreme example, sure, but it goes to show that we don't take dumb risks when dealing with others usually. Which is why it's puzzling to me why Benkei requires a near certainty in this one specific case. I'd say we require a "sneaking suspicion" that our actions will hurt someone in order for doing them without consent to be wrong.

If that's all you're saying then we're back to ridiculous premises leading to ridiculous consequences. — Isaac

Sure but that's not a critique of the form.

But you keep trying to make your premises sound less ridiculous with examples of the form I outlined above. — Isaac

Still not a critique of the form.

Examples of this form are logically flawed in the way I showed. — Isaac

You didn't show much. Again, not any old difference will do. Birth is not fine because it starts with a "b" as that would result in Burglary being fine too, which is an unwanted side effect. I use these examples to try to find a premise that makes having kids ok, without any unwanted side effects. Just out of curiosity. I haven't found one that satisfies me yet.

for which it is shown to be trivially true that it leads to ridiculous conclusions. — Isaac

Try it. At least with my own system. The >0% chance thing isn't mine it's something I found online. It's edited into the same comment.

But in adding these caveats, you change the nature of the argument. — Isaac

What do you mean "change the nature of the argument"?

When these altered arguments are shown to be flawed (as I've just done) — Isaac

You didn't. You said it's trivially easy then proceeded to not give an example.

Also I want to point out:

assumed consent of the unconscious — Isaac

Is not something I ever add but something NAs add often if anything.

And: It's not that I add these caveats on a case by case basis haphazardly. I add the same caveats and start with the same premises over and over. Because I have my "system" figured out already. I just don't present all of it because I don't want to dump a wall of text on someone. I present as much as needed.

"cause", "suffering" and "unnecessary" have a large frayed edge to their common definitions. And you require all three to agree on a specific issue. — Echarmion

I think I defined all three pretty precisely.

Cause: Would it have happened if you weren't there.
Suffering: Something you don't want done to you.
Unnecessary: Does not mitigate any larger suffering/Is not the least harmful option

This implies we're looking at two timelines: one where A happens and one where it doesn't. — Echarmion

Correct. And concluding that one of the causes of timmy breaking his arm was that he was born. Because if timmy hadn't been born he wouldn't have broken his arm. What's wrong with this? Where is the mention of non-existent timmy? Where is the comparison between timmy and non-existent timmy (whatever that is)?

Because an event A is necessary for an event B if, in the absence of it, event B doesn't happen. — Echarmion

That's not really how I use the term. The way you put it I would say A was a cause of B.

And lastly, the notion of suffering also implies a comparison. This is more or less what I've written to Schopenhauer above with respect to harm. We don't just conclude that bad things are bad in a vacuum. If something had happens to someone, they wish it didn't happen . And since there is no simple absence of events, that means they wish for something different to have happened instead. — Echarmion

Sure but I don't see how this is any hindrance to the argument. Timmy wishes he didn't break his arm and wishes instead to have stuck the landing from the tree perfectly.

Still, the point is it is wrong to cause Timmy something that Timmy wouldn't want done unto him for no good reason. Timmy being born was a cause of this. And it did not need to happen, nor was there a good reason for it. You need some justification to do something that you know will cause someone to suffer. That justification is what is missing here.

Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. — Isaac

Echarimon is as far as I can tell.

The issue with non-existence is about consent to risk harm, not future harm itself. — Isaac

I haven't mentioned consent in like 12 pages because of nitpicking like this. I'll ask you the same question I asked Benkei. First off, we can agree that having children in some cases is wrong right? Like for example in severe poverty, or if you know they will have some terrible genetic disease or other.

Benkei for example says in the OP that if it is a near certainty that the child will end up more unhappy than happy then it is wrong to have them. AN (a form of it) is simply moving the bar from "near certainty" to ">0%". What is wrong with that? You have to find some logical inconsistency in moving the bar to ">0%" instead of near certainty.

No mention of consent anywhere. Because it is not required for the argument.

Admittedly this is not the system I normally use so I’ll restate that one too:

First: Check if you’re responsible. “Would this harm have happened had I not been there, and if yes could I have reasonably expected it to?” If the answer is no-no you are not responsible. If the answer is “yes” you are not responsible. If the answer is no-yes then you are responsible. You can also be responsible if you have a duty to do something due to your job, that you are getting compensated for and are expected to perform.

If you are responsible you are obligated to pick the option that does the least harm. If you are not responsible you are not obligated to but it’s still good to do so. Harm done to yourself is optionally part of the calculation.

You can only pick the option that does more harm with consent, if it is available. If it isn’t then just pick the option doing the least harm.


“Consent of non-existent people” is not required. Nor has it ever been.

What does make a difference convincing or reasonable? — Isaac

Depends on the person. But I don't think anyone here finds

“Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’” — khaled

reasonable or convincing. So not just any difference can be used.

since you've literally had to make a moral judgement in order to even describe the situation. 'Malicious genetic engineering'. — Isaac

Doesn't matter what I call it. I think it's wrong definitely and I know you do too so I didn't expect you to nitpick here. I was just too lazy to write "Genetically engineering your child to be blind".

In the example of malicious genetic engineering there is an intention to cause harm — Isaac

Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed". Either the argument applies to both cases or doesn't. Either both are a form of causing harm or neither is.

Also, what if the intention was benign? What if the parents come from a religion where blind people go to heaven and everyone else to hell? Or what if the parents just arbitrarily like blind people? In both cases consider that the parents intend to be model parents for their blind child. Does that make it fine? I doubt it.

So your "difference" fails on two fronts. Firstly, you cannot say that there is intention to do harm, as no harm is being done. This is what you say to me when I say that having children is intentionally doing harm. Secondly, intent is clearly not the main factor here, as even with benign intents I think we can agree that genetically engineering someone to be blind is wrong.

I think that's abundantly apparent. — Isaac

Really? What happened here then?

But if there's no compelling argument (other than just "well that's what my unusual premises lead to") — Isaac

From the other thread. "that's just what my unusual premises lead to" implies that the premises logically lead to the conclusion.

How so? There have been several arguments put forward, that was an opposition to one of them. — Isaac

I don't remember putting forward multiple arguments for AN I've been harping about the same one since I found it. But this is also to say that there exists one of them which you consider internally consistent, at least, if your only objection to it is "the premises are weird". Which is all I'm saying. So you clearly don't consider it abundantly apparent.

Also, again, this is not in opposition to anything I'm saying. I'm not here trying to establish that AN follows form any universal beliefs and that everyone who doesn't believe it is deluding themselves or anything to that effect. On the other hand YOU are trying to demonstrate that there is something wrong with the form of the argument. Saying "The form is fine but the premises are weird" is clearly not demonstrating that something is wrong with the form of the argument.

IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consent — schopenhauer1

This is the best summary so far. No mention of metaphysics anywhere so no pointless nitpicking possible.

Perhaps you feel exactly the same way. — Echarmion

Yup.

I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. But you just somehow don't see it. — Echarmion

False. It’s simply that it is not what’s being done. Shope just explained to you well what is being done. And so have I countless times. I don’t understand what’s so difficult about it. And I’m not trying to be rude I just genuinely don’t understand how this:

IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consen — schopenhauer1

Can ever be interpreted as “comparing existence to non existence”. The word “compare” doesn’t come up once in any shape or form. Neither does “existence”

Everyone here agrees that comparing existence to non existence makes no sense. It’s not that “non existence is better for the child than existence”. I have insisted that that makes no sense.

And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. — Echarmion

Wtf is common suffering and special suffering? Suffering is suffering.

If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. — Echarmion

So being born results in suffering now? I am seriously confused on your position here. Does it or does it not? Oh but it’s “common suffering” so it’s ok I guess....

And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right? — Echarmion

Yes, weird until you can explain what “special suffering” and “common suffering” are. Heck, this particular form of “common suffering” is the source of ALL “special suffering” regardless of how you may define the concepts. So does that make it “special suffering”?


Still waiting on what makes malicious genetic engineering wrong and birth not.

Despite the title, the OP makes it clear that it is the form of argument, not the subjectivity of the premises which is being taken issue with. — Isaac

Sure and I discussed that with Benkei for a while until he stopped replying. But it was clear he had an arbitrary premise as well, despite claiming that he was attacking the form. Page 12 if you’re interested. I don’t think there is anything wrong with my form of the argument at least. Heck, remember the other thread? Where you kept saying “If I have unreasonable premises I end up with unreasonable conclusions” in reference to my argument? That means not even you think there is something wrong with the form, just the premises. That is a failure to show that there is anything wrong with AN.

You can't be seriously saying the only difference anyone could point to between malicious genetic engineering and birth is the initial letter? Ridiculous. — Isaac

I’m saying that if they were to use the first letter as a reason birth should be treated differently in a moral sense, everyone would agree that they were being ridiculous. Although it is a valid moral claim. This was in response to you saying that any way that they are different could be reasonably held as a reason to absolve the obligation. Sure, technically true, but that doesn’t make any difference convincing. Or reasonable in any traditional sense.

But I would be interested in what features about malicious genetic engineering and birth make one ok and the other not, for you. Because all the features I’ve heard so far have seemed ridiculous to me. Not as ridiculous as the first letter, but still ridiculous to think they should matter.

because the ways in which x is dissimilar from conceiving children could otherwise be held as rational reasons to absolve such an obligation. — Isaac

Correct but not very convincing. I don’t think anyone here is willing to say something like “Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’”

IF someone were to say that I would think they’re being crazy and ridiculous. You would probably also think so. And no I would not try to appeal to some sense of objectivity to get them to change their mind. No “I think that’s ridiculous” isn’t necessarily said to change people’s minds and neither does it imply any form of objectivity.

And might I point out that this:

All your arguments are of the form " but you wouldn't do x, which is similar to conceiving children in ways a, b and c...so you're obliged by reason to not conceive children" — Isaac

Is EXACTLY how you would go about trying to show there is something wrong with AN. You would try to show that there is a situation, where the application of its principles leads to conclusions that are deemed by both sides to be ridiculous. No objectivity required. And that’s as far as you can take it.

Protestations to the contrary aside, your approach implies an objectivity you've not demonstrated to be there. — Isaac

This thread was started by the other side. The burden is on you to show that there is, objectivity, something wrong with antinatalism.

Though as usual you fail to do so then run back to “Ok but it’s all subjective anyways”. Agreed, but that’s not something wrong with antinatalism. That’s true of all alternatives.

If you do not consider acts that result in harm to people that are born yet as wrong, then you cannot say that malicious genetic engineering is wrong. I can’t see how natalists expertly “cut out” or isolate birth. It seems all your arguments would apply to ANY act that results in harm in the future, to people that do not exist yet. Which would make malicious genetic engineering fine. What’s the difference between malicious genetic engineering and having children that makes one wrong and the other fine? I have yet to hear a convincing answer to that question.

before finally admitting it's just a personal feeling without any objective validity. — Isaac

So are all the other alternatives. Which makes the statement “There is something wrong with antinatalism” false.

The parents will be benefitted. If they actually want a child, then having one will benefit them. — Pinprick

You can't even say that much for certain. Many parents regret having children, because they weren't actually prepared.

f we need bread, and there’s only one loaf left, we buy it regardless of the fact that the possibility exists that doing so means someone else is doing without. — Pinprick

Because in this case if we don't buy it we ourselves get harmed comparably to how much we can expect the other person (who now can't buy the bread) to be harmed. I don't understand what's so difficult about this.

We routinely risk endangering others if we perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs. — Pinprick

If we perceive the costs of not doing the act to outweigh the costs of doing the act*

To give a real life example, currently where I live a natural gas pipeline is being constructed underground. This has the potential to explode, and pipelines have in fact exploded before. Were that to happen, the damage could be catastrophic, as this thing runs beneath our roads, near private property, etc. No consent was required, yet this project is occurring nonetheless. — Pinprick

Why is this pipeline being built I wonder? It's definitely not being built for no reason. Or rather, the main question is (as always, I don't see what's difficult about this): Is it more harmful to not build the pipeline than it is to build the pipeline? I bet you the answer to that is yes. Or at least it should be.

For example: If the pipeline was being built because some rich guy wanted to have a pipeline there, that connects to nothing, and helps no one, I am pretty sure we can agree that building it in that case is wrong. Because then the frustration of some random guy not getting his arbitrary desire doesn't compare to the risk of someone dying to an explosion.

Why then can we not do the same with childbirth? — Pinprick

Because you cannot say that childbirth is the less risky (likely to cause harm) option. It is basically always the more harmful option, because you're comparing a lifetime of suffering to the suffering of childlessness. Obviously the former is greater, because the latter is literally a subset of it. Whereas you can say with near certainty that throwing someone in jail is the less risky option.

Performing CPR on an unconscious person risks breaking their ribs. We do so anyway. — Pinprick

Because not doing so risks killing them. Which is a much greater harm than a broken rib for most people. I don't understand what's so difficult about this.

The underlying assumption here, I think, is that life has intrinsic value. — Pinprick

Not necessarily. If you go by my definition of harm "Doing something to someone that they would rather not be done to them" then that provides justification for CPR. Most people don't want to die. So not performing CPR would be the more harmful option.

Most people get scrapes and bruises, and maybe broken bones, but these relatively small sufferings do not make most people feel like life is not worthwhile. — Pinprick

Would you mind if I press the button that has a 2% chance of killing you or breaking a bone for a 98% chance of giving you 1000 dollars without asking? Most people walk away 1000 dollars richer.... Heck, most people who have gone through the experience say that it was worth it!

If we could only experience the pain of stubbing our toe, and every other experience was either neutral or positive, would you still conclude AN? — Pinprick

If it is possible that someone will find life not worthwhile because they stubbed their toe once, yes. Though in this case while childbirth would be wrong, it would be a very very small wrong. Akin to pirating a movie or something.

But if you feel that way, then you’re agreeing that sometimes it’s ok to harm others for the sake of other people? — Pinprick

........

I have already given countless examples of this. Like throwing people in jail as letting them go free risks even more harm. Or killing in self defense as not doing so risks comparable harm to yourself. etc.

You minimize harm done. That is all. That is the principle. For a more thorough explanation refer to my talk with Echarimon. Specifically where I talk about what my "tests" are. Search for the word "car" it should be around there.

On the other hand you are suggesting that benefits should also be factored in. That would mean that you are obligated to have children in many scenarios. If you can show that it is likely that they will be beneficial to have overall, then it becomes a duty to have them. But you don't agree with this. Which is weird. Furthermore you say that the risk of significant harm outweighs any considerations of pleasure. I don't see how you balance this. You have two different "variables" whereas I have one.

I say: It's best to do the least risky alternative at all times. And you haven't given an example so far that results in contradictions or ridiculous scenarios by applying this.

Doesn’t AN think it’s always wrong to have kids? — Pinprick

The criteria required is basically impossible. I’ve gone over it before with echarimon. You would need to show that having kids is the less risky option. IE: That you need kids SO BAD that you would suffer more from childlessness alone than your kids are likely to suffer their entire lives. This becomes impossible if your kids are to have their own kids. That’s also on you (though you’re a lot less responsible)

So why not take the risk? — Pinprick

Because it’s not you paying the consequences. You have no right to endanger others. Like with the button example I gave. If one day you woke up 30000 dollars richer and later found that it happened because I pressed the button 30 times without telling you, I think you would be furious at me. I risked harming you. And this is EVEN IF you would have personally pressed the button 50 times.

But maybe prison is a better example. If someone is sentenced to death, there’s no way that is for their benefit, or that they consented to it. Therefore, it must be for the benefit of others. — Pinprick

No it’s for the PROTECTION of others. Not their benefit. Humans like to get revenge but that’s not the primary reason we put people in jail. The primary reason is that we need to protect others. We judge the people in jail as dangerous, which is why we put them there. Letting them walk around is the risky option. We don’t put them there for the population to have fun indulging in a feeling of righteousness.

knowing that they may not find life worthwhile due to suffering, should also be ok as long as doing so benefits others. — Pinprick

You can’t prove that your next child will benefit others. And this isn’t something you can even refer to statistics for. It is possible they’ll be selfish assholes despite your efforts. We have plenty of selfish assholes in the world with parents who had good intentions.

This isn’t really a comparable analogy. There is a difference between potentially taking life and creating it. — Pinprick

Ok make it 2% chance it breaks a random bone in your body. I don’t care. Point is, we don’t take risks with others. Even if we think they’ll think the risk is worth it. We ask first. And when we can’t ask we don’t do it

I think the rest of what I said was “without good reason.” That last bit should clear up most of these scenarios for you — Pinprick

It doesn’t. You said the good reason was that it infringes on liberties. I don’t see how the button examples is infringing on anyone’s liberty. It REALLY doesn’t take much to press a button. I wouldn’t count it as an infringement on liberty to say that I’m obligated to do so.

Generally speaking, the risk of significant harm (dismemberment, lobotomies, disabling injuries, etc.) trumps any potential pleasure. — Pinprick

Wow, crazy what that thought might lead to :rofl:

Seriously though, how do you say this and at the same time say having kids is ok. And don’t go back to the “actually having kids doesn’t harm anyone” BS. We already know there are problems with that, such as not being able to say malicious genetic engineering, or kidnapping people to forests is wrong (since technically neither harms, only creates conditions, but then again, same with shooting people in the face, since the gun might jam)

I personally think these things, but they aren’t facts, and you’re free to disagree. I have no desire to try to force others to agree. You have no obligation towards me whatsoever, nor I to you, but if we both choose individually to follow certain principles in our personal lives, then we owe it to ourselves to follow those principles. But I would never consider you to be obligated towards me due to a principle only I hold. — Pinprick

Sure, agreed. The principle of “do not deny pleasure for no good reason” is very weird. If “good reasons” include “it can harm the guy in question” then the principle just becomes what I’m saying anyways. How do you differentiate?

Ok, consider the example of being sentenced to death then. — Pinprick

We sentence people to death because we deem them too dangerous to keep around. NOT sentencing them to death is the more risky option. Obviously we’re not considering harm done to them, as that is irrelevant. They didn’t consider the harm they did to others, so we don’t consider the harm we do to them as part of the equation at all. They lose the right to be treated as a human in a sense

Ok, but why haven’t I seen this on other similar forums? Is there something about this forum that attracts these sorts of people? — DingoJones

I think it's that this forum is a bit more "personal" than most. In most forums you mainly see the post, don't see the same people too often, no way to customize a profile, etc. So people end up caring what others think of them because they talk to the same people. Maybe idk.

This seems like something different, like these people are going through the motions of the same psychological effect. — DingoJones

I think it's the same thing. If you've ever played a MOBA this would be "inting". Anyways I don't have a degree or anything and I don't know what I'm talking about. Just guesses.

It’s questionable in certain circumstances, but we shouldn’t therefore never send kids to school. — Pinprick

I didn’t say that. You should examine it situation by situation. Sending kids to school is not always right and not always wrong.

That’s why I feel that you must look at the probability of whether or not the person being born will experience enough suffering to not consider their life to be worthwhile. — Pinprick

My point is, there is never a case where you can 100% say that the person will live a worthwhile life. So why are you taking the risk for them?

This is different from sending kids to school. If you DON’T send kids to school then you INCREASE the risk they suffer. Sending them to school is usually the least risky option. And when it isn't the least risky option, we have agreed that sending kids to school would be wrong in that instance. However if you don’t have kids you don’t harm anyone. There is no obligation to have kids. There is no need to take the risk. So don’t

It depends on the probability of harm vs. pleasure. Is it likely that the person will find fending for themselves in a forest pleasurable? — Pinprick

What if you don’t know? Heck, what if it’s a 98% chance they’ll like it? Does that make it moral? I’d say no. Because there is absolutely no need to take the 2% risk.

If there was a button I could press that has a 98% chance to give you 1000 dollars and a 2% chance to kill you, should I press that button without asking you first? No. Because there is no reason I should take the risk when I’m not the one paying the consequences.

Now, if “do not deny pleasure” is your principle then there would be some sum of money at which pressing the button is MANDATORY and similarly, kidnapping the person to put them in a forest is MANDATORY. Otherwise you’d be denying too much pleasure.

I don’t really agree that obligations exist except in the abstract. If you so choose to follow a principle, then your obliged to do so, but you’re not obligated to choose to follow a principle in the first place. IOW’s it’s permissible, but not obligatory. — Pinprick

Huh? But you’re the one that proposed the principle. Are you saying you don’t actually follow it? That you don’t actually think denying pleasure is bad?

Much like the school example. If it’s more likely that the benefits will outweigh the costs, then it’s permissible. — Pinprick

No. It is not like the school example. Because with school, NOT forcing a child to go to school IS the risky option. Even there you’re minimizing risks.

No, in which case having kids is permissible, because it is more likely that they will experience more pleasure than harm. And I’m not claiming that therefore it’s impermissible to not have children either. Neither is obligatory. — Pinprick

You’re trying to have your cake and eat it too.

Either “do not deny pleasure” is a principle or it isn’t. If it is then having kids is ok BUT there are situations where you MUST have kids. Heck, it would come out that in most situations you must have kids. If it isn’t then having kids is not ok, because you’re taking an unnecessary risk, and denying pleasure is not a factor.