You conflate what is and what is not a moral claim vs what is and what is not likely to be adopted widely. I'll just quote parts of my last reply on the other thread here because we were basically discussing metaethics there. Seems relevant.

I doubt you'd get a single person to agree that reducing the number of bananas in the world is a moral imperative, or ensuring that there's no electricity, or no number 7
— Isaac

Agreed. But I also doubt that you can get a single person to agree that "We are morally obligated to reduce the number of bananas" is NOT a valid moral claim, though a ridiculous one. Yet you are attempting to redifine what "moral claim" means by referring to the public use of the word even though you are literally the only one going against the public use which I find funny.

There is a distinction between whether or not something is a moral claim and whether or not you agree with it. "We are morally obligated to reduce the number of bananas" is a moral claim. But not one I think anyone will agree with. — khaled

Is what we generally as a society consider moral related to what kinds of experiences the activity produces? Absolutely.

However, does that lead to pforrest's claim that what feels to everyone in a hedonic sense is what is good? No. Nor does it lead to your even more ridiculous claim that the phrase "Moral claim" only refers to acts that bring about a stable society.

It is precisely because short term gratification can be pleasurable but anti-social that we have a need for a moral code. — Olivier5

I would think this is obvious too.

Sigh. We went over this on the other thread too... It's so tiring.

what is [one of] the common motivating factors for inclusion in that category? — Isaac

That there is no ulterior practical motive behind it.

What is not supported by any evidence I've seen (and is, in fact contradicted by all the evidence I've seen) is the idea that the types of behaviour we generally label 'wrong' have no connection at all and are put into the 'wrong' classification entirely at random. — Isaac

We don't. But we could.

For one, the suffering you outlined isn't quantifiable, since it's a binary relation (something is either what you wish or it isn't) — Echarmion

Not really. The extent to which I wish not to die easily trumps the extent to which I wish it doesn't rain tomorrow.

some hierarchy of interests to resolve conflicts. That isn't necessarily a problem - a lot of legal systems work that way - it's just different from merely tallying up empirical suffering. — Echarmion

How so? Sounds practically like the same thing to me.

More to the point of the decision, if suffering and harm are ultimately about a violation of your will, and your will is how your self realizes itself in the world, then what you seem to be concerned is not so much suffering, but freedom or dignity. — Echarmion

You take it too far. Just apply the principle as it is. Does having children cause someone to experience something they would rather not experience? Overwhelmingly yes. Is there justification for it (consent, dependent + for their own good, or alleviation of suffering)? No. Therefore it is wrong.

Don't morph it into something completely different. No one said anything about freedom or dignity and they are not required to derive the principle. They just sound similar.

No — Isaac

Ok. My bad then.

What is not supported by any evidence I've seen (and is, in fact contradicted by all the evidence I've seen) is the idea that the types of behaviour we generally label 'wrong' have no connection at all and are put into the 'wrong' classification entirely at random. — Isaac

Sure would be ridiculous if anyone claimed that huh.

that's why I used the word 'overall', — Isaac

Which I took to mean overall for a single instance. As in it feels good despite the guilt.

I would bet money on the claim that you could find no case at all where the only psychological response to an anti-social act was pleasure without also seeing signs of significant neurological abnormality. — Isaac

No one said "the only".

Now back to the actual topic, do you agree with:

what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good). — khaled

You seem to like citing unrelated articles in response to reasonable statements. First off, the article isn’t even saying what you’re claiming it is.

It is unlikely that in a normally functioning brain antisocial behaviour overall feels good — Isaac

Whereas the article states:

We aimed to determine whether life-course-persistent antisocial behaviour is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities by testing the hypothesis that it is also associated with brain structure abnormalities. — Isaac

“Life course persistent antisocial behavior is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities” is entirely consistent with “It feels good to rob people if you hate the victim”. One is talking about life course antisocial behavior, one is talking about a single instance. Is there a study showing that a single instance of guilt-free theft is enough evidence to diagnose people with sociopathy?

Is your claim literally that there is never a situation where violence or theft feels good and that it is always a result of a neurological abnormality? I just want to get that clear.

This is not to say that there aren't such people in whom it 'feels good', and that it is still wrong, but that's not the same as an argument that 'wrong' is divorced entirely from what 'feels wrong' to most people most of the time. — Isaac

That’s not the argument I’m making though. I’m saying that what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good).

But there are countless situations where theft would overall feel good, but is still wrong. For example if you hate the victim’s guts. So what’s right and wrong doesn’t seem to have much to do with how the activity feels.

I’ve never stolen anything. Hear it feels good though. But sure I’ll remove it.

Do you ever plan on replying on the other thread btw?

"...actually account for" and "...requires the least effort" are no less subjective than the terms you started with. — Isaac

We seem to agree on something for once though

compared to how real people normally think no. — Pfhorrest

That’s what I’m comparing to

there is a very important difference. the dogmatic justificationist (foundationalist) says that the premises they find self-evident constitute a reason why someone shouldn’t believe differently than they do. the critical rationalist admits of multiple unfalsified possibilites, and will say only that particular sets of possibilities have been eliminated, not which of the remaining set is definitely the right answer. — Pfhorrest

Sure but if you’re going to suggest an objective morality then that’s more in line with the former not the latter.

Saying “there is objective morality” while also holding that we can be wrong about it, is in absolutely no way different from saying there is no objective morality.

Then you are not a justificationist — Pfhorrest

Never said I was. I’ve been saying that critical rationalism doesn’t escape any of the problems you pointed out with justificationalism

The same thing I mean for claims about reality, just involving a different facet of experience: hedonic rather than empirical. — Pfhorrest

what is objectively moral is whatever feels good and not bad to everyone in every circumstance (but regardless of who does or doesn’t want it). — Pfhorrest

I disagree that it has anything to do with hedonism. Punching people you disagree with feels good to everyone all the time. Yet is wrong. I don’t think it’s very difficult to come up with things that feel good but are wrong.

There is nothing more to objectivity than the limit of ever more comprehensive intersubjectivity, unless you want to appeal to things entirely beyond the realm of phenomenal experience, but there’s pragmatic reasons not to do that either. — Pfhorrest

This makes objectivity no more than a popularity contest. Which I think is a very disingenuous way of defining it.

And what are these “pragmatic reasons not to do that either”? If someone believes in God then it becomes very pragmatic to consider things entirely beyond the realms of phenomenal experience.

"Could be" isn't "has to be".

I arrived at critical rationalism (the rejection of justificationism) not via justificationist means, not by appealing to some deeper principle that entails it, but rather via critical rationalist means themselves, by finding a reason to reject justificationism and so being left with its negation the remaining possibility, adhering to that remaining possibility requiring no justification in itself. — Pfhorrest

Sure. Just saying it is not doing much new.

I don't have to actively believe that there are no such reasons in order to be warranted to hold those beliefs. I just need to be unaware of them. — Pfhorrest

But this results in how much you doubt each belief and at what point you decide that you have researched enough to belief something to continue to be arbitrary.

With justificationalism, you believe something after investigating for a while and then coming up on a premise which you deem "self-evident", where that is is arbitrary (I think the other two solutions are BS). With this, you believe something after investigating for a while, and then coming up on a premise which you don't doubt, where that is is arbitrary. You are practically doing the exact same thing in both scenarios. There is no difference between what you're proposing and dogma-justificationalism.

If you committed to rejecting every belief against which there might be... — Pfhorrest

I'm not. But I am committed to not elevating any belief to the status of being undoubtable.

If you're saying there is no objective morality, you're saying that all moral claims are mere baseless opinion and so none are binding on anyone ("binding" in the sense that it'd be as wrong to deny them as they would be to deny an objectively correct claim about reality). That nothing is actually right or wrong, people just have opinions about it and none of those opinions are any better or worse than anyone else's. — Pfhorrest

Correct. Not sure what you mean by "better or worse" though. Obviously some are more conductive to certain goals than others. But if you mean that there is some objective metric by which to measure them then no, since we don't share these goals.

The best you can do is show that a factual claim is the most comprehensive and efficien) — Pfhorrest

What constitutes "most comprehensive and efficient" is just as subjective as what constitutes "moral". You haven't gotten rid of the subjectivity in the least. For someone who believes that God has ordered them to wage war on a certain country, with the risk of suffering eternal damnation should they refuse to do so, the most comprehensive and practical thing to do is to become a terrorist.

Where does objectivity come into this? As opposed to just inter-subjectivity mind you (where everyone happens to share the same starting premises)

That there is no good reason to reject anything is the default state of affairs. — Pfhorrest

This could be taken as a justificationalist’s dogma is my point. Which is why I don’t think your position is fundamentally different. You need to believe that there is no reason for you to reject your opinion that you’re not considering right now. Instead of just believing the opinion itself. Both come with the same issues.

The onus is on those who want to change your mind to show that there is good reason to reject your current opinion. — Pfhorrest

You haven’t actually answered what constitutes a reason for rejecting an opinion. Is me saying “I don’t like your opinion” a good reason for you to reject your opinion?

Back to the topic: People are commonly of the opinion that this or that is morally right or wrong. It’s justificationism to say “nothing is objectively right or wrong because you can’t prove that anything is”.

“Show me moral certainty or reject all morality as baseless opinion” is bad philosophy: it’s just giving up, or worse, insisting that everyone else do so. — Pfhorrest

The first statement is not the second. I never said “reject all morality”. And it doesn’t even follow hat we should from that it’s baseless.

it is not necessary to reject every opinion until you can find reasons to justify it; it is only necessary to reject an opinion if you find reasons to reject it, and it is acceptable to hold any opinion, for no reason at all, until such reasons to reject it are found.

Like with coherentism, contradictions between different opinions are good reasons to reject some or all of them — Pfhorrest

What makes a “good reason” for rejecting something? And why is it a good reason? Boom, another infinite regress/circular logic/dogma. I don’t think rejecting the justificationalist position is what’s actually being done here. All that’s being done is hiding it under one extra layer of unjustified belief (what makes a good reason for rejecting an opinion?)

Now, instead of having to answer for why you believe in something, you have to answer for why you believe there is no good reason to reject the thing. Which is the exact same requirement. In both cases you’re asked to justify a belief, with all the problems that come with that. Just one is more roundabout.

Justificationism, if true, would make it impossible to ever rationally hold an opinio — Pfhorrest

I don’t think so. As I understand it, it would only make it impossible to insist on any opinion or other. It makes knowledge and certainty impossible. But most of us hold opinions we are not certain about anyways. It’s only the dogmatists that don’t. And even then, I don’t think it’s possible to truly believe something without question.

I don’t think your position is any different from justificationalism, it just sounds different. It’s hiding the uncertainty behind an extra layer that makes us not think about it all the time. That’s all.

Thinking you need a starting point is what makes it seem impossible. — Pfhorrest

I don’t think your position gets rid of the need, only obscures it.

there is something real and something moral – as there certainly inevitably seems to be, since even if you deny their universality some things will still look true or false to you and feel good or bad to you – — Pfhorrest

Non sequitor. That it seems good for you doesn’t make it universal in any sense.

I assumed you were taking the opposite position so I was questioning that. What is your position then? Realist? Anti-realist? Something else?

That moral premises are fixed. There are universal moral premises. That moral realism is sound. Same thing. — Philosophim

Ok. How do we come to figure out these fixed moral premises? Because as it stands it is very easily demonstrable that they are not self evident. Since different people consider different things right and wrong.

That moral premises are not fixed. There is no universal moral premises. That moral realism is bullshit. Same thing.

When it is logically shown that it must be the case that it is impossible. Proof by contradiction for example. — Philosophim

Any application of logic requires premises. I’m saying we cannot fix moral premises. You’re saying we can. What I am saying is supported by observation that people find different things wrong. What do you say to support your position?

But more importantly what would a “logical” proof of this even look like? How do you “logically prove” that ethical premises are not fixed? I’d say if you’re looking for empirical data, then there’s plenty to support that people see different things as wrong, so I don’t see the need for a “logical proof” here when you can clearly see, that we cannot fix these premises.

Do you need “logical proof” that gravity works?

But until it has been irrevocably proven that such things are impossible — Philosophim

And when and how will this happen? What would you take as “irrevocable proof”?

In fact, there is no set of contingent conditions imaginable that undo or even mitigate the ethical value, the "badness" of the one child's torture. — Constance

Of course there are. Especially if they’re religious. Those can mitigate the badness of anything. But thankfully I don’t agree with any of them and I hope no one here does either.

I have always viewed these types of arguments as, "Too hard for me to solve, so I guess they can't be objective or real." — Philosophim

Usually it’s not “too hard” it’s “outright impossible”. Because we can’t fix a starting point.

For murder: someone might really enjoy murdering someone, and painlessly murders a homeless person with no relations. — Echarmion

There is a reason I specifically say “Harm caused less than harm mitigated”. Could this murderer foresee, that he would suffer more than the homeless man by not killing the homeless man? I find this very very hard to believe. I can’t imagine someone suffering due to not killing people comparatively to how much the people suffer by dying. Unless said people are the ones causing him suffering but the homeless man is innocent as far as I understand the example.

But I admit this is a fanciful and unrealistic example. — Echarmion

Good

A hungry person steals bread from a large company store. It seems pretty evident that the suffering of being hungry outweighs any suffering anyone who works for the company feels due to the theft. — Echarmion

Sure. Which is why I think we can agree the hungry person didn’t do anything wrong there no? Do you honestly think that stealing food when you’re starving is wrong? The only case I think it is is if you steal it from someone else who is also starving. Because then you’re causing a lot more suffering.

My point is that you don't show how any of this is related to "suffering" in the usual sense of the word. — Echarmion

The way I define “harm” is “Doing to someone something they wish isn’t done to them”. And “suffering” is simply the thing you don’t wish is done to you. Idk if that answers your question.

So you are harming the homeless person even if it’s a painless death (because they don’t want to die I presume)

Why is there no reference to the actual suffering of the person in question? — Echarmion

There is clearly. I don’t know what you’re talking about here.

Well, it depends on the scenario. AN treats the unborn as potential sufferers, so you could argue that they are also potential happy beings. By not allowing them to be born, you are denying their potential happiness, just like you are denying their potential suffering. — Pinprick

Sure. And this doesn’t violate your principle. Because your principle isn’t “denying pleasure is bad”. That would lead to the PC scenario. Your principle is “Stopping people from seeking pleasure is bad”. Even if we were to propose potential happy beings, not having children is NOT in fact stopping even these beings from seeking pleasure, it is simply not providing it for them

Agreed, not having children does, in fact, result in less pleasure existing. Point is that does not violate your principle. It violates a principle which we agree is ridiculous which states that “you cannot do anything other than that which maximizes the pleasure of complete strangers”. That’s the only thing being violated here. But we agreed that’s a ridiculous principle.

To further illustrate this ridiculousness: If I told you that your next child will have a perfect life and not suffer at all, would you be obligated to have them? I think we can agree that no you wouldn’t. Which is very weird if you consider not having children bad because it “stops someone from experiencing pleasure”. This shows that having children is not, in fact, stopping anyone from doing anything.

Also, if you want to have a child, then doing so will likely bring you pleasure. But if you are not permitted to have a child, then your happiness is also being denied — Pinprick

Agreed. Except having children makes THEM also have to deal with the problem as PART of all the suffering they’ll endure. So it’s a totally inacceptable solution. The suffering alleviated is abysmally small compared to that inflicted. It’s like shooting people for entertainment. Sure, if you don’t shoot people you will not be entertained, and may even suffer for it, but the solution you are proposing (shooting people) is completely unacceptable as it causing way more suffering than it alleviates.

I want to have a child so they can experience love, happiness, etc. — Pinprick

No. Because they don’t exist. So this cannot possibly be for them. Making someone exist for the sake of that person is incoherent. Closest you’ll get is “So I can see my child happy” which is not actually for the child but for you.

...So that life will continue. — Pinprick

Some think this is acceptable. I don’t. I think “we should continue life” has to come out of the morality, not just be assumed.

So that I’m not made to feel like a failure. — Pinprick

No. Because again, the suffering you experience is incomparably small to that which you are planning to inflict to alleviate it. There is a much better solution to this feeling known as adoption. Or volunteering in child care. Or not being self loathing and stupid enough that you let societal expectations determine how you feel about yourself to this extent. Or or or or.... All of these inflict a lot less suffering and still solve the problem.

Because the vast majority of people find life worth living, so the risk that my child will not is very small. — Pinprick

“It’s bad but it’s not that bad” isn’t actually a reason to do something at all.

because you deem it to minimize suffering. — Echarmion

I don't just deem it arbitrarily. You haven't actually engaged with the argument. When do we label people as "mentally ill"? It is precisely when they start becoming a danger to themselves and others. For cases of mental illness where we find it appropriate for forcefully intervene, we are interfering because the person in question is threatening someone or is being suicidal due to impairment.

Find me a situation where we find it acceptable to label someone mentally ill and forcefully intervene in their lives when they are:

A- Not (dependents + we are doing it for their own good).
B- Not being harmful towards anyone or themselves.
C- They did not ask us to do it.

it seems to me you can justify any arbitrary result. — Echarmion

False. Try using my system to justify murder or theft. You will fail.

And "foreseeable" was the word I used to denote exactly the things we can predict. — Echarmion

You can predict the outcome of an indefinite chain of events with "some certainty"? I don't see how you could. — Echarmion

I never suggested predicting the outcome of an indefinite chain of events. But predicting as much as you can reasonably.

Police patrols interfere with people traveling. — Echarmion

When they're travelling in such a manner as to be harmful to others. And if police patrols stop random law abiding citizens for no reason they get fired (supposedly) and for good reason.

Casting someone a sideways glance is interfering with their emotions. — Echarmion

Sure. But you are not entitled to people acting a certain way towards you. You accept the risk of sideways glances when you go out in public and do dumb things.

We expect people to abide by all kinds of laws and social norms regardless of how they personally feel about doing so. — Echarmion

Because, as I said, the point of these laws is to make sure people don't harm each other.

Mentally ill patients. — Echarmion

How do we determine "mentally ill"? If not by them being harmful to others or themselves? In which case NOT detaining them would be the more harmful thing to do.

Is there a situation where we do something that does NOT minimize suffering of others (including yourself) and find it acceptable unless it’s dependents and it’s being done for their own good?

Is philosophy good for us? — Brett

In moderation. Would be the boring straightforward answer. Also the one I'm going to give.

you just have no right to stop me from buying a PS5. — Pinprick

Because doing so would be harming you. At least the way I define it. Simply as: Doing to someone something they wish isn’t done to them.

What makes this any weirder than preventing unnecessary harm? — Pinprick

That I misunderstood it.

I do see that, but you can’t claim one the one hand that not having a child prevents harm, and on the other that it doesn’t prevent pleasure as well. — Pinprick

I didn’t. This doesn’t violate your principle though. I have to not stop you from seeking pleasure. Sure. But that does NOT mean I have to provide anybody pleasure. Not having children isn’t stopping anyone from seeking pleasure. So this principle has no bearing on the discussion

Having a child doesn’t just cause harm, it also causes pleasure, but AN seems to want to ignore this side of the equation. — Pinprick

Because it is irrelevant. In the same way that I can’t force you to work for my company just because “it will cause some pleasure as well” even though that is true. Point is that “risky acts” (risk causing both pleasure and pain) require consent or justification normally and neither is given in the case of birth.

There is no cutoff to causal chains, so you're never going to be able to predict the suffering you cause with any certainty. — Echarmion

Non sequitor. "With any certainty". Really? Be reasonable. With some certainty.

If we're going with something more malleable like "never take actions that will cause forseeable suffering greater than the forseeable suffering they prevent" — Echarmion

That is literally the same thing as the above. You just changed "be sure" to "forseeable". Again showing that you can predict these things with some certainty. I don't understand why you insist on pretending we can't.

and if we applied that rigorously we'd be forced to do whatever the most emotionally unstable people wanted in order to avoid causing them any distress, unless and until your distress overrules theirs. — Echarmion

We already do that. Unless they are dependents or they consent to it we do not interfere with others, furthermore we consider it immoral to do so. Doctors don't go around forcefully "curing" people, people instead come to doctors. And if a doctor was going around forcing people to exercise for their health, we'd think he's being immoral, and he'd immediately get his license revoked. It's none of his damn business.

NOT having this principle would mean that if I deem you "unstable" I am allowed to do whatever to you to "stabilize" you without your consent, and without you being my dependent. Give me one situation where we consider that acceptable.

It is also wrong to unnecessarily deny pleasure (or happiness or whichever feel good term you prefer) to others. — Pinprick

So if you want a PS5 I have a moral duty to buy you a new PS5 as a complete stranger? Nah, I don’t think any of us think that. If you think that tell me so I can request a PC from you which you will be morally obligated to provide :lol:

But even if we were to say people have a duty not to deny others pleasure, AN would not violate this (incredibly weird) duty.

If you have a child you cause harm, as the result will be the existence of a child and that child will be harmed. Notice how there is actually a person being harmed in this case. However, if you do not have a child, there will be no child to deny anything. So no violations.

I think the asymmetry argument fails to do so. — Pinprick

I think the asymmetry argument is bullshit so at least we agree there.

I have a method to check principles. — Echarmion

And that is? And does mine pass it? If not why not?

There is no one principle that can be universalised. You figure it out by using something like Kant's categorical imperative, or Rawls "veil of ignorance". You ask yourself whether or not you can imaginge all of humanity as acting as you do, and then see if this results in a) an obvious contradiction and b) a world you would want to life in regardless of how and where you lived. — Echarmion

And which of those does mine produce?

It's not willy nilly if you act according to a principle that can be universalised — Echarmion

I answered this question a couple of times now. Not sure what else I can say. — Echarmion

Which is? I honestly don’t remember and I can’t find it.

If you're thinking about morality as a set of general reasons that can be applied to any given situation regardless of circumstance, like the 10 commandments, what you and I think of as morality is nothing alike. — Echarmion

So.... you DON’T have a principle that can be universalized now? I’m confused.

I said suffering, not harm. And as I already wrote, I consider this merely a statement of fact, not a moral issue. — Echarmion

Any other situations where someone can cause another to suffer and it’s not a moral issue?

I did give you the reason. What else is necessary to turn this reason into a justification? — Echarmion

That the reason should not be useable to make ridiculous things moral. As I said, if A is thinking of causing B to suffer, it is not enough that that A intends to help out B after the fact in order for A to be justified in causing the suffering.

I can’t force you to work at my company no matter how much I like it simply because I reasonably believe that I can really help you out while you’re working there.

That seems to be saying the same thing. — Echarmion

They’re not at all the same. “Suffering is not always bad” is entirely consistent with “Inflicting suffering without consent is always bad”. Therefore they cannot be the same. Again, what you find good and what you’re justified in doing to others are two different things

I did. Causing heartbreak. Doing risks sports. Driving a car. — Echarmion

What I said was: “You haven’t given an example where causing suffering to others without justification is bad”

Doing risk sports is not causing suffering to anyone but yourself so idk what it’s even doing here

Driving a car is justified because otherwise you yourself would be getting harmed comparably. Same with heartbreak in most cases. People break up because they don’t want to be in the relationship anymore.

The principle I recognise here is "don't do things willy nilly", not "do not cause suffering". — Echarmion

Where is the line that defines when causing suffering is Willy nilly and when it isn’t? I’ve stated mine clearly: When the suffering you alleviate is comparable to that which you inflict, and when the suffering you inflict is done on dependents for their own good. Those are the only two cases it’s justified. You?

"Good" is a label I attach to actions, not outcomes, so I don't really agree. — Echarmion

Still, what you find good and what your are justified in doing to others are not the same thing. Masochists don’t get to go around torturing people.

To think that antinatalism is any different than any other moral principle in this regard, would be special pleading to make antinatalism seem extraordinarily out of place with ethical principles. — schopenhauer1

:up:

It’s tiring seeing all these “You didn’t give me a reason to believe your premise” arguments. That’s true of every moral theory, why do you expect it here?

That this will involve suffering on the part of the children. — Echarmion

Oh. Interesting. So you’ll actually consider it as a harm. So then: what is the justification?

I think it's sufficient that you want to have children and honestly judge that you can give them the necessary love and resources in order to allow them to become active members of a free and equal society. — Echarmion

So if I feel like shooting someone and I honestly believe I can pay their hospital bills afterwards, and I even agree to take care of them for 18 years afterwards, I can go around shooting people? No that would be ridiculous. So why is it in this case you find it acceptable to cause harm as long as the harm causer is confident he can help out after the fact? What’s the justification?

I think I'll just not be convinced that the suffering is simply bad. — Echarmion

That’s not what’s being said. What’s being said is that inflicting suffering without justification is simply bad. You haven’t actually given any examples where you think it’s acceptable short of birth itself which makes me suspect you agree. And moreover, this principle does NOT result from or result in “suffering is always a negative”. I agree with you that suffering is sometimes required (I make a distinction between suffering and pain, and think pain is required, but that’s nitpicky and out of scope of the reply) and that it is necessary for growth. That does not give me the privilege to go around causing it Willy nilly.

What I find good, and what I am justified in causing to others are two separate things

I expect he'll claim that having children is in no way a harmful act but I'm drilling there too.

Heartbreak isn't limited to relationships though, is it? — Echarmion

The example you gave was about relationships so I assumed we were talking about that.

But I have to say I'm struggling to find an example of heartbreak that does not involve relationships. And I absolutely cannot find an example where you cause someone heartbreak in such a way that they could not have avoided it at all.

Wouldn't it be better though, if we decreased it? — Echarmion

It would be. I didn't say otherwise.

I don't get why I should stop worrying about suffering just becasue "it's not my responsibility". — Echarmion

A second ago you didn't get why we have to worry about suffering at all XD

This supposed calculation is imaginary though. You're not really doing anything like comparing the suffering of the two scenarios. How would you even go about doing that? How much suffering does taking the bus or the train cause you? 10, 100, 167? How much suffering is the potential of a car crash worth? Does it matter whether you just got your license vs. having 20 years of experience? — Echarmion

We can compare two scenarios and find out which is worse. I don't get why you want to pretend we can't. But no we can't put a number on it. And no it doesn't matter if you just got your license vs 20 years of experiences for this purpose since in both cases you can drive, because you're good enough for that.

I think I am justified to drive if I have a licence. Because otherwise I will literally become homeless. That's a whole lot of harm to inflict on myself when the alternative is to do the relatively safe activity of driving to work. We can make these kinds of comparisons, we may not always agree but we largely do.

You need at least a third principle to decide when to apply which. — Echarmion

If they contradict, sure. But I struggle to find a scnerio where your job (socially mediated responsibillity) would require you to go around doing harm on purpose (responsibility not to cause harm to others) or vice versa. What kind of job is that? "Thug"?

But I would say if they do contradict then the latter wins out. You are responsible not to cause harm over any social responsibilities.

I think I do agre with that. Not in any given case, but yes, in some cases it's ok to cause suffering so that those that suffer (or sometimes even other people) have more choices. — Echarmion

And there is the premise that I disagree with. Looks like you can't provide what I'm looking for either.

But you do intent to have a blind child instead of one can see. That intent can be malicious, as I explained below. — Echarmion

If intending to have a blind child instead of one that can see can be malicious intent then so can intending to have a child at all by the same token.

Either "malicious intent" applies to actions that cause harm to people that don't exist yet or it doesn't. If it does then both are cases of malicious intent. If it doesn't then neither is and you have to explain why genetically engineering a child to be blind is wrong.

Nor do you. So the difference between us isn't really that I inflict suffering on other and you don't. It's just that I consider different reasons sufficient. — Echarmion

In my system it is wrong to inflict more suffering than you alleviate from yourself. Period. We don't agree there.

But also I want to know what the sufficient reason is in the case of having children. Because it can't be for the children themselves, as they don't exist.

If the child lives a perfectly happy life, doesn't matter right? — Kenosha Kid

If you can know that the child will live a perfectly happy life then having them is fine. It doesn't even have to be perfect, if you can know the child will find their own life worthwhile it's fine. Problem is you can't.

He should not have been allowed to be born. — Kenosha Kid

I just replied. False.

He didn't though. Don't you see? There is no kid! He didn't blind anybody! This is what I said a while ago by the way. I said that our empathy can extend to "future people" and you claimed it can't, yet here you are clearly extending empathy to "future people".
— khaled

I meant once the kid was born. — Kenosha Kid

I took this to mean that you mean "Billy's parent blinded billy by genetically engineering him to be blind". That statement is false. There is no billy to be blinded.

Let's say the parent comes from a religion where blind people go to heaven and everyone else goes to hell or something. Let's say his intentions are benign. We also know that in the case of billy, there exists no one to be harmed. Why, then, is genetically engineering billy to be blind wrong? You can't say "Because he is blinding his child", he isn't, as at no point was there a non-blind child that was then blinded. And you can't say he had bad intentions either. So why is it wrong?

More specifically, how can it be wrong in such a way that having children in general is still fine?

Broad or general, yes, that is the point. — Pfhorrest

Not when they're so general they're meaningless.

I think all of these axes are way too vague.

I’m more interested in what you hoped to accomplish by posting this rather than whether or not it’s true.

That's not really how emotions work. You can't decide to not be heartbroken. — Echarmion

That’s not what I meant. I meant you accepted the risk of heartbreak when going into a relationship. You weren’t forced into said relationship so you’re weren’t forced into heartbreak. There was a course of action you could have chosen that doesn’t lead to heartbreak. Children at no point accepted the risk of harm. At no point did they have a course of action that would allow them not to suffer at all.

I still don't see why you say that we should care about suffering for future people and dependants, but for independent adults only their choice matters, and the suffering caused is suddenly no longer relevant. — Echarmion

Because in one case you’re responsible for their suffering since you caused it and you knew it was gonna happen (children) and in the other you have nothing to do with the independent adult’s decision so you’re not responsible to reduce their suffering in any way. Only responsible not to increase it.

But everything from driving your car to going mountain climbing risks other people suffering. If that was really the standard, we'd have to all lock ourselves into our rooms and interact as little as possible. — Echarmion

False and I explained this. Sigh. If I don’t drive my car I won’t get to work. I NEED to drive my car. Therefore we do a calculation: Is the harm I avoid by driving comparable to the harm I am likely to cause by driving? If the answer is no (ie, I’m a bad driver, or I’m drunk, etc) then I shouldn’t drive. If the answer is yes then I can drive.

Sure everything you do risks harming others but you are also part of the calculation. You are part of “others”.

Isn't it kind of a problem to have a moral system that requires things that are practically impossible? — Echarmion

Not really. I am an AN because the requirements to have kids in my system are practically impossible to satisfy.

This would seem to imply that at least the ethics of reducing suffering are not monolithic, i.e. they aren't derived from a single principle, but rather multiple competing ones. — Echarmion

Please explain to me how it implies that because I don’t see the connection. Or more importantly, the significance of this observation were it true.

You can intent to harm people in the future, including people who don't even exist yet. Intent always references a future state of affairs. — Echarmion

Agreed but that’s not what’s happening here. Billy’s parent is not plotting to blind billy at his 15th birthday. No. Billy’s parent is genetically engineering Billy to be blind. There is no billy at any point to be harmed here. If you want to say Billy got harmed or blinded you have to treat billy as if:

they already existed before you decided to cause them to exist. — Echarmion

Which is exactly what you do when you claim that by genetically engineering them to be blind you blind them. Just look at the structure of the sentence. “By genetically engineering billy to be blind you blinded billy”. “You blinded billy” clearly assumes the existence of Billy. You reject this. You say we can’t assume this. So why is genetically engineering someone to be blind wrong. Because “intending to harm people in the future including those that do not exist yet” is FACTUALLY not what’s happening here. Billy’s parent has no such intentions. In fact he intends to be a model parent for his blind son.

I think the most basic thing we'd need to agree on for you to consider my view convincing is that choice is more important than suffering - that what life is about is being who you are, not just trying to get it over with as painlessly as possible. — Echarmion

Agreed. Ok now what? Because that doesn’t lead to your view. What WOULD lead to your view is something like “Choice is more important than suffering therefore I am allowed to inflict suffering on others so that they have choices”. I don’t think either of us can agree with that one.

You conflate your personal philosophy about how one should live with how one should treat others. I can consider that there is more to life than minimizing suffering. But it takes an extra step to then say “Therefore I am allowed to inflict suffering on others if I deem that it would maximize their choice”

I have no problem with you not minimizing your own suffering. I have a problem with you purposely choosing a course of action that doesn’t minimize the suffering of others when an alternative was available (again, you are part of the calculation). When they didn’t ask you to choose that.

Not from the perspective of either of the children, but from the perspective of everyone else. So we can ask ourselves whether the principle that "I should act according to my fancy when deciding on the capabilities of my future children" is a moral one. Can we want that to be a universal principle? — Echarmion

Assume the parent of said child did this. And answered “Yes, this should be a universal principle”. Now what? Is it ok? Also I like how here you don’t consider the perspective of the child even though a paragraph ago you were saying that poor billy got blinded. Which is it? Did billy get harmed or not? Because if he did then you harm someone by giving birth to them. If he didn’t then you have to explain why genetically engineering someone to be blind is wrong.