But you're entertaining panpsychism — Kenosha Kid

I am but I didn't mention that in my discussion with you because it is unrelated to my argument. Whether or not I am a panpsychist should not change what I said.

which is not compatible with consciousness as I define it — Kenosha Kid

I don't see how that follows. Maybe if you were to define it I'd see why it's incompatable with panpsychism. I don't see how it follows because if I entertain the notion that everything in the world has the property "red" that doesn't necessarily mean that our uses of the word are different. They could be the same, but one of us is just outright wrong. In the case of "pan-redism" I am obviously wrong. In the case of panpsychism I don't know which is wrong and which is right (assuming either of us are)

Seeing that I use the word is not evidence that you and I use it in the same way. — Kenosha Kid

Again, it would help if you defined what you mean by it.

The question is: what properties does consciousness have such that one could say a computer has or doesn't have it, or an atom has or doesn't have it. — Kenosha Kid

This is putting the cart before the horse. You already assumed that computers and atoms don't have consciousness before even coming up with a theory that explains what consciousness is. What you're doing here is you're defining this word "consciousness" as a capacity or other that humans possess that computers and atoms don't. But again, I think the word already has an associated meaning, and what you're doing here is simply hijacking the word to detect something else.

I wonder how Dennett or for that matter half the people on this thread would explain what just happened here.

conscious of, say, a red ball — Kenosha Kid

This. This is basically exactly as I defined it but although you were apparently confused by my definition you still reused it. Which shows that maybe it's not confusing or vague, at least for the purposes of this discussion.

If I say the red ball has a soul (a rubber soul, natch) but you can't do anything that proves or disproves it even in principle, or some new property that interacts with nothing in the universe, even other things having that property, it would be foolish to believe me. — Kenosha Kid

What is happening in the case of consciousness is sort of similar. We all jointly claim to have some sense of experience/qualia/consciousness-of-red-balls whatever you wanna call it and we do not know whether or not that property interacts with the universe or how it would do so. And we cannot show how this property interacts with other things that have this property. Would it be foolish for you to believe me if I say "I am conscious"? Regardless of your answer, how do we scientifically go about confirming the existence of this property and what brings it about, when we do not know how it interacts with the universe or similar things that we believe (or don't believe) have that property.

I will ask again. Are you asserting that electrons are "conscious"? — prothero

To know whether they are or not I would have to somehow morph into an electron and back to compare. All I'm asserting is that there is no reason to assume that consciousness is only present in the highest level organisms such as humans without even having any sort of theory that predicts so.

I would have thought the structure adds predictive power where knowledge of the components may be incomplete. — Possibility

But assuming complete knowledge of the componenets the structure is just simplification and adds no predictive powers. So if "consciousness" is a structure it has to arise out of some prooperty or other of its componenets.

then there must be a circumstance in which the presence or absence of that property can be ascertained — Kenosha Kid

Yes but maybe it can’t be ascertainable for most cases. That is different from it not existing.

otherwise it is meaningless to say that it has such a property, since ascribing it says nothing at all. — Kenosha Kid

Incorrect. Ascribing it says something. However we may not be able to ascribe it to most things due to not having enough evidence to do so. That’s how I see consciousness. Ascribing it means something but we have yet to find what causes it (and I don’t think we will)

So the pragmatic way of proceeding is to define what we mean by consciousness in terms of what the property actually does, how it interacts with the world, what it's correlates are, then look for it. — Kenosha Kid

You start with a putative idea of how a conscious thing behaves such that a non-conscious thing would not behave that way, and then you refine. — Kenosha Kid

You’re starting as if there is this word “consciousness” that means nothing that we then ascribe meaning to by specifying some capacity or other. But I would say that consciousness already has a well defined meaning. It is whether or not something can have experiences. And so defining consciousness as something like a certain level of data integration or a certain neural oscillation or whatever is just misleading. It is hijacking the word for a different use and does nothing to explain what people actually mean by consciousness.

You have to explain *why* science cannot explain, which means describing its properties such that they aren't amenable to scientific modelling. This is not what you are doing — Kenosha Kid

I did that already but not in response to you. The reason it cannot be scientifically modeled is because we cannot experiment on it. The only thing that I definitely know has the property “conscious” is me. And 1 data point is not enough to come up with a theory of any accuracy. And unlike a property such as color or length or density, I have no instrument by which to measure consciousness.

The structure adds no extra predictive power and is therefore merely a simplification. That’s what I’m saying.

It's just that this is the trope most people use, and I wanted you to try and paraphrase what it means to you — Harry Hindu

Maybe because it explains enough?

Are there other words that you might use, like "awareness", or "informed"? — Harry Hindu

I can be unaware of my surroundings and still be conscious. And idk what informed has to do with it.

as in only you have this view and no one else does? — Harry Hindu

I don't know. Will get back to you after I become someone else and compare.

What is important is that the components do not, by themselves, contain the information you need to explain the function of the whole — Olivier5

You have yet to show an example of this. My point is that the higher level concepts must be reducible to the interaction of components do you disagree with that? If so please provide an example.

The really useful information is at a level higher then that of components — Olivier5

But has nothing additional to the components.

Consciousness is not as simple as "red" and "square" — Harry Hindu

Then we're probably not talking about the same thing. Consciousness is more fundamental than "red" and "square". Without consciousness "red" and "600 nanometer electromagnetic wave" would be synonymous, but they're clearly not (or else we would need to teach children about electromagnetic waves before they understand what "red" means). I don't see consciousness as a complex entity at all. When first you heard the word didn't you understand it? How is it complicated then and how come we can talk about it so easily?

I'm curious how you would define it now.

definition and theory of consciousness would include how it interacts with, and relates to, the rest of the world — Harry Hindu

And how might we test that?

not anymore than you could predict what a car does based only on a description of its parts. — Olivier5

But you can know what a car does based on the description of its parts. If you know what each part does then you know exactly what will happen when you start driving.

you'd need to know additional stuff about the environment of the car / protein to understand its function. — Olivier5

Yes and in all my examples that information is given as well. This is not "new information arising from the structure of a car/protein".

We know this by looking at how it works in a cell, not by looking at it's atoms. — Olivier5

But if you knew all the atoms in a cell you'd be able to surmise what HSP 60-10 does.

Are you simply trying to say "You can't know what a car is used for just by studying its components"? Yes, obviously, no one is debating that. However if you DO know everything there is to know about cars and you were asked "what happens when the key turns", your explanation (while likely to be very techincal and complicated) has to be reducible to "the car turns on". The introduction of the concept of "car" and "key" does not change the result. There is no NEW information in the introduction of those concepts. They are just simplifications.

So in the same way, if P-zombies are impossible, then the introduction of the concept of "consciousness" must not be a new property with no existence in the subordiante parts. It has to come out of the components naturally, and so the componenets must have some property or other that interacts to produce it. Just like how temperature comes out of kinetic energy or "car" and "key" and "driving" come out of a hunk of metal.

You define consciousness as a "first person experience". But what does that really mean? What is an experience? What does it mean for an experience to be first person? Is there such a thing as second or third, or zero (views from nowhere) person experiences? — Harry Hindu

All of these are questions you already know the answers to. By trying to ask for more and more precise definitions all you end up doing is muddying things that are perfectly clear. It's like if I asked you to define "Red" or "Run" how would you? These concepts are too basic so as to require much definition.

I made a topic about this years ago but basically I think there are some concepts that don't need definition only "assignment". An "assignment" is when you already know the meaning of a word but just need to assign a word to the already present meaning. These concepts include: Color, Space, Shape, Time, Consciousness and many others. You can't define "color" or "shape" or "consciousness" in simpler terms, all you can do is assign a word to a concept that you come pre equipped with. At least that's what it seems like to me. If you want to disagree then by all means try to define "Space" or "Shape" in simpler terms.

No knowledge of atoms will ever allow you to predict this monster: — Olivier5

Really?

Chaperone proteins "Heat Shock Protein 60" and HSP10 (the cap), so called because their molecular mass is approximately 60 and 10 kDa. This means that the whole complex composed of two "baskets" (HSP60) and two "caps" (HSP 10) is more than 8000 times larger than methane, the simplest organic compound (CH4, of molecular mass 16). — Olivier5

Seems like you defined it pretty damn well here though. I'm sure you mean "won't help you predict that this monster would form in the process of evolution". But even that is false. Realistically, yes no amount of computing we can realistically do will ever predict something of that complexity, but it is theoretically possible.

But this seems like bs to me:

combination of things adds information that was not present in the things being combined — Olivier5

If the behavior of this protein doesn't match the predicted behavior that we get by solely applying our best physical theories to it, then either the physical theory is inadequate or the molecule doesn't behave as we think it does. We don't throw up our hands and say "Guess this molecule is so complicated that it is for some reason allowed not to obey our laws because combination of things adds information that was not present in the things being combined (whatever that means)"

If we knew everything there is to know about the state of the world at the big bang, and we had a working physical theory, we would be able to predict everything until today with the highest certainty possible. If we are not able to do this then either we don't have enough computation power, our theory is wrong, or our data is wrong. You sound like you're proposing that despite having all 3 we would still be unable to make accurate predictions because... what exactly?

Consciousness may be necessary for our function, and yet totally different from temperature in that it may require an actual dedicated mechanism, an organ, a structure, in order to happen rather than just piling things up with no particular structure. — Olivier5

Yes but whatever that organ or mechanism is made of it has to have mental properties there at some level. Those cannot arise out of nothing. And panpsychism isn't claiming that consciousness is a piling up of things with no structure. Figuring out that structure is the "combination problem".

...which is ruled out by the uncertainty principle.... — Wayfarer

Sure but on the macro level the uncertainty principle becomes irrelevant so prediction should still be possible as far as I know. Or rather that is what should be the case but for some reason quantum mechanics calculations start breaking down at a level that is "macro enough". But that's why I said "perfect knowledge" as in a working theory that actually works at all levels (the whole goal of physics)

The scientific study of all aspects of consciousness, such as perception and identity, fall within psychology and therefore, where possible, neurology. — Kenosha Kid

But how would that lead to a general theory of consciousness? In psychology and neurology the most you can confirm is "When X happens Y follows". "When asked to focus on a demanding task, participants fail to notice the dancing gorilla". But that would be akin to saying "When I press A on my keyboard the letter A is typed on the screen". This would work for explaining how a PC works eventually by testing countless hypothesis and sometimes breaking open the PC (neurology) but it does not answer whether or not the PC is conscious, or why it would or wouldn't be.

Life emerged. It wasn't there at the beginning. Atoms are not alive. — Olivier5

Life is a pattern. Perfect knowledge of how atoms operate will lead you to understand how "clusters" of them operate. If you could predict accurately all the motions of every single atom you would have been able to predict the second world war.

However for consciousness nothing like that seems to be the case. No amount of knowledge of how particles operate will lead to the conclusion that there is an experience that accompanies their operation assuming that the particles themselves don't have any sort of "mental properties". Because the experience is not a pattern of movement, or charge, or any other physical property.

Consider this:

Can you conceive of a clone of your self acting in the exact same way you do but without conciousness?

If no then you would be implying that consciousness is necessary for our function, that it natrually comes out of the particles that make us up. In this setup "consciousness" is akin to "temperature". Knowledge of everything about the particles will lead you to discover that these particles will act a certain way. Temperature is a pattern produced from the movement of the particles, and it would make no sense if the particles couldn't move (didn't have kinetic energy to be precise). Similarly consciousness would be a pattern produced from the particles and it would make no sense if these particles didn't have any mental properties. That particles have some mental properties is panpsychism.

If you can conceive of such a thing then consciousness is not necessary for our function, and so no amount of studying our function (neurology/psychology/biology) will lead us to detect it. In whichcase the best we can do is say that we don't know anything about why consciousness exists and furthermore that we don't know which participants are conscious and which are not.

Did it ever occur to you that they may be perfectly rational explanations unknown to you in both the cases of the rabbit and consciousness? — Olivier5

Maybe but I don't think there are. I think strong emergence is nonsense. You have to assume that the rabbit didn't pop up out of nowhere, that there was always a rabbit (or the constituents of a rabbit) in the hat but that we couldn't see it, for that trick to make sense.

So you think dead people are still conscious but can't say it anymore? — Olivier5

Not necessarily. I'm pointing out that the ability to talk is not indicitive of consciousness.

If pulling a bunny out of an empty hat is magic then pulling consciousness out of non conscoius blocks is also magic in exactly the same way.

Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that.

Mutes don't talk either, but I'm pretty sure they're conscious. These two properties aren't related then.

Kind of yea. I’ll just add this: the label switching is simpler so should be favored by Occam’s razor. We already assume that some things other than us are conscious. We assume each other is conscious and that animals that are like us are “conscious”. And that things get “less conscious” the less like us they become. That would be panpsychism.

The standard view adds two more assumptions on top:

1- At some point things stop being conscious.
2- When enough non conscious things come together consciousness magically pops up.

And these two assumptions are completely unfounded and assuming them has demonstrably gotten us nowhere. That’s the appeal of panpsychism, that it’s actually simpler and more intuitive. Panpsychism assumes LESS about the world not more.

So now you’re going in circles and that we need panpsychism, and your previous comment was a total deflection. That was the target of my last comment. — Saphsin

If this is what you think you are simply misunderstanding

When I say panpsychism doesn’t explain anything, I meant exactly that. I didn’t mean its explanations are unsatisfying because it fails to get to the root of the mystery, but that it’s just label switching and has no positively contributing content or description. And I’m utterly confused why you think it does. — Saphsin

I’ve restated countless times that panpsychism doesn’t have any additional explanatory power. It solves the problem of WHY we are conscious (by simply attributing it to everything) and replaces it with the equally challenging problem of “How do these consciousnesses combine?”. This doesn’t explain anything, you’re absolutely correct. But it makes just about as much sense as the alternative view of “There are things that aren’t conscious that come together and magically become things that are conscious”

Panpsychism doesn’t explain anything more than the traditional view, and it is not in any way more complicated. Therefore whether or not you choose it or the traditional view (or something else) is a matter of personal preference. That is all I’m trying to establish

So, in this context, toward a neurological basis of psychology. — Kenosha Kid

How is that related to consciousness if at all? Every psychological bias/fallacy/theory/heuristic/etc still makes sense without consciousness.

If you don’t need it, if it doesn’t explain anything, then I don’t know why you’re wasting your time with it — Saphsin

The alternative (that at some point things stop being conscious) also doesn’t explain anything. So why are you wasting your time with THAT? You gotta pick some sort of metaphysical stance here and all of them are untestable, in which case it really doesn’t matter which you pick, that’s mostly personal preference.

all this time you’ve been speaking as if it’s replacing the role of the failure of known forms of scientific explanation — Saphsin

It IS a replacement, that comes with its own questions. It replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the combination problem. Why would someone do that? Because why not, they’re both hard problems.

What happened is: We had the assumption A that we thought was gonna lead us to understand consciousness. We gave up on that idea. Therefore alternate assumptions (panpsychism being one) arose.

All I’m trying to establish here is that panpsychism isn’t a “more complicated” or “unscientific” version of the standard view.

If you think there’s no details that you can empirically confirm I’m conscious and tease out the manner in which I am so, and it’s just an unfounded inference, you don’t even need panpsychism. — Saphsin

No one "needs" panpsychism. It's a theory among many.

settling for a non-explanation. — Saphsin

Panpsychism isn't really "settling". Instead of the "hard problem" which is created when you assume that at some point things aren't conscoius you have the "combination problem" which is asking "How do these "conscoius particles" add up to form a human consciousness and how does a human conscoiusness break down into particles", again, another unassailable problem.

I don't know why you went into this expecting panpsychism to be some sort of physical theory explaining how consciousness arises. It isn't, it is just metaphysical flavor. Which do you wanna deal with? Unassailable problem A or Unassailable problem B? I like B.

neuroscience is making good progress — Kenosha Kid

Towards what exactly?

We haven’t even figured out how to explain chemical bonds form purely out of quantum mechanical principles, and it may be a type of emergent phenomenon where doing so is not possible. There’s still decades and centuries in the future to figure out how far we can do it successfully, — Saphsin

But this is a very different kind of problem from consciousness. WIth enough time and effort we KNOW that we can explain how chemical bonds form because we can all see chemical bonds. We can test different hypothesis and jointly determine which is correct because we can all see the experiment right in front of our eyes.

But for consciousness it is different. I can't tell if you're conscious, or what kind of experience you're having. So how might I possibly construct a theory about how consciousness arises when I have no idea how to measure it in the first place? Let's say my hypothesis is "Consciousness arises when there is X level of data integration happening" or something. How can I test that? I can go and make some sort of machine that meets that condition but how can I know that that machine is conscious?

But for chemical bonds if I propose "X is necessary for a bond to form" I can design an expeirment where X doesn't happen and check whether or not the bond forms.

That's why panpsychism comes up, because not DO we know nothing about consciousness using the scientific method we likely WON'T know anything either (I can't see how the problem is approachable). We can know that this part of the brain produces this experience and this part produces that (and even that is based on testimony) but we can never know how consciousness is produces in the first place (because we can't ask rocks if they're conscious or not).

just adds more confusing assumptions — Saphsin

Is actully false though. The assumption that everything is conscious is just as valid as the assumption that there is some point at which things "stop being conscoius" suddenly in the absence of data to show otherwise. So far we have been assuming that there is some point at which things stop being conscious but since we cannot determine that point, nor does it seem like we'll be able to, the alternative hypothesis (that there is no such point) is starting to be seriously considered. They are both untestable for now.

Then how can you say the YOU are conscious if you can't tell if anyone else is conscious, and there is no theory of conscious? — Harry Hindu

"theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". I am bad at defining things but if I were to define consciousness it would be "Having a first person view" or something like that. I definitely have a first person view, but I can't tell if you do or not. I may not know what conditions produce consciousness as I defined it but I definitely know I have it. It's like how I can know that I am typing on a PC right now but not understand how a PC works or how the internet works.

To cut to the chase, panpsychists have to prove that their thesis doesn't commit the fallacies of composition and division. — TheMadFool

This is the combination problem. How do these "bits of consciousness" add up to a person and how does a person split up into "bits of consciousness". I have no clue how to solve said problem, but it not necessarily a fallacy.

Now, take the panpsychist assertion that everything has a soul/mind in the context of a car. The car has parts. Every part is a thing and since everything has a soul/mind, every part must have a soul/mind but to draw the conclusion that the car itself, the whole, has a soul/mind is the fallacy of composition. — TheMadFool

That conclusion is not drawn. As the combination problem has not been solved yet.

Coming at it from the opposite direction (a more relatable point of view I'm sure), most people will find it easier to think that a car, as a whole, has a soul. If so, according to the panpsychist, since everything has a soul, each and every part of a car should have a soul. That's the fallacy of division. — TheMadFool

Again, that conclusion is not drawn as the combination problem has not been solved yet.

Panpsychism doesn't have much in the way of explanatory power, since it can't explain how these "conscious particles" combine or split up. But I still think it makes sense as a "default belief". If we are willing to say that the other is conscious, without having any evidence to lead us to that belief, then the burden of proof should be on the perosn that claims that "People are conscious but rocks are not because people are special".

As Pfhorrest said:

The things that we are most familiar with, ourselves, are conscious. We're generous enough to at least extend that to other things that look like us "from the outside" (third person); we suppose they're also like us "on the inside" (first person). Some of us are also willing to extend that to things that are similar enough to us, like other animals. But really, the big assumption being made is not by those who just say "sure, and the less like us on the outside, the less like us on the inside, but there's still some 'on the inside' all the way down", but those who say "...and then at some point there stops being any 'from the inside'", or worse yet, those who say "there's no such thing as 'from the inside', even for you or me". — Pfhorrest

Need to prove that or else the assumtion of a "stopping point" where consciousness no longer exists is at least just as baseless as the assumption that there isn't one (panpsychism).

I was replying to the original post

non conscious experiences — prothero

This sounds to me like "Square Circle" or "Married Bachelor"

I thought I promised myself not to waste any more time on threads like these because they go nowhere but here I go again.

You’d deny the entire gamut of human experience so as to avoid one degree of it. — NOS4A2

And this is not unusual. When an experience can harm someone we don't do it, even if it can benefit them as well. I'm pretty sure you'd object if I used your money to buy you a new house because I thought you would like it without asking you. Even though there is a chance you like the house.

The anti-natalist should be honest and admit that his principles are born from fear — NOS4A2

I'd call "fear of harming others" responsibility.

First you must try to define them such that they don't end up being the same thing. I have failed at doing that.

I have no idea what motivates people to extend that notion to everything else in the world. Why do you think that helps explain anything. — Saphsin

Because for the longest time we thought that by coming up with the right physics or chemistry or biology we could find the "equation for consciousness". That eventually concsiousness will be consumed by the sciences and be regarded as mundane as temperature. That one day we may develop a "consciousness-o-meter" which measures consciousness the same way a thermormeter measures temperature. But we've slowly given up on that view, it seems that consciousness is not approachable by scientific method. Heck I can't tell if YOU'RE conscious, or if my couch is conscious, much less come up with a theory for consciousness. So the simplest explanation then is to attribute it to everything, so that you no longer need to explain how it arises from "inanimate matter"

In other words, the assumption that there are these physical objects that have no mental properties that somehow come together and suddenly have mental properties has gotten us nowhere, so people are starting to reject it.

Doesn't really seem like something a philosophy forum can answer. Maybe ask a neurologist or a psychologist. Or maybe just enjoy it for now because it seems like a pretty good state to be in whatever it is.

Your explanation of what you mean by enlightenment doesn't explain much.

Yes, that's it! Changelings would make the best philosophers. They could just morph into whatever and tell us. — Marchesk

But they couldn't tell us. It would be like describing color to a blind man. Maybe if they morph into something similar.

How are we talking about the same thing?

The referent of "red" for you is on your account entirely distinct from mine; so how can they mean the same thing? — Banno

I didn't say we were referring to the same thing, I don't know if we are or not (I don't know if we are having the same experience when looking at an apple). But regardless that is not a hinderence to communication. You could be seing inverted colors from me and we would understand each other perfectly.

Do you understand what a homomorphism is? As long as our experiences are homomorphisms of each other we will understand each other.

But there is still an enormous number of shades between Scarlet and Ferrari so both of them are still describing a range of experiences. And where did you get that 10 million shades of color thing? Just curious.

PS: I shall now call sunsets "Candy Apple" colored.

Well, I could go back and point out again hat the red of the sportscar and the red of the sunset — Banno

Yes there are different shades of red. We couldn't possibly have a word for every possible shade of colors so we lumped similar ones under one word. So I guess it was incorrect to say that "red" refers to a certain experience but rather a range of experiences. And all we need to be able to communicate is for these ranges to be largely similar. For instance I would say that a sunset is orange (the 'range' of experiences included under "orange" includes the shade of a sunset) but small differences like these shouldn't be a problem for understanding.

However if someone says the sunset is green he is either colorblind (his experiences are not a homomorphism of ours to begin with) or doesn't understand what the word means (the "pointer" he uses is incorrect even if the experience itself is a homomorphism of ours)

Tell me, have you read Austin's Sense and Sensibilia? — Banno

No.

Talking about apples 'seeming to be' and/or 'appearing' red is based upon doubting one's own physiological sensory perception — creativesoul

Not really. Even if we pretend to have a hotline to “true reality” then the sentence “The apple seems red” would still be true and would be identical to “The apple is red”.

Doubting one's own physiological sensory perception requires metacognition. Cognition comes first — creativesoul

I don’t understand the significance of this. So what if meta cognition comes later? As marchesk just said:

apples look red because they are red, because the world is at it looks to us, end of story. But it's not. — Marchesk

Or doesn’t have to be at least. Also this:

We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red". — creativesoul

Can’t be true. Red can’t indicate a certain frequency or wavelength. Or else the word “red” would have only been conceived of after we were able to measure frequencies and after we figured out light was a wave. But there are Greek words for “red” even as they were questioning what light was. Unless you suggest that when we say “red” today is different from when we said it in the past.

Furthermore, if this is your conception of red, then we would have to teach children the properties of light before being able to teach them colors. But again that is not the case. And I doubt that understanding light and wavelengths changes the referent of the word either. When a child says “the apple is red” and when einstein says “the apple is red” they mean the same thing.

You said apples are not red; they only appear red. — Banno

I said that when someone says “the apple is red” they really mean “the apple appears red/invokes a certain experience I call ‘red’”. I don’t think that’s even a controversial claim. Whether or not you assign a property “red” to the apple, my claim remains true.

yet you deny that we all have the same experience. — Banno

Incorrect. I deny that there is a reason to assume we all have the same experience, but we may. Because as I said, whether or not we have the same experience when seeing a red apple is irrelevant, all that we need to understand each other is to have a “homomorphism” of experiences.

But when we point out that the experience seems therefore to be irrelevant, you disagree. — Banno

Incorrect. I agree. I already said that talk of qualia is pointless (with them being ineffable and all that) for describing our experiences but that qualia clearly have a referent. So saying they don’t exist is at best purposely misleading and at worst ridiculous.

Perhaps it is your expression that is unclear; there's a vacillation going on in which you think apples are red at the grocer but not at the forum. — Banno

When did it appear to you that I think apples are not red when I’m on the forum? I’m just clarifying what people mean when they say “the apple is red”. That is that the apple produces a certain experience.