Yes, the quality I know infallibly, and the content I know fallibly, although I believe I have very good reasons to know the content (99.99999....% knowledge). I'd say that's a very strong foundation for knowledge.

Sure. At the present moment, (I know that) I'm sitting at my PC writing this sentence.

I adhere to correspondence theory re truth claims, so in this example, I am judging the truth value "true" to correspond to my experience in the present moment sitting at my PC.

I adhere to internalist theories of justification (and meaning wholesale), so in this example, my justification appeals to my believing/knowing that Realism is true and believing that direct realism is true; and that having this experience qua this experience cannot be reasonably refuted, even if what my experience is of cannot be known absolutely known (that is, even though I can be certain I am having an experience, it's possible that the content of my experience is false, e.g. I could be dreaming, hallucinating, etc. in the vein of "brain-in-a-vat" type scenarios).

That's a (strong) foundationalist position.

So far, I don't feel "uncomfortable" about that analysis.

But I become ambivalent when I consider that I have other beliefs that appeal to weak foundationalism as a "starting point"/foundational belief. For example, the (weak foundationalist) empirical claim that the sun will "rise" in the morning. And then I wonder whether it makes sense to say that strong foundationalism is compatible with weak foundationalism. Can there be different types of foundational beliefs within a system, for instance? I think so, but not totally sold yet.

On other hand, I do think it makes sense to believe that coherentism is compatible with foundationlism, since I believe that all thoughts are ultimately circular in nature like a "web/network of thoughts/beliefs." I am aware that coherentism says that there are no foundational beliefs, which I disagree with. So the way I conceive it, I have a variation of foundational beliefs that are organised in a network of other beliefs (a la coherentism).

I leave you with the recommendation to read this article
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154157?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents — MetaphysicsNow

Why would you do that?

Wait--what are patterns for you ontologically? I don't buy that "natural laws" are real, btw, if that's how you support or use "pattern". That's mainly because of the (unresolvable) problem of induction. Rather, we observe tendencies or regularities and project a "law" onto them to help us organise reality and be able to make instrumental predictions.

patterns are not events — MetaphysicsNow

Patterns are, ontologically, identical to properties (re-)occurring, which include things and events, and where things are comprised of properties, and events are collections of things interacting. (I use "events" as "facts" or "states of affairs" too, btw.)

Nevertheless, leaving your mastery of the English language aside, let's focus in on "recurring" shall we? — MetaphysicsNow

Is that how you speak to people face to face?

"consistent, recurring or reiterative" are you supposing those terms are synonymous? — MetaphysicsNow

I'm using them in a similar sense, yes. Whether that's conventional per dicitionary definitions I don't know. But I'm willing to bet you'll throw that in my face.

If a P pattern recurs, then P occurs at at least two distinct times, T1 and T2. Since P at T1 is the same pattern as P at T2 then P has not changed between the times T1 and T2, consequently P has not altered between T1 and T2. Hence a recurring pattern is an unaltering pattern, and despite your word play our definitions are ontologically equivalent. — MetaphysicsNow

As a nominalist, I don't buy that two things/events are numerically identical. So P occurring at two distinct times involve two non-identical ocurrences of P. Ontologically, things/events are relatively similar or disimilar in terms of "degrees of similarity." So P at time T1 is relatively similar to P at T2 but not identical. The degree of similarity of P at T1 and T2 entails a "general regularity" of P, where "general regularity" does not mean identical occurrences or re-occurences of some thing/event, but rather siimilar occurrences or re-occurences of some thing/event.

Definition of the claim "Everything is in constant flux": Every single existent thing alters from one moment to the next.

Definition: "General regularity" = An unaltering pattern, such as a natural law (e.g the force felt by a falling object is proportional to its gravitational mass). — MetaphysicsNow

All that shows, so far, is that we don't share the same views regarding "general regularity" there, which is one reason why I wanted you to reveal your definitions.

It depends how you're using "alter" and "unalter" too. I'm guessing you mean change or non-change, respectively. If so, then that's not how I use them, at least not when I'm talking about this ontologically.

I define "general regularity" as a consistent, recurring or reiterative pattern of particulars (as in, particular properties) in particular relations interacting. That's compatible with "constant flux" or "existent altering from one moment to the next."

Your responses are utter nonsense because you seem to think you can give both responses at one and the same time, which you cannot, since by doing so you would be violating the law of non-contradiction. Please don't respond "paraconsistent logic", because that really is utter nonsense. — MetaphysicsNow

Rather than impulsively assuming you're right, why don't you first try to understand and check what others are claiming? Your comments and attitude reek of "utter" arrogance and condescension. There really is no need for that. It'd be nice if we could have friendly debates/discussion without all the pomposity.

As it is difficult for you to grasp that non-physical things exist, it is equally difficult for me to grasp that physical things exist. I have extreme difficulty grasping what it means to exist. When I started to understand what "exists" means, I started to realize that it's more logical to assume that non-physical things exist than it is to assume that physical things exist. This is expressed by Descartes' "I think therefore I am". However, I see the need to assume that physical things exist as well, therefore I lean toward a dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this brings something up I often think about, actually. The idea that we all have a "network of beliefs" that cohere with one another, and which keep our general perspectives relatively stable. And I also think that people are, in general, relatively resistant to change or changing their ideas because of this stable network. I never expect nor assume anyone will change their mind when I discuss/debate philosophy with them. Nor do I assume or expect my mind to be changed, at least not immediately. But I am generally curious about others' views, especially when they are radically different to mine.

My point is that it is impossible that there is such a thing as a "non-mental property". If something takes up more space than another thing, this is a judgement made by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are necessarily bound by statements that refer when referring to things. But this doesn't constrain us from being able to use statements to refer to things we believe are actually external-to-minds. So when I use a statement in the form of an ontological claim, for instance, I am referring to what obtains ontologically, not to the actual ontological statement that refers. And that is supported by other beliefs, of course.

Let's say that a brain is "weighing up possibilities" as you describe. What is a "possibility" other than a non-physical thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

A brain weighing up possibilities is a brain experiencing a situation with perceived options that they care enough about in order to make a decision re which options to choose. It's a process. If you're talking about "possibility" in a logical or metaphysical sense, that's different; the former being any claim that is not contradictory, and the latter being anything that is possible based on past and present actuals.

Your way of speaking has inherent within it, the assumption of non-physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid not, and it's interesting that you believe that's the case. Which makes me think that's because your ontology re this stuff is so ingrained that it's difficult for you to imagine or make sense of physical existents, as you noted already. That's not a criticism, really; merely an observation. On the other hand, one reason why I don't buy the notion of non-physical existents is because no one has been able to clarify the ontological nature of non-physical existents, except to offer some vague examples like objects of the intellect or universals. In my opinion, the problem with those answers/explanations is the fact that the reason they're intangible is precisely why I think no one can offer a tangible/graspable explanation. It's a self-defeating problem that can't be resolved because of the fuzzy/vague/intangibility of what non-physical existents are for people. And also, I believe that "explanations" are subjective, which means that some people are satisfied with the explanations they have for their beliefs, while others aren't so satisfied.

Anyway...

You claim that your ontology allows for no such non-physical things, but you're always referring to them in your speech. — Metaphysician Undercover

That you believe I'm referring to non-physical existents in my speech is only because you can't imagine how to refer to physical existents in your speech.

In talking about "changing relations", it is implied that there are static things which are being related to each other in this expression of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you just keep putting words in my mouth. I don't believe anything is actually static/non-changing. I've repeatedly claimed the opposite. It's just that you can't (and I don't think you care to) understand my perspective on this, so you just make this stuff up so you can wrap me up in a box and label me as "the guy who thinks there exists physical things but is confused and talks nonsense." That's fine, but all you're doing is showing how dogmatic and close-minded you are.

So instead of
It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general stability to things.
You should have more accurately stated;
It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general regularities to how things occur/are. — MetaphysicsNow

It's not about being more accurate. "General stability" is synonymous with "general regularity" for me in this context. Maybe you would have preferred me to have stated one thing over the other, but both statements mean the same thing for me.

I repeat; this is utter nonsense - to say that everything is always in flux is precisely to deny that there are general regularities to how things occur/are, since if there were such general regularities they would be things exonerated from being in flux. — MetaphysicsNow

Again, it depends on what you mean by "general regularities/stability". You'd have to explain/define those terms for me to understand how you're supporting that claim. In other words, you haven't actually given any good reasons for me to buy the claim you're making. You've just said, A wouldn't happen because B. Well, what does A mean and what does B mean for you? I personally find it coherent for "constant flux" and "general regularities" to be ontologically compatible. Show me how that's incoherent.

I wonder whether you'll repeat "this is utter nonsense" again.

This is utter nonesense. To say that everything is always in flux is precisely to say that there is no general stability to things. — MetaphysicsNow

It depends what you mean by "general stability", which I mean as a general regularity to how things occur/are.

(1) Why you're deflecting the question back to me? — numberjohnny5


I expected that you'd recognize that the question was a rhetorical question. You asked me how do non-physical things exist if they have no properties and my answer (by way of rhetorical question) is that properties are non-physical things. So it doesn't really make sense to ask about the properties of properties. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't realise, no. It's difficult for me to grasp how non-physical things exist (even if you say that properties are non-physical), and at the time, I was hoping you'd clarify that for me. That's why I asked you a direct (non-rhetorical) question.

So, Ill now ask you the question. Do you or do you not apprehend properties as non-physical things? Take the property "large" for example. Many physical things are large, so it is impossible that large is any particular physical thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends how we use "large" -- whether it's a mental property of our minds assigning things as "large" (the concept "large" is a thought) in terms of relative scales, or whether we're referring to non-mental properties of things that actually take up more space than other things, say. There are no "comparisons/measurements" that are non-mental though.

It appears to me, like you do not adequately understand what "ontology" is. Ontology consists of the assumptions which we make about existence, and we always have our own reasons for the assumptions which we make. So my ontological assumption is that non-physical things have existence no less than physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's how I use ontology too, except I'd add claims and commitments to that criteria as well as assumptions.

Non-physical things are apprehended by the mind, they are called intelligible objects like universal ideas, concepts like "large", "red", etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I guessed that you'd believe something like that. It just isn't coherent to me.

How do you think that the numeral "2" stays the same, as the numeral "2", within my mind, if all there is in my mind is brain activity? How does the numeral "2" stay in my mind as a static object, if my "mind" is only accounted for by brain activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

The numeral "2" doesn't stay the same when I visualise it. If I visualise the number "2" now, I notice it isn't this stable image; it fluctuates and changes. It's relatively "stable" in that as long as I try to visualise it, it remains there in some form. But it's in no way an actually non-changing, static thing in my mind.

So let's readdress this question. There is brain activity which corresponds to me thinking should I or should I not shut down my computer. Then I make a choice and proceed with the appropriate activity. What, other than the non-physical mind, causes the actual choice? It cannot be the brain activity which is the cause of the decision, because the brain activity is considering the options, weighing the possibilities, and the choice causes the end of this brain activity, to be replaced with a different activity, the movement of the body parts. The brain activity cannot cause the activity of the bodily parts directly, because a choice is required. Nor is it something external, which is the cause, because the choice comes from within me. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not that it's not like a sequence of brain activity that involves perceiving the situation, weighing up possibilities, making a choice, and making sense of the consequences of that choice. That's all (conscious) brain activity; and it's constantly doing/juggling multiple things sequentially; and this is all happening while nonconscious brain activity is working too.

Brain activity causes the actual choice. It's not like the brain activity only amounts to "considering the options, weighing the possibilities". Whatever gave you that idea? And I'd say "the choice is the end of that particular sequence of brain activities." The brain activity sends projections from the motor regions to the muscle sites in the body. So it is directly responsible (along with other nonconscious processes) for causing movement of body parts. Also, making choices is the mental aspect of brain activity, and it can only be mental activity if non-mental activity (autonomic processes) is functional.

If everything is constantly changing, then there is no such thing as a state of affairs. To assume that everything is changing, and that there are states of affairs is contradictory. So in your claimed ontology, facts or truths cannot be expressed as states of affairs. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only if you parse that as a false dichotomy between "constant change" as not having a regularity to it, and "non-constant change" as being only or permanently static. It's more nuanced than that. Think of it as two dancers dancing together. One dancer represents a person/mind, and the other dancer represents what the mind refers to. Maybe the dancers are waltzing incredibly slowly, so you can't very easily perceive that they're moving/constantly changing. But at any time that one dancer refers to the other dancer re a truth-claim, the other dancer obtains and "makes" the truth-claim "true".

What numberjohnny5 needs to do is read Plato's Theatetus for the definitive refutation of that idea. The basic idea of Plato's (and I think Metaphysician Undercover is getting at precisely the same point) is that the notion of flux only makes sense in the context where there is a background of stability (and one can turn the table also and say even the notion of stability requires that there is some kind of flux). — jkg20

I think you give yourself (and Plato) too much credit. It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general stability to things. That's a false dichotomy: either everything is in constant flux and has no stability, or that nothing is in constant flux and there is stability.

It also seems as though people are assuming that continuous flux or constant change precludes anyone from saying anything true (or false), i.e. making truth-claims or having ontological commitments. That's not the case. We observe flux happening around us, and we refer to it. There is a regularity to change/flux when we observe it. It's not like by things being in continual flux things are only just randomly/acausally doing all sorts of strange, unpredictable things. But it's not that "stability" means "static-non-change" either. That's a very black-and-white, simplistic way of describing those terms in lieu of change/non-change. Further, many things appear not to change on particular levels of scale, and we observe that change is occurring on micro-scales, or over longer and longer periods of change/time.

You are missing the point. Just because the relata of a relation are constantly changing does not entail that the relation itself is constantly changing. Counting relata and counting relations are to count two different kinds of things. — ProcastinationTomorrow

I think you're missing my point. I didn't say that the changing things ("relata") being referred to entail that the mental relations are constantly changing.

I said "Firstly, in my ontology, all existents are constantly changing. There are no "static-instants", for example. That means that both (objective) facts/events/states of affairs and mental events (which are subjective facts/events/states of affairs) are constantly changing/in motion. Any existent at time T1 is non-identical with itself at any other time in the past or future." That's because to exist is to change. Existents change/are in motion.

There's no entailment there between the changing relata and the changing mental relations that refer to relata. The first "premise" is that the mental and non-mental are constantly changing. And while "relations" and "relata" are two kinds of things, they both are material, and they both constantly change.

But insofar as they're physical processes then they're not different in principle. — Wayfarer

Feser's argument is making a positive claim about different "types" of material processes having some commonality, namely, that they don't posses inherent meaning. That's false though because brain processes don't have the same "kinds" of properties and don't "behave" in the "same" kinds of ways as the other non-brain processes examples he gave. That all the examples are, "in principle", material/physical processes is beside the point he's making.

He then goes on to make another positive claim that thoughts have inherent meaning. The problem is thoughts are identical with brain processes.

Another problem is Feser says things like brain processes don't "seem" to have inherent meaning. But that's a claim from a third-person perspective. One can't actually perceive others' first-person experiences of meaning-making.

When you examine brain-scans, you're interpreting graphical images, which are physical in nature - you're examining the trace left by blood-flows in millions of neurons, which is surely a physical process. But it's the nature of interpretation which is at issue - interpreting what the data means is what is at issue in all of this. And you indeed then go on to concede this very point, by saying that 'mental processes are meaning makers' and 'meaning-making is first person'. So your second two paragraphs take back what the first is trying to assert. — Wayfarer

I don't really understand. How is this the issue: "the nature of interpretation which is at issue - interpreting what the data means is what is at issue in all of this"?

That is why the role of number, logic, and language are significant in this context. Numbers are objectively constant for anyone capable of counting, but at the same time, they're not material objects - they're purely intellectual in nature. The same can be said for logical operators such as 'equals' 'greater than' and so on. — Wayfarer

I disagree. "Numbers", "equals" etc., are concepts that occur in minds. They are abstract ways minds organise and try to make quantitative relationships.

Because to account for the fact that there is (presumably) more than one thing that is true, you'd have to have different particular things interacting inone and the same (truth-creating) way. — jkg20

It's not entirely clear to me what you mean. Anyway, I'll try to guess and make a stab at it!

Firstly, in my ontology, all existents are constantly changing. There are no "static-instants", for example. That means that both (objective) facts/events/states of affairs and mental events (which are subjective facts/events/states of affairs) are constantly changing/in motion. Any existent at time T1 is non-identical with itself at any other time in the past or future.

So for example, when an individual (X) makes a truth claim (P) about some event (E) at time T1, X, P, and E are constantly changing/in motion. When the "same" X makes a P about E at time T2, the X, P, and E are not identical with what they were at T1. And so on, over time.

So "objective relations," as the ways in which particular things/properties interact with other things/properties, are constantly changing, through time T1, T2, T3, and so on. So an individual can make truth-claims (in the form of subjective events i.e. truth-claim P1, P2, P3, and so on) about such objective relations at time T1, T2, and T3, etc. That seems consistent and coherent to me, obviously. The truth-claims refer to actual states of affairs. In other words, the subjective events refer to the objective events.

Does that help answer your question?

I'm using the standard philosophical definition of "fact". — numberjohnny5


Where did you get this definition? Please give me the link to it, unless it is Wikipedia. — Sir2u

I must admit, after having looked into it, I didn't realise there were a few popular philosophical and non-philosophical definitions of fact/states of affairs that are not the same. I assumed there was only one--the one that I thought was the standard definition. So that's another thing that I've found useful to learn through this debate/discussion.

I use the Russellian definition, which is one among other popular/standard philosophical definitions. Here's a link: https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2009/entries/states-of-affairs/

The Wikipedia (and Honderich) definitions are also standard definitions, I think, although they don't clearly make reference to objective facts/states of affairs as ontologically different in "kind" in relation to things like truth-claims or propositions, which are mental.

Another discussion about this is in this link: https://philosophynow.org/issues/115/Facts_and_Opinions

The conclusion details the ontological difference between facts and beliefs/claims.

So, in light of these definitions, my view is that as facts/states of affairs aren't the same kind of thing as mental states (which experience and produce things like truth-claims), I then infer that facts/states of affairs don't hinge on things like truth-claims to be the kind of thing that they are i.e. to have the properties that they do. Objective things that mental states refer to aren't the same kinds of things as mental states that do the referring. And that's what leads me to conclude that "facts/events/states of affairs" aren't mind-dependent (but mind-independent), since they don't possess the same properties of minds, and are in different locations to minds (i.e. external to minds).

Yes, but that's changing the topic from when a cat is feline to when a cat is thought of as feline. — Sapientia

It's not changing the topic. In my view, a cat is never objectively feline because "feline" is a meaningful term that is assigned to animals like cats/that have the properties that cats have relative to other animals. This is just a fundamental disagreement about what meaning is, and whether abstract objects are real or not, I think, and so we'll just be going around in circles unless those issues are addressed.

that's where I suspect your form of idealism would come in. It's a variation of the old chestnut, "to be is to be perceived". — Sapientia

You're misunderstanding me. I'm not saying anything like "my perception of something makes it have the properties that it does", like Berkeley. I'm saying, rather, that anything meaningful I assign to objects/properties is not the same as the objects/properties I'm assigning meaning onto. That my classifications of stuff are not the same kinds of stuff as the stuff I'm classifying. It would be a category error to assume the opposite were true.

A cat is a feline because it has been classified as such, and that's a sufficient explanation. — Sapientia

A cat is an animal that we label "feline" based on our taxonomy of animal classification. "Feline" is obviously a label that individuals construct. The term "feline" is not inherent within the animal itself, otherwise what kind of thing, ontologically, is "feline"? What and where is the property "feline"?

There is no view-from-nowhere. — numberjohnny5

That's a kind of nonsense phrase that idealists tend to bring up. I don't recall ever seeing a realist actually posit a so-called view-from-nowhere. I certainly have not done so. There doesn't need to be a view at all. It's the idealist who thinks in those terms. I'm just telling you what's the case, or what it would be. — Sapientia

The "view-from-nowhere" phrase was brought up because it seems you believe concepts (once conceived) are things that objectively exist sans minds. So it's like you're saying that when concepts are initially conceived, they are from an individual perspective; but then after that, they are objectively real from no perspective. They exist in the thing they are about, somehow.

Just as things like rocks and trees don't depend on mental events, and just as facts of the kind under discussion - such as that Earth preexisted us - don't depend on mental events, nor do logical relationships like those implied by classification. — Sapientia

Logic is mental. Concepts are mental. If there were no individuals, there would exist no logic. Are you equating logic with objective phenomena like rocks and trees?

What does that mean? We come up with concepts. They're conceived by us. An act of conception. But they're no more attached to us than you or I are attached to our respective mothers by umbilical cord. We are independent, as are they. — Sapientia

Yes, they are. The kinds of things that concepts are are brain states, particularly, mental states.

And it's a similar thing with classifications. Things don't classify themselves. We classify things. But once a classification has been made, we're no longer necessary. We can step back. Job done. You'd need a cause for the situation to change. — Sapientia

Classifications are made by individuals, right? So they are made from a perspective. They can be written down as objective ink on paper, but they need individuals to assign meaning onto them, otherwise they are just ink on paper.

What is your take on meaning--where is it? What is it? I think this will get to the heart of the matter in terms of our disagreements.

But the act of conceiving is distinct from the concept conceived, yes? Like the act of production is distinct from the product produced. I presume that you'd agree that a product, once produced, no longer depends for it's existence as a product on the process in which it was produced, yes? — Sapientia

No, it depends on what kinds of things we're referring to. Conceiving something and "holding/maintaining" the concept conceived are mental events i.e. thoughts. They are subjective phenomena. They aren't objective (external-to-mind) phenomena. I think what you're talking about is conceiving something as mental phenomena, and then expressing that conception in various material forms, maybe? Like expressing the concept "blue moon" as a drawing on a piece of paper, or via speech-sounds. If that's what you're getting at, that drawing and those speech-sounds wouldn't actually have any inherent meaning. They are objectively a drawing and speech-sounds in that they exist external-to-minds, but meaning is assigned to objective (external-to-mind) phenomena. That's because objective phenomena is not the same kind of thing--doesn't consist of the same kinds of properties/materials--as subjective phenomena. The first-person experience of conceiving and making statements, etc. cannot be observed from third-person perspectives. We can only observe the things that constitute the expression of concepts from third-person perspectives. So for example, the conception of some criteria cannot be literally first-person observed/experienced from another person's first-person experience. That criteria can be expressed via language though. So the "act of producing" some criteria in your mind is not the same kind of thing, ontologically, as the way that criteria is produced/translated/expressed in the form of objective materials, like speech-sounds, pixels on a screen, a diagram/list on paper, etc.

This is a statement: "Earth preexisted humanity". It is displayed on a website. If we all suddenly ceased to exist, then, all else being equal, the statement would still be there, and it would of course still be true, because it would of course still be the case that Earth preexisted humanity.
Q.E.D. — Sapientia

The statement would still be there as pixels on a screen, but there would be no meaning inherent in those pixels. Meaning occurs in minds--we assign meaning onto things like pixels on a screen.

And I don't agree that there would be no truth or falsity either, as truth and falsity would correspond accordingly with what is or is not the case, which, as I've demonstrated, does not depend on us or our judgement — Sapientia

"Truth" is always true to someone because truth is a property of propositions, and propositions are mental events. (Objective) facts/states of affairs are not dependent on someone's perspective, as we agreed.

If no minds, then no minds to judge, comprehend, ascertain, perceive, conceive, understand, think about, know, etc., etc., the truth. But, nevertheless, the truth would be there, with or without us, and with or without our minds, or those of anyone else for that matter, and with or without our judging, comprehending, ascertaining, perceiving, conceiving, understanding, thinking, knowing, etc., etc., anything at all, because the correspondence between truth and fact does not require us, or our minds, or those of anyone else, or any judging, comprehending, ascertaining, perceiving, conceiving, understanding, thinking, knowing, etc., etc., to take place - again, as I've demonstrated. The show would simply go on without us. — Sapientia

I think "the truth" is something you're thinking is a real abstract. You spoke of Lockean primary qualities as opposed to Platonic Forms, but you do realise that primary qualities are inherent qualities within things, right? How does something mental, like "criteria", or a concept, though originally conceived within a mind, then become inherent within the object/thing the criteria/concept refer to?

I think by "the truth" you mean "the cat is feline is an objective fact". But in my view, when we say "the cat is feline," we mean, "it's a fact that we assign meaning to those animals we label as "cats" in the form of a classification system in which cats are labelled 'feline'."

It's like you're saying we conceive of things and make truth-claims about things, and once we have made truth-claims, they persist with or without us. So they go from being mental to non-mental. Well, what exactly is existing/persisting that once was mental and now isn't? What kind of thing is an objective truth-claim? Do you believe 2+2=4 is an objective fact? Where and what kind of thing is the concept "2" in reality if not in minds?


Also, I still want to know what evidence you have to support your claim that I'm some kind of idealist.

what he is challenging you with is to come up with an account of truth that doesn't surreptitiously or explicitly imply the existence of non-particular, not-material things. Even your definition of objective relations just introduces another term that looks like a non-particular : i.e. ways of interaction. — jkg20

You'd have to explain how "particular things interacting in particular ways" looks like a non-particular event. It seems coherent to me, obviously. But I don't know what's preventing you or influencing you to interpret "ways of interaction" as a non-particular.

Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser

Two major problems with this argument are:

Firstly, brain processes aren't anything like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, or an electrical current. Different objects are made of different properties in different relations. So to lump all that stuff together and assume it's all the same is a straw-man re physicalist/materialist views.

Secondly, it's false that thought processes aren't brain processes. Thoughts are identical with brain processes, namely, a "type" of mental process. It's important to realise that mental processes are the meaning-makers, not non-conscious processes.

It's also important to remember that meaning-making (i.e. mental associations) is a first-person experience. A lot of externalists don't recognise this fact, and couch their arguments as if meaning is only perceived in the third-person. What I'd love to know is, if meaning was objective, what the hell is meaning ontologically? Is it "ink marks"? What properties of the ink marks makes it have inherent meaning?

Yes, nominalistic materialism is true, in my view. "Truth" is a property of propositions/claims, and propositions are assertions (made by individuals/minds) about what is the case. Nominalistic materialism (NM) is an ontological claim (being an empirical claim) that asserts that for any thing to exist, that thing is physical/material; and that no two numerically distinct existents/things/occurrences are identical. So yes, propositions feature truth-values (in which minds judge propositions to be true in relation to what they're referring to, in the case of correspondence theory, for example), which occur in brains (specifically, via mental states), which are material things undergoing processes (no thing is static, in my view); and no two numerical brain/mental states are identical. For example, my brain state at T1 is A, and my brain state at T2 is B, and so on.

Propositions are also first-person experiences that refer to things. That is, propositions or truth-claims are always from someone's perspective. It's also important to make a distinction between brain states and mental states, the latter being a "type" (in an anti-realist sense) of the former. That is, mind states are identical to brain states in being a particular "type" of brain state. So it's not that brain states/mind states are in and of themselves true or false, it's rather that brain states/mind states make true or false assertions about stuff.

In lieu of nominalism, then, "types" are ways we organise and classify experience. It's a mental process of abstration. But abstractions are physical processes in the mind/brain. That is, abstractions are thoughts, and thoughts are mental states.

There are (at least) two different "types" of "relations": (i) objective relations as the way materials/properties ontologically interact with other materials/properties (on both the macro or mico scales); and (ii) subjective relations, as the way individuals/minds organise experience and make claims/comments about how objective (and/or subjective) things relate with/to each other. So (ii) is a "type" of mental event/state.

So, the big question is how does a nominalistic materialis account for the distinction between truth and falsity without introducing non-material, non-particular things? — ProcastinationTomorrow

There is no non-material, non-particular thing in my ontology, which I'm hoping you'll recognise in my response.

Sir2u — Sir2u

I've been pondering about our debate to try and understand it more clearly. I think we're talking about different things.

I think you're basically saying that we can't make verifiable claims about events/circumstances if we haven't experienced those events/circumstances.

I'm saying that the kinds of things that objective events are ontologically doesn't hinge on subjective mental states (like experiencing those events, making claims about them, etc.) for them to be the kinds of things that they are. They are the kinds of things that they are whether we experience them or not. So I'm saying that "facts" as objective events are mind-independent. That's a different claim than the one you're putting forward, which is based on a different definition of "fact" I think you're using.

I'm using the standard philosophical definition of "fact". I think you're using a general or non-philosophical definition of "fact", like this one: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fact

I would agree that we can't make (provisionally) verifiable (or falsifiable) claims about events/circumstances if we (a) haven't experienced those events directly, or (b) haven't experienced/learnt about those events indirectly. But that's not a claim against what I'm saying about objective facts being mind-independent.

Perhaps I'm not sure what you mean by physicalist - it's an unclear label for a wide variety of views. Do you mean that mental things simply are physical things, we just don't know it yet? Or do you mean that mental things are caused by physical things, but are distinct kinds of things nevertheless? Or something else? I can only really get to grips with the rest of your response once this is cleared up. — ProcastinationTomorrow

I mean that mental things are identical to physical things, namely, "types" of brain states. Physicalism is pretty much the same as materialism for me. Everything that exists is physical or is made of matter.

It seems as though you're putting the cart before the horse, in that it seems as though you're setting out to reduce whatever I bring up to something that has a mental or a physical location, rather than starting from a position of impartiality whereby you keep your options open. — Sapientia

Well, that's because I'm a physicalist, and it doesn't make sense to me how a non-physical thing can exist. It's not as though I haven't thought about and argued this stuff before, btw.

It's not that I'm "setting out to reduce whatever" you bring up as if I had some kind of agenda. I don't tend to use the terms "reduce/reductionism" because there's often a lot of stigma surrounding those terms in places I've argued philosophy, especially from those who tend to be dualists, universalists, and realists on abstract objects. Furthermore, what makes you think you're being more impartial?

Also, "mental" is physical.

classifications, once made, do not depend on us in any way. They don't depend on our having some kind of mental event which involves them. If a cat has been classified as feline, then, accordingly, a cat is feline, and that's that. — Sapientia

No wonder you believe that there exist "objective standards" of some kind. It seems that you're an externalist. A cat is thought of as feline always to someone. There is no view-from-nowhere. A cat's classification is reinforced by others thinking about a cat as feline. Classifications don't make sense outside of mental events. We assign/impose concepts upon things. Those things aren't real, objective things though. As an internalist, that's my view, anyway.

That would be the case if there were no cats, no people, or no cats or people. — Sapientia

That's just weird to me.

We fundamentally disagree then. It just isn't plausible that the existence of concepts depends on us actively thinking of them; nor, consequently, that they pop in and out of existence, all of a sudden, in accordance with our active thoughts. They're just not like that. Concepts are separable from - and independent of - the act of conceiving. But you're trying to blur the lines. — Sapientia

Again, that's just a bizarre thing to me. Interesting to know though. I'm curious what "concepts" are ontologically for you?

Also, hypothetically, or for the sake of argument, if concepts are thoughts, do you think that thoughts "pop in and out of existence"?

It doesn't even make sense to take a concept as a mental event. It's conceiving which is the mental event. You're confusing a noun with a verb, and a thing with an act. — Sapientia

Well, as we all have different ontologies, I'm sure it doesn't make sense to you. In my view, things are happening/being in some way, some more dynamic than others. Nouns and verbs can be useful, but are just ways of parsing and organising experience. Remember that old thing you said? The map ain't the territory.

Concepts are fixed. Subsequent to conception, they remain static and uniform. They depend on beings such as us for their conception only, and from that point onwards, they're independent. We can alter them, if we're around to do so, but even if we do, those alterations will then remain in place unless tinkered with. — Sapientia

Your definition of "criteria" makes a bit more sense to me now...I think.

And everything that physically exists is changing. — Sapientia

So that's everything then. :)

But I don't understand your confusion, nor why you don't find my explanation coherent. — Sapientia

It's confusing because as I said there's a more straightforward way of making that claim, rather than saying something like "it's the truth that this statement about this fact is true". Using "truth" and "true" in that statement just seems redundant to me. Otherwise, it seems like "truth" is being used like a fact, as in, "it's a fact that this statement about this fact is true".

Yes, that's what I mean...what makes a statement true or false is that someone is judging that statement to be true or false. — numberjohnny5


Oh dear. No, that is not the case at all. That's a kind of idealism which I strongly reject. It's odd, because some of the things you've said make me think that you're a realist like me, but then you come out with a bombshell like that. — Sapientia

I don't know why what I said there makes you think I'm an idealist. I am a realist on some things, but I'm an anti-realist on some things, like abstract objects. Also, I've checked and it seems that, standardly in analytic philosophy, (propositional) statements involve an individual judging statements to be true or false. But then, if you're an externalist and you believe things like concepts are mind-independent once they've been conceived, you would disagree. I'd guess you're a realist about abstract objects too.

What makes a statement like, "Earth preexisted us", true or false, is whether or not Earth preexisted us - which has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone judging any statement to be true or false. — Sapientia

There is a relationship between statements and facts. What makes that relationship is individuals/minds using statements to refer to facts. Objective facts don't literally make that relationship, because they aren't individuals/minds--they don't have things like intentions or will. That's the purpose of propositional statements: they refer to things; and minds judge whether those statements accurately refer to facts or not. What else is going to judge whether a statement is true or not? The non-mental objects/events/facts can't, can they? If there was no one around to observe facts and to make judgements about them in the form of statements, the facts would still obtain, but there would be no true or false because truth is a property of propositions only. No minds, no truth.

Furthermore, I think we have to be careful about how we use/interpret language because it can mislead us into mistaken views. Facts don't actually "make" statements true or false. That's just a manner of speaking. Facts are observed and judged to be facts (via statements/propositions) by individuals/minds.

My understanding was that we're talking about statements in general, not restricting the conversation in that manner, which conveniently suits your argument. Why would you do that? — Sapientia

I think that's because statements don't inherently contain meaning, so it would only be relevant to discuss statements that we think and utter ourselves, or when we assign meaning onto written statements of some medium. Apart from that, it could be an assumption I made that I wasn't aware of.

Bear in mind my view of "truth" is not conventional. When you say "true statement", I parse that as a person judging that statement to be true (about something). — numberjohnny5


Why would you do that? :angry:

The convention makes sense. You shouldn't diverge from it. That's going to cause more problems than it solves. — Sapientia

Yeh, I checked and it seems I'm not using an unconventional definition of "truth" re propositions afterall. Oops. Still learning.

Btw, some conventions make sense, some don't, right? So I wouldn't stick to a convention unless I agreed with it. I think it's useful to be aware of conventions in general though so as to have a reference frame from which to discuss this stuff.

For example, I parse the statement, "the Earth preexisted us" as "the statement 'the Earth preexisted us' is true". — numberjohnny5


But why? Don't.

Do you parse cats as dogs and up as down? — Sapientia

Those examples aren't equivalent to my statement. Is your statement, "The Earth preexisted us" a true statement because it refers to past facts?

I think what you really mean is "assertion" or "claim". Statements are broader and more ambiguous. But again, judgement is only necessary in past tense, not present tense i.e. there must have been a judgement, but there doesn't have to be one. — Sapientia

What I mean by "judgement" is an evaluation and psychological commitment towards the relationship between a statement and how it refers to the facts. E.g. I evaluate whether a statement refers to the facts accurately (via acquaintance knowledge), and if I believe the correspondence is accurate, then I commit myself to a truth-value, namely, "true" or "false".

Also, I make a distinction between "statement" and "sentence". I take "sentence" to be a broader class in which things like statements, questions, instructions, and exclamations exist.

Here's some references I use (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, by Honderich):

"Most modern logicians maintain that statements are distinct
from sentences, citing the fact that not all sentences are used to make statements or arguing
that the same statement may be expressed by different sentences. Some use 'statement' and
'proposition' interchangeably, regarding them as alternative names for what is 'expressed'
by an indicative sentence or 'asserted' when such a sentence is used. Others distinguish
between the two, so that a proposition is what is asserted when such a sentence is used to
make a statement."

"The term 'truth' seems to denote a property, one which is also expressed by the truth-predicate 'is true'. But if so, of what is truth a property? What are the primary 'bearers' of
truth, and of its counterpart, falsity? At least three candidates can be put forward:
sentences, statements, and propositions. Loosely, a sentence is a linguistic token or type,
such as the string of written words 'This is red'. A statement is the assertoric use of a
sentence by a speaker on a particular occasion. A proposition is what is asserted when a
statement is made—its 'content'. Thus two different speakers, or the same speaker on two
different occasions, may assert the same proposition by making two different statements,
perhaps using sentences of two different languages."

Truth-value doesn't hinge on judgement of truth-value. For a statement to have truth-value, it need only be meaningful. — Sapientia

I don't think that's sufficient. Any statement can be interpreted meaningfully in numerous ways, since meaning is subjective.

And, for the kind of statements that we've been talking about to be true, they'd need to correspond with facts which reflect them. — Sapientia

Yes, and individuals/minds are the ones that refer or do the corresponding. The facts don't do anything but "sit" there.

Your conclusion doesn't follow, because statements aren't limited to being those which "occur" in the present, in the form of thoughts expressed verbally (which are arguably "mental events"). — Sapientia

It would also apply to individuals presently assigning meaning onto statements inscribed on some medium in the past.

Your view is unreasonably narrow, and it seems as though you've purposefully made it that way, because making it that way will give you your desired conclusion. — Sapientia

Maybe. Do you think you could be wrong about that, or that there might be other explanations?

What you're doing seems to be fallacious along the lines of begging the question or moving the goalposts. — Sapientia

I think a lot of what's going on is that we obviously don't share similar views about how to use terms conventionally. But more than that, a lot of these views are based on implicit ontological beliefs that influence our explicit views and understandings. It's not necessarily a fallacious issue.

Let me try to clear this up. In my ontology, all existents/events are facts--they're actual/real. There are non-mental facts, like trees, rocks, stars, and so on. There are mental facts, like thoughts and perceptual experiences. "Truth" is a type of mental fact. — numberjohnny5


But that's just wrong. Why would you do that? — Sapientia

Err...because I think I'm right?

Okay, but then your view is wrong. — Sapientia

Or not.

Ask yourself what is a property, and maybe you would realize that a property is itself a non-physical thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Three thoughts came to mind when reading that sentence:

(1) Why you're deflecting the question back to me?
(2) It seems you're implying that I haven't done enough philosophising because if I had, I would share the same conclusions re properties being non-physical as you do.
(3) Why is it that in the handful of times I've asked anyone how to try and explain to me that non-physical existents obtain, they never actually try to accomodate me or give me a straight answer in terms of ontology? (That's rhetorical, but I'd be open to an answer.)

It doesn't make sense to me to suppose that, literally, "intentions lie behind" anything, apart from skulls, since intentions are mental phenomena. Intentions as mental states/events are not the same kind of thing as non-mental states/events, like behaviours, language formalisms, etc. Intentions can't be displayed because mental events are first-person experiences. We can only express intentions via observable methods of communication or action, but those methods are not intentions. — numberjohnny5

It's not clear to me in what capacity you'd like an explanation of a physical brain state making a choice. I'll make a first attempt though. (Btw, when I refer to anything that exists, even when I mention "state", I do not presume they are static things. They are constantly changing/happening.)

The kind of physical state that can make a choice is a mental state that has will and makes choices within particular contexts. For example, the physical state of thinking "I want to shut down my laptop" can (it doesn't have to) result in other conscious processes causing particular motor (efferent) pathways to move (exhibit/inhibit) particular body parts to shut down the laptop.

OK, so let me ask you a question: why can't behaviour be mental? Just saying that it cannot be doesn't answer that question. There seems to be a dualistic metaphysics lying behind your position, and if that is the case, then that dualism needs to be brought out clearly and defended, not just stated. — ProcastinationTomorrow

Sure. Behaviour involves the (autonomic and voluntary) motor movements (exhibition/inhibition of muscles via efferent pathways) as processed by nonconscious and conscious phenomena. Mentality refers just specifically to the conscious phenomena. There is a relationship between voluntary motor movements and mentality, of course, but they ain't the same. One major distinction is that motor movements occur in multiple sites in the body e.g. limbs, hands, feet etc., whereas mentality only occurs in the brain.

And I'm strictly a physicalist.

You seem to be assuming that intentions lie behind the conventions rather than intentions actually being manifested in those conventions. You may be right, you may be wrong, but you would need to address the quasi-behaviourist line of thought that sees intentions as things actually displayed by objective conventional practices, not as things that lie concealed behind those practices and somehow giving rise to them. — ProcastinationTomorrow

It doesn't make sense to me to suppose that, literally, "intentions lie behind" anything, apart from skulls, since intentions are mental phenomena. Intentions as mental states/events are not the same kind of thing as non-mental states/events, like behaviours, language formalisms, etc. Intentions can't be displayed because mental events are first-person experiences. We can only express intentions via observable methods of communication or action, but those methods are not intentions.

OK, so to get to the point, I think conventions are essentially non-physical things. As you say, they are based in intentionality. Intentionality is a view toward what is wanted, and what is wanted is a state apprehended which has no physical existence. How do you reconcile this with physicalism? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, but I'd also like to know from you how non-physical things exist if they have no properties, and therefore no spatio-temporal location? I can't make sense out of non-physical things having properties and no location.

Intentionality is a mental state in my view, and mental states are brain states. Brain states are physical states. Brain states are comprised of properties and therefore, have location. If that's not enough, obviously ask me for more...

There are no case of feral children. The few cases which have sparked the myth are about rejected youth afflicted by developmental and mental problems, which managed to survive on the outskirts of society thanks to scavenging and occasional charity. — Akanthinos

Thanks for clarifying/correcting.

If your aim is to align with conventional practice, then those practices themselves provide the objective grounds for whether you succeed or not. — ProcastinationTomorrow

My aim wasn't to say that one can't observe behaviours/forms of communicating as objective to try and determine what the intentions of a person are. My aim is to say that one can't observe people's actual intentions (their mental events) to determine what their intentions are. We can only make observations of an individual in the third-person; we cannot have first-person experiences of others' first-person experiences.

I use the standard definition of information. Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction. A collection of facts from which conclusions may be drawn — Sir2u

Ok, thanks, I'll go with that definition.

But not having mental phenomena about something simply means that we do not know anything about them therefore it cannot be claimed that facts exist about them. — Sir2u

Let me try to rephrase what you're saying there in an attempt to make progress.

If we are not perceiving/experiencing some X, then we cannot make claims about some X. In other words, we have to have some experience of some X to be able to claim some X exists or to make particular claims about aspects of some X. Is that right?

Information about some X is knowledge obtained from some X. That seems to be saying that making claims about some X is impossible without experiencing some X. Is that right?

If so, the issue I'm trying to resolve is not about making claims about some X. The issue for me is whether experiencing some X and making claims about some X is necessary for some X to obtain/exist.

So how does one obtain the state without the information necessary. — Sir2u

The "obtaining" of a state of affairs just means the actual happening/occurring/existence of a fact/event. But you don't seem to think that facts happen unless they're known about.

Because I witnessed the event I have the information about it and a good description(the facts) of it for anyone that wants to hear the details. — Sir2u

Wait--I just want to make sure I know what you mean by "good description (the facts) of it". Do you mean after having witnessed the event you had knowledge about the event and could therefore describe your knowledge about the event to others? If so, then in other words, you're saying that because I have observed/experienced some X, I have obtained knowledge about some X, and therefore I can make a claim about what I know about some X.

That's not something I disagree with. That you couldn't make a particular knowledge-statement about it prior to experiencing it makes logical sense. I'm saying that some X/that particular X you experienced didn't actually/ontologically just appear/begin-to-exist just when you or because you observed/experienced it. When I talk about "facts" I'm making existence claims. Facts obtain/occur/happen/are/etc. So I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. That objective facts are mind-independent. (Subjective facts are mental facts.)

Where would you get the true proposition about anything that is unknown? — Sir2u

It wouldn't be a true proposition about a particular, actual unknown or un-experienced fact/event. It would be a claim that there exist some unknown or un-experienced facts. It's just an existential claim. It's based on reasoning and other available evidence accumulated by experience. For example, I realise that after having experienced many things in my life, there are some things I haven't experienced that I know exist. I have experienced the sturdiness of a wall in my backyard, and I infer, from experiencing many walls at different locations as sturdy, that other walls exist that are sturdy that I haven't experienced as sturdy. You can apply that logic to other things I haven't experienced but are actual/happening. Essentially, it's an ontological claim based on actuals, i.e. actuals exist in places we have yet to observe. We may not know specifically what those actuals are or what they're like (apart from knowing that they must be physical, in my view), but that's different than knowing that unknown actuals exist in some form.

Again, I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. I think you're arguing that objective facts rely on minds to exist. Correct me if I'm wrong (I know you will ;)).

I have already stated that there are many unknown things happening in the universe. — Sir2u

How could you claim that if you have no information/experience/knowledge about those unknown things? That's the argument you're using against me! You're contradicting yourself. On the one hand, you say one can't make claims about facts unless facts are known about, and also that facts are present actuals that aren't happening. And on the other hand, you're saying that some unknown things are happening. But you say that what determines whether a fact is happening is confirmation of it happening. But how can one confirm something they don't know about? That seems confused to me.

Where would you obtain a state of affairs that would make the proposition true? — Sir2u

Oh by the way, you really do need to start reading your references. — Sir2u

One doesn't literally "obtain a state of affairs". "Obtain" means exist/happen. And I think it's a mis-reading to assume that states of affairs literally "make" (as in, they intentionally/actively make) propositions true. That's just a manner of defining facts. What actually happens is that states of affairs exist, we experience them and judge our statements about them to be true or false. Another way of stating "a state of affairs is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true" is, "a proposition is true if it accurately relates to some state of affairs obtaining".

"Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs."
The key word here is Actual.
Presently existing in fact and not merely potential or possible — Sir2u

Do you believe in past facts?

Not one of those definitions allows one to suppose that something is happening. They would all need confirmation that an event is happening. — Sir2u

How can something actual not be happening? It doesn't make sense to me to suppose any existent isn't happening since all existents are changing. I don't believe in anything being literally static. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense.

You are very confused. Facts are information therefore they are subjective according to your own words. In your head, mental. — Sir2u

Or you're using "facts" in a different way to me; or you're misunderstanding me (which I think is true). I've stated multiple times that there are subjective facts (facts about mental events happening like thoughts etc.), and objective facts (non-mental facts). I wouldn't say "facts are information" because that's a category error. Rather, I'd say information as knowledge is factually a mental event, since knowledge occurs in minds.

I don't think it's the case that the meaning you derive "wouldn't be as accurate" without the use of conventions in interpreting, I don't thjink you could get any meaning at all without the use of conventions, because the interpretation would be completely random. — Metaphysician Undercover

Btw, in my view, what makes something meaningful to a person is that it is a coherent set of beliefs (mental associations) that are assigned/imposed upon things.

I'm considering the cases of "feral children" and how they were able to assign meaning without having any human contact. In these cases, there were no conventions per human communication, and yet, under my definition of "meaning", I believe they were able to assign (non-random) meaning onto things. This is probably because they learned the predictability/consistency of the environment and non-lingual "conventions" of the non-human animals they were interacting with. So I would agree that some kind of "conventionality" is important for coherence re beliefs and meaning.

In any case, you recognize the importance of such conventions in relation to meaning. What type of existence do you think conventions have? They are not in an individual's brain, because they are shared by many brains. Where are they? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd use the entry from Wikipedia as a starting point:

"A convention is a set of agreed, stipulated, or generally accepted standards, norms, social norms, or criteria, often taking the form of a custom."

So conventions are comprised of (a) mental events in the form of agreements, stipulations, standards, etc., (i.e. involving more than one brain) and (b) the manner/method in which those forms of mental events are consistently replicated (i.e. "representational forms", e.g., written language, speech-sounds, non-verbal behaviours, and the organised construction of materials/objects). People learn what these norms are within a community, and then try to imitate these norms. But conventions are a combination of non-mental things (the actual conventional patterns of behaviour and methods of conventional reinforcement) and mental things (conventions are essentially based on intentionality, and how people consistently think about and do/reinforce particular things).

Where is perpendicular located? Where is justification located? Where is mathematics located? Where is the biological kingdom Animalia located? Where is the number twenty located? — Sapientia

This will take us into new territory, which can only make me think these posts will grow even larger. :S

Perpendicular: if we're only talking about mental abstracts, then perpendicular is a mental event (so located in minds). If we're talking about a state of affairs/fact in which two things are actually at 90 degree angles to each other, then that is located in that state of affairs. If we're talking about a mind assigning a state of affairs/fact as being perpendicular, it's a mixture of both mental and non-mental facts, in which both have location.

Justification: this is a mental event (so located in minds).

Mathematics: a language system that allows us to make sense of relations and has instrumental utility. This is mental, since languages are meaningful, and meaning is mental.

Animalia: according to our criteria/definitions of this kingdom, the "kingdom" is any place the animals in this kingdom are located.

The number twenty: located in our minds, since numbers are mental constructs/events.

Yes, in a sense, it's located somewhere. But we'd have to break down what's meant. The term, as a word on a screen, does indeed have a location. But is that necessarily, or always, what is meant? — Sapientia

I meant "truth/true" as in what it is ontologically. In my view, anything related to "truth/truth-values/claims, etc." is a mental event. (I'm an internalist on meaning.) The term "true" as a word on a screen is ontologically pixels on a screen. But the meaning of "truth/true" is a property of the mental.

Thinking and conceptualising are indeed mental events, and they do indeed occur in minds. But what about concepts? The continued existence of concepts does not seem to depend on anyone being around performing any kind of cognitive act relating to them, nor on any kind of mental event taking place. So, where are concepts located? — Sapientia

I disagree. For example, if only one person existed and at time T1 they had a concept x, and then at time T2 they didn't have a concept x, then concept x would not obtain/exist at time T2. Concepts as mental events are not numerically identical with other people's concepts (even if their concepts share a very high degree of similarity). Concepts also aren't static things; in my ontology: everything that exists is also changing. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense.

I'm explaining that if the true statement were, "the cat is on the mat", then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat. Your confusion seems to be a result of confusing a statement with what it says, which relates back to my earlier mention of the use-mention distinction. — Sapientia

No, I'm not confused with the difference between what a statement is ontologically, and what a statement refers to or does. Saying that "if the true statement were, 'the cat is on the mat', then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat" is confusing to me; so you're right about me not finding your explanation coherent. Obviously, if I find something incoherent it doesn't mean others do. I think we may agree in general though that a statement about a fact is not the fact itself, right?

A statement can be true, but a statement can't be truth, as that doesn't make sense. We use "true" to say what a statement of that kind is, and we use "truth" to say what a statement of that kind speaks. — Sapientia

I don't use "truth" in the way you use it. So "truth" is what the truth-statement is stating with regards to facts?

I think that the problem is that you have to pay very close attention to what I'm saying and the distinctions that I'm making, otherwise it's easy to get lost. — Sapientia

I agree that this is partly what is happening, and I'm sometimes still "lost" when you attempt to explain things further. I have hope though! :)

That the earth preexisted us is a fact, not a statement. The statement would be, "That the Earth preexisted us". I'm using a statement to express a fact, not mentioning a statement relating to fact. It's the fact that I mean to talk about, not the statement. — Sapientia

No. It impossible to refer to facts without referring to facts. That doesn't mean I'm saying facts only exist if we refer to them though. So saying "That the earth preexisted us is a fact" is a statement about some state of affairs/a fact. It's an ontological/empirical statement you're making. Please can you tell me how that's not a statement about a past fact? I know that when you're using a statement to "express" a fact you're not referring to that statement as a statement; rather, you're using a statement to make an ontological claim about some state of affairs in the past. I'm saying that statements refer to things, and there's no escaping that fact. You can't make an ontological claim--express a fact--without making a statement about a fact. That's all I'm saying and trying to clarify.

Oh good, so you do understand. It was just a breakdown in communication to some extent, given what we've just gone through. — Sapientia

I hope so :P

Statements can be true. Judgements can be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, etc — Sapientia

Sure, I know that's how you use it. Just for clarification, the way I use "judgement" in a statement is that a "judgement" affirms whether a statement is true or false in relation to or when referring to facts.

We judge what is the truth, but we don't need to do so for there to be truths. That is, truths do not depend on our judgement. — Sapientia

Yeh, I've got a feeling that your use of "fact" and "truth" are similar, if not identical. As if you're saying "it's a fact that this true-statement truthfully corresponds to a fact."

Rather, for anyone to make sense of a statement in relation to an agent, it must be assumed that there is an underlying judgement from the agent about the statement, such that the statement is true. — Sapientia

Yes, that's what I mean...what makes a statement true or false is that someone is judging that statement to be true or false. Without that judgement about the statement being true or false means the statement is not a statement--it is a different kind of sentence, like a question or phrase.

What you're doing here is confusing metaphysics and human psychology. Statements, in the form of recorded statements, would exist without any judgement about them or interpretation of them. They would exist without any humans whatsoever. — Sapientia

I'm not. I have so far been referring to statements as being made in the present (as in, statements being actually thought or expressed in the present moment by minds), not statements as recorded on some document or by pixels on a screen. The latter type of statements are ontologically just that, non-mental, organised (symbolic) patterns that we use to assign meaning onto.

there's no such thing as a mental fact, unless by that what is meant is just a fact about something mental. — Sapientia

Yes, there are mental facts: that mentality occurs in brains is a fact. I explain more about this below re "subjective" and "objective"...so stay tuned!

No, no, no. Truth-values are properties, not judgements! The judgement would be what we make about the truth-value of a statement. Again, judgement is dispensable here in terms of necessity, given that we're talking about metaphysics, and not human psychology. — Sapientia

Yeh, I was incorrect that judgements are identical to truth-values; rather, it's that judgements assign truth-values to a statement. So we judge a statement to be true or false (i.e. assigning a truth-value to that statement), in relation to a fact. It wouldn't make sense to judge a statement without a truth-value.

(Aside from that, it doesn't make sense to me to say "Truth-values are properties" because all existents are just bundles of properties, in my ontology. But we don't need to go there...yet.)

Correspondence between true statement and fact does not require judgement. Logically, the conditional does not need to include judgement, and it should not include judgement if we're aiming to give an accurate account. If the statement is true, then there's a corresponding fact. That's it! You can't rightly add something to that formulation that has no place being there. Otherwise it's anything goes: if the statement is true, and I feel like a ninja, then there's a corresponding fact! — Sapientia

That a statement is judged in terms of truth-value, is not that it must be."

Bear in mind my view of "truth" is not conventional. When you say "true statement", I parse that as a person judging that statement to be true (about something). For example, I parse the statement, "the Earth preexisted us" as "the statement 'the Earth preexisted us' is true". I am making a judgement about that statement by assigning a truth-value to it--the value "true". Without my judgement about that statement, it wouldn't function as a statement in the conventional sense. A statement that isn't judged to be true or false (i.e. without a truth-value) is not conventionally "expressing" anything, unless it's functioning as a question or a phrase. I hope that makes things clearer, even if you don't agree.

If you want to talk about the mental act of association or comparison, then you should at least be clear about it. The term "correspondence" already has a technical use within philosophy, and, more specifically, in relation to theories of truth. Please use another term if this sense of correspondence is not what you mean. — Sapientia

Ok. Correspondence does require minds. This is because the correspondence theory of truth is about statements corresponding to facts; and in my view, "statements" as statements occuring in the present in the form of thoughts expressed verbally, are mental events.

Ok, thanks. So "truth" is a property of minds, then, correct? — numberjohnny5


No, not correct. That's a logical leap you'll have to explain. — Sapientia

In my view, "truth" is a property of statements/claims/propositions that we judge in relation to what the statements are corresponding to. Since statements as thoughts are mental events, and since "truth" is a property of statements as mental events, then "truth" is a property of minds.

in my book (which, by the way, is the bestest book ever) — Sapientia

Where can I get one?

Truth isn't a type of fact — Sapientia

Let me try to clear this up. In my ontology, all existents/events are facts--they're actual/real. There are non-mental facts, like trees, rocks, stars, and so on. There are mental facts, like thoughts and perceptual experiences. "Truth" is a type of mental fact.

Also, facts and events are different things, and should not be conflated. Facts can be about events, and events that have occurred or are occurring are factual. It isn't correct to say that facts occur and events are the case - it's the other way around. — Sapientia

They're not different in my view. In my ontology, since all existents are consistently, dynamically changing in relation to other existents, all events consist of a collection of existents interacting or in relation to each other. This applies to the micro and macro levels of scale. States of affairs as facts are the way things are happening. Things/existents are constantly happening. Things that are happening are events, in my view.

What I had in mind there was more Lockean than Platonic, as in primary qualities. The moon is bigger than my foot, not because I perceive it to be so, but because of the primary qualities of the moon and of my foot. That's the objective standard to which I was referring. — Sapientia

I see. I define "standards" as norms people create, and so they're not objective (as in, external-to-minds). So "objective standard" doesn't make sense to me.

Okay, so maybe I diverged from convention somewhat. So shoot me. Does it really matter? — Sapientia

Haha. I diverge from convention all the time. I don't think that's a problem in itself. Why it matters to me in this case, is to just clarify your views in lieu of mine.

With regards to your last sentence, I've noticed that there are two different senses of "subjective" and "objective" at play here. I agree that assessments are subjective in the sense that they are mental and require a subject, but they can also be objective, in a sense, if they are based upon and reflect reality. — Sapientia

I only use "subjective" and "objective" one way: they are both terms re location, i.e. where some x occurs. "Subjective" refers only to locations occurring in minds. "Objective" refers only to locations occuring external-to-minds. That's it. So "assessments" are things that occur in minds, and hence "subjective". Assessments can refer to/or are about "objective" things, but are not themselves "objective" (unless by "objective assessments" you're referring to a piece of writing or pixels on a screen, in which case, those things don't have meaning "in" them).

Well, you'll need to explain why you think that. What's not to understand? That makes me think that maybe you don't understand what criteria are and how they function. Criteria are like rules. If I set as my criteria for what day it is, whatever date on the calendar I judge to be the most appealing, and the date that I judge to be the most appealing happens to be February 25th, then that's what determines what day it is in accordance with the aforementioned criteria. That's the outcome. If someone were to ask me how I was judging what day it is, or how I am determining what day it is, then that would be the answer. That's my criteria. — Sapientia

Ah, that sounds different in the way you're explaining "criteria" from the other times. I agree that minds set rules/criteria/standards, and then according to those criteria, minds determine whether facts match them, for whatever reason.

Similarly, there are facts about the world which, like criteria, determine the outcome to predicted events, and determine the answer to certain questions. The difference is that we don't set these "criteria" - they're predetermined. But we can set our standards accordingly, and that way move closer towards objectivity. — Sapientia

I don't use "criteria" for objective, mind-independent facts. I keep those two things separate. I'd just say that we can construct criteria about some facts in order to predict or discover how those facts develop or change.

I always try to understand what others are saying, it is up to them to convince me to agree with them and for me to do the same. — Sir2u

Yeh, that's good. I was being facetious, btw. :)

Look at any of the definitions of fact, what do they all imply? Reality is everything that is in existence, of which we know very little. Fact is what we do know about reality. Event about which we have no knowledge (unknown) are usually called unknown events because we have no facts about them. There might have been events that generated information, but we do not have the facts. — Sir2u

Ah, I think I can see how you're defining fact a bit better. My criteria for "facts" include unknowable/unperceived events/things, and yours is tied only to mental events. I'm saying that all things that exist--all events/happening/things--are facts, whether we know about them or not. So it's not tied exclusively to mental phenomena.

I think that you should stop calling events facts unless you can properly explain how that is possible and where you got the definition of fact that you use. — Sir2u

I explained my ontological basis for facts as events already. The definition of fact I use (but which I've elaborated on myself personally) is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_affairs_(philosophy). And here's an excerpt from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich):

"A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs
whose obtaining makes that proposition true. Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs. Facts
possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations. Thus the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing to one another (in
that order) in the relation of stabbing. It is the actual obtaining of this state of affairs that
makes it true that Brutus stabbed Caesar."

No, events occur all the time. I am positing that events can happen, do happen but we are often ignorant of their passing because we have no facts about them. No one said anything about our minds causing events to happen even though that sometimes is the case, as in the event of me replying to you. — Sir2u

Saying something like "we have no facts about them" is confusing. It's not that we literally "have facts" about stuff; it's that we have information or experience about/of stuff--and that "stuff" we call "facts". The facts you're referring to are not internal, but external, so we don't literally "have" the external stuff internally.

This is were I disagree most. I do not see the event itself as the information. From my point of view the information is the product of the event, even if the event is just a tree sitting in the middle of a forest. The information is the description of the event. — Sir2u

"Description" as in a linguistic description?

And I didn't say "the event itself" was the information; I said it's a mixture between the event and our perception and thinking about the event. Think of it in terms of direct realism: phenomena cause us to perceive them (via the particles from their properties that reach our sensorial apparatus). As we experience them, we can think about what we're perceiving/experiencing, and decide to selectively organise some of that experience as sufficient for a "piece of information" that we may want to communicate. So it's a blend of phenomena interacting with us--that's what I think "information" is. It's not either one or the other.

It's not clear to me what you take "information" to be based on your descriptions there. It seems like you've given two definitions of information: "the product of the event" and "the description of the event". Can you clarify what you mean? In what sense "product," and in what sense "description"?

No, you are doing that. See above. Fact and knowledge are not the same. We can have facts as knowledge but we cannot have all of the facts. My question was, if information about some obscure event in the universe is not available to us is it still a fact? Using common acceptable definitions of fact, I don't see how that is possible. — Sir2u

Just to clarify, ontologically, all events/things are facts. That includes mental events. Anything that's actually happening is an event of some sort. So ontologically, "knowledge" of some X is a mental event. The X is also an event/fact, and the X could be another mental event or a non-mental event. For example, I am having the mental event right now of thinking that I know I am having a mental event right now. I can look across the room at a plant and notice I am having a mental event of looking across the room at a plant. The events are facts. The plant across the room (from my perspective) is a fact/event. Every existent is a fact/event.

So "fact" and "knowledge" are ontologically identical in terms of them both being actual events occurring. But epistemologically, (i) "knowledge about some fact" is different than (ii) the actual fact that the knowledge is about.

And I don't think it's possible to have "all of the facts."

My question was, if information about some obscure event in the universe is not available to us is it still a fact? Using common acceptable definitions of fact, I don't see how that is possible. — Sir2u

In my view, if we have no good reason to believe a particular event/fact is occurring whatsoever (so that we're only speculating without any evidence or good reasoning), then we don't know whether it is occurring either way. It could be occurring; it might not. Whether we have that "information" about the event or not doesn't affect whether the event is actually occurring though.

No, I am saying that if something is unknown then we cannot have mental phenomena about it. It is, if it is actually happening phenomena. But How does anyone know about it? — Sir2u

I agree with that. But not having mental phenomena about some X doesn't mean that X isn't real. Things we don't know have no bearing on whether those things exist.

It is, if it is actually happening phenomena. But How does anyone know about it? — Sir2u

If no one knows about some phenomena it doesn't mean that phenomena isn't happening (unless you're some kind of idealist). Facts include knowable and unknowable phenomena. That's because mental phenomena has no bearing on facts obtaining for me (unless the only facts existing were mental facts/events).

This thread was opened over 6 months ago, and all of these issues have been canvassed in depth. — Wayfarer

What if you spun the situation around? That instead, it was you who posted on this thread after it began 6 months ago, and you disagreed with the OP and some other posters. Would you be persuaded that just because "the issues have been canvassed in depth" that either, say, (a) your views must be mistaken, and/or (b) that it wasn't worth trying to argue your views?

However, and I'm not going to argue the point beyond this post, if there was 'no objective meaning', then nobody could ever be correct, or incorrect, about anything. — Wayfarer

There's no need to be objectively correct/incorrect (not that it's possible with meaning). All that's sufficient is instrumental utility. Guesses/speculations/assumptions/agreements/etc. demonstrate that they are good-enough for communication to be effective. It's not an either-or issue, and that's where your problematic thinking lies.

You couldn't write down instructions for how to build a computer, or specify how TCP/IP works, or how information is routed across the internet. All of these things work, because there are successful ways of making them work, which can be communicated via specifications and instructions, which are accurate. — Wayfarer

I agree, they are successful methods of communication. This is because language is (very often) a successful means of communication. Language-users are generally aware of the conventional uses of their language, and when language-users employ those conventions, communication can be very accurate (in the sense of "matching" what language-users intend with their methods of communication) and useful.

And if they were not accurate, and the technological solutions they refer to did not actually exist, then there would be no computers nor an internet. So the fact that you're able to participate in a debate, on the internet, using a computer, contradicts the point you're making - which, incidentally, is not a point at all, but simply a very long-winded way of saying that 'meaning is whatever you want it to be'. Or, in short - whatever. — Wayfarer

I'm sorry that you fail to understand my stance on this. Maybe that's my fault. But your representation of my stance isn't accurate. I never said "meaning is whatever you want it to be". That's not the definition I use. Rather, I think that if a person wants to interpret any piece of writing/sounds/etc. in any way they prefer, then that's their prerogative if they're not interested in trying to "understand" what the intentions are that produced a piece of writing/sounds/etc. If the interpreter is not trying to be "correct" with matching the intention of the writer, then they can't be "correct/incorrect" with their interpretation. They have chosen to assign the meaning they have for whatever reason they have.

On the other hand, if a person is attempting to "understand" what the intention behind a piece of writing was/is, then they might assume the writer/speaker is using language conventions, and then assign language conventions to what the writer/speaker is expressing. In the latter case, though, because meaning is not a non-mental event/thing, there's not any objective (as in, non-mental) thing to try to match. So it's a category error to assume you can actually be objectively "correct/incorrect" with regards to getting meanings right/wrong. All you can do is try to make well-reasoned guesses via the writing/sounds/etc. re the writer's/speaker's intentions. And it helps if both writer and interpreter are using language conventions (that's the utility of conventions in general).

I hope what I've written there is clear in helping you "understand" my views a bit better, even though I am aware you're not interested in continuing this convo with me.

OK, so what you are saying is that anything written can have absolutely any meaning whatsoever, depending entirely on the interpretation. What the written thing means is whatever any individual who interprets it thinks it means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, since meaning is mental events, then anything that is not mental events has no meaning or cannot produce meaning. This is because ontologically, meaning, as mental events, is not materially non-mental events. So a piece of writing, say, on a white piece of paper in black ink, is not ontologically the "same kind" of stuff as the 'intention' of the writer who wrote on that paper, intentions being mental events. In other words, the properties of brain/mind states are not the "same kind" of properties as ink on paper. Interpretations are also mental events.

If you had learned the conventional uses of the words and phrases in the piece of writing and were also assigning those conventional uses to the writing, then you or others could "accurately" interpret what the writer intended with the writing (assuming the writer wasn't lying, pretending, etc.). If you were using unconventional uses of the words/phrases in the piece of writing and assigning those unconventional uses to the writing, then you or others wouldn't be as "accurate" re the writer's intentions.

Do you recognize that this means that the written material cannot communicate any information from one individual to another? The interpreting individual gives the written material any meaning whatsoever. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure how literal you're being there. Do you recognise that "written material" doesn't actually "do" anything like an intentional mind does?

In a nutshell, communication, in my view, is person A expressing their mental events via various mediums or "representational forms" (as Wayfarer put it) (e.g. symbols, sounds) to person B, where person B interpret's person A's mental events via the various forms. This communication is possible if both persons have learned (i.e. they have learned the conventional uses of the language they're using, and therefore assign those conventional meanings onto "representational forms") how to assign meanings onto "representational forms", and how to interpret another person's intentions/beliefs from those representational forms. The more conventional both person's assigned meanings onto said forms, the more likely they are to accurately interpret their intentions/mental events.

Again, it all depends on whether the individual is attempting to accurately interpret another individual's intentions via language and behaviour. I think you're misunderstanding me. I'm not saying an individual just arbitrarily gives the "written material any meaning whatsoever" when trying to interpret the writer's intentions. An individual can interpret any meaning about the writing without caring about what the writer's intention was/is. The writer's intentions might not be valued by the individual interpreter. They might not care what the writer was trying to communicate. That's up to the individual. They can't be right or wrong about that if that's what they want to do. It's their free choice. But if they're trying to interpret the writer's intention as accurately as possible, they can make well-reasoned guesses; and it would be possible for these guesses to be confirmed as accurate or not by the writer.

If any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, then on what basis would you say that there is any "information" in any writing? If there is nothing objective, and any mind can determine the meaning as whatever it wants, then we cannot say that the writing gives us any information because any meaning derived is completely fabricated by the interpreting mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

My definition of "information" is a combination of the phenomena perceived that is then cognitively organised, and communicated via various means if the individual so chooses. (I'd say "information" is similar to (nominalistic) conceptualism for me.) That means that there is no objective meaning, if that's what you mean.

But to say that the interpreter must try to match the intention of the writer, is to contradict this (any way that the brain wants). So which is it, that you believe? Can the writing be interpreted in any way that one wants, or do we assume that there is a correct way, the way intended by the writer? If we assume that there is a correct way, then don't we have to turn to conventions and such to support an interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not saying the interpreter must try to do anything, btw. I'm saying the interpreter has a choice to match the writer's intention through the writing. They don't have to choose that though. They can choose to interpret the writing any way they want. That's what I meant by these earlier statements:

"(there's no objective rule saying everyone must interpret anything in any particular way whatsoever)"

"On the other hand, if the brain wasn't trying to match the writer's intention(s) with their interpretation, then they can't be "right" or "wrong" with how they interpret the writing."

And to be clear, I'm not saying that the interpreter is trying to match their intention with the writer's intention. I'm saying the interpreter can try to match in the form of a guess/speculation what they believe the writer's intention was/is.

Or, do you think that meaning is completely subjective, entirely within each brain? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

Do you think that any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, and each way would be an equally valid interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that "any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants," (there's no objective rule saying everyone must interpret anything in any particular way whatsoever); and that those interpretations that the brain is trying to match (by speculation) with what they believe the intention of the writer was/is can be relatively similar or dissimilar to the writer's intentions. In other words, the brain's interpretation cannot be identical with the writer's intentions (since those are, necessarily, two numerically distinct brain states). On the other hand, if the brain wasn't trying to match the writer's intention(s) with their interpretation, then they can't be "right" or "wrong" with how they interpret the writing.

I am starting with your definition/explanation of what "truth" is because I think this informs the other parts of your recent post, in terms of where I think the problems lie.

It's just a term which refers to what a true statement says. (That's the kind of thing it is). So, if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth. Why should I care whether or not it has a location? I'm not sure whether it even makes sense to ask that question of it. As for properties, I've told you a bit about the truth already, like what I've reiterated above, and like what I've said about correspondence with fact. — Sapientia

The reason I think it's important to care about where things are located for ontological matters is because I think it's nonsense to believe that things/events that exist have no location. "Truth" as "a term", in your words, is located somewhere, otherwise it doesn't exist. Further, the original focus of my inquiry is related to whether "truth" is subjective (occuring in minds) or "objective" (occurring external to minds). So for me, ontologically, thinking/conceptualising "a term" is a mental event, and hence located in minds. The properties of said mental event (on one relative scale of analysis) are comprised of neurons, synapses, chemical reactions, etc.

The problem I have with your explanation for "truth" is that it's unclear and muddled. You write, "...if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth." Let's break this down.

{The first part of this conditional is:}

(i) "if the statement says that the cat is on the mat,"
(ii) "and the statement is true,"

In other words, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true,...

{The second part of this conditional is:}

(iii) "then that's the truth."

...then the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true.

That's a tautology. In other words, your conditional is stating that if the statement about a fact (the cat on the mat) is true, then the statement is true. (I assume by "that's the truth" you're claiming that the statement about the cat is true. But it's redundant and unnecessary to use "true" and "truth" in that way. It muddies the waters.) So all you need to say is "if I judge my statement to correspond with a fact (in this case, the cat being on the mat), then I judge my statement to be true."

Otherwise, what's the difference between "true" and "truth"? I wonder whether you're conflating "truth" with "fact" there, as in, "it's a fact that the statement about the cat on the mat is true."

Ok, so using your definition/explanation of "true/truth"...you write,

"For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us."

In other words, I read that sentence as claiming: "it is true that Earth preexisted us." I don't know what else is could be saying. Maybe it's saying "it is a fact that Earth preexisted us"? But if so, that sentence is still a statement. Referring to facts necessarily involves statements about facts. There's no escaping that fact. Furthermore, you're judging that statement about facts to be true.

"First of all, it doesn't have to be a claim of any type..."

"a type of claim (which is a statement)"

Any statement is a statement about stuff. Statements refer, that's what they do. So any mention or reference about facts is necessarily a statement or claim of some type. So it does have to be a claim...

"despite the fact that I am using a statement to express to you a fact, that statement is not itself the fact."

In other words, although I am using a statement to refer to a fact in a particular way, that statement is not actually the fact I'm referring to. Yeh, I agree.

Despite the fact that I have judged that Earth has preexisted us, and despite the fact that I have judged the statement, "Earth has preexisted us", to be true, that doesn't really matter here. — Sapientia

Judging something to be the case is identical to judging something to be true. That's the only way we can refer to facts, by referring to them in different ways.

It is a fact that the earth preexisted us. And it is a fact that the earth preexisted us whether I make that claim or not. — Sapientia

Both statements are claims about past facts (i.e. that the Earth preexited us). (And statements about facts as ontological statements about ontological facts are empirical statements/claims.) The first statement is a claim about a past fact that you judge to be true, do you not? You're not saying "it is false that the earth preexisted us", are you? And you're not saying "I'm not making any ontological commitment as to whether the earth preexisted us", are you? If your answer to two those questions is "true", then logically, "It is a fact that the earth preexisted us" is a claim that you believe to be true. What else can it be?

The second statement is also one that believes it is true (again, what else can it be?).

You interpret me to be saying that "that the Earth preexisted us" is true, which is understandable, but not quite right. I would say that, "The Earth preexisted us", is true - which is a subtle but important difference. I would not begin the sentence with, "That", because that's how facts are denoted, which would suggest that I'm saying that a fact is true, but that's not what I'm saying. I think that it would be a category error to claim that a fact is true, but correspondence with truth avoids that problem. — Sapientia

I wasn't using the word "that" in any special way, or in the way you're describing; that is, '"that the Earth preexisted us" is true' and '"The Earth preexisted us", is true' are identical statements to me.

In any case, you're then acknowledging that facts cannot be true. Does that mean that judgments about statements that correspond to facts are the things that can be true?

So, you think that truth is a property of statements which correspond with facts. — Sapientia

It's more that "truth" is a property of statements that judges how statements refer/relate to facts. That is, "truth" is the aspect of statements that we use to judge whether statements relate to the facts "accurately" or not. Having a statement without a judgment about that statement excludes it from being a statement. Statements judge. Statements are a type of sentence. A sentence that doesn't judge is rather a non-propositional sentence, like a question or phrase. So it's the property of "truth" in a sentence that makes it a statement/proposition.

But you also seem to think that how statements are used, and judgement, is also somehow relevant. It's the latter that I have a problem with. In what sense are they presumably of relevance? They aren't necessary for correspondence, properly understood, to take place. You could define it as a mental correspondence, but I don't know why you would. That's not the correspondence that I'm talking about, which is the correspondence between truth statements and fact.

Whenever there's a true statement, like "Earth exists", there's a corresponding fact. That's it. No judgement required. No one is required at all. — Sapientia

The judgement is required, otherwise what do you think truth-values are? They are judgements about stuff: either true or false (depending on the species of logic you use). "Earth exists" is a statement that is judged to correspond with a fact.

Either correspondence does not require minds or you're talking about correspondence in a different sense for some reason. But if it's the latter, why are doing so? — Sapientia

I'm saying correspondence requires minds because that's what's involved when corresponding statements to events/facts.

One difference is that truth requires language whereas facts do not. To use your terminology, one could think of truth as a property of statements and facts as a property of reality. — Sapientia

Ok, thanks. So "truth" is a property of minds, then, correct? I would say that "facts [are] a property of reality", but because I think that minds are also part of reality, that means there are also mental facts/events. So "truth" is a type of fact - a mental fact i.e. an event that occurs in minds as opposed to a fact/event that does not occur in minds.

No, I was using the conventional definition. — Sapientia

The conventional definition of criteria refers to standards/principles that we judge. In an earlier post you said "criteria are not subjective". Then you said that criteria are determinants. I don't believe standards are non-mental. So an "objective standard" (i.e. your " the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective") in my ontology would refer to a real external-to-mind standard, akin to what a Platonic realist might believe about Forms being real. I'm an anti-realist on abstract objects like that (insofar as those objects exist external to minds).

You also say "once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement"." Are you saying that minds set or decide upon criteria? If so, it then seems you believe that subjective criteria then "graduate" or change to become objective criteria as "determinants" that relate to (subjective) judgments. Criteria are mental abstract objects, and "judgements" are abstract objects. (I don't know what would be included in "outcome" there.) Which means that subjective standards (as mental abstract objects) "determine" other mental abstract objects like judgements. There is no objective criteria involved.

In an earlier post you wrote, "And criteria are not subjective, even if they require a subject to set them, which they don't in at least some cases. No one really needs to set the criteria for what makes the moon bigger than my foot. The criteria are predetermined, unless you change them to something else."

I don't think you're using the conventional definition of "criteria" here. "What makes the moon bigger than my foot" are the ontological properties of those two objects. An assessment of their relative sizes might involve criteria, which would be subjective, obviously (since assessments occur in minds).

What I'm saying, with regards to what we're talking about, and with regards to the example - which, if I recall correctly, was something like whether or not the moon is bigger than my foot - is that the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective, in that it's defining feature is that it reflects reality, rather than my judgement, which might clash with reality. — Sapientia

You say, "Also, once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement". So, what I was saying was not far off from the wording and gist of those definitions. I think that you're just over-anyalysing. We can call it something else if need be."

You could say I'm over-analysing, but I think I have good reason to do so since I don't think you're being clear or coherent, in my view. I think what you're saying is "far off from the gist of those definitions". I also don't understand how criteria that is set or decided by minds can 'determine the outcome or "judgment".'

I really do find that difficult to agree with. — Sir2u

Well, at least it shows you're trying to agree! :P

fact:
Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction — Sir2u

I've never comes across this definition of "fact".

Anyway, a reason why "fact" is the same as "event" is because in my ontology all things are events. In other words, all things/objects are comprised of properties in relations interacting in particular ways with other things. There's a dynamic fluidity to all that exists, and all that exists is physical, in my view. So in that sense, events are properties undergoing change. Information, as phenomena that we perceive and organise mentally, is included in this ontology.

But the event causes the information, on that we agree. — Sir2u

I think information is a mixture of the event and our experience and processing of the event into an organised, coherent and meaningful set of statements/judgements.

Zillions of events are happening in the universe as we discuss this, which are facts? I think that we can only call facts the ones that we know about. — Sir2u

You're conflating knowledge about events with events. They are not the same. It seems like you're defining "fact" as "knowledge-by-acquaintance" (or acquaintance knowledge). Conventionally, knowledge is justified, true belief in analytic philosophy, right? That's mental phenomena. You're saying mental phenomena about phenomena we have no mental phenomena about is not phenomena.

Do you have a term for phenomena we do not experience and have knowledge of then, if it's not the term "fact" for you?

Let's return to my vignette about someone driving in another country being a fact/event. Would you agree that just because you or I do not know about someone driving in another country at this present moment, that it is therefore not an event that is actually taking place? That because we aren't aware of, having an experience of, or have no knowledge that someone in another country is driving right now, it is not an event? Is that your position?

I presume you'd agree that someone knows that someone is driving in another country even if we do not, right? If you agree, then that means that there are generally people who do know that events are taking place and generally people who do not know that events are taking place in a given moment. What relationship, then, does an event have with mental phenomena in the form of knowledge? How are they connected so that events only qualify as events if they are known?

Did you read about the supernova in the Orion Belt? No,me neither. Probably because no one saw it. It might have happened or it might not. So can the supernova be a fact? Only when the information is available. — Sir2u

If a supernova occurred it would be a fact despite our lack of knowledge about it. Again, knowledge-by-acquaintance is not identical to what--the thing/event in question--we're acquainting ourselves with. Things happen, whether we are aware of them or not.

No, facts are only facts if they describe correctly reality. Facts are statements of truth because they describe reality. — Sir2u

So facts are mental phenomena, for you? What's the difference between "reality" and "fact"? What are events that aren't known?

Because if events/facts only occur when minds know about them occurring, that's a causal argument. That is, you'd be positing that minds and only minds cause events to occur.

You're right, and I applaud you for even engaging with such an argument. I doubt I'd have the patience. — Sapientia

Thanks, but to which post/claim(s) are you referring?

(Btw, I'm currently in the middle of responding to your last (big) post to me, but I won't be able to finish it until the weekend as I'm really busy.)