If you had learned the conventional uses of the words and phrases in the piece of writing and were also assigning those conventional uses to the writing, then you or others could "accurately" interpret what the writer intended with the writing (assuming the writer wasn't lying, pretending, etc.). If you were using unconventional uses of the words/phrases in the piece of writing and assigning those unconventional uses to the writing, then you or others wouldn't be as "accurate" re the writer's intentions. — numberjohnny5
If your aim is to align with conventional practice, then those practices themselves provide the objective grounds for whether you succeed or not.On the other hand, if a person is attempting to "understand" what the intention behind a piece of writing was/is, then they might assume the writer/speaker is using language conventions, and then assign language conventions to what the writer/speaker is expressing. In the latter case, though, because meaning is not a non-mental event/thing, there's not any objective (as in, non-mental) thing to try to match.
I don't think it's the case that the meaning you derive "wouldn't be as accurate" without the use of conventions in interpreting, I don't thjink you could get any meaning at all without the use of conventions, because the interpretation would be completely random. — Metaphysician Undercover
In any case, you recognize the importance of such conventions in relation to meaning. What type of existence do you think conventions have? They are not in an individual's brain, because they are shared by many brains. Where are they? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm considering the cases of "feral children" and how they were able to assign meaning without having any human contact. — numberjohnny5
But conventions are a combination of non-mental things (the actual conventional patterns of behaviour and methods of conventional reinforcement) and mental things (conventions are essentially based on intentionality, and how people consistently think about and do/reinforce particular things). — numberjohnny5
If your aim is to align with conventional practice, then those practices themselves provide the objective grounds for whether you succeed or not. — ProcastinationTomorrow
There are no case of feral children. The few cases which have sparked the myth are about rejected youth afflicted by developmental and mental problems, which managed to survive on the outskirts of society thanks to scavenging and occasional charity. — Akanthinos
OK, so to get to the point, I think conventions are essentially non-physical things. As you say, they are based in intentionality. Intentionality is a view toward what is wanted, and what is wanted is a state apprehended which has no physical existence. How do you reconcile this with physicalism? — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, but I'd also like to know from you how non-physical things exist if they have no properties, and therefore no spatio-temporal location? I can't make sense out of non-physical things having properties and no location. — numberjohnny5
Intentionality is a mental state in my view, and mental states are brain states. Brain states are physical states. Brain states are comprised of properties and therefore, have location. If that's not enough, obviously ask me for more... — numberjohnny5
You seem to be assuming that intentions lie behind the conventions rather than intentions actually being manifested in those conventions. You may be right, you may be wrong, but you would need to address the quasi-behaviourist line of thought that sees intentions as things actually displayed by objective conventional practices, not as things that lie concealed behind those practices and somehow giving rise to them. — ProcastinationTomorrow
OK, so let me ask you a question: why can't behaviour be mental? Just saying that it cannot be doesn't answer that question. There seems to be a dualistic metaphysics lying behind your position, and if that is the case, then that dualism needs to be brought out clearly and defended, not just stated. — ProcastinationTomorrow
Ask yourself what is a property, and maybe you would realize that a property is itself a non-physical thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't make sense to me to suppose that, literally, "intentions lie behind" anything, apart from skulls, since intentions are mental phenomena. Intentions as mental states/events are not the same kind of thing as non-mental states/events, like behaviours, language formalisms, etc. Intentions can't be displayed because mental events are first-person experiences. We can only express intentions via observable methods of communication or action, but those methods are not intentions. — numberjohnny5
Sure. Behaviour involves the (autonomic and voluntary) motor movements (exhibition/inhibition of muscles via efferent pathways) as processed by nonconscious and conscious phenomena. Mentality refers just specifically to the conscious phenomena. There is a relationship between voluntary motor movements and mentality, of course, but they ain't the same. One major distinction is that motor movements occur in multiple sites in the body e.g. limbs, hands, feet etc., whereas mentality only occurs in the brain.
And I'm strictly a physicalist.
Perhaps I'm not sure what you mean by physicalist - it's an unclear label for a wide variety of views. Do you mean that mental things simply are physical things, we just don't know it yet? Or do you mean that mental things are caused by physical things, but are distinct kinds of things nevertheless? Or something else? I can only really get to grips with the rest of your response once this is cleared up. — ProcastinationTomorrow
Brain states, in and of themselves, are neither true nor false, they simply exist or fail to exist, and truth is not to be identified with the mere existence of a brain state and falsity with its simple non-existence, since some people have false beliefs, which are nevertheless themselves - under nominalistic materialism - just occurent brain states. — ProcastinationTomorrow
Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser
He's been doing philosophy for too long to be more strident I guess. Clearly he's plugging in to a line of thought we're both sympathetic with, but I think even he'd agree that he's not presenting anything else than a challenge for materialism to come up with some account of meaning. @numberjohnny5 has been trying to meet that challenge, at least I suppose that's what he or she has been trying to do, not only from a materialist perspective, but also a nominalist one. I hope what I've done is pinpoint a problem any such attempt will have with the bare notion of truth and falsity of thoughts. Non-particular, non-material things need to be introduced, but whether those things that need to be introduced have to be thoughts (either conceived directly as information or as information bearers) I don't know. Some extremely clever people (cleverer than I am anyway) have been materialistic nominalists up to a point (I'm thinking here of Quine) and they believed they could get by with just one type of non-material, non-particular thing in their ontology: sets (or classes).seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. — Ed Feser
So, the big question is how does a nominalistic materialis account for the distinction between truth and falsity without introducing non-material, non-particular things? — ProcastinationTomorrow
Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser
And then you ramble on about propositions being ultimately brain states or whatever. Fine, ProcrastinationTommorow seems to be ceding the point that it might make sense to equate propositions with brain states, but what he is challenging you with is to come up with an account of truth that doesn't surreptitiously or explicitly imply the existence of non-particular, not-material things. Even your definition of objective relations just introduces another term that looks like a non-particular : i.e. ways of interaction."Truth" is a property of propositions/claims — numberjohnny5
what he is challenging you with is to come up with an account of truth that doesn't surreptitiously or explicitly imply the existence of non-particular, not-material things. Even your definition of objective relations just introduces another term that looks like a non-particular : i.e. ways of interaction. — jkg20
Firstly, brain processes aren't anything like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, or an electrical current. Different objects are made of different properties in different relations. So to lump all that stuff together and assume it's all the same is a straw-man re physicalist/materialist views. — numberjohnny5
What I'd love to know is, if meaning was objective, what the hell is meaning ontologically? Is it "ink marks"? What properties of the ink marks makes it have inherent meaning? — numberjohnny5
(1) Why you're deflecting the question back to me? — numberjohnny5
(2) It seems you're implying that I haven't done enough philosophising because if I had, I would share the same conclusions re properties being non-physical as you do. — numberjohnny5
(3) Why is it that in the handful of times I've asked anyone how to try and explain to me that non-physical existents obtain, they never actually try to accomodate me or give me a straight answer in terms of ontology? (That's rhetorical, but I'd be open to an answer.) — numberjohnny5
It's not clear to me in what capacity you'd like an explanation of a physical brain state making a choice. I'll make a first attempt though. (Btw, when I refer to anything that exists, even when I mention "state", I do not presume they are static things. They are constantly changing/happening.) — numberjohnny5
The kind of physical state that can make a choice is a mental state that has will and makes choices within particular contexts. For example, the physical state of thinking "I want to shut down my laptop" can (it doesn't have to) result in other conscious processes causing particular motor (efferent) pathways to move (exhibit/inhibit) particular body parts to shut down the laptop. — numberjohnny5
"Truth" is a property of propositions/claims, and propositions are assertions (made by individuals/minds) about what is the case. — numberjohnny5
As I understand it, the basis of your original argument is that one and same piece of information can be born by numerically distinct material states/processes/events. So, whatever it is that we are counting when we are counting items of information cannot be those material states/processes/events. My argument is, in the nutshell provided by @jkg20, even if particular material things are bearers of truth, since numerically distinct material things can share one and the same feature of being true, whatever we are counting when we count the feature of truth cannot be those material things.But actually, there’s a straight line from your argument, to the premise of the OP - have another look at the first post, and see if you agree that there’s a connection. — Wayfarer
Because to account for the fact that there is (presumably) more than one thing that is true, you'd have to have different particular things interacting inone and the same (truth-creating) way. — jkg20
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