Not answering means ignoring and also means not taking the dying father seriously as an autonomous agent. — Tobias

I don't see how any of that follows.

One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case.

Everyone is in the process of dying.

If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. — Tobias

Just because an emotional aspect is introduced does not mean we can throw overboard all reason.

This situation is framed (and framing is all it is) as though one commits some terrible deed by telling the dying man the truth.

First, some special quality is attributed to the fact this man is dying and normal rules of what is right and wrong apparently no longer apply for reasons that remain unmentioned.

But more importantly, it is the dying man that makes the mistake of saddling one with questions he does not want to know the answer to. Even moreso if he takes one's refusal to answer them as a confirmation of his fears.

The situation is tragic, but caused by the dying man himself and not by whatever poor bystander he forces into this difficult dilemma.

Lying is still bad. Telling the truth, arguably, isn't. Not answering most certainly isn't.

Game-like fantasies with auto-erotic pay-offs, visual narrative voyeurism and its childlike helplessness, and internet obsessions that concentrate on ingraining the former restrict the mind to its single desires and contain our minds within social spheres that in the near past have been associated with childhood and adolescence. Reproduction is the ultimate contradiction to this state, in it the individual must act almost solely in the immediate interests of another. — kudos

I'm not so sure if this is the case. Ideally reproduction is something we partake in with no other interest than the well-being of the child.

In reality however, there can be many selfish motivations that lead to the choice to have children.

Some are economical, others seek to satisfy some deeply engrained biological desire, and yet others simply conform to ideas of what is normal.

I have serious doubts how many couples have entirely altruisitic motives when it comes to having children. If that were to be the case, isn't the first question one ought to ask oneself: how can I seek to do what is in the interest of my child's well-being, when I have never met them?

Furthermore, if one is solely preoccupied with the well-being of their child, another question should be: what gives me the right to decide my child should live. Is that truly in their best interest? And how do I know? And what makes me believe I would be the correct person to raise them?

Yet, parents don't seem to ask themselves these questions, or at the very least do not seem to try to answer them rigorously (I doubt anyone could). As such, these questions are often discarded - after all, they may think to themselves, these questions did not seem to dissuade our predecessors and I want to have children.

Does that attest to the characteristics of altruism and maturity of thought that you describe child-rearing as having?

Because to me, it very much seems like people are either ignorant to or dismiss and refuse to answer the difficult questions that one would expect to be answered prior to making such fundamental decisions on behalf of another. Why? Likely because they are not driven by altruism, but by their desires, and it makes them willfully blind.

That to me is no sign of maturity.

And the things we call truth nowadays, are they truth and facts or will time tell? And what should we do with our principles based on these? Were they principles or weren't they? — Tobias

Time will tell, or maybe it won't.

If one is so inclined, one may seek for truth and likely this will sooner translate into discarding false beliefs rather than ever uncovering truth itself.

But that essential uncertainty is fine, until one attempts to impose their will on others.

Do you have children? If so they will become the victim of your ignorance whether you want it or not. — Tobias

I don't have children, and children indeed become the victim of their parents' ignorance.

Yes but reasoning is presented, that is the whole point. When a police agent shoots a man he is asked why. If he then explains that the man was holding a gun and was shooting and that is why the officer took him down he presents — Tobias

So it is not an appeal to authority or experience that is being made, but an appeal to reason, is what I am trying to say.

I am all for serious cautions. That is why the use of violence is generally prohibited by law. — Tobias

Law is nothing but to threaten with violence. It's the imposition of the will, but on a much larger scale. I subject it to the same scrutiny I would subject an individual's impositions to, and find the same objections.

In order to guide fair judgment we have education and law, training people in using fair judgment. — Tobias

Do you not think the individuals and societies discussed in my examples were under the impression they were capable of fair judgement?

This muddy line of reasoning can only lead to what I already eluded to: that anything that societies accept can be ethical. Ethics loses its meaning.

The alternative is for one to present factors that demonstrate why certain judgements are fairer than others, but then again one only has one's own frame of reference to base it on, just like all the people who were deemed incapable of fair judgement.

If one is to take this line of reasoning, either one accepts that ethics is meaingless, or one goes down the slippery slope of appointing oneself or others as the superior judge.

The course of action society takes is to have these justification examined by a third person, even more trained and educated in weighing arguments and indeed judging the relative wight of principles. — Tobias

This doesn't solve anything. Ethics is then whatever a "qualified" third person considers it to be.

We are not free to rewrite the social contract. whenever we feel like it. — Tobias

There is no social contract that I have voluntarily put my signature under.

Indeed! and you have the idea that you are capable of fair judgment based on principles you seem able to discern, however many would be disagreeing with you. — Tobias

Is it not my right to have my own thoughts, and to be wrong?

It is not my right however, to impose these potentially wrong ideas on others, through violence or otherwise.

Yes, that is what Kantian reasoning comes down to an where the achilles heel of such reasoning has been pointed out. It cannot make sense of the idea of special obligations. No friend of yours will choose your house. Your wife will not ask whether you like her dress, your children will not expect any kind of special treatment from you... — Tobias

This line of thinking is entirely coherent, I grant you that, and entirely absurd. — Tobias

What is absurd is the idea that such considerations as murderers coming to knock on one's door play a serious role in my interactions with other people. But if what people come to me for is protection from murderers then I'll gladly show them out myself.

The problem with this line of anti-social ethics is that you end up with a life that is solitary nasty brutish and short, exactly what we all strive to avoid. — Tobias

What is anti-social or brutish about striving for consensuality in human interaction? It's the basis of ethical conduct, as far as I am concerned.

Also those terms which may be vague, gain their content from the way they are used in practical discussion and argument. It is not utterly subjective, it is intersubjective. — Tobias

So ethics is whatever a group of people decide it is. It loses its meaning. On what basis will you claim that burning the witch, stoning the woman or cutting down the peasant is unethical? Didn't a group of people "intersubjectively" decide to call it justice?

Actually the example shows the problem of your ethical system. Since all judgment is based on this one principle, you cannot make any difference between the police offiicer in my example and the man stoning his wife. — Tobias

Indeed. And I don't seek to differentiate. And I believe you can't coherently differentiate between the two either - at least not with the framework you have put forward so far.

Thinking for others is unethical. ... Therefore in your system it is perfectly fine to sign an arms deal with just such a society. — Tobias

What makes you think that an individual who abhors violence should go around selling weapons?

What we have to do is argue and try to convince this society that their law is unjust. — Tobias

What if the society cannot be convinced, or worse yet, what if the society instead convinces yours to change their laws so stoning is ethical again?

You hold on to a kind of monological ethics by which you can set our own moral compass. — Tobias

And whose moral compasses would you like to set? And perhaps more importantly, what makes you believe you are the right person or part of the right society to do so?

In Japan no one has the right to murder anymore, witches live their lives in peace and their broomsticks are now tax deductible! Progroms have been eradicated in most countries and I can go on. That is not because Kant came along and told them, or because everyone just miraculously came to see the miracle of the categorical imperative. — Tobias

You haven't presented a basis as to why these behaviors were unethical, other than "we don't do those things anymore", which is not a basis at all.

Yes and since there is no foot to stand on, you reach the conclusion that violence should not be stopped by countervailing force when it starts and we should allow ourselves and others to get killed in the name of ethics. — Tobias

I make no claims about what "we" should do. I'm only presenting you the reasoning behind what I think I should do, and asking for yours.

Of course not. I know I am not perfect, which is exactly why I am proposing these things. It is interesting that you interpret my attempts to reconcile my conduct with my imperfection as a claim to being perfect. — Tzeentch

That is because the assumption of perfection is needed. You wish to base your ethics on absolute truth and so there must be a kind of truth to which you have privileged access. — Tobias

No such assumption is needed, because I do not impose. I can be as imperfect as I like, if I do not attempt to impose my imperfections on others.

And I make no claims about having priviledged access to absolute truth. Let's keep the discussion fair and honest.

Perfection is maybe not the words, but you have to presume some sort of moral superiority above others. — Tobias

I'm sorry to say, but this must be projection.

It is out of understanding of my own ignorance that I choose not to impose. It is those who would impose that must by definition consider their ethics or morals to be superior over those of others, and thus give them the right to do so.

I get that, but the term does have overtly physical connotations. I thought that disengaging the term "violence" from the whole idea of ethical violence might be meaningful. After all, people can do a whole lot of horrendous damage to other people without ever lifting a finger against them. Disenfranchising a person or a group, for example. Maybe "trespassing" is a suitable match for the concept? In which case the question becomes, is it ever ethical to trespass against others? — Pantagruel

I see where you're coming from.

Allow me to try and explore:

What can make the use of physical force unethical, is when it is used against someone else's will. So the unethical aspect of this is that it is an imposition. Impositions can include a variety of non-violent behaviors as well.

There was a great and lengthy discussion about impositions in this thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12197/the-reason-for-expressing-opinions/p8

Some of its points I have echoed here.

And the truth is always temporary, facts of today will be overtaken by the science of tomorrow. — Tobias

Then it is not truth, and they were not facts.

Basing the right on truth only makes its foundation more shaky than when you just base in on the ' right' . — Tobias

A shaky foundation is the best one can hope for. However, being unsure or having a shaky foundation is entirely acceptable if one does not allow others to become the victim of one's ignorance, which is exactly what one risks in the case of violence.

No it is not an appeal to authority it is an appeal to experience. — Tobias

Unless some reasoning is presented, there's no difference between the two. And if a line of reasoning is presented, then it is an appeal to reason or logic.

You hold an all or nothing view. Either you have an unshakeable foundation or we have nothing to go on. — Tobias

Indeed. I would require nothing less than an unshakable foundation from someone who attempts to justify violence.

However, in practice we do not have an unshakeable foundation and we still have guiding lights to go on, namely practice and experience. It is not authority based on nothing it is authority based on a past record of equitable and fair judgement. — Tobias

Those things mean nothing to me. It is authority based on opinions. However many atrocities haven't been committed by individuals who made an appeal to past traditions or were under the false impression they were capable of fair judgement?

These things sound reasonable on paper, but the flaws become apparent when one is confronted with someone who has an entirely different frame of reference.

Here your reasoning spirals wildly out of control. Common reasoning is not the same as some truth being discovered. — Tobias

I shouldn't have used the term "common reasoning".

What I meant to say is that I believe these foundational truths to be accessible through reason and logic, so in theory accessible to all (though in practice, probably not), hence the use of the word "common".

And so since we are not sure of these things, no one's view can be imposed on others.... well so much for society than. — Tobias

Indeed. I consider all non-consensual aspects of society to be highly undesirable.

Is placing traffic lights imposing the view of city planners on others? — Tobias

No, but threatening individuals with violence for not stopping is.

If ethics only concerns oneself it becomes meaningless when you do not also provide me some unshakable truth on which it can be based. — Tobias

I disagree. I think that search for a foundation is incredibly meaingful. But each is to judge that for themselves.

How do I know which ethical maxims you hold when there is, as you admit no truth to base them on? — Tobias

The acknowledgement of one's fundamental ignorance can be a great basis for ethics. For one it should lead to a serious caution when imposing on others, violence being an example of one such imposition.

The problem with your slippery slope is you already assume we are at the bottom. — Tobias

No. But when one attempts to justify actions based on slippery slopes, one must either accept that the bottom is also justifiable, or be hypocritical.

Again;

If person A justifies his violence towards person B based on what he considers his "fair judgement", what should stop person B from doing the same?

And what should indeed stop anyone from basing their justifications for violence on their "fair judgement"?

More likely, there are factors that constitute what you call "fair judgement", that determine whether one person's claim to it may be better than another's; principles.

His taking a life is regrettable, not unethical. He is forced in society, we all are. — Tobias

To an extent we are forced to live in a society - a regrettable circumstance. The role we ascribe ourselves in that circumstance is one we choose voluntarily. Whether we choose to adopt its views of what constitutes justified violence is voluntary.

Now, there is an argument to be made here that society brainwashes individuals from a very young age into adopting its views. I'd agree with that, which is why I consider the non-consensual aspects of society to be highly problematic.

It is the common answer and it doesn't work. The murderer knows Kant is a Kantian so when everyone respects this maxim it is easy for the murderer to know the person is indeed in your house, ... — Tobias

As far as I am concerned that is perfectly acceptable. Our involvement in this affair is entirely involuntary, and thus inaction is an acceptable route to take if the alternative is unethical conduct. If our involvement is voluntary then we were foolish to begin with, and our forced choice between two evils is entirely our own mistake.

But I am not here to defend Kant's claim.

You have a condescending tone... — Tobias

I'm sorry you feel that way. I don't see how any of what I said is condescending.

In written discussions it is not always easy to know whether the other side understands what logical path I am taking, which is why I wrote it out in full.

I can be uncompromising and blunt, but you'll have to take the fact that I am writing page-long replies to you as evidence that I value our conversation and your contribution to it.

..., it is not the same as excusing violence whenever it is convenient. One must make an argument for this use of violence and that argument must be plausible in the eyes of others who have proven to be able to discern right arguments from wrong arguments. — Tobias

This is utterly subjective and based on opinion. It may sound reasonable at first glance, but completely falls apart when we consider how many different interpretations there may be from the various terms you use here (plausible, proven, right, wrong, etc.). Those interpretations tend to be guided by merely what is desirable at the time; convenience.

You may think that is fine, but it leads to every action being justifiable, and ethics becoming meaningless via the slippery slope I have discussed.

A. might be of the opinion that the use of force was necessary and then A. would have the task of defending his course of action. If A. says " well violence was justified because that ugly head of his constitutes a bad situation" we will tell him he committed a wrong. His ugly head does not provide a justification for violence since A. you basically do not commit violence out of a whim and B. even if he is god ugly the harm he suffered stands in no proportion to the harm you suffered. — Tobias

Reasonable at first glance, but then;

A. is of the opinion that stoning a married woman is necessary because she looked at another man. A is tasked with defending his course of action, and whatever not-entirely-hypothetical society A is a part of deems this a justifiable use of force.

If we stick to your line of reasoning, we cannot consider this unethical. It seems to boil down to, everything can justify violence as long as there's a society willing to accept it.

Every violent group action is justified.

This isn't ethics. It is a template for atrocity. — Tzeentch

No it is not and that is precisely because there does exist some kind of common reasoning. Exactly the one you seem to base your argument on and deny at will. In no society will " he had an ugly head" fly as an excuse for murder. — Tobias

One would wish for this to be the case, but my previous example shows our reasonings not to be as common as hoped.

Here's another example: Kiri-sute gomen

The "right" to murder, based on a perceived affront.

What about witch burnings? What about pogroms? We could continue, but I think my point is clear.

I think our disconnect lies in that you seem to assume (but correct me if I am wrong) that average behavior of individuals must be ethical. That whatever societies agree on is acceptable, must be justified and ethical.

I disagree with this.

The point is, people can an do reason with each other about what is right and wrong. — Tobias

And regularly they come to conclusions which are clearly unethical, like burning people at the stake baesd on superstition, or murdering people in the street based on perceived insults.

In your view nothing is left and so it is every man for himself to determine what is ethical. A recipe for a war of all against all, not for an ethical society. — Tobias

To the contrary. Every person who understands they have no foot to stand on should steer clear from violence and impositions on others, lest they make others the victim of their ignorance.

Just saying it doesn't work does not mean it doesn't work. Demonstrate it with either argument or empiric facts. — Tobias

I have, by trying to show you that basing ethics on opinion makes ethics meaningless.

Facts are stacked against you, because we are doing it in this way now for ages. — Tobias

And war and man-made suffering run like a red line through mankind's history. That may be the best mankind is capable of, but individuals need not settle for that mess.

It might not be perfect, but it does keep people from killing each other. — Tobias

Perfect it is most certainly not, but where do you get the idea that it keeps people from killing each other? Only a few decades ago mankind was a button-press away from killing, literally, everyone. We still are.

If the historical trend of ever more deadly warfare is to continue, the next war will be deadlier than World War II.

This is what deontology comes down to and I think it exposes one of its core weaknesses. It assumes a kind of free floating individual, unattached to social bonds. — Tobias

That is an interesting discussion in its own right. Not only is it my view that such an individual exists in every one, I'm also considering that analyzing and reevaluating one's core beliefs as imposed by one's upbringing, social climate or state may be a prerequisite for being a moral agent.

The problem is you think you are perfect. — Tobias

Of course not. I know I am not perfect, which is exactly why I am proposing these things. It is interesting that you interpret my attempts to reconcile my conduct with my imperfection as a claim to being perfect.

To me, consensual exchanges of physical force do not constitute violence, and that can include more extreme forms like combat sports.

I understand that may not be entirely colloquial, and that's why I shared the definition I'm using.

Well for one the wife didn't force the man through physical force. — john27

I thought we were talking about BDSM, so I assume the wife is hurting him or something along those lines.

That's to force (it is against the man's will) one's desires (the wife desires to engage in this type of interaction) through physical force (hurting).

And don't turn this into a discussion about what constitutes BDSM, please.

Therefore if you name that previous example as violence, you would do well to admit that it is malleable/contextual? — john27

How come? Isn't a subject being forced to do something against their will through physical force? It's violence, and, like all violence, unethical.

Oh sure, in that case it'd be violence. One just would not be aware that they're commiting it - carelessness coupled with ignorance causes much as suffering as malice, even if it is of a different nature.

That's not what I said.

You asked whether something would still be considered violence if physical force was applied in accordance to the would-be victims desires.

I answered, it is not violence. A doctor pulling a rotten tooth is not violence, or two partners engaging in some kinky intercourse is not violence.

The question that seemed to be implied was: but what if the victim's desires involve a third person?

In that case, the third person's desires must be taken into account.

Maybe I was imprecise with my reference to truth Ethics does not deal with true and false but with right or wrong. — Tobias

To me those two cannot be seperated. That which is Good or right must be based on truth. That which is wrong must be based on falsehoods or delusions. Truth-seeking is therefore a vital part of ethics.

To discern right from wrong we need people experienced in doing so. — Tobias

That would be an appeal to authority. Unless said person can back up their claims with reason, I would not put any value in any experience or authority on a subject they might have.

I do not think opinions are so different between individuals. Actually ethics, also in the absolutist variation you propose is only possible if opinions are not that different, or at least we must presuppose that by the light of common reason we can discern ethical principles. Actually, common reason must be more an assumption of yours than it needs to be mine. For you it is necessary that we can mentally at every age discern ethical principles by deduction alone. — Tobias

Like you said, my view of ethics is dependent on there being some truth to be discovered, or common reasoning. However, we may never be sure of these things, which is why I am also against imposing one's views on others. One's ethics should concern oneself and one's own behavior in regards to others alone. Attempting to force one's views on others risks making them the victim of one's ignorance.

But yes, to put it clearly, my view is that some of the principles I have discussed so far are (potentially) fundamental and I try to back this up by showing how ignoring those principles leads to slippery slopes in which notions of right and wrong become meaningless and all violent behaviors can be justified.

Well, if I am a police agent and I see a man shooting with a machine gun in a school aiming to kill teachers and pupils and I take him down with my fire arms, than I am praised and awarded and rightly so. My violence was necessary to stop further blood shed. I think even Kant would agree: We have an imperfect duty to intervene in this case. We cannot will people who inflict violence on the innocent to keep committing these kinds of acts (Kant was a notable proponent of the death penalty). — Tobias

I think in that situation the police agent's use of violence was still unethical, even if it had desirable effects as well. He had to take a life; something which I consider highly undesirable. Considering his circumstances it is understandable, however his choices in life contributed to putting himself in a position where he may have to take a life. Nothing forced him to associate with a society in which it is normal to murder children, yet he did.

Another famous example, which brought Kant himself into trouble is the murderer at the door scenario. In Kant's scheme lying is categorically wrong just like in yours violence is. When confronted with the question of whether it is ok to lie when a friend hides inside your house from a murderer and the murderer asks the straightforward question whether this friend is in the house, Kant was forced to say that lying would not be appropriate in this case. For ages now Kantian scholars are trying to save the moralist from Konigberg from himself. — Tobias

He could have kept his mouth shut.

Violence is fine to use in certain situations because the situations are bad and need to be resolved. — Tobias

At risk of repeating myself, this is akin to excusing violence whenever one or others deem it convenient. At most it serves as a explanation as to why individuals choose violence, but not as a limitation on it.

The problem with this line of reasoning is clear; person A deems it fine to commit violence against person B because person A is of the opinion there's a bad situation that needs to be resolved.

Every violent action is justified.

You may say, well person A has a group of people who share his opinion so instead; Group A deems it is fine to commit violence against person B because group A is of the opinion there's a bad situation that needs to be resolved.

Every violent group action is justified.

This isn't ethics. It is a template for atrocity.

More likely, there are factors that, in your view, can excuse violence. Self-defense for example, so it would probably be more useful to move on to those critical factors, because this intersubjectivity line of reasoning doesn't work and indeed any line of reasoning that depends on opinion rather than a fundamental truth or principle ends this way.

In an ideal world there are no bad situations so no need for violence. However we do not live in an ideal world we live in an actual one. — Tobias

That is a weak excuse! One cannot control the goings-on of the world, but one can control one's own behavior and whether one lives in accordance to ideals is a product of one's will to do so. The problem is that we often lack the desire to do so, or doing so conflicts with our desires.

If one believes the ideal is for there to be no violence, it is up to oneself to commit none.

Society needs such rules, we call it law. — Tobias

I don't think it's ethical for society, or indeed anyone, to make me the victim of its own imperfections.

So as long as I engage in physical force on the behalf of another's pleasure, or in accordance to someone else's desire, it would not be considered as violence? — john27

Assuming there's no third-party whose will is going to be violated, yes. It is not violence.

The question is, is the settlement we've reached - some violence - like what people disparagingly call gateway crime, a stepping stone towards extreme violence? — Agent Smith

We're not living in a world with some violence.

For one, only a few decades ago, and perhaps still today, every being on Earth was being threatened with death every day. The world's superpowers had and still have their nuclear weapons aimed at each other, ballistic missile submarines on constant patrol in striking range of capital cities.

Secondly, large amounts of people live under threat of armed conflict every day. In places like Ukraine and the South China Sea, we are an incident away from large-scale armed conflict, perhaps even World War III.

Thirdly, every nation on Earth depends heavily on their ability to use and threaten with violence against its own population to maintain control. That is to say, every citizen of every country on Earth is being threatened with violence every day by its own government.

Violence is present in every facet of life. Most nations' populations, and especially those of superpowers, are working around the clock to improve their nation's capacity for violence to even greater levels. Whole civilizations are built around it, whether they realize it or not.

We do not live in a world of some violence. We live in a world of extreme violence.

That's the game humanity has played, and will likely lose sometime in the future. A millenia-long prisoner's dilemma and arms-race that has lead to an accumilation of power that no individual is capable of wielding, ending up in the hands of exactly the imperfect human beings we're trying to keep ourselves safe from.

I'm unsure what you're getting at, but if the point you're making is that they're not in control of their actions and desires play no role, then I'd say they're not commiting violence. Just like a broken machine that hurts its operator is not commiting violence.

Maybe. I think it may be more about outbursts of aggression - most of the people I know who have done this take no interest in the reactions. It's closer to onanism. (This comes from working with prisoners) — Tom Storm

Well, I'd assume they're lying (or equally likely, unaware of what drives them). If they had no interest in the reaction of the victim, and all they were interested in was stabbing for self-gratification they'd be stabbing a rock or a tree.

You confuse intersubjectivity with majority opinion. Not every vote counts in this forum as not everyone has the moral maturity or argumentative acumen to value and weigh the reasons set forth. — Tobias

Basing the question of whose opinions matter on yet more opinions isn't going to help.

All truth is temporary, especially those concerning the social world and ethics is social, ... — Tobias

I disagree. What was unethical 1,000 years ago is unethical now, and vice versa. We can't cherry pick based on what is convenient, normal or accepted. Burning witches at the stake was never ethical, even if it was accepted at points in history.

Whether the arguments that I propose for me committing violence are sound or not, meaning that they are understandable and plausible for others who have seen enough of such situations to be able to weigh them and imagine what they would do were they in my shoes. — Tobias

It is opinion, then. This will get us nowhere when we try to talk about ethics, because opinions are so different between individuals, time periods and locations. If we accept this approach, it would be more appropriate to talk about customs or culture rather than ethics.

The opinions of others is not a sound basis for ethics. It loses its meaning. Everything could be ethical.

I find that unconvincing because I can citer many instances in which it seems that violence is not only the right thing to do, it seems even the necessary thing to do in such a situation. — Tobias

Lets hear it!

What it means to say that 'violence is unethical' in a way that it can be informative and yet retain some of its context inependent quality is to say that "we should strive for a world without violence, because in an ideal world violence is not necessary". — Tobias

Ok, I can get behind that, but there's a principle hidden in that last sentence.

But why would we want a world free of violence if we have all these opinions telling us it's perfectly fine to use in certain situations?

Not too long ago all the superpowers in the world were spending trillions on developing bombs that could wipe the Earth clean of life, all in the name of self-defense and "necessary violence". Doesn't it seem our leniency towards practical considerations is contrary to our goals? On what basis should we allow ourselves such leniency?

In that sense I would agree with you. In practice however we need rules to allow for violence when necessary. In a sense this ethical discussion mirrors he perennial problem of metaphysics how to cross over from the ideal into the real. — Tobias

I don't require such rules. Who does, exactly? You? Society? The world? Coincidentally, it seems they who require such rules are usually those who stand most to gain.

Lastly, what stops one from bringing the ideal into the real? Desires that we dress up as "practical considerations". Desire is what stops us from applying principles consistently. One may apply them to feel good about oneself, until it conflicts with one's desires, and then one may seek for a pretense as to why that is acceptable. That is not ethics. That's doing whatever the hell one wants whenever it's convenient.

Sometimes one must (attempt to) build a tower, to rise above the mud.

Yes, the stabber must have some desire to stab, no? They must enjoy to inflict pain on others, the reaction of the victim is what gives them pleasure or otherwise they would just stab a rock instead. There is a desired reaction they are after.

:roll: — 180 Proof

:roll:

It is not my subjective judgment that is key here, but intersubjective judgment. — Tobias

I find neither are a good basis for ethics. Majority opinions have been terribly wrong in their collective judgement countless times.

Principles are rules of thumb, ... — Tobias

Principle: a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reasoning.

I argue on the other hand that there are no context independen principles, or at least that context may require us to act not in accordance to a principle. — Tobias

What context do you propose, then? Whenever our subjective judgement deems it desirable to commit violence? Whenever a lot of people agree it is desirable to commit violence? I find none of these particularly convincing.

In the event that violence is pleasurable, physically, would it remain categorically unethical? — john27

Depends on one's definition of violence.

Mine is: to (attempt to) make another act in accordance to one's desires through the use of physical force.

As you can see, the forcing of one's desires upon another is a key ingredient. In the case of BDSM type situations another's will is not being violated.

I don't deny that life is not meant to be kept, but am a little skeptical on how the love of ones life impedes or incapacitate one's spiritual integrity. — john27

We're discussing the means (violence) and not the ends (motivations).

I don't think ends can justify means, so one's motivations for choosing violence are not relevant in my view.

And it would impede one's spiritual integrity in the way that any unethical deed does. Any ethical discussion presupposes we see an inherent value in being/striving to be ethical. That it is Good for its own sake, and thus that doing wrong is undesirable.

However not all situations have that degree of difficulty. the weighing of interests between Proof's life and John's broken nose is a pretty easy one to make. (provided that proof is not threatening to blow up a city or whatever). — Tobias

The issue is that in this example, one is using their own subjective judgement to determine what is merited. By doing so, one must also accept when another uses their subjective jdugement to do the same, unless one wishes to argue their judgement is somehow more special than others.

What you end up with is a world in which people constantly use violence against one another, and wonder why others are doing the same to them. That's what we see throughout history.

Why should I refrain from making this calculation and acting accordingly, in the name of some kind of pie in the sky context independent ethical maxim? — Tobias

The point of an ethical principle is that it is context independent.

Like I said to , if we need to ask why following ethical principles is even important at all, then this will not be very constructive. An ethical discussion presupposes they matter to us.

Of course what is up for debate is what these ethical principles are, and I've just shared a rather bold one; violence is categorically unethical. I'm sure you will try to find grounds to disagree, and that is why we're here.

Context-be-damned huh? — 180 Proof

Yes.

If one believes violence can turn into a right whenever it suits one's desires, then we've entered the typical slippery slope that ends at "might makes right".

Should I not celebrate my self preservation? — john27

Self-preservation is a futile endeavor, and to sacrifice one's spiritual integrity for it is not an act worth celebrating, but such is my view. I'll yield that in a situation of self-defense it would not be easy. I'm not sure if I could do it.

... is the will to live a desire? — john27

Of course.

What if the desires of the other are unethical and my violence stops him from bringing these desires into effective action? — Tobias

Two wrongs don't make a right.

Violence is categorically unethical. While in some cases its use may be understandable, that does not change its nature, namely to force someone to act in accordance to one's own desires through physical force. If that is not unethical, nothing is.

Even in the case of self-defense, its use must not be regarded as a victory (ethical), but as a personal defeat (unethical).

If we imagine two worlds, one in which corporations are free to expand and exploit, and one in which they are curtailed by powerful governments, we will start to find different manifestations of the same human flaw - the insatiable lust for power.

There is no system capable of fixing this, for such flaws inhabit nearly every human, and in most it requires years of self-study to become aware of and eventually fix them.

Humanity is its own greatest enemy, and the more we project our own imperfections on systems, the more we blind ourselves to the evil that is residing inside us.

In the case of personal happiness I suppose it's up to the individual themselves to navigate their way through apparent contradictions.

So my question is: why would one choose to pursue truth over peace of soul and pleasure? — smartmonkey1

I struggle to think of ways one could find inner peace without some form of truth-seeking.

To live in ignorance and delusion will sooner or later cause suffering for the self and others. I always like to think of false beliefs as being dissonant with reality, and like a lie has to grow in order to keep itself alive, so do false beliefs grow, and grow ever more dissonant, until things like depression follow.

Maybe the suggestion here is that a state of blissful ignorance is preferable over the turmoil that truth-seeking can bring. Perhaps that is true for some individuals who are unable to stomach the confrontation with their beliefs. That is a very tragic state to be in though.

When I can't get my way the answer is always more force, more mandates, to cede more rights to governments.

So we can all be safe.

My love for power and telling others what to do flows from my essential goodness and desire to be a protector. :pray:

It was, is and always will be authoritarianism - the quintessential ingredient for the worst of mankind's collective behaviors: repression, tyranny, war.

Close second is probably what I call humanity's "Very Hungry Caterpillar-syndrome," which I would typify as a collective lack of understanding of the nature of one's desires, that puts humanity in a perpetual state of wanting more.

Ought we associate with people who keep dragging out the dead horse of organized religion to use as a punching bag to further our philosophical "enlightenment"?

They could suggest it as one way to be a more moral person, sure, but I think one should ask oneself if visiting lonely elders is truly the best thing one can do, ... — Amalac

Juck.

I think that if you stop purchasing the products of animal cruelty, you will be a more moral person than if you don't, ... — Amalac

One person chooses to go vegan, another may visit lonely elders in nursing homes, and yet another donates money to the homeless, etc. What makes one better than the other?

Should people who visit lonely elders in nursing homes go around telling other people that they would live more moral lives if they too visited lonely elders in nursing homes?

Unfortunate that such an interesting discussion had to end with accusations.

I have a general question. How do you determine what a benevolent intent is? — khaled

That is an expansive topic, and I don't think it is constructive to branch out our discussion even further. Lets keep this subject for when we have reached an understanding on the other topics.

If one does anything to another person the rest of their life will be a consequence of that act. You can't be certain of how much of a butterfly effect any act had. This means there are no moral acts in general. That's unavoidable I think. — khaled

It seems this idea equates every type of interaction to a cause or consequence of every thing that follows. I don't necessarily agree with that. In terms of the butterfly effect; does a butterfly cause a hurricane on the other side of the world, or is the flap of its wings a tiny influence in an ocean of influences that cause that hurricane, not all of which are meaningful in the context of our discussion.

But on the other hand, it is a possible conclusion that morality functions like truth. We cannot know truth, but we can aspire to live in accordance with it as much as possible by discarding those things we can discern as not true. Thus living morally would translate into avoiding immorality. It seems consistent.

But what is to be done when the consequences cannot be known? What's the takeaway? Say someone drops a bomb from an airplane, with the benevolent intent of reducing the crime rate by eliminating criminals, and there is no news coverage of the event. Now they don't know the consequence of their action. What's their takeaway? — khaled

No idea. Should there be one?

Assuming the goal of this hypothetical person is to live a moral life, then one would assume they will at some point be moved to reflect upon their actions. Hopefully they realize that their aspirations of doing Good far exceed their limited wisdom.

How to make one see their own ignorance? Some seem to lack that ability entirely, thus a moral life is probably out of reach for them. They're doomed to do harm, and learn very little. A tragic reality, I guess.

I explained why I don't act to solve every problem I see. — khaled

So why is inaction wrong in some circumstances, but not in others? And why is it wrong in the case of Sarah and Jeff?

One instance in which I can agree that inaction is wrong, is when one has taken voluntary responsibility over the well-being over another individual, which is the case for having children.

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. — Tzeentch

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. — Tzeentch

So is one obligated to track or not? — khaled

Track, no.

To make a serious consideration of the consequences before one acts, yes. If one is interested in living morally/avoiding immorality, it would certainly be advisable to say the least.

But this inevitably raises questions of what constitutes enough consideration, whether one can ever be certain, whether every consequence is meaningful, one's ideas on cause and effect, etc.

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? — Tzeentch

Correct. Why is this strange? — khaled

Since not much of a case has been made as to why this distinction should be made.

You have it so that action is wrong only every once in a while. — khaled

I don't think that follows from my argument. The main issue seems to be with whether one can know and/or be certain.

Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society. — khaled

If certainty that the act you're about to do is harmless is what you require, then you will never be justified in acting. Where have I made a mistake here? — khaled

The fact that this "risk" one would be taking is likely to end up with a neutral result, because the possibility of something like this happening is astronomically low.

I'll be as ridiculous as I need to be. — khaled

Ok, but do you think the fact that you need to be ridiculous speaks in your argument's favor or mine?

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. — Tzeentch

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it? — khaled

It's unresolved. We have already established that.

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action since everyone can discern that inaction is safer since it has a 0% chance of failure in your system. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite despite thinking that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative. (may change depending on your resolution of the above) — khaled

I don't think this problem can be understood through something like chance, which in itself is a faulty representation.

I get your point though: if certainty is impossible, and one is obligated to choose the option with the least risk of harm, then it would follow inaction is always the correct option.

To an extent I agree. When in doubt, inaction is the safe option.

However, I don't think the impossibility of certainty, at least certainty to a degree that is meaningful in the context of our discussion, is a given. Nor do I think chance and risk are constructive ways of looking at this problem, because they inherently contain ignorance to causes.

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. — Tzeentch

Moral obligation. — khaled

I don't believe such a thing exists.

We're discussing what's right or wrong by your system not what practical actions a person abiding by your principles would be motivated towards or deterred from. — khaled

In that case I think I've answered your question:

Doing things that are incredibly irresponsible and risky with good intentions:

Very likely to be immoral, with a lot of luck neutral.

Or perhaps categorically immoral if we were to conclude there is some level of risk-taking that is immoral in and of itself. That has remained unresolved.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light". — Tzeentch

One could also define light as "not darkness" could they not? — khaled

We could call darkness purple and it would still refer to the absence of light.

Which of these two "exists" and which is the "non existence of the other" and why can't these criteria be flipped? — khaled

Photons exist, and the absence of them is what we refer to as darkness. Strictly speaking darkness does not exist. it is what we call the absence of photons and it is by their absence that we infer what we know as darkness.

I don't think going further down this sidetrack is constructive.

I ask you what makes an action. You say something is detected for action that's not detected for inaction. I ask you what that something is. You say action. See the problem? — khaled

No, I don't. Action is like light, and inaction is like darkness.

Say A operates a gate by pressing a button. When he presses it the gate opens for a few seconds then closes. B is walking and wants to pass through the gate. B cannot operate the gate (can't get to the booth as it's on the other side of the gate). A refuses to let B through. A is denying B space. Is A imposing on B? — khaled

Assuming it fits our earlier definition of what an imposition is, ergo this is a conscious effort of A to deny B entry, then yes.

I think "yes" is the unavoidable conclusion, since this is the exact same scenario with the walker and stander, except I just changed the mechanism by which the stander is impeding the walker. If so you have an example where sserping a button is an action (since inactions can't be impositions since they can't be wrong). Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. So, what makes it an inaction in Sarah and Jeff's case? — khaled

What this determines, and I thought we had already agreed upon this several posts ago, is that inaction can be an imposition.

What makes an imposition is the use of force (including various non-physical categories of force) to make someone act in accordance to one's desires.

In the case of Sarah and Jeff, one chooses not to get involved at all.

Similarly, if A does not operate the button so as to not involve himself (with the caveat that inaction can be immoral, in the circumstances we have discussed), then it is not an imposition.

Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. — khaled

As I said, the linguistic trick is one I think you're playing on yourself here. I understand the confusion, but I don't see the point and it's honestly getting a little tedious.

A little fear was all it took. — Isaac

Do my eyes deceive me?

Is the Philosophy Forum finally catching up to the fact that everything about this crisis reeks?

I'm asking if it's immoral to take the higher risk option. You answered that it is not moral. That doesn't answer the question as it could still be neutral. — khaled

That depends on the outcome. It could be neutral, I suppose.

If you claim that sometimes we can be certain that our actions will lead to our intentions, then we need to be able to divine the future life of the person who we're acting upon. If we cannot do that this reduces to: — khaled

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, — Tzeentch

The certainty you require for moral action is precisely the certainty to divine the future life of a person. — khaled

By performing an action that involves another person, we must be able to foresee the consequences as far as our actions cause them. Of course that can be a complicated matter, depending on the ambition (or hubris) of one's action.

When one saves another person's life, the rest of their life will be a consequence of this act. In that case, I would agree certainty is impossible thus it is not a moral act. That doesn't automatically mean it is immoral though, or incapable of having desirable effects.

If I lack the wisdom to do something, and attempt it anyways, that's not moral. However, if it doesn't result in a negative consequence that's not immoral leaving us at neutral. Again, there is a world of difference between neutral and immoral acts. — khaled

Certainly. I never intended to imply otherwise.

Since one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, any action is as justified as another when the only criteria to judge immorality is consequence. — khaled

Or the intentions. And whether consequences can be known is up for debate. In a lot of cases I would argue they cannot, but perhaps in some cases they can.

In your system, what is "immoral" (as opposed to not moral, which is determined by intention) is determined only by consequences. — khaled

It seems we are talking past each other.

If one's intentions are malevolent the act is unquestionably immoral.

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? — khaled

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. But also, I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it.

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? Do you have some flowchart keeping track of all the consequences of every action you've ever taken? No. You don't spend all your energy tracking the morality of every act you take. — khaled

Ideally one makes such a "flow chart" before one acts, to the best of their ability. Think before one acts. If one cannot act with wisdom, do not act. It is why I advocate to seek to do Good in small ways, that are overseeable.

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. The deed has already been done. What would the point be of tracking the consequences? Lessons?

That would imply ridding oneself of ignorance is a moral duty. While I think it is certainly advisable to do so, I doubt it would make much sense to turn it into a moral duty.

Thus for the same reason, if inaction is wrong, that doesn't mean I have to spend all of my energy tracking the morality of every time I choose not to act. — khaled

If inaction is wrong, then every moment spent in inaction towards the problems one perceives is wrong. I think there's no way around that.

If there was such a problem, say, a beggar approached me and I had a million dollars to spare, it would be wrong not to help them — khaled

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify your inaction towards all the thousands of beggars and poor people you know exist?

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify ever sitting on the couch watching tv when you know there are people out there that need your help?

Besides, I could very easily argue that spending every ounce of energy tracking whether there is a problem I could help with I'm not helping with doesn't help anyone, and so the best strategy is to just check every once in a while as most do. — khaled

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? :chin:

I'm very interested in knowing why I am causing people's deaths in the first example, but am not causing it in the second. — khaled

If you save someone's life, you cause the rest of their life, no? Thus you are responsible for it.

In your example of the person dying in traffic you don't cause anything. This is either a result of the person's bad driving or another person's bad driving.

Right, but the intent could always be benevolent. The murderer could bet on the 0.001% chance that the victim is actually suicidal and wants to be killed. You can't say the act is wrong until after it is done, and inevitably the 99.999% is what happens. THEN it becomes wrong.

Let's say there is an extremely lucky serial killer. The killer always has the benevolent intent of helping out suicidal people, or sending as many people to heaven as possible. The killer picks targets randomly, but by some statistical miracle they all turn out to have been suicidal and wanting to die. Assume the killer wants to live morally. Should the killer continue to pick randomly — khaled

So criteria 1 is met, and criteria 3, but not criteria 2. A moral act is an impossibility and whether it is immoral comes down to whether people got hurt by the killer's ignorance.

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. (Same question was raised about having children)

How would he know? Well, that's the problem with ignorance: one often doesn't realise it.

Perhaps due to his astronomical luck he continues to be neutral, ending up in some limbo of ignorance. Or his luck runs out, which I guess is more likely.

Can you guarantee that you waking up in the morning isn't enabling serial killers? — khaled

Of course. Don't be ridiculous.

One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong. — khaled

Of course not. If one can discern their actions will have a positive effect, surely one can choose to act. The question is whether one can discern it.

I think in the instance of Jeff we agreed that if Jeff agrees to be pinched to save Sarah, it is not wrong by virtue of imposing on Jeff, because no imposition took place. It can still be wrong for a myriad of other reasons.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite the fact that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative — khaled

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. No one is obligated by anyone to live a moral life. If individuals want to go out and take incredible risk because of contrived reasons presented for the sake of winning an argument, who will stop them?

The likely result will be they live an immoral life, and if we agree that living a moral life (or at least approaching it as we can) is something we are interested in, that prospect of failure should serve as a deterrent in itself.

Let's say there is an alternate world history, where "sserping" was defined first. And "pressing" was defined as "Not sserping". Does sserping now become an action? — khaled

No. It refers to something that isn't.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light".

Let's say I'm pressing a button. What's the "something" whose existence is detected? — khaled

Your action is detected.

I have a general question about your system. If one can choose between a morally risky option (say, 50% chance of harm) and an even riskier option (say, 70% chance of harm), is one ever justified in picking the latter? Is it wrong to pick the latter? — khaled

Taking a risk implies one lacks the wisdom and/or power to produce the intended effect and must rely on luck. It cannot be a moral act, thus there's no point in talking about justification.

Right but the charity example that I gave did have that. Do you believe donating to charity is not moral? I have the receiver’s interests in mind, but I can never be sure my donation actually furthers those interests. — khaled

Any “moral act” as you put it is not moral by this definition, since no one is ever certain they have the power to being their intent about — khaled

1- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means that there is a 100% chance of success, then no one possesses the wisdom or power, and there are no moral acts. — khaled

Doesn’t this mean no one has the power you require for an act to be moral? — khaled

But I can never be certain still, can I? After all, maybe all the evidence I found showing this charity is legit, or that I have the power to see this act through, is a hallucination. It’s possible isn’t it? Therefore no act is moral, as no one can be certain they possess the power to do as they intend 100% of the time — khaled

It seems we can go two ways:

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, and the best one can hope for is to refrain from immoral acts. This would be a similar to approaching truth by discarding things one recognizes to be untrue.

Or one can leave the possibility for certainty, thus some form of communion with ultimate reality, open.

I lean towards the latter. Perhaps certain certainties are possible, but definitely not to the extent that we can divine the future life of a person. I believe morality consists of small acts of humility, kindness and compassion, and not of "saving the world".

Perhaps a better word for certainty would be "wisdom".

Clearly they don’t. If I have never touched a computer in my life, but for some reason was convinced I can hack into the pentagon, and by sheer chance pressing random buttons I succeeded, does that mean I “knew and had the power” to bring about my intentions? — khaled

As I said, criteria 3 is a confirmation or criteria 2. If criteria 2 cannot be met, then criteria 3 (ergo the result) is irrelevant.

If I save someone’s life and he goes on to murder others in one instance, and I save another’s life and he becomes a very benevolent philanthropist, what am I to conclude? — khaled

That one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, I suppose.

Similarly, inaction being wrong would mean you must spend every waking moment checking if you’re being immoral.

And in any case, what kind of argument is it to claim that since inaction being wrong would imply more effort, inaction is not wrong? — khaled

I'm arguing inaction isn't wrong, and pointing out the inconsistencies that arise when one tries to argue it is wrong. The most obvious being, if inaction is immoral, and one is unavoidably in inaction towards many perceived problems at any given time, one is always immoral.

These are questions you'll have to answer yourself if you wish to hold the view that inaction is wrong.

Let’s say I bought a piece of candy, like I have been doing for years. As a result, the person selling them makes enough money to buy a new tv. As he goes to buy the new tv he gets killed on the way. I know this happened. Now how would you suggest I change my behavior?

If I happened to be so unlucky that this happens every time I buy a piece of candy, how should I change my behavior then?

This is what I mean when I say that the mere fact that an act turned out wrong doesn’t really tell you what to do. Maybe it was just bad luck. Maybe it actually caused the harm.

What you have is correlation. But you shouldn’t change your behavior based on correlation alone should you? — khaled

If you suspect that the act of buying candy is actively causing people's deaths, it would certainly be a good idea to stop doing it.

In this instance you are already hinting towards the fact that your buying of the candy is not causing people's deaths, just like not pressing the button to save Sarah does not cause her death; whoever put her in the situation causes her death.

Your system doesn’t judge the morality of the act based on a prediction of likely consequences, aka, before the act is committed. It judges the morality of the act based on what actually ends up happening. — khaled

It determines based on both.

You can’t actually state that murder is wrong by a system that judges after the act. Maybe the person was suicidal. Then it’d be good. — khaled

Not if the intent was to murder, obviously. Then the act is wrong from the outset. We have already been over this.

Judging by expected outcome is what I’m advocating. — khaled

That would mean one's ignorance can justify any of one's actions, and that is not a meaningful way of constructing a moral system.


Perhaps this clarifies:

Criteria 1 discerns between benevolence and malevolence.

Criteria 2 discerns between wisdom and ignorance.


One needs to both benevolence and wisdom to do Good.

To do not Good ("Evil") is much easier: one only needs malevolence or ignorance.

If I am a fire fighter, and save a 100 people. Then the 101st turns out to be a serial killer and kills a 102 people, have I done something immoral in acting exactly as I’ve acted the 100 times prior all with good results? If so, what should be my takeaway? Am I obligated to retire? How should this new data be interpreted? — khaled

That depends, if one wishes to live morally (or avoid immoral behavior) one should probably ensure one isn't enabling serial killers, should they not? And if they cannot guarantee one's behavior isn't enabling serial killers, then maybe one should cease that behavior.

Again, why is sserping an inaction? — khaled

Because it refers to something one isn't doing?

Sarah can detect you sserping — khaled

No, she cannot. One cannot detect the non-existence of something - at most one can infer it.

Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable. — Tzeentch

I really don’t understand how you can think so. — khaled

I expected I didn't have to go through this tedium, but alas here we are:


Example A:

I intend to help another person, but instead I end up killing them.

A just intention, but a harmful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral.


Example B:

I intend to kill another person, but instead I end up helping them.

An unjust intention, but a helpful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral either. The unintended outcome is a result of ignorance.


Both intention and outcome have to be regarded to determine the morality of an act.