"Meta-philosophical eliminativism" According to meta-philosophical eliminativism, things like "positions", "theories", "doubt", "principles", etc. are "human constructs" in the sense that they are merely methods of organizing data and can be eliminated naturalistically in the same way the eliminativist materialist believes that "belief" and "desire" can be eliminated, including the belief in eliminativist materialism as well. — darthbarracuda
i.e. philosophical only insofar as we have no other more precise method of understanding the matter. In this eliminativist approach, which is naturalistic and scientistic, nothing is inherently impossible to study scientifically; the only constraint is that we have no current method of doing so. — darthbarracuda
I don't see why this wasn't included in eliminative materialism to begin with:
"Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that that class of entities does not exist.[4] For example, materialism tends to be eliminativist about the soul; modern chemists are eliminativist about phlogiston; and modern physicists are eliminativist about the existence of luminiferous aether. Eliminative materialism is the relatively new (1960s-1970s) idea that certain classes of mental entities that common sense takes for granted, such as beliefs, desires, and the subjective sensation of pain, do not exist.[5][6] The most common versions are eliminativism about propositional attitudes, as expressed by Paul and Patricia Churchland,[7]and eliminativism about qualia (subjective experience), as expressed by Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey.[2] These philosophers often appeal to an introspection illusion."
A belief or desire is relatively close to being a theory, principle or attitude except that they usually pertain to something concrete in the world that is objectively measurable. Desires and Beliefs however are more subjective and prone to fault.
"Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once. In order to compare propositions of different colours and flavours, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus we are brought back to matters of language and logic. Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interaction. One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, perhaps with intention thrown in for good measure. For example, we frequently find ourselves faced with the question of whether or not a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs. Discrepancies here can occur for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, we usually call that a lie."
Thus it is eliminativist in that it attempts to eliminate philosophical positions entirely, including eliminativism itself, i.e. eliminativism is a temporary tool, a stepping-stone, needed to understand why these tools aren't actually needed, similar to a trust fall or a leap of faith. Once the leap is done, the philosophical position is no longer needed, as there will be no need for positions anyway, since the very nature of knowledge will be elucidated by a perfect science. — darthbarracuda
But how can you have science without positions of any kind? Do you mean scientific fact will make positions redundant? Isn't fact just a kind of position on something given what the factual data is?
This leads to the almost soteriological conception of inquiry; by embracing meta-philosophical eliminativism, our crude theories and positions will eventually be left behind as we transcend "that kind" of knowledge and approach a singularity, fully self-contained and self-justifying in its own right. — darthbarracuda
It sounds like you think we will eventually come towards knowing absolute truth. knowledge that would be self-justifying in it's own right. I thought knowledge and truth was always relative?