TP, we have reached agreement!

There should be some sort of official PF thing for when this happens. Like a flying pig gif or something.

That was the point. In order to get to "the self is still there" we need to do something theoretical — Terrapin Station

That's one way to get to the self, yes, to infer it. But I think we can also do it, as it were, reflexively. We attend to a phenomenon, and then deliberately attend not just to the phenomenon but the self that experiences it. We can be aware of ourselves in a way that does not necessarily involve inference.

OK, so there's the phenomenon of a tree without there being a phenomenon of self. That is, there is awareness of a tree, but no awareness of self. So far so good, I agree that is totally possible.

However the self is still there, or the phenomenon of the tree could not be possible, it's just that the self is not paying attention to itself, and is therefore not apparent, or not present as a phenomenon. To my mind, a phenomenon entails a subject that the appearance appears to. Is that where we disagree?

OK, thanks TP for explaining it again. To my mind, the following is a straightforward contradiction:

So, the idea is that sometimes, to someone, there's no phenomena, no awareness or appearance of self, as well as no awareness or appearance of names, concepts, etc. There's just awareness/appearance of, say a tree (and of course the grass around it, etc.) — Terrapin Station

The bolded bits contradict each other. There are no phenomena, AND there is the phenomenon of a tree.

Where am I going wrong?

I'm not sure. I don't think I understand what you mean by it, and I have read all your posts in this thread. Typically 'ontological' is contrasted with 'epistemological'. For some thinkers the phenomenal is the clearest case of the ontological.

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc. — Terrapin Station

This is too brief. I have no idea at all what point you are making, I really don't.

It seems like you're wanting to argue via creative misunderstandings. I'm not interested in that. — Terrapin Station

TP, I want to understand you. However, I am struggling to do so, as apparently others are also struggling. Misunderstandings are generally the fault of the writer, not the reader.

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc. — Terrapin Station

So there are just trees in empty space, or maybe there are just tress with no space around them at all?

Also, what fdrake said

When I mention "just the tree" for example, I'm not implying thinking of the term "tree" or a concept of a tree, or separating it from anything else. — Terrapin Station

If it's not separate from anything else, then how is it still itself? Identity depends upon separation, no?

I'm not sure philosophy is as big a subject as it might seem - the same issues come up over and over. Obviously there's a heck of a lot of books and you can't read them all. Plus philosophy books usually make horrible reading. Philosophical papers are shorter and get to the point quicker. Personally I'd start with concepts and vocabulary of the various subdivisions of philosophy. And then focus on problems rather than philosophers. Go issue by issue, and don't read a book unless you have a good specific reason to.

Is there any particular area you're into? I'm mainly into the philosophy of consciousness and pretty much stick to that.

Keep in mind that I am NOT necessarily referring to persons, perceptions etc. by "reference point." I'm referring to spatio-temporal locations.

The reference point would be whatever your spatio-temporal location is. That doesn't imply that there's a "you" in the equation in terms of what's phenomenally occurring. — Terrapin Station

But a spatio-temporal location is insufficient for the appearance of a tree, it seems to me. You need to have an apparatus capable of distinguishing the tree from the rest of the stuff, don't you? That's a bit more than a spatio-temporal location.

Appearances are what things are really like from some reference point, and there's always some reference point. — Terrapin Station

So is there a reference point when there is just a tree?

For me, phenomenally, sometimes there's just a tree. There's no subject. — Terrapin Station

There's you isn't there?

What is the philosophical equivalent? — Denovo Meme

I don't think there is one. Maybe universal rationality (rationality common to everyone) is as close as you get.

Don't you need to be conscious before you can feel anything, including fear?

Sorry Terrapin. I've just had to deal with some child protection social workers and was in a bad mood.

Shit or get off the pot Terrapin. Socrates would be murdered here just as in Greece for being an annoying shithead.

B isn't it?
Oh, A as well.

EDIT: I somehow missed the 'NOT'!

My identity would be destroyed. Brains determine identity rather than consciousness, I think. Perhaps by integrating information (Tononi/Koch). I think the IIT may be a good theory of identity, but it fails as a theory of consciousness for the same reasons other reductive theories fail.

Consciousness has nothing to do with brains.

We don't know just how similar to our own brains something has to be before consciousness arises. — Terrapin Station

Indeed. The assumption that consciousness arises at all results in this very difficult problem.

The macro system usually includes a person looking at what is recorded by the equipment, but it doesn't have to. — andrewk

I'm happy to accept this idea if it is right, but I don't understand it. How could it ever be known that 'it doesn't have to', because even if there is a macro system that performs a measurement without a person, we can't know that the measurement has actually collapsed anything until we look at the macro system, at which point we become part of the system? No doubt I've misunderstood something and am happy to be corrected.

Schzophr, I'm interested in whether or not consciousness is a state of being, but I'm struggling to understand this offering, sorry. I suspect others are having similar difficulties.

But don't you see, even if you believe that a will enforces that we call laws, that is also random in the sense that one might say "Well, natural laws could be will-driven or they simply could be there, a feature of the universe we find ourselves in, built-in as it were. We got the will-driven one more or less on the toss of a coin." — Unseen

Yes, I think I see what you mean.

I don't think you need much science. The science is still interesting in its own right of course (not that I'm an expert on it) it's just that I really haven't come across much that is strongly relevant to the philosophy of mind. To put it another way, the science is consistent with pretty much the full range of philosophies of mind, so we can't use science to decide between them. Whatever theory of mind we come up with, it of course has to be consistent with what we empirically know beyond a reasonable doubt. But that is a very low bar.

It refers to predictable and reliable regularity in how things in the world and universe behave. — Unseen

Ok, thanks that's a nice clear answer. I'm not agreeing with Henri in general, but it seems that your claim that the universe is law-driven is a figure of speech in the sense that what you mean by 'law' is not a kind of force that drives things. I do think the universe is law driven, but I mean it more literally, in the sense that I think it is will-driven. Regularity of observed behaviour is a function of persistent will. Are you OK with pillowcase length answers?

But on the gross (atomic level and above) level, the universe is overwhelmingly law-driven. — Unseen

What does 'law' refer to, for you, in this context?

On the subject of religion: what happens to those who do not believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God but yet a real person and a prophet without the kingdom of heaven in the prospect? — christine

I don't understand the context. Do you mean "What happens after physical death?"

Good god man. It's only a few paragraphs. That is brief.

I don't believe free will is possible, so what sort of will are you talking about and how does it work? — Unseen

The ability to self-move I think. Just as our own behaviour is determined by our values, thoughts and feelings, so is the behaviour of fundamental particles and fields is attributable to some kind of value and feeling.

I think this is a solution to the problem of under or over determination in macro-behaviour of creatures which everyone agrees have minds, such as humans. The problem is about deciding what determines behaviour. Do we tell a physical story about photons, retinas, neurons and synapses, adrenaline and motor responses? Or do we tell a story about seeing a lion, feeling fear and running away? Presumably both of these apply in some sense, but how are they compatible and what is their relationship? A panpsychist answer is that the physical is reducible to the psychological. All the particles and forces involved in the 'physical' story are doing what they are doing because of how they feel, and if they felt nothing they would not exist, because to exist is to behave in a persistent way for a while, and no such behaviour could happen without conscious will.

At such a fundamental level, there is no 'how' in terms of mechanism. Mechanism is a higher-level development in which conscious entities all doing their own thing interact in regular predictable ways, and these can then be manipulated. Consider that you could make a light switch out of thirsty human beings. Get a giant tray, pivoted in the centre. Put half a dozen people on the tray. Have electrical contacts under each end. Then put a bottle of water at one end of the tray. The thirsty humans move toward the water. The end they move to goes down and makes a contact. Then put the bottle of water at the other end, the humans move and the contact is broken. This switch would not work if the humans did not feel thirst and did not will to survive. And from an alien perspective, this might look like the mechanical movement of insentient particles obeying some kind of impersonal force. The panpsychist point I'm suggesting is that everything is like the human light-switch, only we don't realise it. When we look at the mechanical behaviour of relatively simple matter, we are like the aliens who don't realise that humans are conscious, and name regular behaviours in terms of impersonal laws. The panpsychist idea is that there are, in fact, no impersonal forces at all. All behaviour is ultimately, and most accurately, attributable to will.

I haven't argued for panpsychism here, I've just explicated (one version of) it a bit to try to answer your question.

EDIT: typos

The relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks is the expressive ego; something that is presumed as the base of sentience. It's not. — Shamshir

I don't understand 'expressive ego'.

Consciousness doesn't denote expression.
Just like how the body is constantly conscious, even during deep sleep, but isn't expressive without commands from the ego. — Shamshir

OK, I think I might know what you mean. Consciousness is necessary for expression or behaviour, but expression/behaviour is not necessary for consciousness. Is that the idea?

The consciousness of rocks is no different from the consciousness of the dreaming man; aware but non-controlling. — Shamshir

Maybe. I favour a version of panpsychism in which all behaviour is caused by will, although much behaviour is a mechanical emergent of many wills interacting. Indeed the behaviour of a rock would be such a mechanical emergent I think, so the whole-rock-consciousness may indeed be as you say, I'm not sure.

The better question, and the one I assert, is why would I think that? The onus seems to be the one on making the claim. — Hanover

That's a perfectly good question, and one we could discuss if you want. I've gone over it many times on this forum and the old one, and I can do it again if you like, but I suggest starting another thread so we don't derail Unseen's too much.

However, that's not how this conversation got started. If you remember, I asked a question of Unseen, specifically, "Why do you think a nervous system is necessary for consciousness?" to which you gave an answer that raised further questions, which you find uninteresting and are disinclined to answer.

It's ridiculous to assert that maybe rocks have experiences, — Hanover

Why? Is it just the burden of proof point? Is it that you perceive that you have no odd claim to defend, and there is no case to answer until I make the case for panpsychism? Is that all?

If we tweak a car's engine it will affect its motion. This does not mean that things in motion are dependent on combustion engines. — Coben

Yes, that's not a bad analogy to show some of the fallacious reasoning, I think. Need to think about it a bit more.

To offer an answer to the OP (apologies for not doing so before), from my panspychist perspective, we are conscious beings because consciousness is a fundamental property. Everything is conscious, so we are as well. Not a terribly interesting answer. There is the follow-up question, 'Why is everything conscious?'. I don't know the answer to that. It just is, like any other fundamental property or force, there comes a point where there are no further layers of reality to appeal to for an explanation.

It is based upon the false premise that you cannot decipher a meaningful difference between rock behavior and my conversation with you here and that has somehow caused you to wonder whether rocks are thinking, conscious things. — Hanover

Is it? You could always try asking me rather than assuming what I think. I can, of course, decipher many important differences between you and a rock. And I certainly don't think a rock can think and experience the kind of things that you can. But that's not what is at stake. We're not talking about differences of content of experience, we're talking about the difference between some experience and no experience at all. And that, it seems to me, is a harder line to reasonably draw. And it seems you have no appetite to attempt to draw it, even though you seem to take this view on a philosophy forum and engaged me in conversation about it. I'm not sure what you are doing here or why you answered my question to Unseen if you find this stuff uninteresting.

Are you suggesting you don't know you're communicating with a conscious being and wonder if I might be a rock? — Hanover

No

Since you can decipher my behavior from a rock, why not use the distinctions you recognize to answer your own question.

I can't. The differences in your behaviour from that of a rock do not allow me to make any general conclusions about consciousness, as far as I can tell. But you may have noticed something I have missed. That's why I am asking you (and Unseen if s/he cares to answer).

What is the relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks, such that you attribute consciousness to the former but not the latter?

As I noted, the only reason I believe any object other than myself has consciousness is by observing its behavior. — Hanover

OK, so what is the relevant difference between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of rocks, such that you attribute consciousness to the former but not the latter?

Because alteration of an organism's nervous system predictably affects its consciousness. — Hanover

It does, but what follows from that? That's perfectly consistent with the idea that alteration in the functioning of a plant, or a rock, or a cell, or a plastic bottle, or whatever, likewise affects its consciousness.

The lack of a sufficiently evolved nervous system—or the total absence of one—makes believing lower organisms might be conscious nevertheless borders on a religious belief. — Unseen

Why do you think a nervous system is necessary for consciousness?