How is the issue of conciousness any different from any other investigation. Why the need for 'the hard problem' epiphet, dualism, panpsychism, all these ideas which require us to add totally new, otherwise unjustified, concepts to our world-views. — Isaac

Because the hard problem only applies to emergentism. I agree the hard problem is horrible. But the only way to make it go away is to ditch emergentism. This is intellectually rather unsatisfactory, as it's saying "Stop trying to figure this out. Lets give up and just add another property to the list of fundamental properties." It seems lazy and unprofessional. However I think there are enough reasons now to do that with some confidence. Not that I want to put people off trying to find a coherent emergentist account of the causation of consciousness - if they think they can do it, by all means have a go.

A panpsychist (at least not my kind of panpsychist) would never say 'such and such causes consciousness'. It's important to distinguish consciousness (as the capacity to experience) and a particular experience itself. To have an actual experience, you need consciousness PLUS something happening to that conscious something. While consciousness itself is not caused by anything, the exact nature of the experienced is very much caused by what is going on. So in humans, WHAT we experience is totally dependent on what are bodies are doing in the world. It makes total sense to speak of causes when one is speaking of the contents of experience, but not experience itself, which is just a property of all matter like charge and spin and mass and so on.

That doesn't help, I'm afraid. It's not more clearly identifiable than 'conciousness'. — Isaac

Indeed, all I can offer in terms of ideas and words are synonyms. 'Consciousness' is impossible to define except by appeal to consciousness, unfortunately. Synonyms like 'sentience and 'awareness' might help some. For a kind of ostensive definition, an act of introspection is required. I'll try to offer instructions for this. Attend to an object. Then attend to your awareness of the object. Then notice that there is a capacity in you to so attend and be aware, regardless of what the object of that attention is. That capacity is consciousness. Not sure if that helps at all.

If I said "the activity of neurons is Sentience" you'd want to deny that, right? So on what grounds, that's what I'm trying to get at. — Isaac

Yes, I'd want to deny that on the grounds that their definitions are different. The activity of neurons is the activity of neurons. Sentience is sentience. If you want to say that, despite definitions, these two things are, in actual fact, the same thing, you need a theory that connects them. Because the definitions, as they stand, don't connect them. The onus, it seems to me, is on the person who asserts that two things which have different names and definitions, are in fact that same thing.

Clearly distinguishing theory from definition is important, in so far as that is possible. We need definition to agree what it is we are talking about. Then we theorise about the details of what that phenomenon is, what causes it, whether it is caused at all, its structure, its function, and so on. Once the theory is settled, then the definition might change to include the theory. This is a bit like the definition of water changing after we discovered it was H2O, or the definition of 'life' changing once biologists settled on a bunch of observable criteria.

As in 'appears to respond to stimuli'? Still sounds behavioural to me. — Isaac

No, 'sentience' as in 'consciousness'. Sorry for the appalling circularity, but I think it goes with the territory. All I have are synonyms and reflexive introspection.

Feel what? — Isaac

Anything, or nothing. To get the idea of consciousness, we have to abstract it from awareness of some particular thing. Otherwise we might be conscious when we are tasting an orange, but not when tasting an apple, which would be absurd. [funtionalist hat] If I were a functionalist (I'm not) I could express this abstraction by saying that there are general characteristics of brain function when someone is experiencing that remain the same no matter what someone is experiencing, be it an apple or orange or whatever. It is those general features that constitute consciousness. Any any system that is instantiating those functions is conscious. [/functionalist hat]

And 'experience' here means? Is it the same as awareness? Does a rock 'experience' being dropped from a cliff? I'd say it doesn't because it is not aware of the event, but you offered this in addition to awareness, so I'm guessing you mean something more? — Isaac

It means 'awareness', 'subjectivity' (to add another one) and the other things I said. These are all more or less synonyms, perhaps with slight differences of emphasis, but I think they are all pretty much the same concept.

For the record I do think that the rock feels something, is aware of something, is a subject, has an experience, when dropped off a cliff. What it feels I don't think is important or interesting in the same way that what a person feels when dropped off a cliff is important and interesting. Although I know there are Rights for Rocks groups that would find this offensive.

OK, so what is the definition of 'conciousness' then, if not behaviour? — Isaac

Sentience, awareness, the capacity to feel, the capacity to experience.

Right. So why not adopt a behaviourist position as the simplest model? — Isaac

Because consciousness, as a matter of definition, is not behaviour.

But, notwithstanding the above, the thing I really want to focus on here is how you would know that you have your sought after 'explanation'. What would it do that 'neurons firing' doesn't? — Isaac

I don't think an explanation is possible in this case, where we think of 'explanation' as explaining one thing in terms of another (walking in terms of neurons firing and muscles contracting etc). It would place consciousness at a point in nature that doesn't generate the problems associated with emergence. For me, the only sensible point is somewhere that doesn't require explanation in terms of something else. That is to say, at a fundamental level of brute fact where explanations (in the above sense) are not required.

You define thoughts as something ineffable and then act surprised that there's no physical explanation for them. — Isaac

It's not just me though, it's every dictionary.

As I asked schopenhauer1, what would an 'explanation look like? What properties of an explanation are missing from "neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts"? — Isaac

Lets take a less problematic example and compare it. "Neurons firing in such and such a way seem to cause walking." In this example, we can detect the firing of neurons. We can detect the walking just by looking at the behaviour of the body. We can do this because walking is defined as nothing other than a certain behaviour of the body. The firing of neurons and the walking of the body is the same kind of thing. It's physical stuff doing something we can observe. We can see both ends of the correlation and how they are related.

Compare this with "Neuron's firing in such and such a way cause experiences, thoughts, feelings, and so on." We can detect the neuron's firing. We can detect certain behaviours, such as screaming, crying, speaking words that explain a complex thought, and so on. But these behaviours are not the definition (unless you are a behaviourist) of thoughts and experiences. The definition of thoughts and experiences involves something other than a behaviour. So we have a difficulty, the two ends of the correlation are not each behaviours, and the relationship between them is not transparent in the way that the relationship between neurons and walking is (at least to someone who understands muscles and nerves and what have you).

If you want to be a panpsychist, the best way to do so is to attack emergentism as hard as you can. If you can say that emergentism isn't true, and that consciousness is real, then you can say that consciousness is fundamental. — Pneumenon

I think it's right to place emergentism as the antithesis of panpsychism. I also think it is right that difficulties with emergentism are the main philosophical reasons for embracing panpsychism. Parsimony is another philosophical reason. There are perhaps other non-philosophical reasons, for example, some personal mystical experiences might suggest panpsychism for some, others feel they perceive agency in the actions of other things, but these are of less interest to philosophers (except those philosophers who prefer to criticise panpsychism on the basis of its perceived non-philosophical motivations).

@Pfhorrest said that the three basic options are:
1) Nothing is conscious (eliminativism)
2) Some things are conscious (emergentism)
3) Everything is conscious (panpsychism)

I agree. All these positions have problems. For me, eliminativism is clearly false (by introspection). Emergentism is fatally problematic. Panpsychism has difficulties, but they seem to me to be much more easily solvable. As I have said many times, following Churchill, "Panpsychism is the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others."

We can do how - neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts. — Isaac

I don't think that's a how. I think it's an observation of a correlation. The explanation of this correlation is still wide open.

No. That's for undergrads who think they're masters because they know some names. — jacksonsprat22

What do you think philosophy is about?

Coming out from under anesthesia one may be partially conscious for a period, — jgill

So one is aware of something hazy and indistinct? That's still awareness of something, which entails consciousness, no? One is conscious when one is aware, even if the object of awareness is fuzzy.

...recognizing a friend but unable to put thoughts together.

But this failure to put a name and memories to a face is still an experience of sorts. And the fact that there is experience, no matter how messed up, still entails consciousness.

Emerging from a deep sleep there may be a short period of partial consciousness, an inability to synchronize sensory input or think clearly. Before my daily two cups of coffee I am only partly conscious, unable to dredge up names to match faces, etc.

Again, your examples are of fuzzy content of consciousness, not examples of states which are in-between consciousness and non-consciousness. All your examples are examples of conscious experience, and fall fully under that definition.

There can be no intermediate ground between consciousness and not-consciousness (I suggest), but there is plenty of middle ground between being conscious of vague fuzzy things, and consciousness of sharply defined things, as you have pointed out. Do you see the difference?

Why do you think panpsychism is true?

In humans, partial consciousness occurs frequently — jgill

Could you give an example or two?

@jacksonsprat22

You haven't done any philosophy here. Philosophy is about argument and rational justification for beliefs.

Why are you a panpsychist? Banno is very annoying in many ways, but his request for philosophy, far from being trolling, is exactly appropriate for this forum, while your avoidance of argument is why you will get banned and not him.

I'm a panpsychist too by the way. I am because of the fact that consciousness does not admit of degrees. What's your reason? You don't have to have one, but then you should be quiet, or perhaps ask people about their reasons for or against.

Again, if something is both A and B, what difference does it make if you call it A or B? — praxis

It depends if it's a name or a property. If A and B are two names for one thing, it makes no difference. If A and B are two properties (or sets of properties) of the same thing, it makes a difference.

Sure, but there's still a fairly clear distinction between philosophy and science, even if it is blurry in places and shifts its ground. Generally, and imperfectly, philosophical questions are not resolvable by making a physical observation. If they are, they tend to cease to be philosophical questions, and become scientific. That's roughly right isn't it? And it's that difference that explains, I suggest, why philosophical solutions do not force agreement in the way that scientific ones eventually do, even if we have to wait for the old duffers to die. Philosophical problems resurface with renewed vigour generation after generation.

Although bizzarely flat Earthism seems to be making a comeback. So maybe I'm totally wrong.

I'm interested in what you think distinguishes philosophy from science. If you don't think it is reliance on physical evidence, what is it? Are you more comfortable with the concept of observation perhaps?

What science are you talking about? Scientific questions are never settled, and can never be settled by definition. — h060tu

Maybe not absolutely 100%, no, but some questions are pretty settled aren't they? They are settled enough to base life and death decisions on, for example, that converting kinetic energy to heat in a brake will reliably slow a car. There's a whole load of contested scientific claims of course, but there's many more that aren't.

Science is always evolving. — h060tu

Verily it evolves. It evolves in light of what?

The only thing I said is that we can proof that it´s conected with nervous systems and the brain in perticular. — InfiniteMonkey

How can we prove that?

I mean when you damage your brain you damage your consiousness. — InfiniteMonkey

I don't think so. You damage what you are conscious of. And in more extreme cases, you damage your identity. Getting knocked out might be shutting down consciousness. Alternatively, it is disrupting identity, such that you no longer exist for a while. Then when you 'come around' your identity re-forms. This is the less problematic thesis I think.

EDIT: Before I fall foul of Banno, when I say 'you damage what you are conscious of', I don't mean the tables and chairs in the room get smashed up. I mean you are no longer aware of them in the same way.

:) Desperate times I guess.

Maybe. It's not just about rape though. It's about things like climate change, which is more important.

A third party might make sense in some situations. But isn't not voting also an evil choice? Not voting affects the numbers.

It's a really horrible situation. I can't see any non-evil practical choices though.

Isn't he still the better of two evils?

So what I'd argue is, Evidentialism is not how science actually functions. — h060tu

OK, but it is more physical-evidence-based than philosophy, no? And that difference is enough to explain why philosophical disputes can and do go unresolved for millennia, whereas scientific questions get actually decided fairly regularly in the light of evidence. That's the question of the thread.

Sure, that's fair enough. But the arbiter of what makes a scientific theory, model, paradigm, or whatever, true or not, is still evidence, which is objective, or at least strongly intersubjective. Scientific theories have a resource that philosophy does not have. When scientists disagree, they typically go over the evidence, or collect more evidence, or reinterpret the evidence, or question the authenticity of the evidence, or suggest that the evidence needs to be seen in a whole new light, or something. Philosophers don't have that. We have internal consistency, consistency with the broad scientific consensus, appeals to common sense, Ockham's razor, introspection, necessary truths, conceptual clarification, etc. Science has all these too, but it has evidence as well.

The scientific method, eventually, forces agreement in a way that the philosophical method cannot. Physical evidence is public, and appears (more or less) the same way to everyone that looks at it. This typically forces agreement, eventually. Even people who don't want to believe what the evidence suggests are convinced. Philosophical theories have no physical evidence that settles them one way or another, indeed that may be what makes them a philosophical theory and not a scientific one. There are still standards that make some philosophical theories better than others, but they are not as public or clear-cut.

It appeals to my panpsychism. I didn't want to mention that as 180 and I disagree sharply on that, and I was enjoying being able to agree with him on something.

But panpsychism aside, it seems to accurately characterise a healthy attitude to one's own existence: to seek to continue it and develop it, to increase the things one is able to do with oneself, increase one's functional efficacy; and also a healthy attitude to others existence: increasing the possibilities of inter-function with others, to aid one another in seeking to persist and grow and develop. Of course, there may be occasions where it is not possible for two creatures to both grow in the way they want to without one interfering with the other. But such abortive relations can perhaps be re-made with adjusted values, so that their purposes and values do not clash. One value we are encouraged to have by Jesus and The Beatles is love. And if we define 'love' as something like the will to develop the possibilities of existence, then that should hopefully result in mutually beneficial relations, whatever forms that takes :).

To live is to evaluate.

In Spinoza's terms, every life seeks to persist in its existence - continue, survive, grow-develop (à la 'will to power'); thus, every life values - is valuable to - herself; and insofar a life recognizes other lives as valuable to themselves, a life enters into reciprocal valuing with and among them, to value and be valued by other lives. Thus, value, or meaning, does not come "out of nothing"; it comes from community - natality, sociality, fatality - and reinforced, or enriched, by communicative practices (e.g. cooperative labors, crafts-arts, rituals, trade, discursive dialectics (e.g. scientific / historical / philosophical inquiries)). — 180 Proof

I like this. Seems intuitively right.

Thank you. :)

Is there a prohibition on any conspiracy theorising, or only on excessive ridiculous conspiracy theorising?

100% There must be big conspiracies. Knowing what they are is the problem.

I may be quibbling here but I think a stressful situation is different than what causes stress. Stress itself begins and ends in biology. — NOS4A2

Ah OK. I see what you mean.

I’m pretty sure the body causes stress, not governments. — NOS4A2

Environmental factors are part of the causal story, no?

GCB nothing to disagree with there. And to answer you rhetorical question, of course they should.

I'll read it. Prompt me if I forget. You won't know if I've forgotten or not but that's epistemology for you.

Have you read any panpsychist literature?

Any developed panpsychist view needs an answer to the combination problem. Micropsychists are particularly targeted: how can lots of individual conscious atoms combine to form a larger conscious entity? Do the individual atoms lose their consciousness? Or are there lots of conscious entities all overlapping? Are their experiences all separate, or do they bleed into one another? As Searle puts it, "What are the units supposed to be?" How is the panpsychist to come up with a plausible story here that isn't just made up and arbitrary?

I like the cover. Looks like it was wrestled from a Lich and you're about to level up big time after reading it.