• There is the phenomenal character of me lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.
• There was something it was like for me to be lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.
• There is the quale of my lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.

I'm not keen on 'quale' in any context, and I like 'something it's like' in some contexts. I think 'phenomenal character' is probably better in most examples. Depends on the language of the example.

EDIT: were you asking for examples from philosophical literature?

You could just as well have these:

• The experience of me lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.
• The feeling of me lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.

I take all these to be essentially equivalent.

phenomenal character — fdrake

= quale
= 'what it's like' language

I'm not keen on the word 'quale', but that's all it's supposed to mean in anything I've read that features the word.

Giulio Tononi has proposed a measure of organized complexity for the determination of the level of consciousness called "integrated information." — litewave

I think the IIT theory might be a very good theory of identity - every system that integrates information is a conscious individual. But as a theory of consciousness I think it fails, as it gives no reason to suppose that the integration of information couldn't happen, as it were 'in the dark'.

Nobody experiences the pain, because the person who would have experienced the pain does not exist while the body is anaesthetised.

To put it another way: the anaesthetic destroys the person, not the consciousness. It doesn't destroy the person legally, of course, just metaphysically.

I just mean that perhaps you disappeared, rather then your consciousness disappeared. I don't mean that you body vanished, obviously. I mean that the brain function required for there to be a single experiencer capable of experiencing pain was not there. Smaller structures which are not capable of integrating the messages from the nerves in the flesh being cut may retain identity and be conscious of their own processes, but these are not you. Not sure if I've explained what I mean very well.

Such experiences probably exist on the level of neural structures, not atoms, and can be temporarily switched off by general anesthesia. — litewave

How do you know it is consciousness that is switched off, rather than unitary identity that is disrupted?

I agree with a good deal of that. I'm a panpsychist and have been for a while. I don't think consciousness comes in units, I think identity does - and I think a lot of confusion in the philosophy of mind comes from muddling up consciousness with identity (for example, when you get knocked out, people usually asusme you are still you, but you have lost your consciousness; but I think the reverse, no consciousness is lost but your identity is disrupted). I like your analogy of the computer screen, although that's a bit passive. I think consciousness is very container-like, but not so much like a jar or screen, but as a field, which is stretchy and is intimately connected with (and constitutive of) its contents. As part of the physical universe, consciousness seems to me to fit most naturally and least problematically at the level of fundamental fields.

EDIT: I'm not a fan of the word 'qualia' as it makes it seem like experience has weird ectoplasmic extra bits called qualia. I know that's probably not how many mean the term, but I think it's best to avoid using it otherwise people get sidetracked into tedious arguments about exactly how real they are and what they refer to, if anything, blah blah. Best to stick to 'phenomenal experience' or something everyone can get on board with.

But I am honestly amused - like it makes me smile irl - to think people look out at the world around them and honestly believe in their heart of hearts that what they see are 'properties'. — StreetlightX

I mean, I'm mostly on board the embodied cognition train that says we see for the most part "affordances", opportunities for action, sites of relief and rest, goals to arrive at, hazards and safety, speed and rest, and so on. — StreetlightX

!

Voluntarism
To begin with, there can be no discrimination.

I think the natural language use and techincal use (if there is such a distinction) intersect in, for example, the following reasonably natural exchange between two people at the beach:

Jack: I wonder what it would be like to be a seagull?
Jill: Fantastic, I would imagine. The feeling of swooping through the air, the effortless traversing of long distances. Pecking people, nicking chips. I'd love it.
Jack: I dunno, it might not feel like how you imagine at all. We're very different from seagulls. It's like trying to imagine what it's like to be a snail, we're just too different.
Jill: Maybe, but even though I can't imagine what it is like to be a snail, I reckon there is still something it is like to be a snail, even though I'm not sure what. I think they have nerves don't they?
Jack: Sure. Not like rocks though, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. No nerves or even cells, so they couldn't possibly have experiences.
Jill: Agreed, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. Although some philosophers think there is according to my friend bert1.

Does anyone not understand what these two people are saying?

This is the very issue at stake. How can you demonstrate that this is the case? Of course there is something it is like for the robot to see red. It is like having some sensation register and some action occur in response. — Isaac

Yeah, I wasn't making a metaphysical claim, these were just examples of language use. It was a statement about language. I was pointing out an equation between 'what it's like' language, and the language of experience.

To make this claim it is necessary for there to be some thing it is to experience red, which is itself a fact, but which is not derivable from the physical facts of seeing red. — Isaac

But you can make the same metaphysical point without 'what it's like' language. For example: one might assert that "It is impossible to derive experiential knowledge of seeing red from the physical facts of seeing red." No 'what it's like' language is necessary if you don't like it.

"...what it is like..." looks no more than an odd reification, creating an it where there is none. — Banno

Should we stop saying 'it's raining'?

And why are we saying "what it's like" rather than "what it is" to be a bat? — Harry Hindu

Because they are different questions. The first is about consciousness, the second is about the definition of 'bat'.

There's something profoundly amiss with the "...like..." in "something it is like...". We see what it is like for Roger to eat cake. — Banno

We see what it is like from our point of view: presumably a messy and pointless exercise. The point of using 'something it is like' is to try to focus attention on Roger's point of view, and if it has a point of view at all in the same sense that humans do. If the language of 'what it's like' doesn't conjure that for you, then yes, it is unhelpful and should be ditched, as it's not doing what it is supposed to be doing.

Wouldn't that just be what it is like for Roger to eat cake? — Banno

Only in the sense that there would be nothing it is like for Roger the Robot to eat the cake.

So is experiencing eating cake different from eating cake? — Banno

Yes, although in a human the two would nearly always occur together. I mean, it is theoretically possible to separate them. You could somehow feed cake to a person who is asleep and dreaming about eating sausages. Then you would have the action without the experience. Conversely, you could fiddle with a brain in a vat to have the experience of eating cake without the action (although I don't know if this is actually possible or not).

EDIT: Also, depending on what you think about robots, it might be possible for Roger the Robot to eat cake without experiencing anything at all.

It's just a turn of phrase which some people find helpful.

X has first person experiences = there is something it is like to be X

There is something it is like for John to see red = John experiences red

There is nothing it is like for Roger the Robot to see red = Roger the robot does not experience red

In some contexts it's clumsy and unhelpful. I think the most helpful use of the phrase is to use it as another way to refer to things that have experiences. Human beings have experiences, but rocks don't. There is something it is like to be a human being, but there is nothing it is like to be a rock. (This is of course wrong, panpsychism is true. You know that now because I've told you.) We don't have to use this language if it is isn't helpful. Anyone who likes to use "what it's like" language could just replace it with something else involving words like 'experience', 'feeling', 'sentience', 'consciousness'.

Street's title is unhelpful as it mixes the two. "What it's like to experience X" invites the reader to think there is something over and above experiencing X that is what it's like to experience X. That's not how the turn of phrase is supposed to work, as far as I understand. And if it is used in such a way that it seems to imply that, then I suggest finding another expression.

I try not to think about explanations that are merely possible or might exist? — fdrake

OK

Reductive explanations don't work very well in cases where the studied phenomena are difficult (ontically/ontologically or epistemically) to completely specify. Try to explain why a photon takes a particular path in a double slit experiment in terms of the particular photon and the slits and you get nonsense. Try to explain why one Vietnam vet becomes mentally ill and another does not based upon their shared experiences and background differences and you don't get a complete picture due to the available information (and randomness in life). Try to study whether a butterfly flapping its wings 1 day ago caused a tropical storm now and the system itself pulls apart arbitrarily close causal histories - rendering the question askable but moot. — fdrake

Are you making a distinction between reducible in principle and reducible in practice?

I don't think my comment warranted any kind of answer, let alone a considered one, so thanks for that.

You say that some errors lead to unporductive irrelevances to you. To me it appears very much like you only declare them irrelevant because you are uncomfortable with the fear that they may be true. So you attempt to throw them out. But that's not very philosophical of you... it is a psychological effect you are displaying. — god must be atheist

I mean that philosophical positions are untrue not by virtue of why they come about (the genetic fallacy) by virtue of their (lack of) coherence or correspondence with reality, or something like that. Therefore going on about why, psychologically, someone believes such and such is not philosophy.

Errors by humans are part of human nature, and so are subjective human experiences. We can discuss both under the auspices of philosophy. You forcefully expressed that you are opposed to have them as topics of discussion. Twice you expressed that. Why? — god must be atheist

Because this is a philosophy forum, and I'm a cunt. And I don't want people to keep pointing out that I'm a cunt when I'm trying to discuss philosophy. I come here to get away from my cuntishness, not have it shitted into my face by a high pressure rectum.

EDIT: I don't mean to suggest you in particular are a high pressure rectum. I mean it in a more generalised way.

"mental states supervene on neural states" — fdrake

I've never taken supervenience to be reductive. It's a statement about a relation between two different things which is agnostic about that relation being identity. Reductionism is an identity relation.

I'm not sure if I am a wanker or a cunt.

I gave you an example of non-reductionist scientific work, bridging neuroscience, evolution, sociology and clinical psychology (and explaining/gesturing towards why it was non reductionist). It analysed first person reports, states of feeling and their patterns; how patterns between these different ontological registers intermingle (brain hormones + feelings + socialisation); and a clinical upshot of this. Science need not be reductionist, and need not generate reductionist worldviews. — fdrake

Not sure if I understand you, I probably don't. Anyway, can you give an example of a non-reductionist explanation of one thing in terms of something else? I mean, all explanations are in terms of something else, otherwise they'd be circular.

EDIT: I guess I'm asking the question, is non-reductive science ever explanatory? Maybe explanation is not science's only role, perhaps it's even a minor role.

I think Swan's observation pertains to the realm of "human nature", which is indeed very much a topic discussed in philosophy. — god must be atheist

Maybe. Human nature, definitely. Human failings as causes of philosophical error seems like an unproductive irrelevance to me.

TL;DW for the Tolstoy vid: the most important time is now, the most important person is the one you're with right now, and the most important action is doing right by that person. — Pfhorrest

But what if you're with more than one person and they have conflicting needs?

Frankly, theists seem stuck in a frame of mind I just lack the capacity to grasp, mostly that of ego and extreme fear. — Swan

Fortunately this is a philosophy forum, so this psychological issue will never arise.

panpsychism (hi bert1) — jorndoe

Big shout from the rock massif

Thus, why would anyone in their right mind take the preachers' words for it all? — jorndoe

I think you could answer this question perfectly easily yourself.

I don't know how many time I need to repeat that. — Pfhorrest

Oh, it's a great many more times. Many many. Nowhere near halfway yet.

It obviously depends upon how the bin feels.

It is based off nothing at all but feeling. — Swan

!

The height and depth of human (and inhuman) experience dismissed. Cool! Feelings are sufficient for marriage, murder, the whole range of human activity. Feelings are not made up. Gender dysphoria is not a confusion, not a muddling up of concepts. It's a feeling, which is real. Not that I have experienced it, but I can perhaps imagine what it might be like.

The problem for me is you pose some kind of solipsismic thing by saying that "gender" is determined by what thinks while no existing references (without first recognizing sex-based phenotypical characteristics in the first place to "reject" or "accept"), yet the existence of "transgenderism" and the claims trans people make do not correspond with what you claim. — Swan

The grammar here (for example) renders your point obscure. I am in general having difficulty understanding your posts.

A "pre-op" transsexual (i.e. transgender) isn't a trans. — Swan

But transgender =/= transsexual as you assert. It just doesn't. They mean different things.

You can attack the distinction on the basis that it refers to a real-world distinction that doesn't, in fact, exist. But if successful, you've just shown that people have made a mistake, not that the words have the same meaning.

The words are used interchangeably and synonymously to each other. — Swan

By whom? A cursory bit of googling will turn up overwhelming evidence of different usage.

Come on. A female butch lesbian is not a "male gender" or a man and vice versa to the effeminate gay man. Most would find it offensive. — Swan

Sexual orientation is a different thing again.

It seems to me the most useful place to start when determining gender is to consider how the person feels.

I don't see the value of the social construct idea. That leads to strange conclusions. For example, a person of the male sex who feels strong gender dysphoria could still dress in a traditionally male way, do manly jobs, etc. As a social construct their gender would be male. But it seems to me that their gender is not male. So maybe we do need two senses of gender if people want to keep the social construct sense. I just don't see the value of that sense - why would we want to gender people in terms of behaviour and traditional roles? The polite and respectful thing to do is to gender them according to how they feel.

"Transgenders" conform via phenotypic necessary biological sex attributes (i.e. imitation) or by removal of the penis/breasts - both internal and external organs and tissues, cosmetic facial and body masculinization/feminization surgeries, etc. — Swan

My understanding is that what you are talking about is being transexual, not transgender.

↪bert1 For what reason? — Shamshir

Because they are contingent on a subject's will, whether that will is a human, animal, rock, Reason or God.

That is considered by most to constitute a decisive refutation of all subjectivist views about moral values and prescriptions. — Bartricks

I don't recognise this at all. Mind you I am out of touch. Does anyone else recognise this picture of the prevailing moral philosophy? I got the impression that most moral philosophers were relativists.

EDIT: Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. That seems very strange to me. We should take a leaf out of AI thinking on this I reckon. EDIT2: that's not to say that they all agree with the argument Bartricks says they agree with. Bartricks argument was not a subject of the philpapers survey.

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject — Bartricks

2 seems clearly false to me

I'm a quasi-god-mongerer. That means I monger God in a quasi way, not that I monger quasi-gods, although maybe I do that as well. Anyway, this forum is way less religion-bashing than the last one (Paul's forum) it seems to me, and I actually miss the rabid attacks a bit, although they did go too far sometimes. I think crappy ideas should be strongly criticised. I miss getting my panpsychism bashed. Apo was the last person to have a go and he seems to have fucked off. Nobody gives a shit that I'm wrong any more. Worse, panpsychism may be becoming popular, which means I may have to adopt another view.

There's nothing wrong with selective readings of holy texts.

I don't know how many Christians are not homophobic or misogynist, but I've met plenty who don't seem that way to me.