There's nothing wrong with selective readings of holy texts.

I don't know how many Christians are not homophobic or misogynist, but I've met plenty who don't seem that way to me.

This is too general. Christianity is not homogenous enough to say it is homophobic and misogynistic.

A mark of our free will.

A mark of our freedom is being free from unwanted constraint (I guess, off the top of my head).

From my perspective, by linguistic convention I should at least say that "you have a choice as to what you eat" with respect to the imprecise situation you put forward. — sime

Yes, I have a choice. I've tried to make the situation precise as we need. Yes, it is idealised and perhaps unrealistic, but I'm trying to keep things simple.

What I'm suggesting is that there are two kinds of choices, those that are determined and those that are not. StreetlightX has suggested that just because a decision is determined by a process of deliberation, does not make that decision any less of a choice, nor does it imply a lack of freedom. And I agree there are choices like that, and that they are correctly called choices. He goes on to say that free will (perhaps in the sense of an undetermined choice) is a pernicious relic that we do not need any more. I'm suggesting that there are, at least in principle, undetermined choices. These are choices where we don't mind which alternative we choose. My cream cake example is one. But perhaps these situations never actually arise in reality, just as perfect circles never occur. Perhaps there is never, actually, a choice about which someone is wholly indifferent to the result. But even if that's the case, the concept is still a useful one - there are decisions that are more or less arbitrary, and these are approaching instances of free will.

Supposing you now reveal that you have an allergy for cream. Then i might now say "it appears that you don't have that much of a choice relative to my previous understanding, given your newly admitted allergy for cream"

The question is, does there exist an absolutely precise and exhaustively describable circumstance that you can describe, or that I can observe, under which I am at least permitted to say without fear of controversy, that you have absolutely no choice but to take one of the presented options? — sime

Assume I've given all the relevant information, for the sake of discussion. In the scenario, I am very hungry and want one of the cakes. I have a choice whether to eat a cake or not (according to street). The deliberation involves feelings of hunger and desire (nothing else). I eat one of the cakes. Not eating one of the cakes in this circumstance would involve other factors which I have not given (i.e. madness, cream allergy, diabetes, obesity, hallucination etc). My choice to eat one of the cakes is highly determined.

However I really don't mind at all which cake I eat. I make a choice and eat the jam doughnut. The question is, is this decision determined or not? I don't think it is. I think it is a free arbitrary choice. Is this even possible do you think? It's logically possible. Is it metaphysically possible? Physically possible? Psychologically possible? Or is there always a determinant?

Regarding vagueness, indulge me with this idealised scenario, which I grant might be impossible to actually exist. Just as the non-existence of perfect circles does not stop us calculating using assumptions of perfect circles when designing machines, I want to contrast the concepts of free and determined choice by using an idealised scenario.

I've got a hazy idea of what you mean. Could you apply that to my example so I can see how it works?

EDIT: Is it that my choice is determined, because I'm hungry and want one of those cakes, AND free, because I don't mind which one?

EDIT2: I think there are two choices, the first is the decision to have one of the cakes, and this is determined by my hunger and desire. The second decision is which cake to have, and this is free, as I don't mind which one I have.

Let's say I have a choice between having a chocolate eclair and a jam doughnut and I don't mind which. However I somehow manage to choose one. Is my choice determined or undetermined?

[The relevance of this is to see if there is an application for the idea of free will or undetermined choice without reference to theology]

I think any account of consciousness arising from severally non-conscious stuff is conceptually doomed. And we don't need such an account, there are other, more fruitful ways to think about consciousness, namely panpsychism. But by all means carry on and see if you can figure something out. I remain interested in the project.

I'd like an answer to this too. I don't know much about Hegel.

So you're rehashing the old attempt to justify (subjective) idealism. — jorndoe

Nay, it is idealism that is the default. The burden is on the realist.

TP, we have reached agreement!

There should be some sort of official PF thing for when this happens. Like a flying pig gif or something.

That was the point. In order to get to "the self is still there" we need to do something theoretical — Terrapin Station

That's one way to get to the self, yes, to infer it. But I think we can also do it, as it were, reflexively. We attend to a phenomenon, and then deliberately attend not just to the phenomenon but the self that experiences it. We can be aware of ourselves in a way that does not necessarily involve inference.

OK, so there's the phenomenon of a tree without there being a phenomenon of self. That is, there is awareness of a tree, but no awareness of self. So far so good, I agree that is totally possible.

However the self is still there, or the phenomenon of the tree could not be possible, it's just that the self is not paying attention to itself, and is therefore not apparent, or not present as a phenomenon. To my mind, a phenomenon entails a subject that the appearance appears to. Is that where we disagree?

OK, thanks TP for explaining it again. To my mind, the following is a straightforward contradiction:

So, the idea is that sometimes, to someone, there's no phenomena, no awareness or appearance of self, as well as no awareness or appearance of names, concepts, etc. There's just awareness/appearance of, say a tree (and of course the grass around it, etc.) — Terrapin Station

The bolded bits contradict each other. There are no phenomena, AND there is the phenomenon of a tree.

Where am I going wrong?

I'm not sure. I don't think I understand what you mean by it, and I have read all your posts in this thread. Typically 'ontological' is contrasted with 'epistemological'. For some thinkers the phenomenal is the clearest case of the ontological.

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc. — Terrapin Station

This is too brief. I have no idea at all what point you are making, I really don't.

It seems like you're wanting to argue via creative misunderstandings. I'm not interested in that. — Terrapin Station

TP, I want to understand you. However, I am struggling to do so, as apparently others are also struggling. Misunderstandings are generally the fault of the writer, not the reader.

I mean in terms of isolation, so there's no grass, atmosphere, etc. — Terrapin Station

So there are just trees in empty space, or maybe there are just tress with no space around them at all?

Also, what fdrake said

When I mention "just the tree" for example, I'm not implying thinking of the term "tree" or a concept of a tree, or separating it from anything else. — Terrapin Station

If it's not separate from anything else, then how is it still itself? Identity depends upon separation, no?

I'm not sure philosophy is as big a subject as it might seem - the same issues come up over and over. Obviously there's a heck of a lot of books and you can't read them all. Plus philosophy books usually make horrible reading. Philosophical papers are shorter and get to the point quicker. Personally I'd start with concepts and vocabulary of the various subdivisions of philosophy. And then focus on problems rather than philosophers. Go issue by issue, and don't read a book unless you have a good specific reason to.

Is there any particular area you're into? I'm mainly into the philosophy of consciousness and pretty much stick to that.

Keep in mind that I am NOT necessarily referring to persons, perceptions etc. by "reference point." I'm referring to spatio-temporal locations.

The reference point would be whatever your spatio-temporal location is. That doesn't imply that there's a "you" in the equation in terms of what's phenomenally occurring. — Terrapin Station

But a spatio-temporal location is insufficient for the appearance of a tree, it seems to me. You need to have an apparatus capable of distinguishing the tree from the rest of the stuff, don't you? That's a bit more than a spatio-temporal location.

Appearances are what things are really like from some reference point, and there's always some reference point. — Terrapin Station

So is there a reference point when there is just a tree?

For me, phenomenally, sometimes there's just a tree. There's no subject. — Terrapin Station

There's you isn't there?

What is the philosophical equivalent? — Denovo Meme

I don't think there is one. Maybe universal rationality (rationality common to everyone) is as close as you get.

Don't you need to be conscious before you can feel anything, including fear?

Sorry Terrapin. I've just had to deal with some child protection social workers and was in a bad mood.

Shit or get off the pot Terrapin. Socrates would be murdered here just as in Greece for being an annoying shithead.

B isn't it?
Oh, A as well.

EDIT: I somehow missed the 'NOT'!

My identity would be destroyed. Brains determine identity rather than consciousness, I think. Perhaps by integrating information (Tononi/Koch). I think the IIT may be a good theory of identity, but it fails as a theory of consciousness for the same reasons other reductive theories fail.

Consciousness has nothing to do with brains.

We don't know just how similar to our own brains something has to be before consciousness arises. — Terrapin Station

Indeed. The assumption that consciousness arises at all results in this very difficult problem.

The macro system usually includes a person looking at what is recorded by the equipment, but it doesn't have to. — andrewk

I'm happy to accept this idea if it is right, but I don't understand it. How could it ever be known that 'it doesn't have to', because even if there is a macro system that performs a measurement without a person, we can't know that the measurement has actually collapsed anything until we look at the macro system, at which point we become part of the system? No doubt I've misunderstood something and am happy to be corrected.

Schzophr, I'm interested in whether or not consciousness is a state of being, but I'm struggling to understand this offering, sorry. I suspect others are having similar difficulties.

But don't you see, even if you believe that a will enforces that we call laws, that is also random in the sense that one might say "Well, natural laws could be will-driven or they simply could be there, a feature of the universe we find ourselves in, built-in as it were. We got the will-driven one more or less on the toss of a coin." — Unseen

Yes, I think I see what you mean.

I don't think you need much science. The science is still interesting in its own right of course (not that I'm an expert on it) it's just that I really haven't come across much that is strongly relevant to the philosophy of mind. To put it another way, the science is consistent with pretty much the full range of philosophies of mind, so we can't use science to decide between them. Whatever theory of mind we come up with, it of course has to be consistent with what we empirically know beyond a reasonable doubt. But that is a very low bar.

It refers to predictable and reliable regularity in how things in the world and universe behave. — Unseen

Ok, thanks that's a nice clear answer. I'm not agreeing with Henri in general, but it seems that your claim that the universe is law-driven is a figure of speech in the sense that what you mean by 'law' is not a kind of force that drives things. I do think the universe is law driven, but I mean it more literally, in the sense that I think it is will-driven. Regularity of observed behaviour is a function of persistent will. Are you OK with pillowcase length answers?

But on the gross (atomic level and above) level, the universe is overwhelmingly law-driven. — Unseen

What does 'law' refer to, for you, in this context?

On the subject of religion: what happens to those who do not believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God but yet a real person and a prophet without the kingdom of heaven in the prospect? — christine

I don't understand the context. Do you mean "What happens after physical death?"

Good god man. It's only a few paragraphs. That is brief.

I don't believe free will is possible, so what sort of will are you talking about and how does it work? — Unseen

The ability to self-move I think. Just as our own behaviour is determined by our values, thoughts and feelings, so is the behaviour of fundamental particles and fields is attributable to some kind of value and feeling.

I think this is a solution to the problem of under or over determination in macro-behaviour of creatures which everyone agrees have minds, such as humans. The problem is about deciding what determines behaviour. Do we tell a physical story about photons, retinas, neurons and synapses, adrenaline and motor responses? Or do we tell a story about seeing a lion, feeling fear and running away? Presumably both of these apply in some sense, but how are they compatible and what is their relationship? A panpsychist answer is that the physical is reducible to the psychological. All the particles and forces involved in the 'physical' story are doing what they are doing because of how they feel, and if they felt nothing they would not exist, because to exist is to behave in a persistent way for a while, and no such behaviour could happen without conscious will.

At such a fundamental level, there is no 'how' in terms of mechanism. Mechanism is a higher-level development in which conscious entities all doing their own thing interact in regular predictable ways, and these can then be manipulated. Consider that you could make a light switch out of thirsty human beings. Get a giant tray, pivoted in the centre. Put half a dozen people on the tray. Have electrical contacts under each end. Then put a bottle of water at one end of the tray. The thirsty humans move toward the water. The end they move to goes down and makes a contact. Then put the bottle of water at the other end, the humans move and the contact is broken. This switch would not work if the humans did not feel thirst and did not will to survive. And from an alien perspective, this might look like the mechanical movement of insentient particles obeying some kind of impersonal force. The panpsychist point I'm suggesting is that everything is like the human light-switch, only we don't realise it. When we look at the mechanical behaviour of relatively simple matter, we are like the aliens who don't realise that humans are conscious, and name regular behaviours in terms of impersonal laws. The panpsychist idea is that there are, in fact, no impersonal forces at all. All behaviour is ultimately, and most accurately, attributable to will.

I haven't argued for panpsychism here, I've just explicated (one version of) it a bit to try to answer your question.

EDIT: typos