Particles are conscious in exactly the same way humans are.
— bert1
How do you know this? — Gnomon

In short, because panpsychism is the least problematic theory of consciousness. I can rehearse the arguments if you want me to.

The point of my comment was less to argue for panpsychism, and more to make a point about the definition of 'consciousness'. The differences in experience between one thing and another are differences in what is experienced, not differences in degree of consciousness, because consciousness does not admit of degree.

I can only infer that other humans are conscious because they behave the same way as I do in similar situations. Do particles behave like humans? — Gnomon

Yes, they move if poked, for example. If you want to say some behaviour is evidence of consciousness and other behaviour is not, I'd be interested in what criterion you use for determining what is admissible evidence and what is not.

Do they show signs of fear as a strange energetic particle approahes? — Gnomon

i doubt it. I understand fear in very human terms, and a particle is very different from me. But they may feel something as their fields gradually overlap, I don't know.

Do they love their entangled partners? — Gnomon

I don't know.

Is your little toe conscious in "exactly the same way" as you are? — Gnomon

Yes, becausue 'consciousness' only means that the bearer is capable of experience, not that their experiences are similar to other conscious things.

Consciousness is an evolutionary advantage for living creatures, but how would it be adaptive for atoms and billiard balls? — Gnomon

I'm a panpsychist, I don't think consciousness did evolve. I don't think consciousness confers any evolutionary advantage, because there are no non-conscious things.

Why do you say mental properties are non-spatial? — Zelebg

I didn't mean to imply that at all. Sorry if I was not clear. I was simply making an analogy between space and consciousness. Being spatial is not the kind of thing that can emerge intuitively. Similarly with consciousness, I am suggesting.

What Maw said.

Not because they are inherently wrong, but they can be misinterpreted as implying that particles are conscious in the same way humans are. — Gnomon

Particles are conscious in exactly the same way humans are. Particles have experiences. Humans have experiences. In so far as they both have experiences, or are capable of experience, they are both conscious. They have different experiences, but we are talking about consciousness, not content.

What it concerns, though, is the relationship of nested hierarchical systems. And, specifically, the appearance of "trigger" subsystems whose function is to focus interaction from a subsystem to its parent. Kind of like the study of encephalization, the development of the central nervous system and brain. — Pantagruel

That sounds interesting, but I don't understand it.

In my thesis, the universe began as non-conscious creative Energy, or as I call it, EnFormAction : the power to enform. Then via a long gradual process of Phase Transformations (emergences) raw Information (mathematics) was developed into the complex chemistry of Life (animation), and thence into the compounded complexities of Mind (intention). The Potential for Consciousness was there all along, but only at the tipping-point was it actualized, or crystallized, into the power to know. The link below is a brief overview of Evolution via EnFormAction. No magic; just continual incremental changes. — Gnomon

Why can't all these emergences happen in the dark? Why is consciousness a necessary consequence of all this?

The hard problem is hard because it assumes emergence.
— bert1

Why is emergence a problem? Emergence is a well known property of complex physical systems. — Pantagruel

It is. But it needs to be considered on a case by case basis. Most stories about emergence are perfectly plausible. But some bugger the mind. For example, its a headfuck to try and figure out how spatial stuff could emerge from non-spatial stuff. If you have a bunch of things that don't take up any space at all, what are they supposed to do to each other such that they end up with something that takes up space? Maybe it's possible, but you need a fuck of a good storyteller to make this convincing. Similarly with consciousness - I want the story of how non-conscious stuff interacting can end up with conscious stuff. Maybe it's possible. Some take a piecemeal approach, and divide up the concept of consciousness into several parts, and then set about attempting to move from one to the next. I haven't heard anything convincing at all so far. It's not enough to say 'hey, fluidity emerges from interactions of hydrogen and oxygen without a problem, therefore I can say anything emerges from anything without a problem.' No, you have to tell a convincing story.

And there are structural problems that work against the emergentist. One big one is that things are either conscious or not. Consciousness seems to be a non-vague concept. That is, if something is conscious at all, it is conscious. And if it isn't, it isn't conscious at all. There are no states that are indeterminate as to whether they are conscious or not. Are there? Maybe that's wrong. But if it's right, that presents a problem for emergence. Emergent properties typically emerge gradually in systems whose defining properties are vague. Fitting in a sudden switch from non-conscious to conscious in such systems is difficult and arbitrary. Such stories are unlikely to be convincing. But if you have such a story to present, please do so.

The idea is that if consciousness does not admit of degree, then it becomes very hard to find a point at which it can plausibly emerge. We'd have to find a change in a physical system that did not admit of any degree, some kind of quantum jump or something, with which to correlate the emergence of consciousness. This cannot plausibly be done it seems to me.

Stanford has caught up with this, no doubt due to my heroic efforts on these forums and the last:

More recently, Goff (2013) has argued that consciousness is not vague, and that this leads to a sorites-style argument for panpsychism. Very roughly if consciousness does not admit of borderline cases, then we will have to suppose that some utterly precise micro-level change—down to an exact arrangement of particles—marked the first appearance of consciousness (or the change from non-conscious to conscious embryo/foetus), and it is going to seem arbitrary that it was that utterly precise change that was responsible for this significant change in nature. — Goff, Philip, Seager, William and Allen-Hermanson, Sean, 'Panpsychism', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

EDIT: ...and just to finish the thought, we then have to pick an alternative to emergentism. And as pfhorrest has already mentioned, the two obvious alternatives are eliminativism (nothing is conscious) or panpsychism (everything is). Eliminativism is false because I am conscious. That leaves panpsychism. It's the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others.

Phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness track each other. — fdrake

I don't think that's right. Could you give an example?

Therefore, phenomenal consciousness comes in degrees. — fdrake

This doesn't seem right tome either, and a number of other philosophers also think that consciousness does not admit of degrees. It's important to distinguish consciousness from content, and consciousness from identity. One argument for panpsychism springs from the idea that consciousness does not admit of degree.

Emergence is only one proposed solution to the hard problem. — Pfhorrest

Sure. The formulation of the hard problem does not strictly assume emergence, I was being a bit glib. But I think it springs from naturally emergentist assumptions. Namely that the universe started out unconscious, and then, as a result of non-conscious stuff doing things, consciousness arises. And explaining how this happens is hard in the strong sense Chalmers meant it. Eliminativism and panpsychism (and objections based on language and misapplications of concepts etc) sidestep the problem. The only people who have to tackle the hardness of the hard problem are emergentists it seems to me, as they are the ones who have to build this conceptual bridge between the non-experiential and the experiential.

The hard problem is hard because it assumes emergence.

I'd like to ask him about his critique of panpsychism. I'll figure out a question in the next few days.
https://platofootnote.wordpress.com/2016/09/20/on-panpsychism/

I don't think any deep thought is required is there? It's easier. Les power, less responsibility, less hassle.

The will to develop the potential of someone or something. That's one kind of love I think and covers quite a lot.

The concept of the soul is integral to the judeo christian framework — dazed

I'm doubtful if the framework has a metaphysical concept of soul. It has a moral, and functional one. The soul plays a role in our mortal and immortal lives. But I am not aware of any theory of what the soul actually is and how it interacts with the brain or whatever. I'm probably ignorant though.

Nardil — Wallows

I don't see how Aragorn's fictional broken sword is going to help Tim.

I like the analytical style, but I think most analytical philosophers are wankers. If I knew any continental philosophy I'm sure I think they were wankers too. I think I think philosophers are wankers. Certainly everyone on this forum is. Except maybe pfhorrest and TGW, who I wish would come back. I like philosophers though, even the black ones. Guess that makes me a cunt.

EDIT: wallows isn't a wanker

I'm a panspychist too and I agree with some of this.

it seems logically impossible that nerve signals can generate a subjective observer while at the same time enabling that self to have its own distinct powers. — lorenzo sleakes

This is intuitively plausible but could do with more elaboration and argument, if you have time. Can you explain further what you mean?

I propose that the brain only generates the content of consciousness and not the self that binds it into a whole. The visual processing center for instance generates visual perceptions and thoughts. But the conscious self, that private world that binds the sensations into a simple unity, has a more permanent status and is not generated by the pattern of nerve signals — lorenzo sleakes

I agree with that I think. I think identity should be distinguished from consciousness. Consciouness seems to me to be about the unification of its content, whereas identity is about the contents of consciousness, which are various and plural and determined by brain (or perhaps body) function.

Instead the mental subject comes from an already conscious nerve cell from which it splits off to become what Lebiniz called the dominant monad. The conscious self then is an atomic unity evolving from other conscious natural beings in a panpsychist universe and as such can have real causal powers. — lorenzo sleakes

I can't bear Leibniz's Monadology, so I instinctively recoil from this. But you may have repurposed his ideas fruitfully, I don't know. I'd need to hear more about this bit.

No need to apologise Chris. I definitely am racist. I don't like it. I don't like to say 'we're all racist', because that might make me feel better about it. Although if I did feel better about my racism because everyone else was racist too, then that would make me a dick as well as a racist.

I am ashamed Chris.

I'm racist, but not because of the language I use. I try to avoid talking about any racial issues for fear of revealing how racist I am.

What are the options again? Are there more than two?

Yep. The whole lot.

I think it's all real jorndoe.

1- mans evil is caused by his freedom not by god
2- natures evil is necessary for creation or part of gods higher plan

3- god helps stop evil sometimes if you pray.

4- god gives justice in the afterlife — OmniscientNihilist

5 - there is no evil from God's point of view

Perfectly good and omnipotent are incompatible. Christians like Ockham and Martin Luther, in consideration of the matter, voted for omnipotence, leaving the problem of goodness still to ad hoc resolutions. — tim wood

If that's right then they didn't understand the concepts. It follows from God's omnipotence that everything is good from God's point of view. It can still be really shitty from our point of view though, with no contradiction.

All of these are nothing more than you lying in the bath and farting, and being aware of it. — Janus

Yes, indeed.

• There is the phenomenal character of me lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.
• There was something it was like for me to be lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.
• There is the quale of my lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.

I'm not keen on 'quale' in any context, and I like 'something it's like' in some contexts. I think 'phenomenal character' is probably better in most examples. Depends on the language of the example.

EDIT: were you asking for examples from philosophical literature?

You could just as well have these:

• The experience of me lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.
• The feeling of me lying in the bath with the bubbles of my farts trickling between my thighs.

I take all these to be essentially equivalent.

phenomenal character — fdrake

= quale
= 'what it's like' language

I'm not keen on the word 'quale', but that's all it's supposed to mean in anything I've read that features the word.

Giulio Tononi has proposed a measure of organized complexity for the determination of the level of consciousness called "integrated information." — litewave

I think the IIT theory might be a very good theory of identity - every system that integrates information is a conscious individual. But as a theory of consciousness I think it fails, as it gives no reason to suppose that the integration of information couldn't happen, as it were 'in the dark'.

Nobody experiences the pain, because the person who would have experienced the pain does not exist while the body is anaesthetised.

To put it another way: the anaesthetic destroys the person, not the consciousness. It doesn't destroy the person legally, of course, just metaphysically.

I just mean that perhaps you disappeared, rather then your consciousness disappeared. I don't mean that you body vanished, obviously. I mean that the brain function required for there to be a single experiencer capable of experiencing pain was not there. Smaller structures which are not capable of integrating the messages from the nerves in the flesh being cut may retain identity and be conscious of their own processes, but these are not you. Not sure if I've explained what I mean very well.

Such experiences probably exist on the level of neural structures, not atoms, and can be temporarily switched off by general anesthesia. — litewave

How do you know it is consciousness that is switched off, rather than unitary identity that is disrupted?

I agree with a good deal of that. I'm a panpsychist and have been for a while. I don't think consciousness comes in units, I think identity does - and I think a lot of confusion in the philosophy of mind comes from muddling up consciousness with identity (for example, when you get knocked out, people usually asusme you are still you, but you have lost your consciousness; but I think the reverse, no consciousness is lost but your identity is disrupted). I like your analogy of the computer screen, although that's a bit passive. I think consciousness is very container-like, but not so much like a jar or screen, but as a field, which is stretchy and is intimately connected with (and constitutive of) its contents. As part of the physical universe, consciousness seems to me to fit most naturally and least problematically at the level of fundamental fields.

EDIT: I'm not a fan of the word 'qualia' as it makes it seem like experience has weird ectoplasmic extra bits called qualia. I know that's probably not how many mean the term, but I think it's best to avoid using it otherwise people get sidetracked into tedious arguments about exactly how real they are and what they refer to, if anything, blah blah. Best to stick to 'phenomenal experience' or something everyone can get on board with.

But I am honestly amused - like it makes me smile irl - to think people look out at the world around them and honestly believe in their heart of hearts that what they see are 'properties'. — StreetlightX

I mean, I'm mostly on board the embodied cognition train that says we see for the most part "affordances", opportunities for action, sites of relief and rest, goals to arrive at, hazards and safety, speed and rest, and so on. — StreetlightX

!

Voluntarism
To begin with, there can be no discrimination.

I think the natural language use and techincal use (if there is such a distinction) intersect in, for example, the following reasonably natural exchange between two people at the beach:

Jack: I wonder what it would be like to be a seagull?
Jill: Fantastic, I would imagine. The feeling of swooping through the air, the effortless traversing of long distances. Pecking people, nicking chips. I'd love it.
Jack: I dunno, it might not feel like how you imagine at all. We're very different from seagulls. It's like trying to imagine what it's like to be a snail, we're just too different.
Jill: Maybe, but even though I can't imagine what it is like to be a snail, I reckon there is still something it is like to be a snail, even though I'm not sure what. I think they have nerves don't they?
Jack: Sure. Not like rocks though, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. No nerves or even cells, so they couldn't possibly have experiences.
Jill: Agreed, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. Although some philosophers think there is according to my friend bert1.

Does anyone not understand what these two people are saying?

This is the very issue at stake. How can you demonstrate that this is the case? Of course there is something it is like for the robot to see red. It is like having some sensation register and some action occur in response. — Isaac

Yeah, I wasn't making a metaphysical claim, these were just examples of language use. It was a statement about language. I was pointing out an equation between 'what it's like' language, and the language of experience.

To make this claim it is necessary for there to be some thing it is to experience red, which is itself a fact, but which is not derivable from the physical facts of seeing red. — Isaac

But you can make the same metaphysical point without 'what it's like' language. For example: one might assert that "It is impossible to derive experiential knowledge of seeing red from the physical facts of seeing red." No 'what it's like' language is necessary if you don't like it.

"...what it is like..." looks no more than an odd reification, creating an it where there is none. — Banno

Should we stop saying 'it's raining'?