Coercion, free will, compatibilism In reply to OP:
Yeah. I got very upset at university when compatibilism came up. It was plainly just a (not very) special case of determinism and seemed like an abuse of language to me.
Anyway, one might be able to defend a notion of degrees of freedom. Total freedom is, arguably, only possible after death, as to exist is to be constrained and differentiated in some way, and perhaps non-existence is just total lack of constraint. So no existing person can be free. But one person can be more free than another. While no one is free from the need to eat, for example, some people are free from the need to eat nothing but millet every day. Consider also that relative to a particular decision, some people are free while others are not. Someone who doesn't give a shit about politics, for example, is therefore free with regard to what party to vote for, whereas the person who gives a shit is constrained to vote for the party that is conducive to his shit giving.
EDIT: I guess also that one could take the non-shit-giving to its logical conclusion. We don't give a shit about anything and act totally arbitrarily for as long as we lived, which wouldn't be that long, as it is highly unlikely that any food or drink would happen to go into our mouths by accident. I guess this is the closest approximation to free will we could have without ceasing to exist.