Here is my simple argument in syllogism form:

P1) Time is needed for any change
P2) Nothing to something is a change
P3) There is no time in nothing
C) Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible. (From P1-P3) — MoK

@Banno How about:

1) Assumption: If change, then time
2) Assumption: If nothing to something, then change
3) Assumption: Nothing to something [object of reductio]
4) Therefore, change [2,3 MPP]
5) Therefore, time [1,4 MPP]
6) Therefore, nothing [3, some kind of a fortiori inference, like &elimination, seems reasonable]
7) Assumption: If nothing, then not-time
8) Therefore, not-time [6, 7 MPP]
9) Therefore, time and not-time [5,8 & introduction]
10) Therefore, NOT nothing to something [RAA]

Or something like that. May have missed out some bits. What lines do you cite for a reductio?

I give it a day

For example, philosophy used to be the general name for various sciences, but when these sciences specialized there was a shift in philosophy towards questions that didn't concern the sciences, such as ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and some left-over questions from psychology. Then with the linguistic turn there was a shift towards the nature of language. — jkop

Yes, science has been gradually annexing philosophical territory as it figures out a way to check an idea against the world in a publicly repeatable way. I'd less characterise these as paradigm shifts (which represent progress and no loss of territory) and more as straightforward redrawing of the boundaries of philosophy.

The linguistic turn is an interesting case. I think of it more as a fashion, but perhaps for some it really is a paradigm shift because, if successful, it renders large quantities of philosophy confused and obsolete. I just don't think it's successful.

Paradigm shifts in science result from the scientific method, it seems to me. There is no analogous method in philosophy, and i can't really think of any paradigm shifts that have advanced the whole enterprise. Interesting question though.

That seems like a reasonable analysis to me.

The skeptic equivocates between self and consciousness. The idealist says there is a world external to self, but not a world external to consciousness.

They are very sticky, even to use the word taints one with racism — Punshhh

Yes, not as sticky a paedophilia though.

They chose to get in bed with Hamas, and now they're in a war and getting the shit kicked out of them. Live and learn. Next time don't vote for terrorists. — RogueAI

There is a moral (but not legal) argument to be made that the citizens of a democracy are responsible for the actions of their rulers, and therefore are morally legitimate targets in a war. I don't know how much of a democracy there was in the region at the time. I live in the uk and we have a shit democracy here. We have a choice of two due to the gaming mechanics of the first past the post system. I certainly don't think I'm personally responsible for anything the current government does. Do you feel the same about those who didn't vote for Hamas? What about the children of Hamas voters? Do your think international law should be changed to allow targeting of civilians in a democracy? If so, how direct should the democracy be?

If you think there is a problem of other minds, the conceivability of p-zombies follows. If it's conceivable that other people than I lack consciousness, that's basically the same thing as conceiving of p-zombies.

I don't know much about international law. Is there an equivalent concept to mens rea when it comes to crimes committed by states?

counts as evidence — neomac

It's pretty normal to use behaviour and words as evidence of intention, as we don't have mind-reading machines.

Just listening to Tal Becker's defence. He's just talking about how nasty Hamas is. Nothing directly relevant to the case so far. He's just mischaracterised South Africa's argument by saying that SA is denying Israel's right to defend itself in any way at all. Now he's doing an ad hom against SA saying SA has links with Hamas, which is irrelevant. Not impressed so far. More emotional pleas than legal points.

Besides it isn’t that easy to prove the intentionality of such violations like “collective punishment and deliberate targetting of civilians” and pin it down on specific political leaders, or is it? — neomac

Fairly straightforward I would have thought. The facts of what has happened is evidence of intention. Words are evidence of intention.

One good thing about mobile phones - soldiers keep incriminating themselves

Nice bit of simple modus tollens in there @ 11:18 in establishing genocidal intent:

"The statements were made by persons in command of the state. They communicated state policy. It is simple. If the statements were not intended, they would not have been made."

Here it is:

The simplest and cleanest way to understand physicalism is as the idea that only the stuff described in physics texts is true. — Banno

Maybe, but I've always thought that both physicalism and materialism were theories of mind, as usually discussed anyway. I'm not at all sure what one has said about something when one says it is physical, but typically people don't mean 'has a mind' or 'is conscious'. But some think it's fine to include mind in the conception of physical.

I've also taken issue elsewhere with the overly simplistic notion that physical explanations are "causal", the image of A causing B causing C and the folk hereabouts who think this an adequate description of the world. "Cause" isn't a term used in physics, having been replaced by maths since Galileo. But it lingers in meta-physics and in pop philosophy of science. — Banno

Yes, that's really interesting, I noted your post about that with interest. Worth a thread perhaps. The place of causality in nature, if anywhere,

So physics is not capable of giving an account of the simplest social interactions. — Banno

I probably agree with you, I was just putting a counter-argument. But if I adopt a reductive bottom-up causality position, I'm not convinced you have shown me I am wrong. They may not be more than the individual brain and its model of the social world. And the model is itself, the argument will go, is nothing more than a stupendously complex brain process. But yeah, I don't find that plausible either.

How? Show your working. In terms only found in physics. — Banno

Isn't that like asking someone who wrote a program in python to write it instead in machine code? Possible but a pain in the ass. Not that I know anything about programming.

It's very simple: anyone who believes the universe existed before it contained any minds is a physicalist, as long as they don't posit a transcendent mind. — Janus

I think that's a good way to characterise it. I think the clearest dividing line is between emergentist and non-emergentists regarding mind. When materialists or physicalists identify as such, what they usually end up meaning is that they don't think any consciousness or intentionality was there at the start.

Galen Strawson possibly bucks this trend as he claims to be a physicalist panpsychist.

1) Some things are physical
2) Monism is true
Therefore: 3) Everything is physical

I guess the barebones reductio is something like this:

1. Assumption: Ethical non-naturalism
2. Assumption: Ethical truths affect choices
3. Assumption (but argued for in this thread): If ethical non-naturalism is true then ethical truths cannot affect choices
4. Therefore, both (ethical truths affect choices) and not (ethical truths affect choices)
5. Therefore, ethical non-naturalism is false.

3 is the subject of this thread.

But if people have the moral beliefs they do because of moral facts (at least in part), then there seems to be a clear connection here between evil acts and social consequences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's exactly that question that is the subject of the thread. What is the connection between these moral facts and people's beliefs? You could be a moral intuitionist, perhaps.

And it is this that will be missed if one places undue emphasis on dictionary definitions. — Banno

Sure

...over the course of this thread. — Banno

Righto, I haven't closely read it. I'll check your posts again.

Of much greater import is the way the word is used. — Banno

And if you want to know how a word is used, a good current dictionary will tell you the common usages. There is no difference between the idea that dictionaries define words and the idea that dictionaries describe usage. It's the same thing. Although I acknowledge that this is not always understood.

But you have been shown that this is not correct. — Banno

Oh, sorry I missed that. Can you link to where?

Treat your wife and kids terribly, only focusing on yourself and you'll end up divorced and no one will come visit you down at the retirement home, where you sit, quite likely tormented by the thoughts of how you could have done things differently. I mean, that scenerio isn't particularly out there, it plays out across the world everyday. You could also consider the drug addict who begins taking advantage of their friends and family, stealing from them, etc. and ends up completely estranged from them. Generally, doing things that people readily identify as evil is going to have very real consequences. People who "get away," with evil to some extent generally have to convince everyone around them that they aren't really being evil. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course, I agree with you. Remember, for the purposes of this thread we are assuming ethical non-naturalism. Simple summary here:

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_ethical_nonnaturalism.html

All the bad consequences you list are natural ones. I, like you, think it makes sense to ask 'Why is such and such wrong?" ...and expect in the explanation some kind of reference to experience.

This is like puling teeth. Let's see if I can articulate your argument for you. Your intuition is that there is a problem with the symmetry of belief and truth against is and ought. — Banno

Maybe, not sure if I understand you there.

It is not true that John can walk through walls.

With you so far.

Even if John believes that he can walk through walls, he will not be able to. Regardless of John's belief, he will not be able to walk through walls.

Very good, still with you.

The broken symmetry in your intuition is something like this:

Grant me for the sake of the discussion that it is true that we ought not eat meat. Put this in the place of "John can walk through walls" above.

It is not true that John ought eat meat.

The intuition is something like that if John believes he ought eat meat, he will still be able to - unlike walking through the wall. The symmetry is supposedly broken, and hence your claim that it's the belief, not the truth, that makes the difference.

Yes, something like that.

I hope you can see that the substitution here is incomplete. It's not "if John believes he ought eat meat, he will be able to" that results, but "If John believes he ought eat meat, he still ought not"

Anyway, that's were charity leads me in attempting to understand you.

Not sure about that bit, but thanks anyway. I'll give it some thought. The idea is that the fact that John can't walk through a wall will affect his choices eventually - it is reality asserting itself. This doesn't happen with oughts. It may be that John out not eat meat, and he does wrong by doing so, even if he believes he is doing right, but nothing happens as a result. If an angel came down with a clip-board and informed John of his moral ineptitude, that would be like him banging his head on the wall, but presumably it doesn't. Unless you want to say we apprehend moral truths by a faculty such as conscience, perhaps. It just seems there is no role here for moral truths to play - all they do is confer an invisible label that no one can read on actions labelling them 'good' or 'bad'. But for you they are still of practical import, and that's where I am baffled.They play no role in deliberation, they confer no consequences, I'm not sure what function they have.

I've never understood the point of 'continual self-overcoming'. What does this mean (or look like) in practice when you are going about your daily business? It sounds kind of tedious. — Tom Storm

I think it means not constantly wanking in public

I think you need to fill the question out. That's why I returned it to you. Generally, I don't see that your last few posts show much at all. It looks to me like you are fishing. So I've thrown it back to you, to see if you have a point to make. — Banno

OK, it's the same as Michael's point. It's belief in what is right that affects what we do. What is actually right doesn't. I don't see how it possibly could. However, I think you have already rejected this. So I'm interested, how does what is actually right, sans belief, actually affect our choices?

What do you think? — Banno

What do you think? I'm actually interested in your view.

EDIT: there is mutual incomprehension here. I understand what Michael is getting at, but that's because I already agree with him and have thought along these lines myself. And no doubt your own view seems the height of common sense to you, but I don't get it.

Whether I ought or ought not eat meat does not affect the choice
— Michael
Well, yes, it does. That's the point. — Banno

Does it make a difference to the choice as to whether or not to eat meat? For example, does the fact that Michael ought not to eat meat make it more likely that he won't?

One ought not do what one ought not do. — Banno

OK, so now could you explicate how that can have an influence on a person's decisions?

You've lost me. — Banno

Sorry about that. If you answer the question I'll be able to see if it's a counter example, and that will be interesting.

That would be a counter-example to Michael's thesis. I'm just trying to help you Roland.

@Banno Can you give an example of a moral truth that Calum does not believe, yet influences Calum's choices?

That you ought not eat meat does have practical relevance. — Banno

How?

How the world ought be is not somethign found by observation. — Banno

What process (if not obeservation) do we come to apprehend moral truths? You may have already said, sorry. I do take it that Michael is arguing against a position you more or less hold. You're a moral cognitivist, perhaps also realist, also a non-naturalist it seems.