↪bert1 agrees. — Banno

Do I? I thought I was agreeing with Michael

If CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming and I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

"If CO2 emissions are not causing a severe acceleration in global warming but I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. Remarkable. :meh: — Leontiskos

Indeed, you've got it.

The difference with co2 is that reality will assert itself on the non believer anyway. But what about moral truths that no one believes? What difference do they make?

What would you do as Israeli head of government? — tim wood

Cease fire, then apologise and turn myself in at the nearest cop shop as a war criminal

Everyone needs to grasp that Michael is assuming a moral position he doesn't necessarily agree with for the sake of argument. The thread is structured a bit like a reductio, although Michael hasn't stated the punchline, and that may not be his interest.

in looking at how the world is, nothing is said about what to do about it. — Banno

One's desires, preferences, values, goals, visions are part of the world, no?

I haven't claimed otherwise. — Michael

Indeed

@Banno Can a moral fact cause belief in it?

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

But that's not a practical implication. A practical implication would be to not eat meat. Your belief that you should not eat meat might result in not eating meat, but it's possible that not eating meat is moral, without believing that not eating meat is moral. Only beliefs in moral facts can affect action, not the moral facts themselves.

Yes, I read that. Very odd. As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

Is "I don't want to eat meat because I don't want animals to suffer in factory farms" a moral stance?

I'm impressed with Michael's patience in the face of incomprehension

I don't really understand the opposition to dictionary use. There are times when it's really useful, especially when there are several different senses of a word and people are talking at cross-purposes. It's a reference resource that can help resolve misunderstanding, one hopes. Or if someone says "You're using a word in a weird way" a dictionary can be consulted to check common usage. This sort of thing. No one is saying dictionaries are a final source or arbiter of meaning, indeed lexicographers describe usage, it's not prescriptive. And sometimes in philosophy technical terms develop that may not be well represented in dictionaries, and they are not helpful then.

I'm invited to a dinner party.

"Hey, bert1, nice of you to come. Have you had a good day?"
"Yeah, fab. I killed 21 babies. Great day!"
"Oh bert1! That's dreadful. It's morally wrong to kill babies."
"Is it? Let me just check I've understood you. I shouldn't kill babies. It's morally wrong. If I kill babies, I'm evil. I'm obligated not to kill babies. I have no doubt you are right, although I don't understand how you know that. You are all much better at morality than I am. Have I understood?"
"Yes! Oh thank goodness you've finally got the memo."
"Well, I think I'll be off now. There's a few more babies I'l like to finish off before tomorrow."
"What? But you've just agreed that it's wrong!"
"Yes, it is clearly wrong. But I just don't care about that. I like killing babies, and I don't mind being evil at all. I understand i am morally obligated not to kill babies, but I'd much rather just kill them anyway."

Has bert1 understood the concept of moral obligation?

[separate thread perhaps?]

The p-zombie argument is an argument against physicalism. If you're a panpsychist then the p-zombie argument is irrelevant. You already accept the conclusion that the mind is non-physical. — Michael

Yes, that's pretty much true. I just wanted to point out the problem of over-determination, which RogueAI is approaching. He may have an overdetermination problem if he thinks causation in humans is psychological, and I wonder how he handles it.

You seem to think that certain bodily behaviours can only be caused by subjective consciousness. Why is that? — Michael

I think he's right, but that's because I'm a panpstychist. I suspect all causation is, at bottom, psychological. That avoids overdetermination.

The OP scenario is very different from the one in Omelas. The OP is not an intensification, it's something different. In Omelas the tension is between pleasure and pain. In the OP the tension is between pain and existence.

Israel is trying to play by Western rules against an enemy that openly despises all Western values that do not fall strictly in line with their radical Islamist ideology. — Merkwurdichliebe

This conflict is over a specific bit of territory, not any kind of generalised eastern vs western values thing. If it's east v west at all it is only because western colonial powers decided to confiscate and divvy up foreign countries again, cunts that we are.

After all, what other value system has delivered such widespread prosperity and quality of life? — Merkwurdichliebe

This is a very weirdly loaded question. What is the connection between value system and quality of life? I suspect hunter gathering is the most stable long term guarantee of quality of life. But that's less a value system and more of a social/survival practice. I'm as miserable as fuck living in the UK. Loads of reasons for that. I remember in the 1980s looking at pictures of starving Ethiopians on the TV. Half of them were grinning like lunatics. Not to say starving makes you happy, obviously, but western values (whatever the hell they are) don't seem to.

Religious brainwashing has a lot to do with this. — RogueAI

Even from the man you quoted, this is primarily about land, not about religion. Same for Israel's government, no? It's a dispute over land. A feeling of injustice is a very strong motivator, much stronger than the will to live in many cases. People, not mad people, think there are just causes worth dying for. That doesn't seem stupid to me.

The Palestinians thought it would be a good idea to put Hamas in charge. Hamas decided to commit mass rape, and kill a bunch of babies, old people and civilians. What did Hamas and the Palestinians think would happen when they went down this road? Did they think it would end well? Did they learn nothing from history? You call it "war-crimes". :roll: I call it the inevitable ass-kicking that happens after something like Oct. 7th. — RogueAI

Why did they do all that then if it's so stupid?

That doesn't absolve Israel of agency though. — Baden

I remember Blair saying that, by Saddam's actions, Saddam chose to be invaded.

@180 Proof is right in a way. When formalised, "an infinite person" does not entail a contradiction. There is an X that is both i and p. No problem logically.

However if we think of the concept of a person, and then the concept of infinity, can they both be properties of the same subject? Well, inevitably it depends on what our concepts are. If we start with a concept of a person as a a thing with spatial limits, and infinity as without spatial limits, then an infinite person would be a conceptual impossibility. Is this what is meant by metaphysical possibility?

Is conceptual possibility the same thing as metaphysical possibility?

Kids slow you down. They're resource-intensive. They take up vast amounts of time. It seems the only reasons to mate and have them are emotional reasons: the urge to procreate, the feeling your life won't be complete without them, the anticipation of the joy they'll bring, etc. P-zombies don't have urges or emotions, so why would they reproduce? — RogueAI

This gets to the nub of the debate really well I think. The answer to this question depends brings out the different views.

Someone who thinks the physical is causally closed would presumably say the p-zombies would reproduce. Because the reason we reproduce is just because that's what DNA does - it creates reproduction machines. Feelings, emotions and so on are causal illusions, it seems like we do things because of how we feel, but we don't.

There is also a definition problem. p-zombies must reproduce by definition. They are indistinguishable from humans in terms of their behaviour, their response to stimuli etc. But if we think that p-zombies just wouldn't reproduce, then we have a conceptual incoherence - the p-zombie is in principle impossible in some sense.

Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. I guess I think that p-zombies are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. They are conceivable, because consciousness is not a function. They are metaphysically impossible because panpsychism is true.

I'm protecting the walls of Israel, a democracy from an invasive force. — Hanover

But Israel is a colony isn't it? Yes, Hamas are horrible, but the cause is just, no? That's why even if all the Hamas assholes are killed, Israel is still going to come under attack while people have a memory. Have I got that right?

Palestinian terrorists — Hanover

Maybe I'm watching the wrong lefty YouTube videos. Are these the stone-throwers?

I should probably read a book before getting involved in these conversations. I'm happy to be educated.

EDIT: if I was a Palestinian, I think there's a pretty good chance I'd want to go and fuck up an Israeli. And I'd want one that would hurt and shock - a woman or a child. And I'd do something to maim and traumatise, and probably leave just about alive. Maybe I'd come to my senses half way through and stop. Dunno. EDIT2: it would be futile and I'd know it. It wouldn't hurt Netenyahu one bit, in fact it would help him further justify military action. But I'd have the fantasy at least.

It's an odd kind of universe. How is it set up in Omelas? Why does the child need to be tortured?

I know thought experiments are supposed to abstract away details to get to the principles involved, but I like to know the practical details anyway. The thing is, there never is an idealised context-free situation, so we never actually have to make such a determination. And it's not as if we have to decide in the abstract before we must decide in the concrete.

Ah, very good. New word for me, thanks. No doubt I heard the sentiment indirectly from Nietzsche somehow and it stuck in my head.

Someone’s been reading Nietzsche. — Joshs

I can't actually cope with Nietzsche! I tried reading him a few times but found it too emotional. I'm vaguely aware it's the sort of thing he says though.

There is only power, interests and negotiation. Morality is a trick of the weak to constrain the strong. Morality is what other people want you to do. Often it's in one's interests to do what others want. Or at least not do what they don't want.

Wealthiest: maybe £10 million, a worthwhile target for greedy wankers to have something to aim at. Keep them busy. But then have a mechanism that redistributes most of that on their death to prevent private dynasties. More charitably, some rich people are just passionate about something and happen to make a load of money on the way.

Poorest: the price of a small flat or house. £100,000 or something. Security of accommodation, and ownership of home.

How are moral facts discovered?

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do?

I don't think there's a meaningful answer to the question. Some things are simply fundamental, brute facts about the world. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere. — Michael

I half agree with you. A person's values might ultimately be a brute fact (as Hume attempted to demonstrate), and that determines what is good for them.

But the fact that different people have different values means that there is no point-of-view invariant value, as value depends on the point of view. Even if everyone has the same base set of values (if we go with Hume, avoidance of pain (broadly conceived) and pursuit of pleasure (again broadly conceived), the fact that one person's pleasures (bathing in asses milk) entailing another one's pain (slavery) renders an objective account inaccurate. Values can be real (in the sense of not fictions or illusions) and brute, while also being subjective, it seems to me. Unless 'real' is construed to mean 'point of view invariant' or even a view from nowhere. I haven't read the whole thread, sorry if this has been dealt with already.

Interesting comparing Hamas to animals. I suppose all people are animals. But no non-human animals rape and pillage (AFAIK), not to say drop bombs, in quite the same way humans manage to do. I guess dehumanising language has the effect of making the context irrelevant. The actions come out of nowhere, for no reason, a bit like the weather. That's just what they do, there's no explanation.

Do animals have a reason for their behaviour?

Dickheads can still be right sometimes.

I am pretty disturbed by the sheer number of defenses of a terrorist attack targeting civilians throughout the thread. — AmadeusD

Who has defended Hamas actions?

It is absolutely NOT a very big if. Did you look at the studies on hive mind / consciousness of a hive of bees? Scientists now believe a hive of bees IS a singular, intelligent consciousness, not just the imitation of one. So if bees -- not touching, separate creatures, no physical connection, no mass brain -- give rise by being in same group, same hive, to an intelligent, conscious hive mind, how the heck do you claim it is a big "if" to suggest the VERY SAME THING happens to people? — ken2esq

OK, this is an argument from analogy, which is interesting. The difficulty is, how similar do two things have to be to make the argument convincing? Are we similar enough to bees? Is there a default position in arguments from analogy; do we favour similarity and validity, or dissimilarity and invalidity?

For example: If you hit a human with a hammer it makes a noise because it feels pain. Interestingly (or not) if you hit a rock with a hammer is also makes a noise. Can we conclude that the rock also feels pain, by analogy with the human?

Watch the video at the top on collective intelligence — ken2esq

This is an example of what not to do in a group you have only just joined. Demand they do what you say.

Ken, chill out. We're people, not receptacles for you to dump your ideas in. Meet us half way. This is a society. Take an interest in us first, then we might take an interest in you. You're lucky to have got the engagement you have in this thread.

Some people here are even panpsychists who may be naturally sympathetic to your views. There's one guy on here who thinks that any randomly defined object has its own unitary consciousness, say three and a half marbles in a jar of 100, because he thinks it solves the combination problem. He is tolerated because he has arguments, despite being insane. You are clearly less insane and you may even be right, but you haven't shown why yet.

The solution to a might-is-right free for all is to have global rule of law, no?

This is all a bit context-free isn't it?