Usually, people don't seem to indulge in such moral skepticism, so your thought experiment is moot for them. A philosopher cannot just ignore such things about people. It seems that most people are intuitively and absolutely sure about their sense of right and wrong, and this surety being intuitive and absolute is essential to their sense of morality. — baker

Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to continue as you were?

If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned.

Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to not give a damn about what's right or wrong and continue as you were?

If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned. — Michael

That's with everything. If you told me that my cat was a dog and insisted that God said the cat was a dog, I'd still say it was a cat. If you told me you had some special access to what a dog was and that I just couldn't see it, it'd take some convincing, but I can't say I'd always stubbornly insist to my view of cats and dogs regardless of the proof, but it's doubtful you'd change my mind about dogs and cats.

So it goes with murdering babies. I'm pretty clear on my moral dictates and that excludes murdering babies, and I can't imagine you'd convince me otherwise, but it's theoretically possible.

My guess is that there are some right now who insist upon their moral right to own their children and do with them as they may. I'd like to think they could be convinced otherwise, but I wouldn't want them to say "morality be damned" if they received convincing evidence but just didn't like it.

Just like I think my observations about cats and dogs are pretty much beyond question, I think that too of baby murdering, but I'm having trouble with the epistimological certainty you're trying to argue.

Then I'll give you a real life example. My friend is a gay Muslim. She genuinely believes in the teachings of Islam – including that homosexuality is wrong – and yet she still dates women. She "knows" that this is "haram" but her desires trump her moral beliefs in deciding how to live her life.

Of course for her the choice is more difficult because she believes that she will be punished for doing wrong, but for the non-religious ethical non-naturalist, there's no such punishment. And so my question stands; what is the motivation to be moral?

Well to be accurate, homosexuality is wrong by her (Muslim) community ethical standard, not her personal moral code (based on her actions). This is very common for folks' morals to clash with their community ethical standards. But she is, in fact, following her moral code.

Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno

If only it would be clear what "moral" means, in any particular instance. Hating your enemies (the persons), like the Jews do? Stoning infidels, like some Muslims do?

course for her the choice is more difficult because she believes that she will be punished for doing wrong, but for the non-religious ethical non-naturalist, there's no such punishment. And so my question stands; what is the motivation to be moral? — Michael

In Judaism, there is no punishment for not being moral either, so why should a Jew be moral? Even for a Christian, you can murder babies and go to heaven if you eventually accept Jesus, so why be moral?

I also think it's possible to choose to be immoral, as in, I don't think pedophiles necessarily think they're moral or that your friend thinks she's moral.

If you arrive at a logical basis to explain your basis for morality, like say the categorical imperative, then you would be moral regardless of measurable consequence, but you must believe that is the proper expression of humanity or something along those lines.

Is your main point here just that you think non-naturalism doesn't work and you're therefore a naturalist consequentialist when it comes to ethics?

Yes, and what if you are absolutely sure that something you enjoy is wrong and something you're disgusted by is right? Would you change your behaviour to reflect your moral knowledge, or would you decide to continue as you were? — Michael

I have been faced with similar situations when I approached some religions/spiritualities. But I wasn't actually sure that something I enjoyed was wrong, and I wasn't sure that something I'm disgusted by was right -- instead, I felt enormously pressured to have such surety, and my continual involvement was predicated on at least aiming for such surety. I couldn't stand it for long, though, and eventually broke off my involvement with them. I'm also facing such situations in relation to politics, and as things stand, my current means of coping is cynicism.

But, realistically, as years pass, I can see on my own example that Kohlberg's theory of moral development applies, esp. the part where he notes that changes in moral reasoning happen gradually over long periods of time, through personal experience, discussions with others, reading, reflecting, as opposed to people changing their moral beliefs simply after reading a syllogism. For me, this manifests in having developed a new framework for understanding religious/spiritual claims and expectations, and a kind of -- not exactly stiff upper lip -- but a certain, let's call that, inner, non-verbal rigidity because of which those religious/spiritual claims and expectations can't take much hold of me (unlike they did in the past).

If it could be proved beyond all doubt that there was a God, that divine command theory is true, and that we have a moral obligation to kill infidels then I still wouldn't kill infidels because I don't want to be a killer. Morality be damned.

While a person's moral stances can remain the same for long periods of time, things can change. External events might provoke one to think and act in ways that one previously thought unimaginable, not only impossible.

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

What is the practical difference between these worlds?

It seems to me that only moral beliefs matter. Whether or not the beliefs are true has no practical relevance. — Michael

The problem is the bit about _everyone_. It's usually not the case that everyone thinks the same way. This is why the issues of whether moral facts exist or not and whether a belief is true or not come into play. As soon as someone is "different" than the majority, this will have some practical consequences for the person (often adverse ones), and the person will try to make sense of this being different and of how other people treat them because of it.

Perhaps I should have said that it isn't necessarily a sufficient reason. If I were to somehow know that I have an obligation to kill children, I would need a more convincing reason to carry it out. That I am obligated isn't reason enough for me. — Michael

Because you haven't internalized the metaphysical framework needed for said obligation to make sense.

So what is the motivation to obey God's moral laws? — Michael

For most people who (claim to) obey God's law, that motivation appears to be pre-cognitive; ie. they have internalized it before they were even old enough to think about it.
For many of those who first turn to obeying God's law as adults, there's some trauma or crisis.

I, for one, am not motivated simply by the belief (or knowledge) of what I ought to do. — Michael

Moral obligation only makes sense in a religious framework to begin with.

I can't make the possibility of any kind of moral obligation believable. That's really what I'm trying to show here. — Michael

As is inevitably the case for someone who is not religious or whose sense of morality is not shaped after religions.

If it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to harm and if it's logically possible for there to be a moral obligation to not harm, and if there's no practical difference between being morally obligated to harm and being morally obligated to not harm, then moral obligations are a vacuous concept.

Because moral obligations only make sense in the framework of religion. Only religion has the metaphysical underpinnings needed for making moral obligations intelligible (and the practical means for raising prospective believers).

only it would be clear what "moral" means, in any particular instance. Hating your enemies (the persons), like the Jews do? Stoning infidels, like some Muslims do? — baker

Tread more carefully in your attempts to describe Jewish theology so as not to appear anti-Jewish. I don't trust that your description of the way Jewish theology describes evil is entirely a misunderstanding, but I am more convinced it's a desire to cast the religion in a bad light.

You are not asked to hate your enemy. Forgiveness is central to the religion, but I won't waste my time with a discussion of halacha with you. Instead, I'll just tell you to end your Judaism bashing.

So why don’t we dump moral realism and moral subjectivism and all other moldy conformist dictums stuck in the 18th century, which blithely ignore all the exciting ideas coming from current research in evolutionary biology, anthropology , psychology and language studies? — Joshs

We don't dump them because in order to be able to dump them safely, without adverse consequences for ourselves, other people would have to dump them as well. But this, clearly, isn't happening.

Tread more carefully in your attempts to describe Jewish theology so as not to appear anti-Jewish. I don't trust that your description of the way Jewish theology describes evil is entirely a misunderstanding, but I am more convinced it's a desire to cast the religion in a bad light. — Hanover

Actually, I heard about the need for hatred from you for the first time. I was quite taken aback.
But some things started to make sense.

Instead, I'll just tell you to end your Judaism bashing.

Is it even possible to say something about Judaism without the Jews feeling offended?
Religious/spiritual people tend to have toes all over the place, it's impossible not to step on them.

Well to be accurate, homosexuality is wrong by her (Muslim) community ethical standard, not her personal moral code (based on her actions). This is very common for folks' morals to clash with their community ethical standards. But she is, in fact, following her moral code. — LuckyR

She told me that she believes it's wrong and struggles with that belief.

Is your main point here just that you think non-naturalism doesn't work and you're therefore a naturalist consequentialist when it comes to ethics? — Hanover

No, I'm just asking a question of non-naturalists: why be moral? It seems to me that if non-naturalism is true then moral facts are of no practical import and so I wonder why they'd be motivated to be moral.

But now that you mention it, perhaps there's a case to argue that moral facts must be of practical import and so if non-naturalism entails that moral facts are of no practical import then non-naturalism must be false, but that's perhaps a topic for a different discussion.

I'm asking why there is a motivation to be moral if moral facts have no practical implications. — Michael

How is this not a slide from obligation to motivation? Sure, there are issues of weakness of the will. But they presume an obligation avoided, and hence an obligation.

What you are doing here is indeed incomprehensible.

How is this not a slide from obligation to motivation? Sure, there are issues of weakness of the will. But they presume an obligation avoided, and hence an obligation.

What you are doing here is indeed incomprehensible. — Banno

Assume that we have some obligation. What is our motivation to obey such an obligation?

That's the question asked by the OP.

My stance is that if obligations have no practical import then the mere existence of an obligation is insufficiently motivating.

I ought do this? Okay, but I won't because I don't want to.

The fact that nobody just answers his question is a sign that he's right.

That's the question asked by the OP. — Michael

Well, no, it isn't - not in so many words. From here it just looks as if you slide the goal post.

...obligations have no practical import... — Michael

I don't understand this phrase. If one is under an obligation to act in a certain way, then one ought act in that way - that's what an obligation is. That is the "practical import" of the obligation.

Hence the answer I gave previously - that it makes no sense to ask why we ought do what we ought do.

So whatever it is you think you are claiming remains quite obscure to me.

I don't understand this phrase. — Banno

See here.

Hence the answer I gave previously - that it makes no sense to ask why we ought do what we ought do. — Banno

I'm not asking that.

Yes, a very odd post, in which you claim that there are no "practical implications" for vegetarianism while pointing out that the vegetarian will probably not eat meat.

What more practical an implication could you find?

Yes, a very odd post, in which you claim that there are no "practical implications" for vegetarianism while pointing out that the vegetarian will probably not eat meat.

What more practical an implication could you find? — Banno

See here:

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications.

And from the OP:

Sure, if we believe that we ought not do X then we might not do X, but then it wouldn't really matter if our beliefs were true; only that we have them.

It's certainly not the case that if my belief that eating meat is wrong is true then I won't eat meat and that if my belief that eating meat is wrong is false then I will eat meat, as if moral facts themselves, as distinct from moral beliefs, influence my behaviour.

Yes, I read that. Very odd. As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty.

Actually, I heard about the need for hatred from you for the first time. I was quite taken aback.
But some things started to make sense. — baker

I'm going to give you a chance not to be antisemitic and to clarify yourself.

First, Jews have no rule about hating their enemies. It has to do with responses to evil generally, but, like I said, if you want to know the Jewish rules on such things, Google it instead of spouting ignorance.

Second, what you're implying is that what now makes sense to you is that the response in Israel is motivated by Jewish law, meaning your condemnation of Israel is in fact a condemnation of Judaism. If that is your view, and I've read this correctly, please tell me so that I know that. Could be a misread by me, so clarify if I've missed it.

Is even possible to say something about Judaism without the Jews feeling offended? — baker

If your implication is that Jews are too fucked up to respond appropriately to comments because that's what Jews are like, let me know that so I can be clear where you stand.

In any event, when you say something offensive, expect it to be taken as offensive.

Yes, I read that. Very odd. As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

Is "I don't want to eat meat because I don't want animals to suffer in factory farms" a moral stance?

As if someone could have a moral belief that they ought not eat meat without believing that "I ought not eat meat" is true. — Banno

I'm not claiming otherwise.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

The existence of the obligation has no practical implication.

If I put my hand in water then it matters if it's boiling. If it is then I will burn my hand.

If I eat meat then it doesn't matter if I ought not eat meat. Nothing detrimental will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing beneficial will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation?

To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies.

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Michael

There would be a difference only if moral facts were discoverable. If they are, then their discovery would motivate people to obey the discovered moral fact, via their motivation to be and be seen as moral, by others and by themselves. If on the other hand such facts are not discoverable, then they make no difference whatsoever.

In the above example, due to epistemological uncertainty, people would be highly skeptical. There would be an assumption that some mistake was made in whatever process of moral discovery lead to the conclusion that it is moral to kill babies. I think for most people, the result would be so incongruous with their moral intuition that they would never accept it, and go to their grave thinking there must be some mistake, somewhere. But at least a few would probably start killing babies.

If eating meat is immoral, then "eating meat is immoral" is true, and the direct practical implication is that one ought not eat meaty. — Banno

But that's not a practical implication. A practical implication would be to not eat meat. Your belief that you should not eat meat might result in not eating meat, but it's possible that not eating meat is moral, without believing that not eating meat is moral. Only beliefs in moral facts can affect action, not the moral facts themselves.

If I eat meat then it doesn't matter if I ought not eat meat. Nothing bad will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing good will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation? — Michael

Clear as mud. "Nothing bad will happen if I disobey an obligation" - the "bad" thing that will have happened is that you will have disobeyed an obligation.

Clear as mud. "Nothing bad will happen if I disobey an obligation" - the "bad" thing that will have happened is that you will have disobeyed an obligation. — Banno

I didn't mean "bad" in the moral sense. I pre-empted this response and already changed the wording.

I didn't mean "bad" in the moral sense. — Michael

Ok, so except for all the morally bad things, nothing morally bad will happen...

Not such a profound observation.

@Banno Can a moral fact cause belief in it?

Ok, so except for all the morally bad things, nothing morally bad will happen...

Not such a profound observation. — Banno

I didn't say nothing morally bad will happen. I said that nothing non-morally bad will happen.