Is there any sense of "truth" that is not existentially contingent upon language? Perhaps this be better put a bit differently:Does any sense of "truth" define something that we discover?

Yes, and you don't need correspondence for that. The sentence "there have been dinosaurs" states a truth which existed way before humans or language did.

We can also make sense of the notion of 'discovery' without correspondence. Objective truths exist, and we can discover them. To discover if something is true, we don't need to take the sentence (or psychological state, or whatever) expressing that truth and check if it 'corresponds' to reality; rather what we do is go and look whether things in the world are the same as what the sentence says about them. So the question of correspondence simply doesn't arise in any normal process of inquiry.

On my view, correspondence is presupposed within all rudimentary thought/belief by the very act of drawing a mental correlation between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself;emotional/linguistic state of mind. — creativesoul

Here's one problem with your story. Suppose that you have a mental state that you want to correlate with your sensory perception, let's say seeing an apple. But when you are having that perception, do you know that what you are having is a sensory perception of an apple? If you do, then it means that you already can think about apples or mentally represent them even before you have correlated anything with your mental states, in which case your story seems redundant. But if you don't know that you have a sensory perception of seeing an apple, then it is not clear how correlating you perception with some other mental state could enable you to acquire the ability to mentally represent apples, or to know what apples are. So correspondence is either redundant or useless.

Without an interpretation of "P", there is no such thing as "the truth condition expressed by P". What is expressed by P is the product of an interpretation of P. Therefore the truth of P is relative to the interpretation. Interpretation is necessarily subjective. So I'll repeat myself, you define "objectively true" as something subjective. Your use of "objectively" only disguises the fact that what you are referring to is something subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing between meaning and truth. It is the assignment of meaning to P that is relative to an interpretation, but once a particular meaning has been fixed for P, than what P says given that meaning can be objectively true.

Secondly, my claim was that the two events are numerically distinct by dint of the predicates "...died" and "...was murdered" referring to different sorts of actions/processes regardless of anyone's knowledge of the references of those predicates. — Pierre-Normand

I agree that at least on some cases we can know just on conceptual grounds that the same thing cannot satisfy two different description if it doesn't make sense to say that it does (e.g. to describe something both as an animal and as an inanimate object at the same time). But sometimes such identities can become aposteriori discoverable possibilities, as Kripke and Putnam have taught us about natural kinds. The interesting question here is what distinguishes the two cases and how can you know when you are confronted with the one or the other. And this brings me to another interesting thing that you said.

I think the case being discussed, and the implicit surrounding narratives, can be further filled up in such a manner as to warrant either one of the two intuitions depending on the kind of 'sortal concept' (or rather, the kind of 'event- or process-form', for the category of events) that most perspicuously attaches to the events being talked about and thereby determines their criteria of persistence and individuation. — Pierre-Normand

I believe that you are exactly right about sortals -- and this is directly connected to the question that I just raised -- it strikes me as very plausible to say that an identity statement can be ruled out on purely conceptual grounds if the two descriptions don't employ the same sortal concept (as in my example of 'animal' and an 'inanimate object').

So perhaps a more fruitful approach to our case would be to ask whether a death and a murder fall under the same sortal concept. Personally I think that the answer is 'yes' (they are both events for start, and furthermore events that involve a death of a person). But since we are talking here about a conceptual question, would you agree that at least on some understanding of 'death' and 'murder' it can make sense to employ the two terms in descriptions of the same event? For example, what you said about the component of criminal intent present in the case of murder is of course true, but it doesn't strike me as very intuitive to attribute the murderer's state of mind to the event of murdering itself (though it is something that we use as a criteria to determine whether a murder took place).

That condition (the truth condition expressed by P obtains), can only be fulfilled by a subject — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't agree with that.

A subject must determine, decide, judge, whether the condition obtains. — Metaphysician Undercover

Judging that a truth condition obtains is a different thing though from the actual obtainment of that truth condition (you can have the one without the other). You cannot just assume (without begging the question) that they are the same thing.

I agree that in order to know that a truth condition obtains you have to form a judgment, but it doesn't prove that the obtaining of the truth condition itself requires a judgement. You are once again confusing epistemic and metaphysical questions.

What is especially noteworthy about that McDowell paper is his argument about frogs. He uses a Davidsonian argument to argue that even if you take such a simple organism as a frog, you are not going to make much sense of the idea of the frog as 'internally' representing his environment, if you only consider his internal parts in isolation from his 'froggy way of life' (that is, as a living organism inhabiting a particular sort of environment). So the idea of 'mental representetions' as some sort of theoretical psychological entities discoverable inside organisms (that prevails in contemporary cognitive science) doesn't even make sense when applied to frogs, let alone humans.

Another paper that is quite relevant to anti-representationalism is: Jennifer Hornsby, Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction, Philosophical Exploratons, 3, 1, 2000 — Pierre-Normand

There's also a very good paper by john McDowell "The Content of Perceptual Experience" (appears in "Mind, Value and Reality"), that argues for a very similar idea to Hornsby.

Of course language is representational, and truth is (in a certain sense) dependent on representation. This goes without saying :)

Correspondence is truth. It is what makes statements true. The lack thereof is what makes them false. — creativesoul

But the question is whether this talk about 'correspondence' adds anything substantial over and above what we can already say just using the notion of truth. If what you mean by 'correspondence' is not meant as an explanation of anything (as you claim) then can we simply drop this words and say everything that you want by using only 'truth'?

Statement P is objectively true def= if the truth condition expressed by P obtains (and otherwise it is objectively false).

Are you happy now?

Again, it all depends on what one means by 'correspondence'. If it is not meant as some sort of metaphysical theory that attempts to explain the truth of statements/sentences/propositions, but merely as some sort of truism, then it could be a pretty innocuous thing to say (but then it is not clear what exactly you are gaining philosophically by talking about 'correspondence' in the first place).

If the truth of a statement were dependent upon interpretation, then all statements would have precisely the same truth conditions as all of the interpretations thereof. — creativesoul

There's no contradiction because you can make different statements by using the same words (consider indexicals such as "I" "here" etc.).

But what distinguishes that two propositions on your view of correspondence?

I hold that different true statements can most certainly be made about the same facts/events/happenings/states of affairs/etc. I wouldn't however call those "entities". The "truth-maker" notion falls flat on my view as well, for it isolates one necessary element for truth and calls it a truth-maker. That would be akin to calling apples "apple pie-makers". It takes more. — creativesoul

The idea behind truth-makers is to give a metaphysical explanation of truth in terms of entities which are language-independent (or mind independent more generally). But if you appeal to facts or states of affairs instead, then they are too much like propositions (because how do you individuate facts/states of affairs if not by the propositions describing them? - it seems that understanding what facts/states of affairs are already presupposes the understanding of propositions), and that threatens to make the correspondence theory vacuous (because why do we need to talk about correspondence at all, if all we need is to analyze propositions in order to understand what makes them true? -- the later was, incidentally, Wittgenstein's view, both early and late, at least on my understanding of his philosophy).

On my view truth is a relationship. Correspondence theorists typically posit truth as a quality/property of true statements/assertions/propositions. — creativesoul

Here's one argument against the view the truth is a relation from the top of my head (I think it originated from either Russell or Wittgenstein).

Consider the two propositions "A loves B" and "B loves A". Clearly they mean different things and therefore they are true under different condition (regrettably, the one can be true without the other). Now, if there's anything they are related with, it must be A, the relation Love and B. However, this by itself cannot explain the difference between the two propositions, since both are related to precisely the same list of entities, so under the relational theory they must be the same proposition (but they aren't), so the theory cannot explain why they differ in their truth conditions.

I'm rather saying that 'x' and 'y' refer to distinct events if [their predicates] have different Fregean references. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not necessarily disagreeing, but I have two questions (which are related): a) are you claiming that one can know the Fregean reference solely by virtue of knowing the meaning of the relevant predicates? (which clearly you can't since you cannot know apriori whether "Caesar" and "the conqueror of Gaul" denote the same person) and b) Is "the conqueror of Gaul" a rigid designator on your account? Because if it is not (and it is plain that it isn't) then I think your criteria for the non-identity of 'x' and 'y' (in the quote) becomes vacuous. Because consider that it is a contingent fact that "Caesar" and "the conqueror of Gaul" denote the same person (and you can further substitute 'Caesar' with another description to eliminate all names); but this you can know only aposteriori, so it means that on your criteria 'x' and 'y' (if 'x' and 'y' are definite descriptions) denote the same entity if their terms happen to denote the same entity, and of course everyone will agree with that...

And this is directly connected to our original example: since "Caesar's murder" and "Caesar's death" are non-rigid designators (because in some possible worlds they denote discrete events even on my view), then you cannot know apriori just from knowing the meaning of the predicates "__ died" and "__ was murdered" whether they happen to denote the same event or not, so I don't think these Fregean consideration can really help your case.

I wouldn't say that Caesar died twice. I would say that he died because he was murdered. The 'violence' that is constitutive of the event's being a case of murder is the mens rea of the murderer(s). This mens rea isn't a constitutive part of Ceasar's dying. Hence, since the two events don't have the same constitutive parts, they are not the same. That is true (in this case, anyway) even when we restrict attention to what occurred in the actual world (and a fortiori if we consider the modal properties of those events). — Pierre-Normand

I think that in the end it is an arbitrary matter whether we call it the same event or two different events, since we sometimes talk about the two interchangeably and sometimes not, so I don't think you can really prove that it must be the one way and not the other (and I took this example from Ramsey's paper, who might've chose a different less controversial example (and you can easily think of some like "the death of the conqueror of Gaul") - but the point remains that there's not principled apriori criterion to distinguish between co-refrential and non-coreferential descriptions).

But the fact that the apple is red isn't the same as the fact that the apple is crimson, is it? — Pierre-Normand

No, they are not the same facts, but the two descriptions (containing 'crimson' and 'red') do denote the same thing or entity in your example (an apple with a single color) :)

You are right, but my argument assumed a definition of correspondence on which for every proposition there's a unique entity corresponding when it is true.

And if the correspondence theorist will accept your suggestion that the same entity can make two different propositions true, then I think his theory will loose much of its explanatory power. And the reasons are related to Quine's famous renate/cordate example that shows that if you define meaning extentionally, then it becomes too coarse-grained for many concepts as we normally understand them.

And by the way, it also makes sense to talk about death as a process that can begin some time before the body actually shuts down (thus involving causes): take the expression "slow death".

It might be easier if we imagine that Caesar was stabbed on a Monday and died on the Tuesday. "the death of Caesar" refers to what happened on Tuesday, whereas "the murder of Caesar" refers to what happened on Monday as well. — Michael

Ok, I agree that you can make this distinction in some cases. But if someone is stabbed and dies immediately on the spot, then I think it is plausible to say that his murder and death denote the same event.

I wonder if perhaps "the death of Caesar" only refers to the event of his body shutting down whereas "the murder of Caesar" refers also to the events that lead up to it. — Michael

But which events? Does the plotting before the actual assassination is part of the murder? Surely before he physically got stabbed he wasn't in the process of being murdered (say while comfortably eating lunch the day before or whatever).

As for "...was murdered" and "...died", there just is no way to fill those up and refer to the same event (or so would I argue). In order to achieve something similar to the previous case, you would rather need something like "the ... who was murdered at (some time and place)" and "the ... who died at (some time and place)". Then, yes, you could fill them up in such a way that they would refer to the same individual (under two different Fregean senses). But this individual would be a human being rather than a historical event. — Pierre-Normand

You should change the descriptions to "the death of Caesar" and "the murder of Caesar", and then I think it will make more sense to think that they denote the same event (and also note that it is perfectly possible for two different descriptions to denote the same event; e.g. "the death of Caesar" and "the death of the conqueror of Gaul" - I hope would you agree).

The issue with Caesar's murder and Caesar's death is that they refer to two different things that happened to Caesar. — Pierre-Normand

Since "murder" just means something like "violent death", then on your view it would follow that a person can die twice (if "murder" and "death" are two distinct things that happen to everyone who's murdered), which is a pretty bizarre thing to say in my opinion.

Another way to highlight the difference is to notice that "...was murdered" is a determination of the determinable "...died" rather in the same way in which the property "...is crimson" is a determination of "...is red". But it is clear that an apple's being red isn't the same thing as its being crimson under two different descriptions. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not claiming that dying and being murdered are always the same thing. I'm only claiming that in the particular case of Caesar the two descriptions happen to denote contingently the same event (since they are non-rigid designators etc.). And there's nothing problematic in saying this. I'll try to illustrate this through your example. Crimson is a type of red, but it doesn't follow that a crimson apple has two distinct colors: crimson and red, but it has only one color that falls under two different descriptions (and this is consistent with the fact that being crimson and being red sometimes do refer to distinct colors). I hope that this makes sense.

That there is no objective reality is the premise, not the conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then see my other comment above.

This premise is supported by the fact that any assumption of an objective reality, is an assumption made by a subject. Therefore the assumption of an objective reality is itself subjective, and this negates the assumption that the reality being assumed is objective, because the assumption itself is subjective. The conclusion, which follows from this, is that there is no objective truth. Truth is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well no, it doesn't follow. If by "subjective assumption" you mean something like an unjustified or ungrounded belief, then this doesn't show that the belief itself isn't objectively true. It may be the case that my belief that there is life on Mars is ungrounded or unjustified, and yet it still can be the case that it is itself objectively true, and there is life on Mars. Here you are surely trying to derive a metaphysical conclusion from epistemic premises.

Unless the assumption of an objective reality can be made to be sound, then any claim of an objective truth is equally unsound, because this relies on the assumption of an objective reality. You are claiming that there is objective truth, so the onus is on you to support this claim by validating your claim of an objective reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not trying to prove to you anything about the objective reality (I have better things to do), but only to show you that your arguments don't work, which is different. I don't have to demonstrate that truth is objective (or that there is an objective reality) in order to show that your arguments that truth is subjective are unsound.

This claim is just made by you, and you are a subject and therefore the claim is subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

As my example about the existence of life on Mars shows, you cannot make this inference. The fact that the word 'subject' appears in 'subjective', doesn't license you to treat everything that a subject says as itself subjective. You are equivocating between words with different meaning, and this is a blatant logical fallacy (it's like inferring something about the banks of a river from claims about banks as financial institutions, just on the grounds they are spelled the same).

On my view, there is no common 'event' that is being referred two under different descriptions. They are two numerically distinct events even though the very same individual is involved in both of them roughly at the same time and at the same place. — Pierre-Normand

I don't agree, I think it is the same event under different description. I don't see the disanalogy between the two examples: why can't "...was murdered" and "...died" (or more accurately "the death of..." and "the murder of...") have the same reference just as "the son of..." and "the father of..."?

The same with my earlier example of "the son of of Edward VIII" and "the father of Elizabeth II". — Michael

Or my example of "Caesar's murder" from the thread about truth.

I must be arguing with an idiot. How about answering every question I posed on this page that you didn't answer. — Harry Hindu

Because you are asking many irrelevant things, and life is too short (and anyway, I don't understand most of your questions).

uhhh, Ok. It is about the weather outside but it's meaning is independent of the actual weather outside. How does that make any sense? — Harry Hindu

Simple: "the weather outside" means that it can be either rainy or sunny, so the sentence "it is rainy" can refer to the whether outside even if it is false.

After all, I can ask you what is the whether outside without knowing if it is raining (and I will still be referring to the weather--whatever it is).

And another thing: you argument attempts to establish a metaphysical conclusion ("there's no objective reality") from epistemic premises (all the stuff that you say about interpretation), but this is invalid.

Even if you were correct that all interpretation is subjective (and you are not), it wouldn't follow that objective reality doesn't exist. At best, it could only show that reality cannot be known by us, but its existence is a different matter. It's like arguing that since we don't know if there is life on Mars, then it follows that there is no life on Mars.

No, that's not the case, because to be objectively true or false, requires that there is an objective reality which the interpretation of the sentence either corresponds with, or does not. But there is no such thing. The so-called "objective reality" only exists as interpreted. There is no reality without a perspective, so any reality which would be judged as corresponding to an interpretation, is itself subjective because it is dependent on a perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you are changing the argument. Plainly the claim that sentences are subjectively interpreted doesn't logically entail that there's no objective reality. When you try to present an argument you should explicitly mention all the premises on which you are relying from the start.

On the one hand we have the words, the sentence, "cats fly", which needs to be interpreted. On the other hand, we have the reality which "cats fly" is supposed to correspond with, and this needs to be interpreted as well. Therefore you cannot say that there is an objective truth or falsity to any interpretation of the sentence because reality, what is real, needs to be interpreted as well, in order that it does or does not correspond to the interpretation of the sentence. — Metaphysician Undercover

First I don't accept the correspondence theory of truth, that is, when a sentence is true I don't believe that there is something "corresponding" to the sentence, by virtue of which it is true. On my view, you can have objective truth without correspondence.

Secondly, I can accept your claim that in order to perceive reality you need some sort of interpretation, but again, just as in the case of sentences in language, it doesn't follow that the interpretation must be always subjective. It could be the case that some interpretations of reality are objective, and some are not -- nothing about the concept of 'interpretation' by itself entails that all interpretations are subjective.

Sheesh! I'm not changing the topic. I was responding to a specific post of yours. If I'm off topic, then you are as well. You keep trying to avoid answering the question - that's all. If you can't do that then there is no point in continuing this with you. — Harry Hindu

Which question?

Why would you ever say "it is raining" without ever referring to the weather outside? — Harry Hindu

What do you mean "referring to the weather outside"? Of course the sentence "it is raining" is about the weather outside, but its meaning is independent from the actual weather outside (because otherwise false statements would be meaningless).

You seem to be saying that words have an objective meaning independent of them ever being used. But words have multiple meanings. We can say "it is raining" metaphorically, which doesn't meant that water is falling from clouds. What would we mean if we say, "it is raining cats and dogs." That sentence means that cats and dogs are falling from they sky? — Harry Hindu

You are right, but this doesn't help you. But you also seem to be affirming the meaning is determined by use, contrary to what you've been arguing, so which way is it?

My previous post was in response to your previous post, not a response to your argument. It is you that stated, "Misspeaking and saying something false are not the same thing." which is a separate argument than your main one. I was simply responding, and even agreeing with you, to your previous post only. Why don't you answer the question? — Harry Hindu

Because you are changing the topic. As I already told you, if you want to criticize an argument, then you should stick to the original formulation and not just make up your own unrelated examples. If you don't wish to engage seriously with my arguments, then I'm not interested in this conversation.

Exactly, the words, "it is raining", refers to the state-of-affairs outside — Harry Hindu

The 'refers' part here is ambiguous. I wasn't talking about the truth of the sentence, but about it's meaning. The sentence 'it is raining' means that it is raining (if you wish, "refers to rain"), even if doesn't rain outside; so it doesn't matter if the sentence is true or false if we only want to know its meaning.

Exactly. How do you know the difference without getting at my intent? Was I misspeaking or lying? — Harry Hindu

It doesn't matter, because it is irrelevant to my argument. To repeat: If I utter the sentence "it is raining", my words will mean that it is raining no matter what my actual intention was, because this is what the sentence conventionally means in English.

He does have to know about the weather to know if the person misspoke or not. — Harry Hindu

Misspeaking and saying something false are not the same thing.

Your objection doesn't make any sense. The sentence "it is raining" means the same regardless of whether it actually rains or not, so the listener doesn't have to know anything about the actual weather in order to understand the sentence.

Then you are no longer arguing for meaning is use. You are arguing that meaning is what a word refers to, which aren't other words. — Harry Hindu

Not at all. The view that 'meaning is use' doesn't entail that words don't refer, it only says that words refer by virtue of their use.

If one uses "raining" to mean, "sunny" as a joke or a lie, then that would be a conventional use of the word, which then makes it the correct use of the word for the person who "misspeaks". — Harry Hindu

I don't understand what you mean. 'Correct' in what sense? Saying 'raining' instead of 'sunny' is not the conventional or correct use in English of these words, that's plainly absurd.

The only way you can get at the distinction between using a word in a way that isn't conventionally used and it mean something and using a word that is conventionally used and it not mean something is by applying one's intention in speaking. Did they intend to say what they said, or no? — Harry Hindu

I don't understand what you are saying, the grammar here is all over the place. Please reformulate.

The fact is that we can adapt to other people's use of words. If someone uses a word "incorrectly" to express their intent, and no one "corrects" them and they continue to use the word "incorrectly", then you will understand what they mean, and that becomes the conventional use of the word, at least between that pair of speaker and listener — Harry Hindu

You are not getting my argument. If it is possible to intend x by uttering the word W, without making W to mean x, then it follows that intention is nut sufficient for meaning, period. If I utter the sentence "it is raining", my words will mean that it is raining no matter what my actual intention was, because this is what the sentence conventionally means in English.

You can use a scribble or sound for anything and it becomes conventional only after repetitive use, and only after repetitive use do we understand what it is the words means — Harry Hindu

So you finally accepted the view that meaning is use, congrats.

A proposition such as "Caesar died" might be true not because it has a truth-maker of its own, but because it is entailed by a proposition such as "Caesar was murdered" that does have a truth-maker. — Srap Tasmaner

But what if Caesar had not been murdered but died a natural death? In this case it seems that "Caesar died" would have its own truthmaker (distinct from the truthmaker of "Caesar was murdered"), and this will contradict the basic idea of correspondence that for any proposition, there's a unique entity that makes it true if it is the case (because "Caesar died" is the same propositions no matter how he died, but on your account it looks like two different propositions).

And also I think that the correspondence theorist would argue that if P is entailed by Q, then the truthmaker of Q is also the truthmaker of P (but this is just speculation).

The point is that any statement's correspondence to an event cannot ever be complete, but that that fact in no way rules out the possibility of correspondence. Nothing you have said seems to show that incompleteness of correspondence renders the idea contradictory, inconsistent or incoherent. — John

I give up.

Are you attempting to draw a distinction between "events" and "entities"? — John

No, I treat events as entities for the sake of argument.

But despite their ability to correspond or not, they are both only partial descriptions of the event, no? — John

Sure, but I don't see how this helps (actually this fact is precisely what explains the reason that correspondence fails: descriptions don't overlap neatly with unique entities, because you can have the same entity satisfying many descriptions, and so you cannot define the truth of descriptions by simply referring to the entities which they describe).

You seem to be thinking in some absolutist terms of correspondence, which would seem to have little or nothing to do with the ordinary logic of correspondence. — John

Well either a proposition corresponds to an entity or it doesn't, what other options are there?

You seem to be saying that the event of Caesar dying cannot be the same event as Caesar being murdered — John

I didn't say this, I only said that the propositions "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are different, but the event to which they refer is the same (but of course they could've referred to different events).

But what I did claim is that if you have two different proposition, then by the definition of correspondence, they cannot have the same entity corresponding to them when true. So having two different propositions with the same corresponding entity (as in the case of "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered") contradicts the definition, and renders the theory incoherent.

They are the same event iff Caesar was murdered. " Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are different statements about the event is all. They bear a different relation to one another: if the second statement is true then the first necessarily is. but the obverse does not follow. What's the point of trying to complicate it? — John

It follows from the definition of correspondence that if two propositions corresponds to the same entity when true, then they are the same proposition, but "Caesar died" and "Caesar was murdered" are not the same proposition.

Possibility has nothing to do with actual correspondence, though, as far as I can tell. — John

Possibility has a lot to do with correspondence in general, because claims about possibility follow logically from the definition of correspondence (and therefore I have a full right to use premises about possibility when arguing against correspondence).

P is true = there's entity x corresponding to P
P is false = entity x doesn't exist (= the entity which would correspond to P if P were true)

It follows for the definition that if you have two propositions such that one could be true while the other is false, then it follows logically that they cannot correspond to the same entity when true. Because consider:

1) Assume A is true = entity x exists.
2) Assume B is false = entity y doesn't exist (B would be true if y existed).
3) If x can exist when y doesn't, then x is not identical with y (Leibniz law).
4) Therefore A and B are different propositions, since they don't correspond to the same entity when true.

This is not what the correspondence theory says though. The thing that correspond to a true proposition is not simply 'actuality' but a particular entity which is relevant to the meaning of the proposition. So if you have a true proposition such as "Trump is the president" then not everything which exists in the world is relevant to the truth of the proposition, like the fact that London is the capital of England or whatever. And this is for a simple reason: the proposition that "Trump is the president" still could be true even if London wasn't the capital of England, so surely London and England are irrelevant to the truth of "Trump is the president", even when both propositions happen to be true. So you must select only the entities which 'track' all the possibilities in which the proposition is true (like Trump for example), otherwise you'll get into absurdities.

And do you agree that if A and B correspond to the same entity, then a situation in which A is true and B is false is impossible? (it simply follows from the definition of correspondence)