Gives relatable form to the chaos of your experiences. Brings to the surface meaning that already resides in the understanding. A prompting to see what is already on some level known.

You'll never understand through observation anything that isn't just superficial... not from the outside, gotta be inside to get insight.

So Wittgenstein leaves us with no approach to the "desire to say something meaningful". — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't trying to explain what Wittgenstein leaves us with. I was pointing out something cool about speech that has to do with freedom and limitation.

Gives relatable form to the chaos of your experiences. Brings to the surface meaning that already resides in the understanding. A prompting to see what is already on some level known. — Wosret

Precipitates... like rain from a cloud. That's what poetry does. It precipitates.

I wasn't trying to explain what Wittgenstein leaves us with. I was pointing out something cool about speech that has to do with freedom and limitation. — Mongrel

Well I haven't read the thread, it's progressed far to fast for me, but I think we've hit the nail on the head. "Language as use" provides us with no approach to this cool thing about speech which has to due with freedom and limitation. Likewise, describing any tool by its use, doesn't give us an approach to the creative force of production and manufacturing, which is the real drive behind the use of that tool. To say that the hammer drives the nail, is to tell us nothing about the art of building, which is what the hammer is really used for. It's not used for driving nails, it's used for building. To say that language is use, is to tell us nothing about thinking, which is what language is really used for, not communicating.

What your post demonstrates is just how different real "rule-following" is, from the Wittgensteinian "rule-following". Real "rule-following" is acting according to the limitations which exist within your mind, that are guiding your actions. Whether these limitations are guiding you toward right or wrong is irrelevant in real rule-following. Wittgensteinian "rule-following" is acting in a way which may be observed as being in accordance with some descriptive, inductive principles, which determine right and wrong, i.e., acting like the others.

In the Wittgensteinian sense, it is impossible that one who is following the rule is acting wrongly, to follow the rule is to act correctly. In the reality of rule-following, one who is following a rule might just as likely be acting wrongly, because following a rule is acting according to the principles of limitation which one accesses within one's mind, thinking.

Use theory of meaning is the view that meanings of linguistic expressions are controlled by uses of language. Suppose that you try to possess the meaning of the concept 'dog'. According to old-fashioned use theory of meaning, you can possess the concept 'dog' by using the sentence in which 'dog' is included, e.g. "All big dogs are dogs", and so on. Wilfrid Sellars says, "knowing a concept is knowing how to use the concept".
Animals can merely use sounds and signs to communicate. However, animals don't know how to use them as inferential roles. This follows that animals are not use theorists of meaning at all.

A word employed in a particular language game may be used once in a particular way, and for whatever, totally contingent reason never be used that way ever again by anyone else living or dead, and it would still fall under the rubric of 'meaning-as-use'. — StreetlightX

So when someone "misuses" a word and someone corrects them, and it is no longer used that way again, then that would still fall under the rubric of meaning as use, which is to say that that person didn't really misuse the word. You only know that they misused a word when you understand what they intended. They could have been using a metaphor, or been joking. You need to get at their intent to know the difference between them making a mistake or them joking.

But In the example that I gave they were intentional.

Let me change it slightly. Imagine someone who doesn't speak English very well, and he utters the sentence "it is raining", while intending to say that it is sunny, because for some reason he believes that this is how you say that it is sunny in English. You cannot say that he was insincere or lying, or using a metaphor, or telling a joke etc; he had the intention to mean something different from what his words in fact mean. How do you explain this? — Fafner

Then you are no longer arguing for meaning is use. You are arguing that meaning is what a word refers to, which aren't other words. Saying, "It is raining" or "It is sunny" are the correct use of words. You only say that they are incorrect when the words don't refer to the actual state-of-affairs of the weather outside. The listener would never know I misspoke until they went outside. Then they would be left thinking what I intended with my words. Was I joking, lying, or did I misspeak?

You don't seem to understand the contradictory nature of your own position. If one uses "raining" to mean, "sunny" as a joke or a lie, then that would be a conventional use of the word, which then makes it the correct use of the word for the person who "misspeaks". In other words, you can't say that they used words incorrectly. The only way you can get at the distinction between using a word in a way that isn't conventionally used and it mean something and using a word that is conventionally used and it not mean something is by applying one's intention in speaking. Did they intend to say what they said, or no?

The fact is that we can adapt to other people's use of words. If someone uses a word "incorrectly" to express their intent, and no one "corrects" them and they continue to use the word "incorrectly", then you will understand what they mean, and that becomes the conventional use of the word, at least between that pair of speaker and listener.

StreelightX has said we can use any scribble or sound to refer to anything we want. A scribble or sound is "convetionizable." It is up to the listener to get at the intent for the use of the word. There are basically no rules for language in this sense. You can use a scribble or sound for anything and it becomes conventional only after repetitive use, and only after repetitive use do we understand what it is the word means. Does it matter how many people use the word in that way if just one person understands what they meant?

Then you are no longer arguing for meaning is use. You are arguing that meaning is what a word refers to, which aren't other words. — Harry Hindu

Not at all. The view that 'meaning is use' doesn't entail that words don't refer, it only says that words refer by virtue of their use.

If one uses "raining" to mean, "sunny" as a joke or a lie, then that would be a conventional use of the word, which then makes it the correct use of the word for the person who "misspeaks". — Harry Hindu

I don't understand what you mean. 'Correct' in what sense? Saying 'raining' instead of 'sunny' is not the conventional or correct use in English of these words, that's plainly absurd.

The only way you can get at the distinction between using a word in a way that isn't conventionally used and it mean something and using a word that is conventionally used and it not mean something is by applying one's intention in speaking. Did they intend to say what they said, or no? — Harry Hindu

I don't understand what you are saying, the grammar here is all over the place. Please reformulate.

The fact is that we can adapt to other people's use of words. If someone uses a word "incorrectly" to express their intent, and no one "corrects" them and they continue to use the word "incorrectly", then you will understand what they mean, and that becomes the conventional use of the word, at least between that pair of speaker and listener — Harry Hindu

You are not getting my argument. If it is possible to intend x by uttering the word W, without making W to mean x, then it follows that intention is nut sufficient for meaning, period. If I utter the sentence "it is raining", my words will mean that it is raining no matter what my actual intention was, because this is what the sentence conventionally means in English.

You can use a scribble or sound for anything and it becomes conventional only after repetitive use, and only after repetitive use do we understand what it is the words means — Harry Hindu

So you finally accepted the view that meaning is use, congrats.

You completely skipped this part (intentionally or no?):

Saying, "It is raining" or "It is sunny" are the correct use of words. You only say that they are incorrect when the words don't refer to the actual state-of-affairs of the weather outside. The listener would never know I misspoke until they went outside. Then they would be left thinking what I intended with my words. Was I joking, lying, or did I misspeak? — Harry Hindu

Your objection doesn't make any sense. The sentence "it is raining" means the same regardless of whether it actually rains or not, so the listener doesn't have to know anything about the actual weather in order to understand the sentence.

He does have to know about the weather to know if the person used words incorrectly or not. That was your argument - that the speaker was only wrong because it wasn't raining outside. If the listener already knew the weather, then telling them would be redundant. I can say it is sunny or simply point to the window.

He does have to know about the weather to know if the person misspoke or not. — Harry Hindu

Misspeaking and saying something false are not the same thing.

How do you know the difference without getting at my intent? Was I misspeaking or lying?

Exactly. How do you know the difference without getting at my intent? Was I misspeaking or lying? — Harry Hindu

It doesn't matter, because it is irrelevant to my argument. To repeat: If I utter the sentence "it is raining", my words will mean that it is raining no matter what my actual intention was, because this is what the sentence conventionally means in English.

My previous post was in response to your previous post, not a response to your argument. It is you that stated, "Misspeaking and saying something false are not the same thing." which is a separate argument than your main one. I was simply responding to, and even agreeing with, your previous post only. Why don't you answer the question?

It doesn't matter, because it is irrelevant to my argument. To repeat: If I utter the sentence "it is raining", my words will mean that it is raining no matter what my actual intention was, because this is what the sentence conventionally means in English. — Fafner

Exactly, the words, "it is raining", refers to the state-of-affairs outside, which aren't more words. To say that "It is raining" means "it is raining" is nonsense. That is why you used quotes to refer to your words and didn't use quotes to refer to the actual state-of-affairs.

My previous post was in response to your previous post, not a response to your argument. It is you that stated, "Misspeaking and saying something false are not the same thing." which is a separate argument than your main one. I was simply responding, and even agreeing with you, to your previous post only. Why don't you answer the question? — Harry Hindu

Because you are changing the topic. As I already told you, if you want to criticize an argument, then you should stick to the original formulation and not just make up your own unrelated examples. If you don't wish to engage seriously with my arguments, then I'm not interested in this conversation.

Exactly, the words, "it is raining", refers to the state-of-affairs outside — Harry Hindu

The 'refers' part here is ambiguous. I wasn't talking about the truth of the sentence, but about it's meaning. The sentence 'it is raining' means that it is raining (if you wish, "refers to rain"), even if doesn't rain outside; so it doesn't matter if the sentence is true or false if we only want to know its meaning.

Because you are changing the topic. As I already told you, if you want to criticize an argument, then you should stick to the original formulation and not just make up your own unrelated examples. If you don't wish to engage seriously with my arguments, then I'm not interested in this conversation. — Fafner

Sheesh! I'm not changing the topic. I was responding to a specific post of yours. If I'm off topic, then you are as well. You keep trying to avoid answering the question - that's all. If you can't do that then there is no point in continuing this with you.

The 'refers' part here is ambiguous. I wasn't talking about the truth of the sentence, but about it's meaning. The sentence 'it is raining' means that it is raining, even if doesn't rain outside; so it doesn't matter if the sentence is true or false if we only want to know its meaning. — Fafner

Why would you ever say "it is raining" without ever referring to the weather outside? You seem to be saying that words have an objective meaning independent of them ever being used. But words have multiple meanings. We can say "it is raining" metaphorically, which doesn't meant that water is falling from clouds. What would we mean if we say, "it is raining cats and dogs." That sentence means that cats and dogs are falling from they sky?

Sheesh! I'm not changing the topic. I was responding to a specific post of yours. If I'm off topic, then you are as well. You keep trying to avoid answering the question - that's all. If you can't do that then there is no point in continuing this with you. — Harry Hindu

Which question?

Why would you ever say "it is raining" without ever referring to the weather outside? — Harry Hindu

What do you mean "referring to the weather outside"? Of course the sentence "it is raining" is about the weather outside, but its meaning is independent from the actual weather outside (because otherwise false statements would be meaningless).

You seem to be saying that words have an objective meaning independent of them ever being used. But words have multiple meanings. We can say "it is raining" metaphorically, which doesn't meant that water is falling from clouds. What would we mean if we say, "it is raining cats and dogs." That sentence means that cats and dogs are falling from they sky? — Harry Hindu

You are right, but this doesn't help you. But you also seem to be affirming the meaning is determined by use, contrary to what you've been arguing, so which way is it?

Which question? — Fafner

I must be arguing with an idiot. How about answering every question I posed on this page that you didn't answer.

What do you mean "referring to the weather outside"? Of course the sentence "it is raining" is about the weather outside, but its meaning is independent from the actual weather outside — Fafner

uhhh, Ok. It is about the weather outside but it's meaning is independent of the actual weather outside. How does that make any sense? In your effort to never admit you are wrong, you begin to sound incoherent.

I must be arguing with an idiot. How about answering every question I posed on this page that you didn't answer. — Harry Hindu

Because you are asking many irrelevant things, and life is too short (and anyway, I don't understand most of your questions).

uhhh, Ok. It is about the weather outside but it's meaning is independent of the actual weather outside. How does that make any sense? — Harry Hindu

Simple: "the weather outside" means that it can be either rainy or sunny, so the sentence "it is rainy" can refer to the whether outside even if it is false.

After all, I can ask you what is the whether outside without knowing if it is raining (and I will still be referring to the weather--whatever it is).

Simple: "the weather outside" means that it can be either rainy or sunny, so the sentence "it is rainy" can refer to the whether outside even if it is false.

After all, I can ask you what is the whether outside without knowing if it is raining (and I will be referring to the weather). — Fafner

I think this is a useful example of how meaning is different to reference. Both "it is raining" and "the weather outside" can refer to the same thing (if it's raining), but don't mean the same thing. So it is wrong to say that the meaning of a word (or a phrase) is the thing it refers to.

The same with my earlier example of "the son of of Edward VIII" and "the father of Elizabeth II".

So neither of Harry's proposed accounts of meaning (the other being concerned with intention) works at all.

The same with my earlier example of "the son of of Edward VIII" and "the father of Elizabeth II". — Michael

Or my example of "Caesar's murder" from the thread about truth.

Or my example of "Caesar's murder" etc. — Fafner

That doesn't seem to be quite the same since in the case of the earlier two examples (regarding the state of the weather, or George VI) the respective pairs of predicates, or singular terms, had the same Fregean reference (same Bedeutung) albeit different Fregean senses. But in the case of the events being referred to as "Caesar's murder" and as "Ceasar's dying" the difference in meaning runs deeper since the predicates "...was murdered" and "...died" have different Fregean references and not merely different Fregean senses. They are not two ways to single out the very same determination of the object (Caesar) but rather are ascribing different properties of him. On my view, there is no common 'event' that is being referred two under different descriptions. They are two numerically distinct events even though the very same individual is involved in both of them roughly at the same time and at the same place.

On my view, there is no common 'event' that is being referred two under different descriptions. They are two numerically distinct events even though the very same individual is involved in both of them roughly at the same time and at the same place. — Pierre-Normand

I don't agree, I think it is the same event under different description. I don't see the disanalogy between the two examples: why can't "...was murdered" and "...died" (or more accurately "the death of..." and "the murder of...") have the same reference just as "the son of..." and "the father of..."?

Well I haven't read the thread, it's progressed far to fast for me, but I think we've hit the nail on the head. "Language as use" provides us with no approach to this cool thing about speech which has to due with freedom and limitation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? Surely there is at least one interpretation of Wittgenstein that allows first person data about the experience of speaking.

Wittgensteinian "rule-following" is acting in a way which may be observed as being in accordance with some descriptive, inductive principles, which determine right and wrong, i.e., acting like the others. — Metaphysician Undercover

But don't you agree that sometimes there's value in asking if a statement is informative? To me that's a marker for ordinary language use vs unnecessary philosophical shenanigans (and sometimes other forms of bullshit.)

In the Wittgensteinian sense, it is impossible that one who is following the rule is acting wrongly, — Metaphysician Undercover

Right and wrong is just settled via success in communication, right?

I don't agree, I think it is the same event under different description. And also I don't see the disanalogy between the two examples: why can't "...was murdered" and "...died" have the same reference just as "the son of..." and "the father of..."? — Fafner

Well, "the son of..." and "the father of..." will only have the same reference if you fill them up with singular terms in such a way as to turn them into complete definite descriptions.

As for "...was murdered" and "...died", there just is no way to fill those up and refer to the same event (or so would I argue). In order to achieve something similar to the previous case, you would rather need something like "the ... who was murdered at (some time and place)" and "the ... who died at (some time and place)". Then, yes, you could fill them up in such a way that they would refer to the same individual (under two different Fregean senses). But this individual would be a human being rather than a historical event.

The issue with Caesar's murder and Caesar's death is that they refer to two different things that happened to Caesar. For sure, the murder could not have occurred without the death also occurring, but, as I think you already noted, the converse isn't true. And this asymmetry isn't merely a matter of the modes of presentation (Fregean sense) of the events.

Another way to highlight the difference is to notice that "...was murdered" is a determination of the determinable "...died" rather in the same way in which the property "...is crimson" is a determination of "...is red". But it is clear that an apple's being red isn't the same thing as its being crimson under two different descriptions. Likewise for, say, Fido being a dog and Fido being a mammal. Being a dog is one determinate way for an animal to be a mammal and being murdered is one determinate way for someone to die.

Again, I think the root of the illusion of there being a common "thing" being referred to under different descriptions when two separate events occur at the same place and the same time is the fact that roughly the same individuals are involved in both cases and there is a tendency to identify what happens (the 'neutral event') with its 'raw' material supervenience base, as it were. But an event singles out not just the individuals involved while merely specifying some definite time interval when the action occurs. It ascribes to them some specific relations and/or action/process forms that those individuals are involved into, and leaves out others that are irrelevant to the constitution of the event. (Hence, say, an apple falling from a tree wasn't necessarily part of WWII even if it occurred right then and there).

On edit: I think the same error underlies Donald Davidson anomalous monism. He is right regarding mental events not being subsumable under universally quantified statements of laws under those descriptions (that is, qua mental events), but he is wrong about them being token identical with physical events that are so subsumable under those different descriptions. A physical event never is something mental that is being described differently. If something mental occurs, then when one proceeds to describe what is occurring in physical terms, one is thereby talking about something else. (Which is not to say that there aren't any relationships between mental events and some of their physical underpinnings).

As for "...was murdered" and "...died", there just is no way to fill those up and refer to the same event (or so would I argue). In order to achieve something similar to the previous case, you would rather need something like "the ... who was murdered at (some time and place)" and "the ... who died at (some time and place)". Then, yes, you could fill them up in such a way that they would refer to the same individual (under two different Fregean senses). But this individual would be a human being rather than a historical event. — Pierre-Normand

You should change the descriptions to "the death of Caesar" and "the murder of Caesar", and then I think it will make more sense to think that they denote the same event (and also note that it is perfectly possible for two different descriptions to denote the same event; e.g. "the death of Caesar" and "the death of the conqueror of Gaul" - I hope would you agree).

The issue with Caesar's murder and Caesar's death is that they refer to two different things that happened to Caesar. — Pierre-Normand

Since "murder" just means something like "violent death", then on your view it would follow that a person can die twice (if "murder" and "death" are two distinct things that happen to everyone who's murdered), which is a pretty bizarre thing to say in my opinion.

Another way to highlight the difference is to notice that "...was murdered" is a determination of the determinable "...died" rather in the same way in which the property "...is crimson" is a determination of "...is red". But it is clear that an apple's being red isn't the same thing as its being crimson under two different descriptions. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not claiming that dying and being murdered are always the same thing. I'm only claiming that in the particular case of Caesar the two descriptions happen to denote contingently the same event (since they are non-rigid designators etc.). And there's nothing problematic in saying this. I'll try to illustrate this through your example. Crimson is a type of red, but it doesn't follow that a crimson apple has two distinct colors: crimson and red, but it has only one color that falls under two different descriptions (and this is consistent with the fact that being crimson and being red sometimes do refer to distinct colors). I hope that this makes sense.

I wonder if perhaps "the death of Caesar" only refers to the event of his body shutting down whereas "the murder of Caesar" refers also to the events that lead up to it.

It might be easier if we imagine that Caesar was stabbed on a Monday and died on the Tuesday. "the death of Caesar" refers to what happened on Tuesday, whereas "the murder of Caesar" refers to what happened on Monday as well.

I wonder if perhaps "the death of Caesar" only refers to the event of his body shutting down whereas "the murder of Caesar" refers also to the events that lead up to it. — Michael

But which events? Does the plotting before the actual assassination is part of the murder? Surely before he physically got stabbed he wasn't in the process of being murdered (say while comfortably eating lunch the day before or whatever).

I think my edit pre-empted this response.