We can also perceive it through other senses as well, including touching it. — NOS4A2
It is apparently easy enough to be sure about world events that one can quite hysterically object to alternative interpretations of them, and yet strangely, they can never be sure they're really seeing the tree as it is. — Isaac
I'm afraid this bears little relation to anything I've written.I'll try one more time to show how this is a mischaracterisation of realism. — Banno
In particular, for you, "the tree has leaves" is not about the light reflected from the tree. — Banno
The pretence is that our only choice is between a direct realism that does not recognise a causal chain involved in prception - a view that no one here actually holds — Banno
It’s when people are explicitly and politely told that what they are attacking is a position that nobody holds, and they ignore the information completely. — Jamal
I think it’s more that he is reacting to the equally incoherent claim that we don’t perceive things “as they (really) are”. — Jamal
The idea that we perceive things "as they are' seems incoherent to me. — Janus
Naive realists like Banno don't seem to be able to let go of this primal picture. — Janus
is oddly passive — Banno
Do you think philosophy, in the sense that it is being "practiced" here is anything more than an amusing pastime? — Janus
Are we directly affected by the light reflected off of objects? What would it mean to say we are indirectly affected by light? — Janus
Do you think philosophy, in the sense that it is being "practiced" here is anything more than an amusing pastime? — Janus
But we do not see the reflected light. — Banno
There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2
transformations you listed are transformations of the perceiver, not the perceived. — NOS4A2
A major type of direct realism is distinguished by its claim that we perceive trees, not representations of trees—not that perception isn’t a transformative process. — Jamal
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind and Cosmos
Basically, because (2) is at least possible, there's no 'hard problem' of consciousness because neuroscience's failure to account for it in terms of one-to-one correspondence with physically instantiated objects may be simply because there is no such correspondence to be found. — Isaac
In more detail, the challenge arises because it does not seem that the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”—fit into a physicalist ontology, one consisting of just the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements. It appears that even a complete specification of a creature in physical terms leaves unanswered the question of whether or not the creature is conscious. And it seems that we can easily conceive of creatures just like us physically and functionally that nonetheless lack consciousness. This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. All these factors make the hard problem hard.
It's entity all the way down and any action is just the movements and contortions of that entity. — NOS4A2
As I gave the example of earlier, early scientists used to refer to 'ether' and each would know what the other meant. Their use of the word didn't create a necessity for science to explain what 'ether' was. It doesn't exist, there's no such thing. — Isaac
This radical separation of cognitive processes from consciousness created a peculiar "explanatory gap" in scientific theorizing about the mind. — Joshs
Its role is not as an internal agent or ho-munculus that issues commands, but as an order parameter that or-ganizes and regulates dynamic activity. Freeman and Varela thus agree that consciousness is neurally embodied as a global dynamic activity pattern that organizes activity throughout the brain.” — Joshs
This thread consist in impotent virtue signalling. — Banno
There isn't any phenomenal aspect to the third person account. It's the God's eye view. — frank
Tommy squirmed in the hard plastic chair, suffocating in the reek of recent flatulence which pervaded the office. The principal's voice was a drone, a distant second to the large red birthmark on the principal's forehead in the competition for Tommy's attention.
The fact that we share a common experiential ground stems from the fact that we share a common world, as well as a common neurology. Nonetheless I cannot look through your eyes, as you cannot mine. We can never know what it would actually be like, if we could.Well... it's that we couldn't communicate all without any preceding common ground. — frank
I think Chalmers is including all of that as phenomenal consciousness, of the outer world and the realm of imagination. — frank
Would you agree that the third person view is a construction? — frank
Having said that, if someone wants to create a new account with a new email address its not that difficult, sure they have lost their philosophical history but it allows them to participate once again. A fresh start.
It's not like anyone can be permanently banned from contributing, it's account specific. — Benj96
Think of tpf as a magazine or philosophical daily paper, staffed by volunteer contributors and volunteer editors. — unenlightened
It basically concludes that communication is always a matter of pointing to facets of your audience's experience. — frank
There could be cases where experience varies significantly, as with people with aphantasia, but knowledge of that implies some commonality in order to communicate it. — frank
As for "internal". I just don't understand what it's supposed to be internal to. My skull? — frank
? Are we supposed to reason towards what elevates our self esteem and makes us feel good? Rather than towards the truth?the aspect of phenomenality cannot be all that significant — Joshs
is experience and intentionality on the contrary intimately connected? — Joshs
you can't follow a simple argument there's little point continuing. try reading what I've written rather than arguing against what you think I probably wrote. — Isaac
If we're not describing some.empirical object (or event) then it would be weird if some empirical objects matched up with it exactly. The 'hard problem' would emerge if there was a one-to-one correspondence. Then we'd have something odd to explain. That it doesn't is exactly what we'd expect. It's not even an easy problem, its not a problem at all. — Isaac
I'm not looking to do a deep dive on what Isaac thinks because I'd probably bump my head on the bottom of the pool — frank
Something odd I've recently noticed is that I don't really understand why people say phenomenal consciousness is private, internal, and ineffable. I really believed Dennett was being disingenuous when he assigned those properties to it.
Now I'm starting to realize that many people actually do experience things that way. — frank
Yes. I wouldn't want to deny a Bishop moves diagonally in chess either. Doesn't mean there's a scientific explanation lacking for why. — Isaac
We're not gods. — Isaac
Through dendrites. — Isaac
But that doesn't seem to satisfy because you switch definition of 'consciousness'. — Isaac
Other than that, you can't point to it, you can't specify it, you can't identify it in any way other than saying the word. — Isaac
I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences — Isaac
The cause of phenomenological consciousness is the striate cortex, since you find lesions there to be an adequate explanation for blindsight. — Isaac
No 'Experience' is a word it's felicitous use in conversation is not empirical evidence, — Isaac
There already is a very good explanation for Blindsight. what is it you think the explanation is lacking? — Isaac