Moreover, even if the implication of relativity is true, that past and future are coequally real with the present, doesn't mean that they are real for us.

Similarly, from the god's eye view, there might be billions of other universes. But their events do not intersect ours, at all, and so from our view, they are not real.

Or, there might be an amazing alien civilization "right now" in another galaxy. But it is strictly inaccessible to us, due to the speed of light we are completely limited to imagining it. "unreal" is what only exists in the imagination, and so this civilization is unreal to us.

I have a somewhat similar view. I believe the past and future is real, but only by virtue of the present.

The past is not like a museum hall frozen in time. The past is both the progenitor and the imprint on the present. The bite wound on my finger is real, and the event that caused it is real, as it caused and imprinted the present state of my finger, and my memory of it. But as the scar and my memory fades, so does the bite event. In 100 years, the event will have passed from existence.

Similarly, the future is the set of open possibilities which can be arrived at from the present. A future event is real to the extent that it is the likely possibility or range of possibilities. The future event of me sitting in this chair 10 seconds from my typing this sentence is quite real, most paths from the present lead to it. But it is not quite as real as my present state of sitting. Where I will be at this time of day in June is largely undetermined and so has not emerged as real yet. The first thought of my day 20 years from now is barely real yet at all, since it is almost totally unconstrained from this point.

To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin

To clarify: By "Can this same something" , I was referring to the property of existence, however you define it. I am not asking if precisely the same thing can be said. By trying to sidestep "how do you define existence", it looks like I created more confusion.

To say “This rock exists” is saying something about the rock. But have I said anything less if I just pointed to the rock and said “This rock”. — Richard B

"This rock" merely points attention to the rock.

And would I say anything more if I said “This is the rock I stubbed my toe on yesterday and by the way it still exists. You mean now? No, I mean still exists in yesterday.” — Richard B

This senselessly attaches a metaphysical claim to a mundane one.

This is good example of confusion disguised as deep metaphysical musings. — Richard B

I make no claim to philosophical depth, but you are the one confused.

This rock exists cannot be said of the rock of yesterday nor the rock of tomorrow, — Mww

No, but you can say, "the rock of yesterday exists", "the rock of tomorrow exists".

The issue cannot be reduced to grammar.

I am wondering more about what it is saying about the person who says it and in what situation saying it would be of any use. — Fooloso4

Perhaps teaching the language, or a philosophical discussion: "This rock exists. Dragons do not."
Perhaps there is a situation where some rocks are illusory projections.

There is one now in the sense that there is one north. But just like north points in different directions at different points, different moments of time are christened "now".

Every single 'now'? Have you ever experienced more than one? — Tate

Of course. Just not simultaneously.

which is also saying something, but not the same something, — Mww

which says something about this rock but does not say the same thing — Mww

So you understand that you did not answer my question. I am asking if the same thing, the property of existence, can be applied to the rock of the past and future.

"Exists" typically connotes the present only because we don't generally speak of metaphysical topics like the existence of the past and future.

clarification — Banno

What you've said was clear enough. Clearly wrong. But clear, yes.

As if putting a piece on the board were a move in chess. — Banno

Except for your analogy.

At least our has finally found religion. There is no God worth its salt that cannot be the subject of a predicate.

Einstein seems to answer that the past and future exist as much as the present. If we grant this, then there is nothing mysterious about a specialness to "now" that cannot be explained by science. It is simply an illusion. After all, every single "now" has this apparent specialness.

Yep. Both may be the. subject of a predicate. — Banno

Nope. This is just not how we use "exist". If it were, "x does not exist" would be a contradiction.

can lead you to water, but not make you drink. — Banno

:lol:

Yes, it does, since you are talking about it. — Banno

how we use the term "such-and-such". — Banno

How about the term "exist"?

You collapse the distinction that the term "exists" picks out. In your sense, fairies on mars exist as much as my nose.

You are asking the wrong question. — Banno

Who made you arbiter of right and wrong questions?

:clap:

My answer: the past exists, to the extent that the past is embodied in the present. A baby in the past is embodied in an adult in the present, since the adult causally flowed from the baby. But a past event or object which is embodied by nothing in the present, for instance, a butterfly flapping it's wings once 10000 years ago, no longer exists.

Similarly, future objects and events exist to the extent that they are embodied by present antecedents. For instance, a completed sculpture is embodied by a work in progress, but in a fuzzy manner, to the extent that the completed work can still take many forms. But future events and objects which have no antecedents yet, for instance the bar code number on a receipt given to a raven in a far future corvid civilization, does not yet exist in any sense.

Even if we accept that the accounts and quotations of Jesus are accurate in the new testament, I see no contradiction in treating him as a wise man who expressed this in the prevailing prophetic, eschatological mode of that time and place.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13434/the-moral-instinct

My answer is, both.

As I noted, even if it exists, it isn't evidence for your position. — T Clark

How no?

Large parental power differentials over their children leave an impression of an almighty parent after that differential is outgrown. The absence of the fictional parent-as-god is fulfilled by religion. If this were so, we would expect more religiosity in cultures where that power differential is larger, in cultures with paternalistic God figures.

I don't see any necessary connection between the conditions you describe and the results you claim. — T Clark

You just restated more verbosely. Do you agree the correlation I describe exists?

I don't see that as evidence for your point at all. — T Clark

Oh? Great. Why don't you elaborate?

https://www.khaleejtimes.com/business/miracle-girl-nandana-has-access-to-mothers-memory

I have heard of this case several times before, it is supposed to be quite extraordinary.

Presuming this is real, I wonder what is any standard of evidence would be required before it is accepted.

As noted earlier by myself and others, no evidence has been provided that this is really the way things work. It doesn't seem likely to me. — T Clark

Consider this evidence: The relationship of extreme power between parent and child is more prevalent in more conservative societies and households, and far more prevalent in the past. The more this extreme relationship holds, the more religiosity we observe. Corresponding with liberalization, and the softening of the parent-child relationship, we see a corresponding trend towards secularism.

I wrote a similar post a few months back.

I would add that a (typically) a parent occupies a overwhelming position of power in relation to their child. The parent decrees what is right and wrong, dispenses reward and punishment, at their whim as does the God of the OT. This power differential creates in your terms a mold which inevitably the parent cannot actually fill. But as you say, the mold remains, and is fulfilled by personal gods.

Reading the texts of personal god religions, the parental character of God the Father is hard to overlook.

I think what is missing from this discussion is context. Given a context, there are of course numbers which you can consider effectively infinite: c for velocities, the age of the earth for history, and so on. But there is no such thing as an effective infinity free of context. This is especially clear when you consider that when you are talking about the real big boys, Graham's Number for instance, you need their context to even mention them. Without the context of their formulation, they are inconceivable.

Another way to think about truth is in terms of possible worlds.

First, it must be acknowledged that truth is a continuum, it is non-binary (If you doubt this, consider the claim "X has $10000 in their bank account. This is true if X has $10000 or $9990, mostly true if X has $9500, not at all true if X has $50).

Every proposition P proposes not a possible world, but rather a ;large or infinite set of possible worlds. This is the only way language can work, since reality is very fine grained, whereas language is very coarse.

P is true if the actual world is one among that set of possible worlds P means, or if the distance between the actual world and the nearest possible world of P is negligible. The degree of truth declines as the actual world recedes from the cloud of possible worlds meant by P.

The same is true of the interpretation of P. An interpretation is valid if the possible world(s) the interpretation represents is contained by or closely matches the set of possible worlds which P means,, or if the distance is negligible. The correctness of the interpretation of P declines with it's distance from P.

I think it boils down to this.

There is a concept of agenthood. Like most concepts it is not binary, it is a continuum. Humans are highly agent, though debates over free will attack this. Rocks are not. Animals are, although their degree varies with the animal and with the person considering them.

Events and objects are similarly the product of agents, by proxy, to various degrees. Paintings are very agent-by-proxy. Cities are as well, though perhaps somewhat less, as there is an element of blind process in their development over time. Thunderstorms are not agent-by-proxy at all.

To be theist is to adopt a radical worldview where, in the deepest sense, agent-by-proxy is applied to everything, to the maximal degree. To be atheist is the opposite, nothing is agent-by-proxy in the deepest sense, everything ultimately results from blind process. There is a whole spectrum of worldviews in between.

cheerleading different linguistic conventions that emphasize different semantics for different purposes. — sime

I wouldn't put it that way. It is about our concepts. "Meaning" is a word for a concept. What is it? Specifically here, does it include features of objective reality, even ones we are unaware of?

The debate is factual to the extent you consider the contents of our concepts as matters of fact.

To think otherwise is to grant linguists powers of omniscient authority. — sime

Not sure what you mean here.

Would we all be wrong who say "Joe Biden is president?" — hypericin

I just did it. It is conflation.

In this case, yes we would be wrong, at least legally. Nonetheless we (by "we" I emphatically exclude batshit Trumpies) all mean Joe Biden, not Kamela Harris, not Trump, by "The President of the US".

See the SEP article on names — Michael

If this is true, then meaning is divorced from extension. Names have extension, but according to this no corresponding intension.

Let A and B be any two terms which differ in extension. By assumption (II) they must differ in meaning (in the sense of "intension").

must be wrong. Two names differ in extension, but have the same (absent) intension.

Arent we condemned to a world of ideas? — Joshs

Yes, this is why I disagree with Putnam. Putnam believes that differences in the thing in itself, differences which we have no access to, can impose change on our meaning. These differences can only impose changes in the absolute facticity of our claims.

the term "the President" refers to Joe Biden. — Michael

This is grounded in community usage, as well as in this case legalisms. My argument is that meaning derives from community usage, not objective reality. (A more analogous example would be, suppose there was some bylaw which meant that legally Kamela Harris was in fact president. This law was so obscure that on one ever noticed, now or in the future. Would we all be wrong who say "Joe Biden is president?").

In 2000BC, "The center of the universe" generally had the extension of "The earth". Factually this was incorrect. Nonetheless, that is what people meant by it.

You have to divorce the concept of meaning from factual. How would you otherwise understand the history of science? When ancient philosophers mentioned "substance" did they mean all the details of quantum theory? Factually, that is what they were referring to, but their meaning contained no trace of wave equations.

And in such a scenario if you were to say "this is a glass of water" you would be wrong because it isn't a glass of water, it's a glass of twin-water. — Michael

Suppose this change happened in 2000BC? Would everyone suddenly be wrong when they said "this is a cup of water" in their language?

That's a proper name. "Michael" doesn't really mean anything, it's just an identifier. — Michael

What is a proper name if not a word that means a particular thing?

The same example can be made without using a proper name. Suppose all the world's water was suddenly replaced with twin water. Until I learned of this replacement, I would still mean water when I said "water". Only when I learned would I mean twin water. While still acknowledging that the people who were naïve to the change still mean water.

n other words, there's no such thing as what I mean by the word "water", there is only what the word "water" means. — Michael

Imagine you were killed and replaced by an evil doppelganger. Your friend George, unaware of this, says "Hi Michael". George doesn't mean the doppelganger, he means to greet Good Michael. Only for those who learned of substitution would "Michael" mean the doppelganger.

Let A and B be any two terms which differ in extension. By assumption (II) they must differ in meaning (in the sense of "intension").

Seems very dubious when applied to differences in extension which the speaker is unaware of.

I think I agree, and I think you hit on the mistake of my op.

The full meaning of a sentence can only be gotten with it's context. The context free part, the part you understand just by knowing the language, is only part of the meaning. The other part of the meaning is the part gotten from context. This contextual meaning may include referent(s), though the actual, physical (or mental) referent is of course not a meaning.

I was confusing contextualized meaning and referent.

Hmm, good point. I think you're right.

My current thinking:
From our omniscient perspective of the posers of the thought experiment, "water" and twin "water" mean something different, for us. Nonetheless, when earthlings and twin earthlings say "water", they mean the exact same thing, for them. You can see this by imagining an earthling being transpose into twin earth, or vice versa. The alien's extension for water will exactly match the natives.

Putnam unjustifiably projects the perspective of the thought experiment onto its subjects.

I suggest they're interchangeable. — bongo fury

Compare the four sentences:

S1: The water is cold.
Meaning known, referent unknown

S2: ទឹកគឺត្រជាក់។
Meaning unknown (unless you are Cambodian), referent unknown

S3: The water in Lake Michigan is cold.
Meaning known, referent known

S4: The water in Lake Michigan is ironic.
Meaning unknown, referent known


Meaning and referent can each be independently known or unknown.

If you prefer. The point being that it clearly distinguishes meaning and reference, in contrast to your title. — Banno

You got the argument totally wrong, nothing to do with my preference.

It would be silly to suggest that someone like Putnam would be naive to the distinction between meaning and reference. Nonetheless I'm claiming that he conflated the two in his conclusion.

I suggest they're interchangeable. We all know that your sentence S refers to water in general, and cold things in general. We just don't know which bit of water you mean. — bongo fury

The use of the definite article means that S refers to a specific bit of water, not water in general.

If meaning and referent were interchangeable it would not be possible to know the meaning but not the referent.