didn't quite get it until I thought of "our only point of contact" in a sort of Flatland way -- imagine that all you know of the line is what you know as a point on it, take its point of view, and to be such a point is to see a neverending expanse of line to either side of you — Srap Tasmaner
Please explain where I go wrong. :chin: — jgill
So reference is to some particular item (e.g. glass of liquid), whereas meaning is reference to a wider class or extension (e.g. of water)? — bongo fury
Same meaning in each case, but different referent. Hence, the argument goes, the meaning of "water" is not its chemical composition. — Banno
Let W 1 and W 2 be two possible worlds in which I exist and in which
this glass exists and in which I am giving a meaning explanation by
pointing to this glass and saying "this is water." (We do not assume
that the liquid in the glass is the same in both worlds.) Let us suppose
that in W 1 the glass is full of H20 and in W2 the glass is full of XYZ.
We shall also suppose that W 1 is the actual world and that XYZ is the
stuff typically called "water" in the world W 2 (so that the relation between English speakers in W 1 and English speakers in W 2 is exactly
the same as the relation between English speakers on Earth and English
speakers on Twin Earth). Then there are two theories one might have
concerning the meaning of "water."
( 1) One might hold that "water" was world-relative but constant in
meaning (i.e., the word has a constant relative meaning). On this
theory, "water" means the same in W 1 and W 2; it's just that water is
H20 in W 1 and water is XYZ in Wz.
(2) One might hold that water is H20 in all worlds (the stuff called
"water" in W 2 isn't water), but "water" doesn't have the same meaning
in W1 and Wz.
If what was said before about the Twin Earth case was correct, then
( 2) is clearly the correct theory.
My correction:
1) The symbols themselves are not concept-independent, as if sounds or markings were not already interpretive meanings.
2)The meaning of symbols can’t be divorced from its interpretation by an individual in a given context.
3)Interpretation doesnt just compare itself to an extant set of rules for meaning. It is the only place where meaning actually arises.
4) We can’t speak of objects in the world outside of the objects that we form through our conceptual interpretations — Joshs
But there seems to be an inconsistency in that you agreed "meaning is something like a social reality" then recanted with "Sentences are just tools used to induce thoughts in others". — Banno
Yep, why not? — bongo fury
Eh? — bongo fury
We may or may not pretend some corresponding bolt of energy passes between the symbol and object themselves.
But I'm treating meaning as synonymous with reference — bongo fury
Then how does he deal with sentences with no referent? "The cat in the hat" has meaning but no reference in the world. If the meaning of "The cat in the hat" is in your head, then mustn't all meaning be in the head?And recommends dropping it. — bongo fury
It is invented, or pretended, by people using their heads, but that doesn't locate it in the head. — bongo fury
He illustrated this with his twin earth experiment. — Joshs
What are interpretations? I would say: sentences that help us construe symbols as pointing at things. What would you say? — bongo fury
P is true is just fancy talk for P. — Pie
9. Sentient life has a tendency to destroy itself. — praxis
Sure, in some contexts, propositional logic for instance, truth is binary.So... that's partially true? — Banno
Your argument, of course, applies to your own remarks, and so if it undermines everything, it undermines itself. — Banno
I think that they sometimes to, due to ambiguity primarily. But let us differentiate carefully here between imperfectly true statements (fuzzy logic, etc.) and the confidence we have in our beliefs. — Pie
P is true is just fancy talk for P. This is the 'redundancy' theory. — Pie
just as you who are experiencing them are also interpreting them
for yourself — Joshs
and as a result we directly perceive ( without simulation) a version of the other’s intentions , — Joshs
it is an elaboration of organizational and functional characteristics of all living systems. — Joshs
Calculations in physics. The Lorentz factor is unbounded. — jgill
the observable universe is far too small to contain an ordinary digital representation of Graham's number, assuming that each digit occupies one Planck volume, possibly the smallest measurable space. But even the number of digits in this digital representation of Graham's number would itself be a number so large that its digital representation cannot be represented in the observable universe. Nor even can the number of digits of that number—and so forth, for a number of times far exceeding the total number of Planck volumes in the observable universe.
I don't see the difference. Sorry, I just don't. — noAxioms
You completely misunderstood, this is all just background I made up for my hypothetical question. No scientists in question, no such structure has been discovered. — hypericin
Are you making this up or did the scientists in question actually say this? Did they actually say this structure is responsible for the kind of consciousness that the dualists are talking about? — noAxioms
You suggest that some people are zombies, but balk when I suggest I'm probably one of them since I don't see the problem that others do so clearly. — noAxioms
A digital camera doesn't just store it, there are a multitude of processes which must occur before the light can be stored digitally. Correcting for red eye is just another transformation.A device with a camera sees red if it in any way reacts to the data instead of just storing it like a camera does. — noAxioms
That is not the usual definition. The usual is something more like "private internal perception". A camera or a computer can respond behaviorally to it's red sensors in essentially the same way you can to yours. But (we presume) only you have an accompanying subjective experience of red.By what definition? It's not human, sure, and that's the usual definition. — noAxioms
Ah, but I'm behaving differently, and true zombies apparently must lie about this sort of thing. — noAxioms
Exactly what evidence was collected to suggest this conclusion? — noAxioms
I've never been able to figure out what people have that a machine cannot. — noAxioms