There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2

When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. That is one level of indirection.

Your body might tumble around and bump into other objects. But, you are not your body. You are the part of your brain that is aware. If you fall into a vegetative coma, you are gone, even if the rest of your body is healthy. If your awareness survived your body's death, you would survive.

This part of the brain that is aware has no direct access to the world. It can only interpret certain brain activity sensorily. These interpretations, experiences, are at a great remove from the objects that stimulate them.

Which is not to say you only access these experiences. These experiences track real actions and properties of real objects, and so you are aware of objects, not merely experiences. But this awareness is at a remove from the objects, it is indirect.

You cannot see the tree as it really is, this is a contraction. To see is to experience subjectively. Bats will see the tree differently than us, and aliens will see it differently than us and bats. There is no right answer among these different ways of seeing, they are all interpretations.

transformations you listed are transformations of the perceiver, not the perceived. — NOS4A2

Exactly right, the tree transforms the light that reflects off it, which transforms the chemical activity of the light receptors, which transforms electrical activity in the nervous system, which transforms subjective experience.

What exactly about this process is "direct"?

It is reasonable to treat the mental act of categorization as part of the perception. It is also reasonable to distinguish it from the perception.

A major type of direct realism is distinguished by its claim that we perceive trees, not representations of trees—not that perception isn’t a transformative process. — Jamal

We perceive directly.
Perception is a transformative process.

How can these be consistent?

Direct realism is logically impossible. To perceive something means to translate it's sense data into a form that is apprehendable by an agent. This involves two transformations:

1. The transformation from sensory media (light, sound waves, chemicals) into nerve signals.

2: The transformation or interpretation of nerve signals into the abstract, fictive qualities of experience (colors, sounds, smells).

This double transformation is the precondition of perception and rules out direct realism.

To answer your question, you perceive the tree. But to perceive entails the above two transformations.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. — Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind and Cosmos

Does this imply that an amended science could account for the mental? What could that amendment look like?

It seems that recently our willingness to grant consciousness to others has increased recently. I was surprised to see Sartre, the philosopher of subjectivity, declare animals to be machines, not even a century ago. And my feeling is that even children were not granted full consciousness status not long ago, in spite of the evidence of peoples own memories. Were women deemed to be conscious in 1860?

Is this broadening of what is deemed conscious a reflection of a broader trend towards greater inclusivity? Is the perception of something as an insentient thing a necessary step towards abusing, exploiting, and killing it?

Precisely because we have no answer to the hard problem, we don't know definitely, we can only make educated guesses.

The hard problem seems inescapable. Even if you claim, "phenomenal consciousness is an illusion", the question remains, "why do some systems experience this illusion, and others do not?". People are experiencing something, and this must be explained.

Basically, because (2) is at least possible, there's no 'hard problem' of consciousness because neuroscience's failure to account for it in terms of one-to-one correspondence with physically instantiated objects may be simply because there is no such correspondence to be found. — Isaac

After what, 100 posts on this topic? You demonstrate you have no clue what the hard problem is.

At least read this: https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/#:~:text=The%20hard%20problem%20of%20consciousness%20is%20the%20problem%20of%20explaining,directly%20appear%20to%20the%20subject.

In more detail, the challenge arises because it does not seem that the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”—fit into a physicalist ontology, one consisting of just the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements. It appears that even a complete specification of a creature in physical terms leaves unanswered the question of whether or not the creature is conscious. And it seems that we can easily conceive of creatures just like us physically and functionally that nonetheless lack consciousness. This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. All these factors make the hard problem hard.

It's entity all the way down and any action is just the movements and contortions of that entity. — NOS4A2

In other words, the activity of that entity.

As I gave the example of earlier, early scientists used to refer to 'ether' and each would know what the other meant. Their use of the word didn't create a necessity for science to explain what 'ether' was. It doesn't exist, there's no such thing. — Isaac

You can only say that because you have the advantage of the 20th century knowledge that the ether doesn't exist..

In the 19th century there were very good reasons for believing in the ether, we would have too if we lived then (if we were lucky enough to be educated). You didn't get to just say, "hey guys, ether is just a felicitous word, that doesn't imply it exists." That's because no one was arguing from it's use in language. You had to actually demonstrate the ether doesn't exist, that the good reasons were not good enough, which is not a trivial thing.

This radical separation of cognitive processes from consciousness created a peculiar "explanatory gap" in scientific theorizing about the mind. — Joshs

This suggests that the origin of the explanatory gap is theoretical, if only the wrong theory wasn't chosen there wouldn't be one.. I can't see how this is so. One of these two propositions must be shown to be false to resolve the hard problem:

1. The existence of mental events is conditional on the right kinds of physical events taking place. (note that this does not imply epiphenomenalism).

2. We can't conceive how physical events can engender mental events, as an exhaustive inventory of physical events does not seem to imply mental events.

Does the choice of theory as described here impact either?

Its role is not as an internal agent or ho-munculus that issues commands, but as an order parameter that or-ganizes and regulates dynamic activity. Freeman and Varela thus agree that consciousness is neurally embodied as a global dynamic activity pattern that organizes activity throughout the brain.” — Joshs

Does this mean something?

Hi Ukraine. How's the weather up there, cold enough for ya? Sorry about Dnipro and all. I'm sure you have your ideas on how to proceed from here, but I'm afraid @Isaac says that borders don't exist. As it thereby follows that your will in this matter has no particular moral claim, we decided to consult with a random sampling of hotdog vendors instead. Have a nice day.

This thread consist in impotent virtue signalling. — Banno

A complaint typically levied by those lacking the virtue in question.

There isn't any phenomenal aspect to the third person account. It's the God's eye view. — frank

In the literary sense it doesn't have to be free of phenomenal content. It just means that the point of view is not tied to any one character:

Tommy squirmed in the hard plastic chair, suffocating in the reek of recent flatulence which pervaded the office. The principal's voice was a drone, a distant second to the large red birthmark on the principal's forehead in the competition for Tommy's attention.

Philosophers don't generally use the 1st/3rd person distinction in the strict literary sense however, the usage is more by analogy. The third person perspective is that of the detached observer, while the first is the perspective of the conscious individual. In this sense everybody takes on both perspectives, and when looking in the mirror, simultaneously, on the same object.

Well... it's that we couldn't communicate all without any preceding common ground. — frank

The fact that we share a common experiential ground stems from the fact that we share a common world, as well as a common neurology. Nonetheless I cannot look through your eyes, as you cannot mine. We can never know what it would actually be like, if we could.

I think Chalmers is including all of that as phenomenal consciousness, of the outer world and the realm of imagination. — frank

Yup

Would you agree that the third person view is a construction? — frank

In what sense? When we observe anything in the world, we are observing it from a third person perspective. That is a component of our first person perspective, what it is like to be us.

Having said that, if someone wants to create a new account with a new email address its not that difficult, sure they have lost their philosophical history but it allows them to participate once again. A fresh start.

It's not like anyone can be permanently banned from contributing, it's account specific. — Benj96

For new posters, and even someone like me, that is not that a big deal. But Olivier5 had thousands of posts, and more importantly, real relationships, mayhap even friendships. It seems cruel to sever those over this incident, which had multiple sides to it.

Think of tpf as a magazine or philosophical daily paper, staffed by volunteer contributors and volunteer editors. — unenlightened

Except it is not. It is a voluntary community, moderated ideally for that communities benefit. There was no benefit here afaict, rather the mere assuagement of the moderators' egos.

It basically concludes that communication is always a matter of pointing to facets of your audience's experience. — frank

If communication requires common experiential ground, this seems to rather imply the privacy of experience. If experience were communicable, then the relevant experiential background could be communicated.

There could be cases where experience varies significantly, as with people with aphantasia, but knowledge of that implies some commonality in order to communicate it. — frank

Aphantasia is kind of a special case. Our experience of our inner world echoes our experience of the outer world. Our inner monologue echoes the sound of us (or someone) talking, and our inner visualization echo (faintly,to be sure, for most) the experience of seeing. And so it is possible to understand one in terms of the other. Since those with aphantasia can still see, they can imagine visualization as a movie playing inside the head. But if they lacked both inner and outer sight, then it is impossible to communicate vision to that person.

As for "internal". I just don't understand what it's supposed to be internal to. My skull? — frank

Internality to me is close to privacy: from the external, third-person perspective, the organism's experience is not evident. Experience is only revealed from the internal, first-person perspective. That is, to the organism.

A few things struck me as odd. Why does epiphenomenalism "threaten"?
So what if

the aspect of phenomenality cannot be all that significant — Joshs

? Are we supposed to reason towards what elevates our self esteem and makes us feel good? Rather than towards the truth?

is experience and intentionality on the contrary intimately connected? — Joshs

I think I agree with this, but in the sense that explaining cognition without experience is hopeless, in the same way that explaining biology without cells is hopeless. Sure, all biology is ultimately reducible to molecules bouncing around, but you won't get anywhere trying to describe it in those terms. It is the wrong level of description. Similarly, neural activity is the wrong level of description to explain "higher" (that is, conscious) cognition. It (we) treats phenomenal experience as if it were elemental, and thinks in terms of them, even if they are ultimately reducible to neural activity (in ways yet to be elucidated).

you can't follow a simple argument there's little point continuing. try reading what I've written rather than arguing against what you think I probably wrote. — Isaac

If I'm not understanding you correctly, maybe it would help if your "argument" was the least bit coherent.

On the one hand, we "have" experiences, yet whatever they are, they are a pale, ghostly thing, a not "an entity/event in need of explanation", it is a mere "felicitous word", that exists somewhere in it's "own world".

At times you have likened experience to fictional entities (gods, pixie dust, the ether), at other times human convention (the boundary between red and orange, the movement of chess pieces), at other times you declared the simple identity of experience and neural activity. Which is it? And all this without, as far as I can tell, the slightest shred of evidence or argument that experience is any of these, or even that it is possible for experience to be any of these. You just baldly insist on it.

Are you just waving around your (no doubt flawed) interpretation of the results of the Anomalous Monism argument as if they were self evident truths?

If there is an argument somewhere, it seems to be this "killer".

If we're not describing some.empirical object (or event) then it would be weird if some empirical objects matched up with it exactly. The 'hard problem' would emerge if there was a one-to-one correspondence. Then we'd have something odd to explain. That it doesn't is exactly what we'd expect. It's not even an easy problem, its not a problem at all. — Isaac

Which is garbage. If memory does not have a one-to-one correspondence with neural activity (as you have asserted), does that imply that there is no neural basis for memory? That memory too has no need for explanation, existing in its own shadowy world? No, it just means that the relationship between memory and neural activity is irreducibly complex. Do I need to waste time providing evidence of the neural basis of memory?

No, forgive me if I'm not willing to spend another iota of my precious time picking over your opinions on this matter. They are just not that interesting. As a far wiser man than me said,

I'm not looking to do a deep dive on what Isaac thinks because I'd probably bump my head on the bottom of the pool — frank

PS no one is attacking your precious neuroscience, so quit whining about it as if they were.

Something odd I've recently noticed is that I don't really understand why people say phenomenal consciousness is private, internal, and ineffable. I really believed Dennett was being disingenuous when he assigned those properties to it.

Now I'm starting to realize that many people actually do experience things that way. — frank

So do you experience them as public, external, effable?

Im confused how much all these disagreements are due to conceptual differences and how much are due to differences in ways of experiencing.

I believe experience is all three, for reasons that are more conceptual than experiential:

Private and internal: experiences are not public, a third party will never be able to access them, they are available to you and you alone, because experience cannot be experienced in the third person, only lived in the first person. Experience is your first person interface to the world. It is what it is like to be you, and no one else.

Ineffable: Experiences are incommunicable. The best you can do to describe them is to use other experience words. Red is like orange, feels hot, and so on. But ultimately any description must be circular. If my experience words map to your experience words in totally different ways, we will never find out. We can never know if humanity all experiences in the same way, if is it is divided into experiential groups, or if we all experience uniquely. This follows from the privacy of experience, which is absolute, there is no way out of it.

I doubt this will convince you. But this is my view, and it is quite hard for me to think outside of it. Especially the denialists, they are incomprehensible to me.

Yes. I wouldn't want to deny a Bishop moves diagonally in chess either. Doesn't mean there's a scientific explanation lacking for why. — Isaac

Why waste our time demanding evidence for something you wouldn't deny?

Bishops move diagonally for historical reasons. History and science are both necessary for understanding the world. Bishops don't move diagonally "just because". If someone claimed that I would require a better explanation for that as well.

We're not gods. — Isaac

Exactly, unlike chess experience does not strike me as something we can whisk into being from nothingness. If we can, I want to know how.

Through dendrites. — Isaac

How is your conscious brain interface with something it is unconscious of? "The ball is red" is information, when confronted by a red ball does this proposition pop into your head unbidden?

But that doesn't seem to satisfy because you switch definition of 'consciousness'. — Isaac

Where have I done so?

Other than that, you can't point to it, you can't specify it, you can't identify it in any way other than saying the word. — Isaac

But wait, I thought:

I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences — Isaac

Have you reverted back to p-zombiehood? How exactly does your conscious mind (if it is) receive information about the world, if it doesn't experience? If there is no experience, what exactly are sufferers of blindsight complaining about?

The cause of phenomenological consciousness is the striate cortex, since you find lesions there to be an adequate explanation for blindsight. — Isaac

Again, the question is not what is responsible for consciousness. It's the brain, everyone knows it. The question is how the brain is responsible for consciousness.

No 'Experience' is a word it's felicitous use in conversation is not empirical evidence, — Isaac

Who exactly is arguing from its felicitous use as a word? Only you, for me.

There already is a very good explanation for Blindsight. what is it you think the explanation is lacking? — Isaac

I think it is just fine. It is a biological explanation for a change (loss) of phenomenal experience. The explanation is not floating off in some other world, as you would have it. .

The hard problem is not about consciousness in the abstract, it specifically asks how the biological reality of nervous systems relates to the first person reality of experiences.

If this were true there would be as many hard problems as there are nominalizations.

Right, and that is a far cry from saying "science needn't bother answering this".

There's no need for one to explain the other — Isaac

There is absolutely a need for one to explain the other, if there was no need there would be no hard problem.

I think you're broadly in agreement with Chalmers here. — frank

I don't see how. — Isaac

For once I agree with @Isaac. For Chalmers there is an explanatory gap, for Isaac there is no gap, since consciousness is somehow a purely human construct, requiring no explanation.

Us being able to use a word in conversation is not an indicator that that word picks out some empirical object or event in need of a scientific explanation. — Isaac

you agree that we have experiences, and therefore some scientific accounting for them is necessary, to have a complete understanding of the world. — hypericin

Understanding of the world, not word. Experiences are events, whether or not they are somehow illusory. As such they require an explanation.

The boundary between two words that designate regions of a continuous phenomenon is very clearly not a event or property of the world. But our capacity to use such words as 'orange' to conceptually discretize continuities is subject to scientific explanation.

The use of the word 'consciousness' as it's used here and the study of neurons are not 'in the same world' they don't overlap in their activities. There's no need for one to explain the other, it wouldn't even make sense it'd be like expecting physics to explain what a googly is in cricket. — Isaac

Suppose you lost your ability to experience sight (assuming you have it), even though you can still clearly respond to visual events. In what "world" would you look for an explanation of your plight?

Much the same thing happens with an inverted spectrum; — Banno

But don't stop there, you've left us hanging.

Gibberish.

How so? — frank

Every event must have a cause. If consciousness isn't supernatural, and the physical state of the brain remains constant, then the inversion would be left without any possible cause.

One day you wake up and your spectrum is inverted, but no physical changes happened to your brain. Is that conceivable? Sure. — frank

Assuming you reject dualism then I don't see how that is conceivable.

I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences, but this doesn't touch on the 'hard problem'. The hard problem has, as a foundational axiom, the notion that the things we talk about - experiences, awareness,... - ought to be causally connected to the objects of empirical sciences. That it's in some way odd that there's no direct connection. I reject that premise. It seems to me that we can talk of all sorts of things from consciousness, to god, to pixie dust... We all know what each other is talking about to some extent in each case (enough to get by) but it doesn't require any of those objects to correlate with something empirical science might reify. — Isaac

Gods and pixie dust don't exist, so no account is necessary. But you agree that we have experiences, and therefore some scientific accounting for them is necessary, to have a complete understanding of the world. If a pixie were to materialize in front of you, you would have to account for it somehow, either as a supernatural manifestation, a hologram, etc. But you can't close your eyes and pretend it's not there, or just say "well, that happened.", and still fully understand the world.

Then it's unclear what 'aware of' could possibly mean here. We know nothing of their properties, but are 'aware of' them? — Isaac

Who said we know nothing of their properties? Their properties just do not match their physical counterparts. In fact, we know everything of their properties, since unlike physical objects their properties exactly match what is subjectively disclosed. They are yellow and blue, they are round, their shape and size do not hold steady in my case. That is all. You cannot peer behind an imaginary object to examine additional properties you were not aware of initially; this is confabulation, not examination.

Can we? — Isaac

Can't we?

Then why did you say that the camera wasn't aware. We're trying to pin down the meaning of 'aware' here. So if a camera might be aware, is there anything which definitely isn't? Or is 'awareness' a property literally anything might have, or might not have? — Isaac

Not according to the theory that awareness is a property of brains, a consequence of a certain kind of information processing that is definitely absent in a camera. Of course that is just a theory, panpsychism in principle might be true. Awareness is only "observed" directly by an aware subject of itself, all other observations of it are inferred. Since there is no observation that can conclusively disprove awareness, anything in principle might be aware. But, lacking any compelling evidence that they are aware, these claims can be discarded, just like I can discard the claim that there is a bearded giant living on a planet orbiting alpha centauri.

Qualia are fine, until folk say absurd things about them. Red and smooth and sour and so on - all good. But then folk will claim that they are private, ineffable, and it all loses coherence. — Banno

If you don't understand that qualia are private and ineffable, then you don't understand qualia.

Then in what sense are we 'aware' of a yellow disk and a blue disk? We clearly are not experiencing their actual properties. — Isaac

We are aware of an imaginary yellow and blue disks, which is just an awkward way of saying we are imagining them. Why should imaginary and real things share all their properties?

What neural correlates? And how do we know they are the neural correlates? If "by report" then how do we know the camera's circuits aren't 'aware' of the light? — Isaac

We can measure neural activity that correlates with reported states of awareness, and which are absent when the subject is not aware.

We don't definitely know that the camera is not aware, just as we don't know the camera is not inhabited by a malignant spirit. We just have no evidence pointing to either case.

I don't agree with this one, I always thought he was a high quality poster. I guess I missed the dickish stuff?