Exactly what evidence was collected to suggest this conclusion? — noAxioms
I've never been able to figure out what people have that a machine cannot. — noAxioms
Computers have memory, and they identify themselves, but they have no awareness. Think of a p zombie as a perfect computer simulation of how a human behaves, without any of the internal stuff. — hypericin
The point of the OP was apparently to play what-if games given a hypothetical empirical p-zombie test. But I'm addressing the opening assertion that such a test exists, which it cannot by Chalmers' definition.This is not really the point of the OP however. — hypericin
This is self contradictory. Are you making this up or did the scientists in question actually say this? Did they actually say this structure is responsible for the kind of consciousness that the dualists are talking about?Even though behaviorally it makes no difference, subjects might report a difference who have this structure temporarily knocked out.
What is phenomenal memory? Memory of a phenomenon? All memory is phenomenal by that definition, except I suppose memory of conclusions reached by thought, such Fermat working out his last theorem.Perhaps there is a lapse of phenomenal memory.
You suggest that some people are zombies, but balk when I suggest I'm probably one of them since I don't see the problem that others do so clearly. Ah, but I'm behaving differently, and true zombies apparently must lie about this sort of thing. I don't do that, so somebody must be wrong.I've never been able to figure out what people have that a machine cannot.
— noAxioms
It's always weird to me when someone makes this claim.
It does not, no more than does an eyeball. A human with an eye sees red. A device with a camera sees red if it in any way reacts to the data instead of just storing it like a camera does. OK, a smart camera with red-eye editing sees red. I'll buy that.A digital camera sees red
By what definition? It's not human, sure, and that's the usual definition. You have a better one that doesn't so much beg your conclusion?But it has no experience.
Of course? What if it isn't?A quick test is developed for the presence of this structure. You take it, and of course, you are positive. — hypericin
Are you making this up or did the scientists in question actually say this? Did they actually say this structure is responsible for the kind of consciousness that the dualists are talking about? — noAxioms
You suggest that some people are zombies, but balk when I suggest I'm probably one of them since I don't see the problem that others do so clearly. — noAxioms
A digital camera doesn't just store it, there are a multitude of processes which must occur before the light can be stored digitally. Correcting for red eye is just another transformation.A device with a camera sees red if it in any way reacts to the data instead of just storing it like a camera does. — noAxioms
That is not the usual definition. The usual is something more like "private internal perception". A camera or a computer can respond behaviorally to it's red sensors in essentially the same way you can to yours. But (we presume) only you have an accompanying subjective experience of red.By what definition? It's not human, sure, and that's the usual definition. — noAxioms
Ah, but I'm behaving differently, and true zombies apparently must lie about this sort of thing. — noAxioms
OK, that wasn't clear. I retract my attack on the OP since it wasn't a claim, only a proposition.You completely misunderstood, this is all just background I made up for my hypothetical question. No scientists in question, no such structure has been discovered. — hypericin
I'd be very surprised if somebody wasn't one, so go figure.In reality I would be very surprised if zombies existed.
I don't see the difference. Sorry, I just don't. I notice you didn't hazzard a line between what likely has it (a dog? frog? jellyfish? non-gloppy-interior alien?). How could such a thing evolve? At some point a non-dualistic parent needs to breed a dualistic offspring, totally discarding all the beneficial functionality of the parents, offloading the task to this presumably more capable external entity. It makes no sense outside of religious creationism, a total denial of science.The usual is something more like "private internal perception". A camera or a computer can respond behaviorally to it's red sensors in essentially the same way you can to yours. But (we presume) only you have an accompanying subjective experience of red.
I don't see the difference. Sorry, I just don't. — noAxioms
If your definition of one is that it operates the same way a computer would (a pure physical process, no help from an external acausal entity), then yes.Are you a p zombie? — hypericin
You should pick something that a computer can't do. Can you think of one? These questions seem irrelevant.Are you able to visualize? Can you create a picture of something, say a beach, on command in your head? Some people lack this ability entirely. I can do it, but the quality is poor.
Can you imagine sounds? I can do this quite well, with great clarity.
I do best literally talking out loud to myself, which is why I work out hard problems while walking/biking away from others. As a kid I would shoot baskets for hours, talking about anything except the activity itself. I think best when I move.How do you think? I think primarily by talking to myself.
Are you a p zombie? — hypericin
Behaviorally, its absence makes little difference, apart for a few subtle impairments. But internally, the consequences are profound: those who lack this structure have no internal lives at all. — hypericin
People tend to treat others as if those others don't really exist, as if they are merely shells with no inner life, other than the one stipulated by other people.
— baker
I do not. Is this projection? — hypericin
That is, they dispense with the internal-external, subjective-objective divide and argue that awareness is embodied , which means that it is an interaction , either with other persons or other aspects of one’s environment, which can include one’s bodily( affective) environment. — Joshs
it is an elaboration of organizational and functional characteristics of all living systems. — Joshs
I don't see how dreams fit with this approach. Your body is normally paralyzed during dreams, and your dream content is usually imaginary. You're not typically perceiving the world. How is that not internal to the brain? There's quite a lot to consciousness which is more than just perceiving or interacting with the world. Like imagination, memory and inner dialog. Even perception carries some anticipation of what one is going to perceive. And when we interact with others, we do a sort of simulation or estimation of their internal states. We guess at what they're thinking and feeling. — Marchesk
“In most intersubjective situations, that is, in situations of social interaction, we have a direct perceptual understanding of another person's intentions because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions and their expressive behaviors. This understanding does not require us to postulate or infer a belief or a desire hidden away in the other person's mind — Joshs
The question is whether we should
look at such experiences as imagination
and dreaming as merely a re-arrangement of what was already there, the accessing of inert memories in place of contact with fresh, external novelty. Why not look at such experiences as forms of self-transformation? To do this would be to re-think the meaning of internal vs external. — Joshs
So how does this account for lying and manipulation? Or someone putting on a front to appear acceptable? How about all the times we wonder to ourselves what someone is really feeling or whether they're telling us the truth? If beliefs and desires are never hidden away in people's minds, then how come we have no accurate way to always tell when someone is lying or what they're feeling? — Marchesk
and as a result we directly perceive ( without simulation) a version of the other’s intentions , which subsequent experience with the other may validate or invalidate. — Joshs
Regardless of how you look at it, you're still experience an environment that is not in the external world and is not publically available to others. You may not wish to call it subjective or internal, but it sure has the same hallmarks of being subjective/internal. — Marchesk
How does this account for autism, or "mind-blindness"? Or how humans tend to anthropomorphize the world around us? How we find cartoon characters, puppets and animals to have beliefs and desires like us? Or the belief that natures if full of spirts and gods? — Marchesk
Or how humans tend to anthropomorphize the world around us? How we find cartoon characters, puppets and animals to have beliefs and desires like us? Or the belief that natures if full of spirts and gods? — Marchesk
If I am attempting to understand an ecosystem are the features of this system that I fail to model well ‘private’?
What makes something private? If we believe that brains make use of stored representations it would seem that we could call such entities private. They are protected from direct expose to an outside world as well as from other representations. But embodied enactivist accounts of cognition see the brain as part of an ecosystem which includes the body and the world. And even when world seems to be minimally involved in cognitive
activity ( deep thought) , we are still dealing with a total system that is in the business of making changes in itself.
That means that even my own thinking isn’t strictly ‘private’ , given that my mind is subtly reinventing itself and its past every moment of its functioning. It is already out in the world every moment , coming back to itself
from an outside. — Joshs
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