This implies that religion developed historically as a response to our disappointment with our parents. You've used that to undermine the credibility of those who believe in God. — Clarky

I suggest that instead of facing the falsity of parental "gods", the religious invent new ones to take their place.

Either the content of religions are factually true, or they arose historically for one reason or another. Does the reason I suggest impugn your credibility more than any other?

Not put on a pedestal. However, they were the center of my universe, to a degree that was strongerthe younger I was.

Forget the emotional side. Factually, the parallel between God and parents is far stronger than you suggest. Both are givers of life. Both provide sustainance. Both decide right and wrong. Both reward virtue, and punish misdeeds. Both are turned to when in distress, and for guidance. Both are to be obeyed, above all others.

These godly features of parents are not idiosyncratic to my upbringing. Gods are parents taken to an abstract ideal.

I don't want to suggest that this process of disillusionment and subsequent turn to religion is recapitulated in every religious individual. Rather, the centrality of parents to the young is a feature of our culture, and religion is a collective response to the inevitable disillusionment this leads to.


Does this help explain?

Also I don't agree that we are already "at the despair". You may be: I think promoting magical thinking might be a symptom. — Janus

Our inaction speaks to our despair. We face an existential threat the likes of which humanity has never experienced, and we avert our gaze. What is this, if not despair?

It would be great if we could confront the problem rationally. But how do we get there? I don't think we can, there is too much magical thinking already. The magical thinking we require is, "we can succeed, if only we give it absolutely everything". This may involve trying everything feasible, even the doomed solutions.

But I agree, it is certainly best to avoid solutions which likely make the problem worse, like perhaps biofuel. My take though of the op was that it was "magical thinking" to pursue mere partial solutions. On the contrary, we need all the partial solutions we can think of.

It's total existential crisis. — Noble Dust

It's a crisis, which is fearful, but at the same time you get to experience the universe stripped of false gods, which is exhilarating.

Which part doesn't ring true? If it's the religion, of course this is totally speculation. But if it's the godlike elemental primacy of parents in early childhood, then it's true, I thought this was shared experience. I can't say I've discussed it much, but I've seen the notion several times in literature.

projects doomed to failure — Janus

Which projects? The ones mentioned in the op are precisely the kind of changes we need to make things less bad. But they aren't perfect solutions, there will always be pollution and carbon emission, So according to the OP they are not worth pursuing? Is that magical thinking, and an excuse for inaction? Outcomes are not binary. It is possible we can still collectively live relativly well for 10 more years, or for 50, depending on our choices now.

but the impossibility of replacing the whole entrenched infrastructure based on fossil fuels rapidly enough to achieve the projected reductions of emissions. — Janus

I understand, that's what I meant. And it may not be possible even with endless time.

s the latter mindset will probably lead to rapid disappointment and ensuing despair. — Janus

The thing is, we are already at the despair. And so we don't try, out of fear of disappointment. Far far easier to simply suppress the awareness, after all, there is still time...

If magical thinking is ever needed, it is needed now.

The thing is, deviance is not a thing. It is not something you whisk away with a sleight of hand. Deviance is a stance, and something inherently non-objective masquerading as objective. It is not magical thinking to challenge `the concept of deviance, the psuedo objectivity of the category of deviance is itself the magical thinking. A reification, a slight of hand which brings something phantasmal into a fictitious reality.

Whereas, the non-feasibility of renewable energy is a problem as real and objective as it gets. This is *the* problem of our age, and I will not concede it's non feasibility until all the greatest minds of our time are fully engaged with it, and admit defeat. The germane problem, as of now, is why they are not.

"Because evolution!" is simply a non-sequitur.
Suppose we discover an animal which levitates.
"How does it levitate?", we might ask.
"Because evolution!"
"Uh, yes, I agree, it evolved. But again, how does it levitate?"

That quibble aside — 180 Proof

Not a quibble. QAnon is intersubjective, but I don't think anyone here would label it objective. The fact that a belief is intersubjective (many fools, vs one) grants it nothing.

my normative ethics is Negative Hedonic Utilitarianism (i.e. "right" judgments and conduct that prevents or reduces harm); and my applied ethics is Negative Preference Consequentialism (i.e. "right" policies-practices that prevents or reduces injustice). — 180 Proof

It is all injustice, justice is the elemental concept in ethics. Harm is just a salient instance of injustice, but harm is not always unjust. Redressing a wrong may inflict more harm on the perpetrator than what was inflicted on the victim, and in any event, by the perp's suffering, increases the total suffering in the world. Nonetheless, if we consider the redress to bee just, we do not consider it wrong.


.

Either the state will regulate the economy, or the economy will regulate the state. These are your choices

Uh huh.

When you drop an apple, you don't see it fall in a book. These Books just try to tell the story of what happens in the world.

Where can we find them than? I can see the laws of quantum field theory or general relativity written anywhere but in the law books of physics. — Hillary

We find them in the physical world. Physics books try to articulate them.

What do you guys think of the escalation of nuclear threats from Russia?

Initially, Russia must have known it faced military calamity if other nations intervened directly in Ukraine. It effectively used nuclear threats to deter this. But, it did not include mere armament in it's threat: perhaps it feared the west would arm Ukraine anyway.

But now, Russia must realize that any kind of victory might be impossible if arms continue to follow more or less freely into Ukraine. And so, it has extended it's nuclear threats to include armament.

First, I think it is important to note that there is a subtle but important difference between warning against something an adversary has not yet done, versus warning against something an adversary is currently doing. In the latter case, if the adversary continues to do it, there is still room to manouver: you can issue more furious threats, and maintain some credibility. Whereas in the first case, if you draw the line first, then the adversary crosses it anyway, more threats strike of impotence: the choice becomes escalation or humiliation.

Second, what is the rational response to such threats? The stakes seem excessively high: is it rational to back down in the face of such threats, and leave Ukraine to it's fate? After all, MAD only works with rational actors, this is far from guaranteed when the decision maker is an (aging, deeply immoral) individual. For such an individual, Armageddon, or the risk of such, might indeed seen preferable to worldwide humiliation.

But on the other side, if we back down, then we immediately enter a world where every nuclear power may leverage their nukes for potentially unlimited strategic gain. The world would enter a new, even more dangerous and destabilized phase, one in which the US and the west's relative strategic power is vastly diminished: the latter alone makes this choice untenable to Western policymakers.

So then, how to respond? It is an uncomfortable dilemma.

no

Then where does the physical law come from? — Hillary

Who can say. But it is fallacious to argue they must come from a lawmaker, because they are laws.

If laws exist, then a lawgiver must exist, too. Therefore, God. — Art48

You are conflating legal "laws" with physical "laws".

Says who? — Changeling

Says the kinds of contradictions pointed out in the op.

Well, "God" is the ur-"incoherent concept" (i.e. empty name), no? — 180 Proof

If you demonstrate this then you demonstrate logically and conclusively that God does not exist. Not easily done. But you can demonstrate quite easily that an omnipotent God does not exist: such a quality cannot be instantiated.

Endless blather, blah blah blah blah blah, when the solution is so simple: omnipotence is an incoherent concept.

t's inevitably what it means for something to be justified that causes grief. But of course one man's justification will be insufficient to convince another.

It's not truth that is problematic for knowledge, but justification. — Banno

This is true, but it is not problematic, as far as JTB is concerned. Different people will in fact disagree on what is knowledge, due to disagreements about what is justification.

Consider religious knowledge. The religious will happily fill libraries with "knowledge" based on arguments from scripture. The primitive atheist will contest this knowledge because it is not true. The more sophisticated atheist will contest it because they consider its justification (scriptural, faith based, etc.) to be illegitimate.

These groups have irreconcilable views on what is knowledge, because they have irreconcilable views on what is justification. This is not a problem for JTB, but rather an affirmation: different concepts of justice imply marking different things as knowledge.

This only might be a problem if the aim was to elucidate knowledge's "ultimate", ontological essence. But this would be a foolish endeavor, knowledge is a human construct and it presumes too much that it should have such an essence. Rather, the aim is to clarify what it is people are conceptually picking out when they mark something as "knowledge".

The sentences should make sense if 'I know X' can be treated as an empirical fact. The sentences don't make sense. So there seems to be a problem with treating 'I know X' as if it were an empirical fact. — Isaac

Really, these don't seem particularly uninterpretable. "I know that I know X" conveys either unordinary confidence (after all, knowledge is a claim, because as you point out we don't have access to absolute truth). Or, it affirms that you not only know X, but you are aware of the fact that you know. As opposed to the many things you may know peripherally or unconsciously. "I believe that I know X" is even more straightforward: You believe you have knowledge, but are not quite sure: perhaps you are not quite sure what you know is true, perhaps you feel your justification is possibly suspect. The further iterations are more rarefied and silly, but you can still assign an interpretation.

How so? I mean, it seems to me to intersect in the manner of christening of terms at the very least. You've not supported your assertion. — Isaac

Suppose we conclude the external world is illusory. Berkeley was right, esse est percepi. Would Searle then be obligated to re-write his theory of speech acts, so that all assertives are in fact emissives?

Which seems of the same sort as "suppose there's a big green dragon..." — Isaac

I don't think so. Whatever your theoretical model of what geometric truths are, that is independent of the speech act being performed. Geometry is taught at school, assertively, it is something students must absorb from without. Even if you declare that geometry is purely mental (I disagree, but I guess it is possible to argue), this theory does not intersect with the nature of the assertive speech acts which communicate it.

This same distinction has a lot bearing on our discussion of knowledge: the theoretical status of truth does not intersect with the everyday usage of the concept.

_well I can not say that I know how this comment is relevant to my point that "knowledge" and "truth" do not always overlap. "I know" and "I use a specific knowledge" are two different things. — Nickolasgaspar

You are conflating what it is you are "knowing". You can "know" or "not know" how to use a technique which produces useful results, and you can "know" or "not know" ontological truths. Just because you can "know" how to use a technique which does not correspond to ultimate reality, doesn't mean that knowledge and truth are disjoint.

Again, you're just repeating back to me what your preferred theory of knowledge is ("yet, you do not know it, because the truth is..."). You've not demonstrated that I don't 'know' it because the truth of the matter is what determines whether I know something. — Isaac

If it sounds like I am talking to you in absolutes, it is because I am appealing to your presumed competence as a speaker of English. If you think that you were right when you said "I know I have apples in the bag", or if the statement was correct until the moment you opened the bag, if you think that is how the word 'know' works, in the plain language you and appeal to while simultaneously disregarding , then we really have nothing further to discuss. You can cite a hundred dictionary definitions, that is completely irrelevant. Tell me, is this how "know" works for you?

Yes. I'm deflationist about 'truth'. I thought I explained that earlier by referencing Ramsey. The entire problem here is the definition of "I know" for someone deflationist about truth. — Isaac

Your initial argument was that the truth is inaccessible, and therefore cannot be a component of the concept of 'knowledge', because how can people access something which is inaccessable? And yet, people use the concept 'truth' itself quite happily, without giving Ramsey a second or even first thought. Even if absolute truth is theoretically inaccessible, this in no way prevents people from making use of the concept.

Whatever your theoretical notion of truth may be, you have to deal with the fact that truth is a component of the plain English concept of knowledge. To deny this, you have to account for all of the plain English examples I have given which strongly suggest that is the case. In spite of mental gyrations requiring meaning to shift with tense, which is in any case irrelevant, I haven't seen anything approaching that from you.

I've shown the problem with this above. If "I know" is simply a claim to knowledge, then we have to admit of the disjunction "I believe I know..." and "I know I know...". Then we have to admit of "I believe I know I know..." and "I know I know I know...", and so on. — Isaac

These marginal formulations could charitably be construed to communicate degrees of certainty. The fact that you can construct these cumbersome sentences is supposed to say what exactly?

You seem to use "Knowledge" as an idealistic "quality" that a claim has it or not...when its the other way around. — Nickolasgaspar

You can call it idealistic, but I am not discussing platonic ideals. I am discussing the concept of knowledge, as we use it daily. A guess is not considered knowledge until it has been verified, not ideally, but in the mundane, everyday English sense.

Knowledge and truth are not(always) the same thing.
I.e. We know Relativity(in an ontological sense) is wrong but we still use it for its instrumental value. — Nickolasgaspar

I know how to use this technique, I know it has instrumental value, I know it doesn't match the world ontologically. The can all be true, justified claims.

Exactly. Yet your claim was that such assertions refer to objects in the external world. — Isaac

"External world" is not what I want. Rather, external to the speaker.

My point is that there is a clear external-to-the-speaker/internal-to-the-speaker distinction between assertiives/expressives, and directives/comissives.

So then there should be another, internal to the speaker, corresponding category to declaratives.

What, that we refer to the ratio with the sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet? That's a geometric fact? — Isaac

If we take π to mean the number, which people generally do, your quote is a assertion of a geometric fact:
"the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is 3.14159..."

If we are talking about the use of the symbol itself, that is also an assertion of convention:
"the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is denoted by π"

A claim is accepted as knowledge when it is in agreement with available facts and carries an instrumental value. — Nickolasgaspar

A random guess may be in agreement with facts, it may have instrumental value, but it is not knowledge.

We can only evaluate a claim as true or not true based on the facts that are currently available to us...not in an absolute sense, because we don't know if we have all the facts needed to make such an absolute evaluation. — Nickolasgaspar

I see no inconsistency with this account of truth and JTB. If we cannot evaluate truth in an absolute sense, then we cannot evaluate knowledge either. We can only claim that something does or does not hold the status of knowledge. What is or is not considered knowledge changes over time, because our body of currently accepted truths, as well as the justifications we consider legitimate, change over time.

So to properly use the word knowledge, the public rule governing it's proper use (the rule which we reference to say what it 'means') cannot use the concept of what is 'actually true' since no-one in the public rule-making community has this information. It can only use what they think is true. But that (as above) already constitutes that which is well-justified - and being well-justified is already one of the criteria for 'knowledge' under JTB. — Isaac

There are plenty of examples of well justified falsehoods, like the one I gave above.

By your logic, the use of the everyday word 'true' would be impossible, since no one has access to the truth. The way out is simple: every "I know", every "this is true", is a claim to knowledge and truth. We don't need direct access to the truth to make claims to it.

So, like our apple, proper justification (relative to the context) is the truthmaker of "I know X". If it turns out that (like our apple not being there) that I don't have proper justification for believing X, then the proposition "I know X" is false. — Isaac

Suppose you bought a paper bag of apples, and left them in the car for a few minutes when you went to the post office. While you were away, a thief broke into your car, and replaced it with a bag of oranges. Later, you claim, "I know I have a bag of apples in the car". By every standard you are perfectly justified in believing so. And yet, you do not know it, because the truth is, you have a bag of oranges.

Perfectly good English, just wrong. — T Clark

Oh? And why is it wrong?

I see the distinction, but it's less clear with something like "the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is Π" This doesn't apply to any object in the external world (unless you want to posit the existence of perfect circles), but it declares rather than supposes. — Isaac

This is neither declaration nor supposition. It is an assertion, of a geometric fact. Not an expressive, because geometry, like the physical world, is something external to the speaker.

'Knew' is the past tense. We use the past tense differently to the present tense. — Isaac

So now meaning shifts with tense to keep your account coherent. And I'm the dogmatist.

Yet, tense has absolutely nothing to do with it.

He knows that 8*8 is 63.

This is simply bad English, given that the speaker presumably knows that it does not. "Know" in English cannot be applied to something that is known to be false. Similarly, it cannot be applied to a guess, and be good English. This is not how "know" ought to be used, it is how it is used. These are the rules that JTB captures.

JTB is not perfect (which I pointed out in my op). But it is a far better model of how we actually use the word than your mental state theory.

to be clear, I'm not looking for someone to clarify what the standard theory is, I'm trying (or was) to explain a different theory (broadly Ramseyan - or my interpretation of it). — Isaac

Please.

There were Greeks as long ago as 500 bce who theorized that the earth revolves around the sun. Just type in ancient Greeks heliocentrism. — T Clark

Yeah yeah. From what I read this was a minority view. But this is utterly beside the point. Answer the question. Did MOST of the ancient Greeks know the earth was the center of the universe?

This is not even philosophy anymore, just basic English.

An inward declaration would make no sense in the same way a private rule would make no sense. A declaration is a public event, creates a public rule. — Isaac

Every speech act is public, that goes without saying (leaving aside self talk). The distinction is, what is the domain of this rule? Where does it happen? Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker.

Not sure what you mean by "inward". — Banno

Assertives and Expressives are quite similar. The difference is that assertives assert about the outer world, expressives assert about the inner world of the speaker.

Similarly, a Directive and a Commissive are quite similar. Directives direct out, at someone other than the speaker, while a Commissive directs in, to the speaker himself.

And in the same way, I propose that Declaratives by fiat create an external reality, in the world, while Suppositions by fiat create an internal reality, in the minds of the listeners.

But on first glance I think you are right that suppositions are declarations. — Banno

After thinking about it, by Searle's scheme there must be a missing category:

There are assertives, and inward assertives, which are expressives.
There are directives, and inward directives, which are commissives.

But that leaves declarations as the odd man out. Mustn't there be corresponding category of inward declarations?

There is, and it is precisely: suppositions. Declarations declare something into existence in the world, suppositions declare something into existence in the mind.