I guess it's a matter of interpretation: to me an "understanding of how things can come to be as they are" suggests some kind of causal account of the genesis of the world, and i don't think Heidegger was concerned with that. Of course I might be mistaken, and I could be persuaded to change my mind by being presented with anything he wrote which would suggest otherwise. — Janus
I agree, the "purely negative effort to clear up some deep confusions" is precisely what I understand to be philosophy's "transformative process of liberation". I can speculate that Wittgenstein may have meant that philosophy leaves the world just as it is, in the sense of not adopting any metaphysical view about the nature of reality, and I would agree with that.
I see philosophy as a propaedeutic to spiritual transformation, to learning to see non-dually. Still, I would say that although philosophy cannot effect a far-reaching spiritual transformation, it can help to liberate us from being concerned with "views", just as Nagarjuna's dialectic is intended to do, and that that counts as a "transformative process of liberation"; albeit merely an intellectual one. — Janus
But going back to the rock interacting with the tree, I would like to at least ask the question how it is that physical properties obtain without perception. What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? And you see, this IS where this direct/indirect/ideal becomes kind of "personal" for those who care about metaphysical theories. As I said before, I think informs the perceiving interactions. — schopenhauer1
We can only say what interaction between what we think of as non-perceiving objects is like for us. Personally I find metaphysical theories interesting in that they explore the possibilities that are (coherently or incoherently?) imaginable to us. I think that is worth exploring just for its own sake; it's aesthetic interest, if you like. — Janus
I'll not accept your characterising me as not calling realism into question. — Banno
With "learning to perceive truly" do you mean something like 'learning to see richness instead of paucity'? — Janus
Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. — Janus
But going back to the rock interacting with the tree, I would like to at least ask the question how it is that physical properties obtain without perception. What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? — schopenhauer1
One of the books I keep referring up to is Charles Pinter. Mind and the Cosmic Order, published February 2021, He’s a mathematics emeritus whose only other published books are on set theory and algebra but has a deep interest in neural modelling. This book is a real breakthrough in philosophy of cognitive science in my view. Google it and just scan through the chapter abstracts, it’s about just this question. — Wayfarer
The idea of progress inherent in (and kind of contradictory to the spirit of) Hegels' philosophy is its weakness and possibly why both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard reacted against it.
It seems to me that those who get "persnickety" are those who "gave a dog in the race" and/ or are uncomfortable with uncertainty. I think uncertainty is, spiritually speaking, a blessing, because it makes for humility. — Janus
Obviously a big call, but what I have in mind is very like what is described by avidya, in Eastern philosophy - it’s usually translated as ignorance, but I think something like spiritual blindness is more apt. It’s kind of like ‘sin’ albeit more cognitive than volitional - that ‘we don’t see the world aright’. (I’ve long thought that the fact that it became entangled with dogma about sin is one of the things that prevents us from seeing it.) Hey I know that’s bound to be controversial but I can’t help but see it like that. — Wayfarer
Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. — Janus
Isn’t that cultural relativism? I know it’s very difficult to adjudicate betweeen the thousands of systems of ideas out there but some must resonate, and some decision must be made as to which. — Wayfarer
Yes, there is always the illusion of progress bolstered by the obvious progress of the sciences, but philosophy is not like that in my view. The idea of progress inherent in (and kind of contradictory to the spirit of) Hegels' philosophy is its weakness and possibly why both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard reacted against it. — Janus
When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. That is one level of indirection.
Your body might tumble around and bump into other objects. But, you are not your body. You are the part of your brain that is aware. If you fall into a vegetative coma, you are gone, even if the rest of your body is healthy. If your awareness survived your body's death, you would survive.
This part of the brain that is aware has no direct access to the world. It can only interpret certain brain activity sensorily. These interpretations, experiences, are at a great remove from the objects that stimulate them.
Which is not to say you only access these experiences. These experiences track real actions and properties of real objects, and so you are aware of objects, not merely experiences. But this awareness is at a remove from the objects, it is indirect.
You cannot see the tree as it really is, this is a contraction. To see is to experience subjectively. Bats will see the tree differently than us, and aliens will see it differently than us and bats. There is no right answer among these different ways of seeing, they are all interpretations.
One reason philosophers in the past have rejected Direct Realism is because of The Argument from Illusion, which is obviously a strong argument. — RussellA
He does take this distinction as granted, as well as that the folk he is addressing can, at least for the most part, tell the difference. But I suppose that RussellA and @schopenhauer1 cannot tell if they are hallucinating gives us an explanation for why there is not much hope of "penetrating the darkness here". — Banno
If you need that explaining you may want to seek professional help. — Isaac
But there's nothing causal here. Not knowing whether A caused B has no bearing on the plausibility of an hypothesis that A causes B. — Isaac
Can we really talk about non-perceived events and interactions — schopenhauer1
concerned with ... how to know whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience — RussellA
In order to talk about a non-perceived event, one first has to presuppose that we are able to perceive it. — RussellA
You have sufficient warrant to believe the tree you see is, in fact, a tree, all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree. — Isaac
I agree with that. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, a pragmatic approach to the world. — RussellA
You have sufficient warrant to believe the tree you see is, in fact, a tree, all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree. — Isaac
'know' [is] simply having sufficient warrant — Isaac
Physical properties interacting with each other without perceivers, becomes oddly anthropomorphic in its conception. — schopenhauer1
If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. — Wayfarer
Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. The idea that some are "correct" and others not, tout court, erroneously fails to acknowledge the different presuppositions in play, and the reality of talking past one another on account of that. — Janus
What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? — schopenhauer1
One is my Anglo mode, in which I’m a plain-speaking direct realist, and the other is my sort of phenomenological, sort of Marxian, quite traditional, wannabe Hegelian mode, in which philosophy has ambitions as grand as you’ve set out here. — Jamal
The question is moot, it looks like, from an antirealist standpoint. — Agent Smith
You questioned whether we know what we see is the tree. — Isaac
So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree — Isaac
I believe that Marx provided a very unique and informative approach (in the form of basic assumptions) toward the interactions between things, both animate and inanimate. He has very insightful principles which ought not be ignored by anyone interested in the interactions between beings, things, and both. — Metaphysician Undercover
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.
What is it about trees, for these people, that is so impenetrable, I wonder? — Isaac
Other oddities from indirect realists here….. — Isaac
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