Fair enough, I agree with this

That seems to me a perversion (no pun intended) of the notion of morality. Morals / ethics are about interpersonal relationships / conduct. Fantasies or wishes do not enter into it. So unless you have an agreement with your partner regarding masturbation, I don't see how any of it could be of moral concern. And I think that applies even to fantasies which contain immoral acts. — Echarmion

Well, this excludes many popular ethical traditions from being counted as ethics in your book. Aristotelian ethics tends to have some focus on controlling fantasies. Even utilitarians would likely encourage fantasy control as a strategy to avoiding acting on that fantasy. The Christians are big on fantasy control as well. Also, who exactly gets to decide what ethics is about and what it’s not about? Isn’t ethics just a loosely defined phenomena that concerns the actions of people? Of course, it’s worth noting that thoughts and fantasies can be regarded as actions in a loose sense.

I think that the reality of life is that many people have not found the relationship which they would like to have. Rather than seek other alternatives including shallow sexual encounters or prostitution surely masturbated is a best option. — Jack Cummins

Well, I think most people would probably say the absolute best option is to try to fix your relationship or try to avoid entering a bad relationship in the first place or maybe leaving that relationship. I agree that masturbation beats the other stuff you mentioned though.

Masturbation avoids the problem of safe sex. Also, at the present time of the pandemic we are almost prohibited from meeting others so masturbation is about the only uncomplicated form of sexual expression left open. — Jack Cummins

That is a pretty good point. With the pandemic, it’s probably more ethical to masturbate then to get intimate with your SO.

I see that some people have spoken of fantasies while masturbating and I would say that it is likely that those fantasies would likely be experiences anyway. Surely life cannot be about regulating people's fantasies but about ensuring that they treat other people with respect and cause no harm to others. Any prohibited on fantasy life in itself would be about thought control. — Jack Cummins

I agree but many people would disagree especially those from a religious background. Christianity has plenty of thought sins(in fact most sins in the Bible are thought sins.) Although, nobody believes that we can control our all our thoughts and the occasional bad thought is not thought of as being sinful in the religious traditions. But, it may be argued that one chooses to let their pattern of thought continue for too long and this puts them at a greater risk of acting on their thoughts.

For example, suppose you have 2 guys who fantasize about molesting their young nephews. One guy is repulsed by his fantasies and tries to seek help from a sex therapist. The other guy is completely unbothered by them and continues masturbating while thinking about his nephew. Who do you think is more likely to molest their nephew one day?

On a final note, it could be argued that the fantasies you have on a regular basis are a better indication of what lies deep in your heart than your actions are. Many people don’t act on their fantasies because they afraid of the consequences of doing so rather than genuinely being troubled by the behavior.

I think the circumstances surrounding masturbation may often bring up ethical questions. For example, is it ethical to masturbate while you are in a relationship if you are not thinking about your SO while your doing it? Is it ethical to watch porn if you’re in a relationship while you masturbate? What kind of porn is it ethical for a single person to masturbate to? Almost everyone would agree that it would be unethical if someone masturbates to child porn and most people would probably think that it would be unethical to even fantasize about children while you masturbate. The same goes for fantasizing about your siblings or fantasizing about rape or masturbating to photos of women taken without their consent in the dressing room for example. It may also be unethical to masturbate in a dangerous manner such as one involving autoerotic asphyxiation. It can also be unethical to spend too much time masturbating if it keeps you away from accomplishing all that you would like to accomplish.

So, the devil is really in the details here. Almost anything could have some moral concern under some circumstance. For example, you don’t have to be an antinatalist to think that a fairly mundane act like reproduction can often be morally problematic if it is done in a careless manner for example. Similarly, one does not have to be a religious or Kantian prude to understand that there’s probably a lot of people who do have problematic masturbation habits(at least if they are in a relationship or masturbate too often or watch messed up porn).

A: The aim is to show that if one feels that one has free will, then it is rational for them to believe they have free will. Indeed, the argument will show that it is more rational to believe one has free will than the opposite. — icosahedron

What if someone testifies that they do not feel as though they have free will? Not only does it seem that this person has more reason to believe that he doesn’t have free will but according to your argumentation it also seems that a person who feels like he has free will has more reason to believe that the person who says he doesn’t feel like he has free will probably doesn’t actually have free will. There doesn’t seem to be any good reason to think that the person who says he doesn’t feel like he has free will is lying or is mistaken about not feeling like he has free will. But, I think this potentially causes a problem because people who say they feel free will do not seem to be different in any noticeable way to those who say they don’t feel free will. Both types of individuals are probably roughly equally intelligent and seemingly capable of making decisions. So, if someone believes that some highly functioning people have free will and others do not, then it’s almost like they believe in something akin to “free will zombies”.

Free will zombies are individuals which act in such a way as to appear to have free will to those who believe in free will but they do not actually have free will. The existence of free will zombies in a world where most humans have free will seems to me to be about as implausible as the existence of philosophical zombies which are individuals that appear to be conscious and act as though they are conscious but are not conscious. Both types of zombies seem to be implausible because they imply that consciousness in the case of p zombies has no role to play in the functioning of a highly functioning human and free will has no role to play in the functioning of a highly functioning human either. I think it is more likely that either all humans have free will or no human has free will. This would imply that most people either have a mistaken perception of their free will or the rare people who claim they don’t feel free will are mistaken or lying about their experiences. Thus, I think the burden of proof should really be shared among both sides of the debate and we should be very much open to the idea of certain people having mistaken perceptions about having free will or individuals claiming to not have free will.

What is the cause of the suffering? The suffering of broken bones is different from the suffering of a broken heart. People like to have sex, but they like to have sex with people they choose to have sex with. Rape is removing a person's choice NOT to have sex. It is the removal of this personal agency that in my mind defines rape. If you have another way of defining it, feel free to propose it. — Philosophim

I don’t think the suffering that comes with rape is necessarily caused by a removal of choice. For example, suppose there is a guy who has a button that could freeze time and he uses this button to molest women. The women would never suffer as a result of the molestation even though their choice had been violated and I would go as far as to say that the time freezing molester hasn’t wronged them if there was a very low possibility of them ever finding out that they were molested by him. What he’s doing is still sexual assault though and he’s definitely taking away the women’s ability to choose to get touched sexually by him but it only matters if he either makes them feel suffering and deprives them of pleasure.

While it is inevitable we will all die one day, dying at the hands of the murderer is not inevitable at that particular time. If the murderer did not interfere, it was inevitable that you would live. If we ignore the time between when you were murdered, versus when you would die of "natural causes", we are missing a major part of the equation.

The only way we could state murder to be equivalent with dying is if a person was murdered at almost the exact moment they would have died naturally. But the idea of, "You're going to die in 20 years, so its not so bad if I murder you now," doesn't work as a valid comparison — Philosophim

I agree that getting murdered is not completely equivalent to dying a natural death and this is why I still think you can say that murder is wrong. My point is that we would likely consider murder to be a far smaller wrong if we also consider that we will have to face our mortality at some point anyways. It seems to me that your argument here boils down to a deprivation of life span which the murdered individual happens to value. In that case, I would argue that the reason why most people would rather get raped rather than get murdered has more to do with their fear of imminent death rather than a desire to live longer. I think we can maybe agree that if people prefer rape over murder because of a fear of death then it would be an irrational preference because they will have to confront their mortality at some point anyways. I could give you an argument for why I think it’s motivated mostly by the fear of death if you would like to hear one but I’m trying to keep my posts reasonably short for now so I’ll just let you respond first.

Actually narrowing down what you mean by a "major wrong", is difficult because of statements like this. Now its not inevitability, but the idea of murder with pain versus murder without pain which determines what makes it a major wrong versus not so bad. But that doesn't answer whether that's a major wrong in relation to different types of wrongs. Of course getting sliced into bits with a razor blade while numbed is going to be a less horrible experience then if you feel every second of it, but does that make the action less wrong then having 5 dollars stolen from you? — Philosophim

Well, I never claimed that having someone murder you painlessly is less wrong than something as minor as theft. Rather, I only claimed that it isn’t as bad as rape or long term imprisonment.

The problem is you're not including all of the other positives of living you might have to undergo as well.
Its kind of like saying, "I stole all your money, but don't worry, now you don't have to pay taxes anymore". Taxes are not the only thing we spend money on. Suffering is not the only thing we spend life on. — Philosophim

I am including all the positives in life as well. My point would be that unless you believe that a particular person would experience far more good things in life if he hadn’t gotten murdered than bad things in his continued life, you couldn’t say that getting murdered is extremely bad for that person. You can say that it’s still significantly bad though like the equivalent of having to serve a 5 year prison sentence or something.

At some point I think it will become possible to change weights and to understand that in some cases consequences may be much worse than just death. But there is no way to change historical process in a blink of the eye — Skeptic

Well, I’m not trying to change the historical process in a blink of an eye. My goal is to make progress on that goal as much as I can. Obviously, we couldn’t really alter our laws in a democratic society without the members of such society agreeing with those laws on some level. Legal changes have to start with cultural changes. But, how do you initiate a cultural change? It seems like a good way to start is to make your case to the community of intellectuals and then hope a lot of them will think that what you are saying makes a whole lot of sense. Then, the idea spreads further and becomes fairly common among moral philosophers but mostly rejected by the common man. Veganism can be said to be in that sort of stage right now where a decent proportion of moral philosophers accept it but it’s mostly rejected by society at large. Eventually, ideas with decent intellectual credibility could start becoming more mainstream in society at large and it could change reactions and the historical process in the end. I actually really doubt that this will happen in the end but as a philosopher I enjoy talking about ideas that make sense to me based on the reasons given behind those ideas. I think that is a useful exercise for moral progress as well though because you never know how influential an idea can become. It’s worth noting that the idea of gay marriage was ridiculed in the past and it was also probably considered resistant to the historical process. If I was making an argument for gay marriage in the 80s, I would be under no illusion that everything would change in a blink of eye. Rather, I would hope that the idea would get more respect in a more enlightened future world.

I meant that lethal aggression has much higher psychological impact on people around, and I don't mean direct relatives here. In general such atmosphere will push people to be more aggressive. Even without direct immediate lethal context it may cause political disaster. — Skeptic

I don’t know if I agree with that. For example, there are murder scenes in kid friendly movies like the Lion King and the Hunchback of Notre Dame for example while mutilation scenes or rape scenes or torture scenes are pretty unlikely to be shown in any movie that isn’t for adults over 18. In addition, I have personally felt sick to my stomach when watching a documentary about blood diamonds and mutilation getting used as punishment for not finding enough diamonds and the scene in Get The Gringo where a cop gets tortured by having toes snipped off one by one and the scene from Tiger King where someone gets their arm ripped off by a tiger. I can vividly remember every mutilation scene that I have watched because of how sick to my stomach it made me feel. I can’t remember almost any murder scene I watched because those scenes have never had any emotional impact on me. I actually think my reaction to those different types of scenes is the typical reaction that people have. Mutilation scenes and torture scenes probably disturb people the most. Followed by rape scenes and murder scenes are actually probably last if they don’t particularly brutal.

Deprivation applies to most wrongs. Stealing deprives one of things. Rape deprives one of sexual choice. Each of these deprivations though can be recovered from. Murder, cannot. As there is potential to better oneself in almost every wrong except murder, I can't see these wrongs being greater than murder. — Philosophim

I have defined deprivation as an aspect of a harm that removes a benefit from a particular person. I don’t think that rape is primarily harmful because of deprivation as I have defined it. The primary aspect of rape that makes it really bad is that it causes a lot of suffering which isn’t inevitable suffering. The suffering caused by murder, on the other hand, could be called inevitable in a sense that this individual would have likely died in a painful way regardless. Though, I was talking more about painless murder being not as wrong as we typically think. Under my view, one could be committing a major wrong by murdering someone painfully. The wrongdoer’s biggest offense would be torture rather than murder though. Another thing worth mentioning is that there is a silver lining to getting murdered in that it alleviates you of any future suffering that you might have to undergo. This is at least a small upside to murder even for those who wish to continue living. Rape doesn’t usually have any upside at all. I suppose there are rare cases where a woman might think that there was a small upside to being raped because it made her a stronger person or maybe she is glad that it caused the creation of her child. Though, more often than not, rape makes people weaker by traumatizing them and a rape pregnancy doesn’t get celebrated and gets aborted or given away instead.

How about we call this, "Agency of choice". Again, all wrongs are the removal of choice from a person. Murder is when you deprive someone of their life against their consent for some personal gain. Again, all other wrongs can be recovered from to some extent except murder. If someone chooses to die, this is not murder. So someone may prefer death to a particular existence. When we choose for them, that is when it is an evil. — Philosophim

I also don’t think that the removal of choice is a central aspect which makes rape and torture bad. It is rather the suffering that it produces which is not inevitable suffering. It’s also worth noting that your agency of choice in regards to wanting to continue your life is bound to get violated at some point because you cannot live forever. Your agency of choice in regards to rape however, does not ever have to be violated.

Again, all of these griefs have the potential to resolve themselves into something better, except murder. — Philosophim

Why do you think that? Couldn’t you overcome the grief of your loved one getting murdered as well? Couldn’t you also better yourself after your loved one gets murdered? I’m having a hard time understanding why murder grief would be inherently worse than natural death grief.

Actually, Alex O'Connor (CosmicSkeptic on YouTube) is to release a video on why he believe death is not bad for those that die. Apparently he is delaying its release due to the sensitivities with the pandemic. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I’m a pretty big fan of Cosmic Skeptic so I’d have to stick around for that. One thing that makes him so great is his willingness to entertain very controversial viewpoints that other philosophers are not willing to entertain.

Others have raised the point that if murder was normalised there would be negative knock-on effects. Maybe I am missing something, but surely the knock-on effects of normalising causing suffering, would rise equally. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I agree, that’s what I’ve been trying to suggest in response to those posts. I think these types of slippery slope arguments are often a sort of last resort argument. If someone doesn’t have any other good reason to think that their ethical position is correct then they could always make a slippery slope argument and speculate a dystopian future created by an opposition to their viewpoint. You see this with the anti-euthanasia advocates for example. But, almost any position could be defended with a slippery slope argument. For example, I could argue that we should ban violent video games because they will eventually cause a normalization of gruesome murder and this will lead to societal decay.

In a bit more real world scenario I would rather said that a live person can be useful for society even in case of serious injury. — Skeptic

Well, some people can be useful for society after a serious injury but I would say most will end taking more resources from society than they will give to society. For example, if I got my arm mutilated, then I would probably would go on disabilities and avoid working(assuming that I still decide to continue living life under those circumstances.). In the case of rape, I would likely be traumatized and that wouldn’t be an ideal mindset for making society better.

The next level of reasoning is the political instability. Protests may look very different in case of different mentality... and so on, with the serious degradation or even extinction at the end. — Skeptic

Do you mean to say that protests would become more lethal if we had a more lax attitude towards murder?

Actually it worth mention that we are on the middle of the humanization process. It means that things will change seriously later on. For example, right now, nonlethal harm is gaining more and more criminal weight. — Skeptic

Is non-lethal harm really receiving more attention? I suppose you can make that case with rape and the Me Too movement making it gain more attention. It’s hard to comment on the change in attitude for mutilation and stereotypical forms of torture because those things are sufficiently rare in our society. Though, one of the non-lethal harms that I have mentioned in the OP is long term imprisonment. It seems like just about everyone would consider that to be a more humane punishment for crime than the death penalty. I actually tend to think the death penalty is a more humane punishment myself. Though, someone holding my viewpoint could still argue that long term imprisonment is a better punishment because criminals deserve a harsher punishment.

On a final note, I would like to talk about the concern surrounding a rapist killing his rape victim in court to receive a lighter prison sentence. Realistically, I think this should be considered pretty overwhelming evidence that he really committed the rape and thus he would probably get charged with both rape and murder. In addition, I think most rapists would still have a bigger incentive to keep their victim alive because a dead body will likely get found and they usually investigate if it got raped before hand(at least that’s how it appears on tv shows like CSI:SVU). On the other hand, surviving victims of rape rarely report their victims so the rapist is probably less likely to get caught if he just lets the victim live. Though, it might be the case that in a society where rape is considered worse than murder, victims of rape will report their rapists more frequently. Another solution we might have to this problem is to specifically give a higher prison sentence for murder committed to prevent the investigation of more serious crimes.

Otherwise you will left possibility fo rapist to kill his victim in a court to mitigate the punishment... — Skeptic

I have not considered that possibility. That would kind of be a convenient way to get your prison sentence reduced for raping someone in a world where murder is punished less. I’ll have think about that a little more. I’m gonna head to sleep for now :yawn:

Society is the system and it has many system effects. Most dangerous are psychological changes and attitude to death. That's why many topics are just forbidden for public discussions (at least our country has some). I don't think that it's too hard to see possible consequences of such changes. At least fast growth is incompatible with instability that can be caused by ability of people to kill easily. — Skeptic

So, my understanding of what you are saying is that perhaps human extinction can be a possible consequence of a society that has a less negative attitude of murder. I assumed that mainly because you mentioned the ability that we have to kill people very easily and nuclear weapons is always the first thing that comes to mind regarding that subject matter for me. Given our nuclear capabilities and myriad of other potential ways to destroy mankind, it seems like you could argue that having a more lax view on murder could potentially add fuel to the fire to our destructive potential more so than a more lax attitude towards rape or mutilation. Would you say that this is one of the biggest global concerns around there being more lax attitudes towards murder?

Damn, your writing style reminds me of Thomas Jefferson lol. It was quite elegant and pretty. They should hire you to write presidential speeches. I don’t think I understand your point of view well enough to comment on it so I would like to ask some clarifying questions instead:

You mentioned that you believe that there is a need for mankind to be free to live under the assumption that they are free from death except from natural causes. I’m having a hard time understanding why a death from natural causes should or would be viewed more positively by someone. Do many people even care about the cause of their death? I can kind of understand that one might be selected by evolution to wish to avoid death before one has time to reproduce. But, why would an old woman care if she dies from murder or from natural causes?

I also would like to mention that I don’t think that murder is completely ok. We should still punish murderers. I just think it’s not as bad as significant forms of torture. So, I think torture is more deserving of punishment. On that note, I must ask: doesn’t torture have just as much of a destabilizing effect on society as murder? I’m failing to understand why it wouldn’t.

I would like to ask you some questions about your post. Please do not take these questions as a criticism of position since I don’t feel I understand your position well enough to criticize.

1. You mentioned that you thought that humanism and various religions have succeeded. By what standard have they succeeded and why do you feel that this standard is appropriate at judging the success of a set of ideas. I don’t mean to say that these sets of ideas are not successful since I tend to analyze religious and humanist ideas separately rather than as some kind of combined package or a united ideology.

2. My understanding is that your primary concern is that a more lax attitude towards murder will be instrumental in promoting the prevalence of vigilante justice and revenge. Rape and mutilation also seem to encourage revenge if the punishment is seen as being too weak. What I was suggesting partially by my OP was that a father should be more willing to engage in vigilante justice if the rapist of his daughter receives a light punishment then if the murderer of his daughter receives a light punishment. I’m kinda struggling to understand why murder has a greater destabilizing effect here if there doesn’t seem to be any necessity to regard murder as being worse than an act like rape. I would love it if you can elaborate more on this topic.

I don’t think I speak lightly of murder. I just think suffering has a far greater degree of value significance than having a longer life span. I would love to know why you would consider preserving one’s life span to be a more worthy pursuit if you can be as kind as to share your reasoning with me. I can give you a fairly quick answer for why I think suffering matters more: you don’t have to value your life but you are forced to disvalue suffering. If someone claims that they don’t think there’s anything bad about suffering then I would speculate that they must not have a capacity to suffer. My past experience with suffering seems to prove its badness. I can’t say the same thing about death.

Yes, I think death is to be preferred over any significant form of torture. I will die one day anyways and I don’t understand why it would be much worse to die later. I don’t have to experience the suffering that comes with rape though because that suffering is not inevitable like death happens to be. Now, if we had an opportunity to live forever this might change the equation though

Well, my issue with drawing this distinction is that I think only some objects have a spatiotemporal dimension, many do not.

Since I tend to take an object-oriented approach in my philosophy, I consider “object” to be the most general category. Everything is an object, on my view. — Alvin Capello

Fair enough, I don’t really have an argument against this view.

I would say that Homer Simpson and the concept of Homer Simpson are two very different things. For one thing, the concept of Homer Simpson does not have yellow skin, while Homer Simpson himself does have yellow skin. The difference between concepts and objects is this: all concepts are objects, but not all objects are concepts. I'm not a concept, for instance, but I am still an object. — Alvin Capello

Fair enough, I suppose you could think of concepts as being a sub-type of objects. Though, I kinda figured that there were 2 sub-categories of ”things” that exist in the world namely concepts and objects. I tend to understand that the distinction between them is that objects exist in space and time while concepts are timeless and spaceless. So, I don’t think any object is a concept and vice versa. In your viewpoint, are there any problems with drawing the distinction between these 2 concepts on the criteria that only objects have a spatiotemporal dimension.

Whenever this happens, it usually seems to be because there is a more fundamental disagreement regarding principles at work here . For instance, if your opponent bites the bullet on the unintuitive utilitarian implications, then most likely the real issue here is more structural than ethical theory. So what I normally do is take a step back and try to get at the fundamental tenets of my opponents worldview. — Alvin Capello

That’s a pretty good approach since you may find that your opponent holds an inconsistent epistemic criteria when he goes about judging other people’s bullet biting. For example, the utilitarian might think that the implications of utilitarianism provide no good reason to reject utilitarianism while also thinking that the implications of Kantian ethics such as the insistence that one ought to never lie even when there’s lives at stake is an undeniable refutation of Kantian ethics. You would want to ask that utilitarian why he is willing to bite the bullet on the utilitarian implications but not the Kantian ones. More educated utilitarians would probably appeal to some deeper axiological viewpoint that morally relevant value can only lie in state of affairs and that only one particular aspect of state of affairs such as valences felt by sentient beings or the facts about preferences of various value bearers and their satisfaction status is relevant to morality. Other utilitarians might not have a good reason to give for thinking that utilitarianism is more plausible than Kantian deontology.

I also believe that the naive semantic account of truth, i.e. the truth of declarative sentences is dependent upon objects having properties, is the correct view. Therefore, I am forced to conclude that nonexistent objects can really have properties — Alvin Capello

Would you mind giving me an example of a non-existent object having a property? I’m somewhat under-educated on this topic but my initial thought is that fictional entities could have properties. For example, I could make a declarative statement that “Homer Simpson has yellow skin”. Obviously, Homer Simpson doesn’t actually exist as an object but it might seem intuitive to interpret the statement as being true because the term “Homer Simpson” typically denotes the character from the cartoon and that character is portrayed with yellow skin. But, Homer Simpson seems to be a concept rather than an object. What exactly is a non-existent object then? Is there a difference between concepts and objects?

I don't know if you would consider my version of free will as radical but it appears to me that if we are to call ourselves free then there should be no force, from torture to logic, that should have an influence over us. I think I touched on this in some other thread; the basic idea being that if we are free, in the truest sense, we should be able to deny every possible influence over the choices we make. — TheMadFool

Well, I think we should discuss the usage of the word “free” as it applies to a variety of different things. For example, we might call Canada a free nation because people who live in Canada have more freedoms than they would in the vast majority of the world. I feel that it seems reasonable to call Canada a free nation despite the fact that there isn’t an unlimited freedom there. Similarly, we might say that Canada values free speech even if they support some restrictions on speech like ones that involve threats of violence. Given this, I think someone could reasonably say that we have free will in the same way that Canada is a free nation. We might be said to be free relative to animals and Canada might be said to be free relative to other nations.

Belief, if free will exists, must also be a choice. — TheMadFool

I’m not sure about that claim. Couldn’t we say that free will is like a mediator between beliefs and wants? What determines whether we act on our wants or our beliefs in any given instance? Some philosophers might say that nothing determines our prioritizations between beliefs and wants and it’s simply our free will.

Can you tell me how we form beliefs that are not, in some way, tied to our wants? — TheMadFool

I would like to answer that question with another question if you don’t mind. How did you form your belief that the Earth revolves around the Sun? Did you simply want that to be the case? Though, I’m guessing you meant to ask me how choice-oriented beliefs could be formed instead of just ordinary beliefs. I think those beliefs could be formed the same way. Just like you might have been taught in school that the Earth revolves around the Sun, you might have also been taught by your parents or society that the disadvantages of drug use are greater than the advantages. This doesn’t seem to necessarily imply that you wish that either beliefs were the case, but rather you simply believe the information that is provided to you. Nonetheless, I think you might still have wants that contradict that information which you may still genuinely believe. I think we could be indoctrinated into holding value beliefs that are contradictory to our wants.

Type 1 beliefs don't figure in the issue and so can be set aside for they automatically preclude free will since we, perforce, must believe in them. In case you say that we still have a choice regarding such beliefs, the choices we make would be influenced by our wants which we already agreed preclude free will.

With type 2 beliefs we have choice insofar as believing them is concerned but the choice we make would be based on our wants and that, at the risk of repeating myself, we already know leads us back to what we agreed upon - we didn't choose our wants. — TheMadFool

I agree with this. I don’t think we choose our beliefs either. I only disagreed with the claim that beliefs that concern choices are only determined or influenced by wants.

What is the nature of these "certain beliefs"? In the case of the junkie what would just one of these beliefs, unrelated to any want as you claim, be? I'd like to know. — TheMadFool

Well, the junkie may believe that living a longer life would be better for him. Nonetheless, he may actually be suicidal and desire to die soon because of his drug addiction. The junkie may also desire to do drugs but proclaim that drugs caused him nothing but trouble and provided him with no benefit whatsoever. It’s worth remembering that if the junkie is a hardcore addict then he probably doesn’t even experience pleasure from taking drugs anymore; rather drugs only alleviate his withdrawal symptoms. In addition, the drug addict may believe that he’s better off not being in jail but can become apathetic towards the prospect of his own arrest despite this. So, it’s seems like these are some examples of the drug addict having beliefs about value that don’t correspond to his desires and vice versa.

The issue here is free will and it's defined in terms of unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. — TheMadFool

I’m not sure if it is defined in those terms actually. There seems to be a diversity of ways of understanding and defining free will. I suppose that what you mean by free will in the OP is that it is an unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. If you are claiming nothing more than that in the OP than I agree with you that there isn’t an unimpeded choosing of available alternatives in our worldline. If you are claiming that this is the only proper way of understanding free will, then I’m not sure if I agree.

However, a belief such as that I mentioned just now must have a basis of some sort, right? — TheMadFool

I agree that there is usually a basis for a belief. But, I’m not sure why that basis necessary has to be a want instead of something else. Maybe they are simply based on intuitions or introspective observations.

A belief in equality is founded on the difficulty we face with suffering, which slavery entails and also on the happiness that equality will bring. — TheMadFool

Well, it seems like the belief in equality could be based on a variety of things which may be unrelated to wants. For example, one might believe in equality simply because they are persuaded by John Locke’s arguments for it. I think one could accept Locke’s argument for natural rights without necessarily having a desire for natural rights to exist. Though, I think most people who are persuaded by Locke’s argument probably do simply wish to live in a world with natural rights.

Suffering and happiness, the disliking the former and liking the latter, were not choices we ever made; we came preprogrammed as hedonists. Ergo, even if preferences are based on beliefs, beliefs themselves trace their origins to a point when and where it's impossible to make choices, let alone free choices. Similarly, other beliefs, at least those that influence our choices, have origins of the same nature - one that precludes any choice at all. — TheMadFool

I agree with the first sentence of this post to an extent. I think everyone was pre-programmed to like pleasure and to dislike suffering. But, I’m not sure how this entails that no one could have a choice motivating belief that is not hedonistically motivated. Do you think that all human motivations are influenced by pleasure and suffering?

Do you mean preference is a judgement and a want is, well, more visceral, if you will? — TheMadFool

Yes, I would say that’s a pretty accurate representation of the distinction that I was going for.

However, the junkie's (is this word still in use?) preference is actually based on another want is it not? I mean though he wants to take drugs he would prefer not to because other wants get in the way e.g. the junkie wants to live longer, live healthier, have friends, family, avoid jail, etc. and these wants are again not of his choosing right? — TheMadFool

Well, I would say that preferences are not only necessarily based on other wants in many cases. Rather, I would say that they could also be based on certain beliefs about what is truly better or worse or they could be those beliefs as well. Regarding the junkie case, the junkie not only wants to avoid the negative consequences of using drugs but he also believes that those negative consequences are truly bad. This belief might be independent of his desire for those things or at least I think that there could be desire independent beliefs(some philosophers may disagree). On the other hand, the junkie only wishes to use drugs but he may lack the belief that those drugs have any intrinsic benefit for him(again that’s actually a controversial premise but I think few would challenge it.) The believer in libertarian free will might argue that we choose our beliefs about what is good or bad for us or they may argue that we choose to either prioritize our desires or prioritize our beliefs about what is good or bad. I actually think that we don’t choose what we believe about goodness and badness. I also don’t think we choose to prioritize our value beliefs over our desires or vice versa. If you agree with me, then you would have no reason to believe in libertarian free will. But, if you think I’m wrong about assuming that we don’t choose what we believe about value or what we prioritize, then I would say that you have reason to accept libertarian free will. Of course, you might also disagree with my topology of desires, preferences, and beliefs and that might give you a different reason to reject libertarian free will that are somewhat unrelated to my reasons for rejecting it. I was mostly trying to make an argument regarding the concept analysis of desires and preferences rather than object to your position on free will which I consider plausible.

I consider myself to be undecided between compatiblism and incompatiblism but I definitely reject the notion of libertarian free will. But, I wanna play devil’s advocate and make some technical suggestions.

My first suggestion is that we should not conflate preferences with wants or desires. It’s a pretty common practice to do this in philosophy and I really cannot blame OP or anyone else for assuming that preferences and desires are synonymous. But, it seems like desires are more like urges and impulses while preferences are more like value judgements or beliefs about what’s better and what’s worse. To give a clear example of what I mean, imagine a drug addict who recognizes that he has a problem with drugs. It seems like this drug addict desires to do drugs but has a preference to not be doing drugs. If you asked the drug addict to make a pros and cons list involving the decision to do drugs, they would argue that doing drugs has more disadvantages than advantages. Nonetheless, they may lack an urge to actually stop doing drugs and they may have a severe urge to continue doing them. So, there is a conflict between preferences and desires here.

The believer of libertarian free will could take advantage of this conflict—they may ask: what determines whether the drug addict chooses to act on his desires or act on his preferences? A skeptic of free will would likely respond that the personality trait of conscientiousness determines whether or not someone has a tendency of having desires that align with their preferences. People who are more conscientious will tend to have an urge to do the thing that they think is the right thing to do which is the thing that aligns with their preferences. While people who are low in conscientiousness would be more driven by their irrational impulses which are contradictory to their preferences. The skeptic of free will would then state that your level of conscientiousness is determined by gene-environment interactions.

The believer of libertarian free will might argue back that one could be born with a low level of conscientiousness and improve his consciousness across time with hard work and dedication. They might point out that sometimes someone has a low level of conscientiousness as a young adult but becomes very conscientious as he gets older.

But, there seems to be something paradoxical about claiming that one could essentially become hardworking in the future through hard work and dedication. After all, what determines whether or not someone is capable of working hard at developing an ability to work hard? It seems like a more plausible explanation for why some people become more hardworking over time is that they simply experienced a sort of growth spurt of conscientiousness kinda like a growth spurt that one might have with their height or an event in their life that was triggered by the environment triggered a sudden improvement in conscientiousness. So, I think ultimately we should reject this argument for free will. But, I figured that it was worth mentioning since free will is often associated with a mystical notion of “willpower” which basically a kind of strange non-deterministic change in conscientiousness.

I still think the only consistent path to music stardom is promotion by a record label...unless you have your own millions. — ZhouBoTong

I agree, exposure takes a lot of money usually.

I think it is because media does not sell dreams of growing up to write music for a celebrity. They sell dreams of singing in front of 50,000 screaming fans. — ZhouBoTong

I agree, I think people are more attracted to the idea of being a performer who is more admired rather than some nerd behind a desk who writes songs for performers. It’s somewhat unfortunate though.

Yes, I do. The argument is simple: there are prescriptions of Reason; only an agent can make a prescription; therefore Reason is an agent. And that agent is a god, because the agent who is Reason has the power and knowledge of Reason, which is more power and knowledge than anyone else. — Bartricks

Ok, I need to ask you several clarification questions here. So, what exactly is a prescription of reason? Would you mind explaining that concept a bit more to me. Because it seems rather counterintuitive to me to think of reason as a command or a prescription. The 2nd question I want to ask is what exactly is “the power and knowledge” of reason. I don’t think I have ever heard of anyone saying that someone could have power and knowledge of reason.

But I have already agreed to that. Anyone who thinks that some intuitions count for more than others has the burden of proof. I have shouldered that burden, though. I have provided a case for thinking some - such as those for which a wholly evolutionary explanation is the most reasonable - lack evidential clout. But so far as I can tell, you have not shouldered the burden - you have not explained why the intiuitions you want to dismiss lack probative force. — Bartricks

Regarding the case of Tom, I had actually given you a debunking explanation that:

It’s possible that people have moral disgust towards the torture of Tom because human beings evolved to experience moral empathy towards someone getting tortured while not evolving to experience extra strong happiness towards billions of happy people that come as a result. This is because our pre-historic ancestors had no survival advantage by being happy about a world full of billions of happy people who are not their relatives. On the other hand, they had evolved a capacity for empathy towards the pain of a stranger because it made them better at forming cooperative relationships. — TheHedoMinimalist

You responded to this debunking explanation by saying this:

Yes, I agree with all of that. But I said that if the 'sole' explanation for why we get a moral intuition is an evolutionary one, then that debunks the intuition. If, however, the evolutionary explanation is only partial, then the intuition may retain its probative force. — Bartricks

So, in this comment above, you said that the debunking explanation has to be the “sole” explanation which means there cannot be any other explanation but now you just wrote another comment that is saying this:

Likewise, the best explanation of why so many of humans get the impression it is morally alright to procreate is the evolutionary one. That explanation does not have to make mention of the actual morality of procreation, and thus it is an explanation that discredits the impressions in question. — Bartricks

So, now you seem to be implying that the debunking explanation doesn’t have to be the sole explanation but rather just the best explanation. In that case, why is my debunking explanation for intuitions that people hold about the case of Tom not the best explanation? You responded by saying this:

For example, imagine a divine command theory is true (which it is). That is, imagine that moral rightness and wrongness are prescriptions of a god, prescriptions that our rational intuitions give us some insight into.

Now imagine that the god is benevolent (which she is). Well, it seems reasonable to suppose that a benevolent god would issue prescriptions that would benefit us: that is, that she'd want us to do thrive and form meaningful relationships and all that stuff. If we follow prescriptions of that sort, then we're also likely to be more reproductively successful than those who did not.

In this case, then, we have a divine explanation for why it might be that living in accordance with many moral prescriptions has, in the main, proved to be adaptive. And in this case the explanation does not debunk the intuitions at all. — Bartricks

So, how exactly do you know that a benevolent god would issue a prescription that we shouldn’t torture Tom? Also, how do you know that benevolent god would issue a prescription against procreation? It’s entirely possible for a pro-natalist to respond to your debunking explanation for their intuitions by just saying this:

Now imagine that the god is benevolent (which she is). Well, it seems reasonable to suppose that a benevolent god would issue prescriptions that would benefit us: that is, that she'd want us to do thrive and form meaningful relationships and all that stuff. If we follow prescriptions of that sort, then we're also likely to be more reproductively successful than those who did not.

In this case, then, we have a divine explanation for why it might be that living in accordance with many moral prescriptions has, in the main, proved to be adaptive. And in this case the explanation does not debunk the intuitions at all.

That doesn't follow. Plus it is not at all clear what 'complex' and 'simple' mean in this context. For instance, is moral particularism complex or simple? In one sense it is simple, for it denies the truth of any fixed moral rule. But in another sense it is the most complex of all normative theories, for it allows that anything - anything - can, in principle, be morally relevant, which is precisely why rules - which, by their very nature deny this - should be taken with a pinch of salt. — Bartricks

The way I was judging a theory to be simple or complex is based on how long it would take for someone to summarize the viewpoint. It takes me at least a good paragraph to summarize my viewpoint briefly. This could be contrasted with a simple theory like Classical Utilitarianisms which simply states that we should maximize the happiness of the world and it takes me just one sentence to summarize it. Though, it’s also worth noting that my intention for that previous comment was not to argue that simple theories should be dismissed just because they are simple but rather that convoluted theories that are counterintuitive to most people because of their complexity shouldn’t be dismissed just because they are convoluted.

if one were a god and one could create one of those worlds but not the other, then clearly a good god would create the first and not the second. If you deny this, it is only because that's what your theory commits you to - that is, your theory commits you to denying the probative force of those intuitions that conflict with it. — Bartricks

Well, there would be a lot of additional factors to analyze here. First, we need to figure out how creating each world would impact god’s happiness. That should be his first consideration. I’m assuming that you want me to imagine a scenario where both worlds would impact god’s happiness equally. Another consideration that should be made is the room for improvement for both worlds. It may be argued that the world where the wicked people get all the happiness must have a much better environment for producing happiness in order to be hedonistically equal to the world where the virtuous people have all the happiness. This is because pleasure and suffering act as incentives for good and bad behavior. In the world where the wicked get all the happiness, the world is very inefficient at maximizing its potential happiness. If it were to be become more efficient in the future by punishing bad behavior, then it might greatly surpass the world where the virtuous are happy. In that latter world, there is only room for things to get worse. That world has arranged their incentives perfectly to promote good behavior and yet it still can’t surpass the inefficient world. This would imply that god could choose to create a world where the environment is much easier to live in but for some reason he could only put people on there that will arrange their societal structure in a really messed up way.

Intuitively many people would not blame god for creating the wrong types of people in that world but rather blame the people in that world for their inability to create the right incentives for good behavior in that world and thus they are to blame for making that world hedonistically inefficient. The fact that god created a better environment for that world which allowed it to be equally happy to the efficient world which seems to have a worse environment is the more relevant factor when it comes to praising and blaming god’s actions of creating both worlds in the eyes of most people. Given that god must create a better environment for happiness in the inefficient world where bad behavior is rewarded, I think most people would intuit that god can only be held responsible for making sure that the environment of a world is pleasant. He cannot be held accountable for the incentives for good and bad behavior which are usually governed by human societies. This is because the famous Free Will Defense could be employed as a justification for why god created people who can’t run their societies properly. It was their choice to make the world hedonistically inefficient rather than god’s choice.

In addition, I’m not sure if we are imagining 2 worlds across their entire span of their existence or if we are imagining 2 worlds across a particular period of time. If you were thinking of the latter scenario, then most people would intuit that the fact that the inefficient world could only get more efficient across time and the efficient world could only get more inefficient across time would imply that we could expect that the inefficient world would be happier in the future. But, if you were imagining the former scenario where the 2 world’s are equally happy by the end of their existence, then I would actually disagree with the intuitions of most people on this. This is because if god knew that the level of happiness of both worlds would be equal in the end, he would have as much responsibility to create wise people that can make their societies efficient as he would to create a pleasant environment for life. I would say that creating the world where the virtuous are happy would be slightly better simply because there is some probability that I’m wrong about my desert eliminativism.

Desert eliminativism is the view that I hold that the concept of fairness and unfairness has no metaphysical reality behind it. That is to say, no one truly deserves anything or fails to deserve anything. An outcome can never be fair or unfair. This is highly counterintuitive to most people but I have a debunking explanation for those intuitions. The reason why most people think that people can deserve or fail to deserve things is because they had evolved to experience the emotions of anger and indignation. The emotion of indignation has provided an adaptive advantage in the past because it made it less likely that someone would get ripped off and manipulated in some manner. This is actually a point that Peter Singer made in his book called The Expanding Circle. Let me give you some examples where indignation is a useful emotion. In prehistoric times, people lived in small tribes of about 100 people and everyone knew everyone else pretty well. This meant that reputation was pretty important for your survival. If people who wanted to trade with you knew that you were the kind of person who would walk away from the trade if you got too much of a low offer, then they are less likely to try to low ball you. People who feel a greater sense of indignation are more likely to avoid getting scammed in environments where people are aware that you would be greatly offended by any attempt made to rip you off. This emotion of indignation could only come about if people believe that certain things are unfair and that they deserve to be treated a certain way.

Another example where indignation would be useful is in cases where somebody has wronged you. People who feel that they didn’t deserve to get wronged are more likely to feel anger and take revenge on the person who wronged them. In small tribal settings, people who have a reputation of taking revenge on people are less likely to be wronged in the first place. This is because people who try to wrong others try to target those who won’t fight back. So, it’s seems pretty likely that the concept of fairness is simply an evolutionary adaptation. It’s also worth noting that perceptions of fairness and unfairness can be highly subjective and dependent on your personality. For example, there have been some slaves in the past who were brutally mistreated by their masters but didn’t feel as though they deserved to not be mistreated. On the other hand, there are some spoiled brats who live with their parents at the age of 30 and they feel that it’s unfair for their parents to not buy them a new car for Christmas. I think the best explanation for why there is such a massive difference in intuitions about fairness across people is that those intuitions are really just emotions of anger and indignation and various people have different levels of those emotions.

But, if you are not convinced by my desert eliminativism, then there is actually another version of hedonism that was first introduced by Fred Feldman called “Desert Adjusted Hedonism”. This form of hedonism argues that the external fact about the deservedness of a particular episode of pleasure and suffering also contributes to its goodness or badness. So, an episode of pleasure that is given to a person who doesn’t deserve it would count for less than an episode of pleasure given to a person who deserves it. This is because those hedonists argue that importance of pleasure is not only about how it feels on the inside but also how it looks from the perspective of an outside observer who is witnessing the behaviors associated with experiencing the pleasure and suffering. Thus, it would entirely possible for some hedonists to say that the extent to which a pleasure matters is dependent on how much a person deserves the pleasure.

And then there's this argument (made by W.D.Ross):

1. If hedonism is true, then two worlds that contain equal amounts of happiness and pain are necessarily equally good
2. Two worlds that contain equal amounts of happiness and pain are not necessarily equally good
3. Therefore hedonism is false. — Bartricks

Premise 1 is false for my version of hedonism because my theory does not compare the quality of worlds. Since my theory is egoistical to a decent extent, the goodness and badness of an outcome is agent dependent. This means that a particular outcome cannot be simply good from some sort of a neutral perspective. To give an example of what I mean. Imagine that Josh and Tyler made a bet for $100 and Josh won. The outcome of the bet was good for Josh but bad for Tyler. Now, let me give you a more complicated example which now involves causing suffering to others. Suppose that Steve hits Greg in the face. From the perspective of Steve, the outcome was bad because it made him feel guilty for hitting Greg and it also increased the suffering that Greg has to endure. The suffering involved with him feeling guilty counts for something extra from the perspective of Steve because it happens to be suffering that he has to endure. From the perspective of Greg, the guilt experienced by Steve counts for less because it is not suffering that he has to endure. The suffering that Greg felt from being punched in the face does count for more from his perspective though.

Thanks for the suggestion! :smile:

1 is a conceptual truth. I mean, how are you going to deny it? If you're a hedonist, you think happiness is morally valuable, yes? — Bartricks

Yes, but there are many different types of hedonistic theories. Hedonistic Egoism states that only your own happiness matters. Agent Neutral Hedonistic Utilitarianism states that everyone’s happiness matters equally. My theory is somewhere between those 2 extremes. Unlike Hedonistic Egoism, my theory posits that the happiness of others has some positive value. Unlike Agent Neutral Hedonistic Utilitarianism, I don’t think I have as much reason to make a stranger happy as I do to make myself happy. So, premise 1 of your argument seems to only apply to Agent Neutral Hedonistic Utilitarianism which is a theory that I do not support. To use an analogy, you know that there are many different types of divine command theories. There are religious and non-religious divine command theories. Well, there is also many different types of Hedonism. There are literally hundreds of different theories that could be called hedonistic in some regard.

I believe in a very complicated and particular version of hedonism which is difficult for me to even name. My best attempt at naming it would be calling it “Slightly Egoistic Soft Negative Valance Hedonistic Act Consequentialism”. Every word of that name is philosophically controversial. There is a debate between egoistic consequentialist and agent neutral consequentialists about whether or not we should be completely selfish or almost completely selfless. I lean towards ethical egoism but I also think that the happiness of others has some value. This is why I say that I’m “Slightly egoistic”.

There’s also a debate among hedonists about whether or not pleasure has more positive value than suffering has negative value. Soft Positive Hedonists say that pleasure usually counts for more than suffering under most circumstances. Soft Negative Hedonists say that suffering usually counts for more than pleasure. I have also encountered some Hard Negative Hedonists that go as far as to say that pleasure has no positive value at all and we should only focus on minimizing suffering. I have never encountered somebody that argued for Hard Positive Hedonism and claimed suffering had no negative value and we should only try to maximize pleasure. This is part of the reason why I find Soft Negative Hedonism more plausible than Soft Positive Hedonism.

Then, there are also different definitions of pleasure and pain/suffering. My definition of pleasure defines it as any sort of positive valance and defines suffering as any sort of negative valance. Positive and negative valances are experiences that are experienced as being undeniably and unambiguously good and bad respectively. When you know that you are definitely feeling something good, you are experiencing pleasure. The same applies for suffering except it’s bad instead of good. A masochist might enjoy the experience of pain because pain is just a type of sensation. Suffering is the usual reaction to the sensation of pain but it’s not the only reaction that someone might have. The masochist might experience something that he sees as being definitely good while he is in pain and thus he would be experiencing pleasure instead of suffering. He might also experience an ambiguous experience while in pain which seems both good and bad. In that case, the ambiguous experience should be treated like a neutral experience.

Next, there’s also a debate between act consequentialism and rule consequentialism and trait consequentialism. Act consequentialism states that a person should always perform actions that produce the best consequences. Rule consequentialism states that a person should create and follow general life principles that are likely to lead to the best consequences. So, they don’t think that you should try to calculate the goodness or badness of an outcome. Rather, just follow basic principles that tend to lead to best outcomes. Then, there is trait consequentialism which states that someone should focus on developing their character traits in order to produce the best outcome. I think that Act Consequentialism is the most plausible theory. Then finally, there is also a dispute between Consequentialism and non-consequentialist moral theories. So, it’s a bit complicated and there’s lots of disputes.

But that's surely not what your intuitions say? Even if it is, it is certainly not what most people's intuitions say. It is normally far, far worse to hit someone else than to hit oneself, other things being equal.

But you've judged that hitting yourself is worse because your theory says so. My whole point is that this is a topsy turvy way of doing moral philosophy. You're appealing to your theory rather than trying to respect intuitions. Yet any credibility your theory has will ultimately rest on how well it respects intuitions. So why not just cut to the chase and appeal to intuitions about each case, rather than appealing to theories? — Bartricks

Well, I think I need to clarify my opinion on this matter a bit more. First, it might be worse to hit another person if hitting another person also cause you to suffer. Normally, when you hit another person for no reason, you could expect to feel guilty or ashamed about doing so. I might reasonably think that it’s better for me to hit myself than it is to hit someone else because I would be causing the other person to suffering and I would also cause myself to suffer from the guilt caused by my action. In addition, I could get arrested and charged for assault. Being in jail could also cause me to suffer and give me an additional reason not to hit someone. Finally, I might also have the person that I hit decide to hit me back and that would be painful as well.

So, there are both selfish and selfless reasons for why I shouldn’t hit other people but there are only selfish reasons to not hit yourself unless someone else notices you hitting yourself and gets distressed. But, I assumed that you wanted me to isolate away all the selfish reasons for not hitting another person by imagining a case where I wouldn’t feel guilty about hitting them and I’m guaranteed to not be arrested or hit back. In that case, it would still be bad to hit the other person and cause them to suffer but if we imagine a circumstance where me and a stranger get kidnapped by a weird person who tells me that I will be severely tortured unless I either hit myself or hit the stranger, then the only reasons that I would have to choose to hit myself instead of the stranger is that it would cause the stranger suffering and cause me suffering by making me feel guilty. Now, suppose that the kidnapper offers me a magic pill that allows me to avoid feeling guilty about choosing to hit the stranger. In the case, the only reason I would have to not to choose to hit the stranger is that it might cause the stranger to suffer.

So, it might be better for me to hit the stranger in this highly unrealistic scenario. In any realistic scenario, it might be better to allow yourself to get hit since receiving a punch is less unpleasant than a lifetime of guilt that might result from hitting another person. It’s also worth noting that in the scenario with the kidnapper who forces me to hurt someone else or hurt myself, it’s intuitive to most people to view the action of hitting the innocent stranger as self-defense since it’s the only way that you can protect yourself from suffering. Given this, it is entirely possible that choosing to hit the stranger would be viewed as permissible by many people. Though, it’s also worth considering that I can’t realistically know if the kidnapper would not torture me if I hit someone. He might simply be lying and choose to torture me anyways. So, it’s a bit complicated and there are various things to consider.

I also interpreted that you might have wanted me to compare the actions of one agent who chooses to hit himself to another agent who chooses to hit someone else. In that case, it’s worth considering that the person who chooses to hit himself might be a masochist and enjoy the pain. Why else would he be hitting himself? If somebody enjoys their pain then I don’t consider their pain to be a form of suffering since I define suffering as “an unenjoyable experience”. So, in that case, that masochistic person might have a reason to hit themselves and doing so would increase their quality of life.

Sorry for the delayed response... — ZhouBoTong

That’s perfectly fine :smile:

Unless I get a job as a mechanic, being skilled at automotive repair might save me a few hundred dollars a year on maintenance...philosophy seems more important than that (even if the only practical purpose is a more informed vote and a bit of self confidence in one's world view). — ZhouBoTong

Fair enough, I suppose that it depends on your relationship to philosophy and your relationship to cars. Some people have a good relationship with philosophy and they find some useful application to it while others seem to use it somewhat trivially. The same goes for working on cars. Some people don’t even own a car and have no intention of becoming a mechanic. In some cases, both knowledge of philosophy and cars could even be harmful. This is usually as a result of stubbornness and arrogance though. There are some mechanics who think that they could fix a problem in their car or someone else’s car that they can’t actually fix and they end up making things worse for the car. Similarly, there are some philosophers who think they have nothing left to learn about philosophy because they happen to know some things about it already and they might end up holding dogmatic viewpoints that are even worse than the viewpoints of most non-philosophers.

Shows like "The Voice", "American Idol", etc. have PROVED that the real talent in music is song writing. There are hundreds or thousands of talented, good looking musicians out there. However, very few can write an entertaining piece of music. So don't get too caught up in "practical" skills that you ignore a much more significant talent that you may have. — ZhouBoTong

I agree that I should focus more on songwriting than playing instruments in this day and age of superior computerized instrument recording technology which makes the technical aspects of producing a piece of music with a bunch of different instruments much easier. But, I don’t know if there are more good singers than songwriters out there. I actually know plenty of songwriters who wrote really great songs but they only got around 300 views on YouTube. So, there seems to be lots of great songwriters out there who are simply obscure and their content just gets buried by the YouTube algorithm and it’s impossible to even find their work unless you are already aware of their existence. Anyways, I actually think there could be a TV show called “The Songwriter” where unknown songwriters compete to write the best song. I kinda wonder why no one created such a show already.

You have described several things that should be considered in the antinatalist discussion. I still think there is a huge overarching "personal preference" that will be the deciding factor for most people. For example, when analyzing the financial costs, someone who really wants kids will justify any cost while those who don't will view all costs as prohibitive. — ZhouBoTong

I agree. I think the reasons that I had mentioned do not really suggest that the right answer to this question will be the same for everyone but I also tend to think that they might change some minds on both sides of the discussion. I think this sort of pros and cons analysis is most useful for the minority of people who do not hold a strong opinion on the matter and they might have a hard time deciding.

You are that rare (and admirable) person that does not have a nagging personal feeling and is just analyzing the factors involved. I think there is a lot of value in your video series. Both for the other people out there who attempt to make decisions purely based on objective analysis (I really wish there were a lot more people like this...I though I was close, but can certainly see my personal preferences interfering in this case), and just as an objective overview of the argument. It will be particularly useful for those who are new to the antinatalist discussion and may hear some of those factors for the first time (similar to that stanford.plato website). — ZhouBoTong

Thank you, I’m flattered by your compliments :blush: . I agree that there is a greater need to inform people about the various arguments rather than try to simply promote one’s own arguments and ignore arguments that you don’t find convincing. I also agree that Stanford.plato website is one of the best sources for getting a good understanding of a particular specialized topic in philosophy. I sometimes read stuff on there too.

For instance, in the debate over Gettier cases in Epistemology virtually no one has the intuition that the agent involved possesses knowledge, but there is disagreement over the correct analysis of why the agent fails to possess knowledge. — Bartricks

I don’t think that’s true. I had heard that studies in experimental philosophy had revealed that most people in East Asian countries think that the agent has knowledge in Gettier cases. In addition, as many as 25% of people in Western countries claim that the agent had knowledge. I’m using a lecture I heard on YouTube as the source. The lecture is called “Intuition in Philosophy 2” and it is given by a philosopher named Kane B.

I do not see how that's an objection to moral particularism. My case does not assume that people are good at doing philosophy, only that they have fairly reliable faculties of rational intuition (just as I assume people have fairly reliable faculties of sight - and so if the vast bulk of people see a mugging, that's good evidence there was a mugging). — Bartricks

Well, I don’t share your assumption that our intuitions are somewhat close to reliability to our eyesights . Unlike our intuitions, our eyesight doesn’t get influenced by the place and time period that we grew up in and almost nobody sees something that no one else sees. For example, if I had a time machine and brought people from 15th century Japan to look at a basketball, then the basketball would appear the same to them as it would to modern day humans. It would have the same color and the same shape and the stripes of the basketball would appear in the same location for every person with very few exceptions of those who are blind or color blind. But, the intuitions held by the Medieval Japanese would be wildly different from the intuitions held by modern day humans. The Medieval Japanese would likely hold intuitions that the Earth is flat and that killing a peasant to please an aristocrat is morally right. It’s worth pointing out that people in the past did not only hold different moral intuitions than modern day humans but they also held different intuitions about how the world works in general. They had the intuition that the Earth was flat. They also had intuitions that tragedies came about because of black magic performed by witches. They also had intuitions that we could cure diseases with leeches and blood letting and so on. Given that the vast majority of intuitions held throughout history turned out to be inaccurate, why should we expect most intuitions that are held today to be accurate? Of course, I would like to point out that arguing that most intuitions are inaccurate does not imply that we shouldn’t use intuitions in philosophy. We simply have no choice but to use intuitions and other unreliable tools like language in philosophy and this is why humans are so inadequate at doing philosophy. But, there might be a very small minority of humans that have exceptional intuitions and an exceptionally precise use of language. I’m not saying that I belong to that extremely elite minority. I have no way of determining if I do or do not belong in that exceptional minority. Though, I suspect that the odds of me being right about most things are slim to none. But, as a philosopher, I strive to be in that minority of people anyway. Given that the vast majority of people probably have really inaccurate intuitions, this opens up the door for those who hold very strange and wildly unusual intuitions to trust their intuitions as much as most normal people trust their intuitions. So, I think that people with crazy intuitions are just as likely to be right as those with normal intuitions.

By contrast, you want to say - it would seem - that rational intuitions that lend themselves to systemisation by some kind of rule or principle carry more weight than those that do not. I simply see no good reason to think that's true. I can understand that we might want it to be true - it would be damn useful if it were true - but that isn't any kind of evidence that it is true (indeed, if anything it should make us even more wary of its truth, given our tendency to engage in wishful thinking). — Bartricks

Fair enough, but are you willing to grant that those deeper intuitions matter as well? If you are willing to grant that all types of intuitions matter then it must be pointed out that moral particularism itself is counterintuitive to most people. Of course, most people simply do not know what moral particularism is but even among philosophers who know about the theory there is a small percentage who find it intuitive. So, what debunking explanation would you give for dismissing the intuitions of the majority of philosophers who find moral particularism counterintuitive? In addition, I think the majority of people also find your non-religious divine command theory to be counterintuitive as well. Most people seem to have an intuition that the existence of god or gods either implies that one of the religions is true or it implies that god is indifferent to human concerns. It’s counterintuitive for the vast majority of people to think that god cares about humanity and chose to give us prescriptions but he didn’t give us a religious text to allow us follow those prescriptions. Instead, he gave intuitions which are sometimes unreliable and for some reason there are some people who do not hold some of the most rational intuitions. If most people find this sort of divine command theory counterintuitive, then what is the debunking explanation for the intuitions of the vast majority of people?

In answer to 2 - I am not sure, but it would seem not. For the god is benevolent (see above) and a benevolent being would not have created a world like this one and then forced innocent creatures to live in it. Most humans do that, of course - they're well aware of what the world is like, well aware that they themselves did not choose to live in it, yet think nothing of forcing innocent creatures to live in it, partly, no doubt, out of a desire to be admired and loved and worshipped - but I don't think a truly benevolent being would do that. Hence, I conclude that the god who exists, Reason, has not done so. But I am not sure, of course, it is just what seems to be implied by the evidence. — Bartricks

Well, in that case, you must have very unusual arguments for the existence of god. Most arguments for god’s existence argue that she is needed to explain the existence of the humans and the universe. The 2 most popular arguments for god’s existence are the Kalam Cosmological Argument and The Fine Tuning Argument. The former of which argues that the universe is not infinite and thus it had to be caused by something to exist. The latter arguments argues that the probability of the universe being stable enough for life to exist is so astronomically small that it couldn’t have been an accident. I’m not convinced by either argument because I have a Time Dependence Argument which argues that it’s unlikely that a mind can be eternal. For the sake of brevity, I’m not going to try to tell you the argument because it’s pretty long unless you want me to tell you the argument. But, since you do not think that god created the universe, I’m curious what other good arguments could you make for god’s existence which doesn’t appeal to her being the creator of the universe?

Because that's the default. If you think some rational intuitions count for more, then you have the burden of proof. — Bartricks

I think the burden of proof is shared here because almost every philosopher thinks that some intuitions count for more than others(including yourself). We just have different theories about which intuitions count for more. You seem to think that if there is a debunking explanation for an intuition then the intuition becomes irrational. But, how do we determine which explanations for the intuition are debunking? I would like to suggest that there’s one more debunking explanation that you can add to your list of debunking explanations — and that would be that if an intuition contradicts itself with another intuition that most people hold then one of the intuitions must be false. I would argue that the intuition that the torture of Tom is unjustified contradicts itself with an epistemological intuition that most people hold. The epistemological intuition that most people hold is that all actions have deeper explanations for why they are wrong. Most people will try to give you a reason for why they think the torture of Tom is unjustified. They wouldn’t just say “well, it just seems wrong”. Given that most people reject your moral particularism, they would also reject the deeper intuitions of other people that they agree with on the case of Tom. I call these intuitions against the intuitions of other people “meta-intuitions”. So, suppose that a negative utilitarian and a Christian philosopher who gets his moral guidance from the Bible agree that the torture of Tom is unjustified but they give different explanations for why it is unjustified. In this case, they share the intuition that torture of Tom is unjustified but they also share the meta-intuition that the other philosopher has no good reason to agree with them that the torture of Tom is unjustified. So, the Negative Utilitarian might think that the Christian philosopher has no good reason to think that the torture of Tom is unjustified because The Christian God doesn’t exist and if he did then he would probably approve of Tom’s torture because he is a sadistic butcher(in the eyes of the negative utilitarian). The Christian philosopher might also think that the negative utilitarian has no reason to disapprove of Tom’s torture because he might think that without God everything would be morally permissible. So, given that most people share the meta-intuition that there’s no good reason for why so many people agree that the torture of Tom is unjustified, we must either reject the intuition that the torture of Tom is unjustified or we must reject the meta-intuition that most people have no reason to agree on this case given that they have vastly different reasons for doing so. I would choose to reject the first intuition because I have an intuition that meta-intuitions are more important than intuitions about cases of Applied Ethics.

Yes, it’s really just laziness and a lack of desire to hone one’s own explanation skills that causes people to “name drop” sources instead of making those sources more accessible and relevant to the conversation. Usually, it takes me like 10 posts to fully explain all of my ideas relevant to the topic. So, I try to start with a simplified version of my viewpoint and then make my viewpoint more complex and provide more detailed arguments for my viewpoints. The disadvantage of this approach though is that it makes it seem like I am changing my entire argument or position when I’m really just getting more specific about what I really believe. The advantage of this approach though is that it allows you to figure out which of your ideas are relevant to the conversation and which are not relevant. Sometimes, you should exclude certain details to avoid simply confusing the person you are talking to and I usually provide plenty of examples to try to minimize confusion. Though, usually explaining your position and argument is a grinding task and confusion is to be expected.

Oooo!!! Suicide!!! That’s always a cheerful topic to discuss! :starstruck: I loove talking about suicide :heart: . I think it’s always good to start the discussion with 2 top 10 lists for reasons to commit and not commit suicide:

Top 10 reasons to commit suicide:

1. It can prevent all the suffering that you would have to endure if you don’t commit suicide. I think this is undeniably a strong advantage. There’s a lot of suffering that comes after your loved ones die and with all the health problems towards the end of life. Also, having all the daily stress of life and having to deal with being tired and hungry and having to use the restroom but you can’t alleviate yourself because you have to work. Then, there’s the boredom of work as well and having anxiety that something terrible might happen at any moment. Also, having to deal with being sick. That’s not fun either. Also, feeling ashamed and embarrassed about your past words and actions sucks. So, it’s understandable why some people wish to end their life.

2. It can prevent you from being dissatisfied with your life for longer than you have to. I don’t think this is really an advantage but some people might consider life dissatisfaction to be bad for reasons aside from the suffering that it causes.

3. If you’re a dick then you get to prevent all the suffering that you are going to cause to the world! Yay :grin: !!! I don’t really think that this matters much either though

4. If you desire to die, then suicide can fulfill your desire. But, I sincerely doubt that it matters that you got what you wanted unless you had a rational reason to want it in the first place.

5. If you’re a cock blocker, then your death will prevent the deprivation of pleasure that you would of caused to others with your cock blocking ways! Obviously, this is a silly reason.

I know this was supposed to be a top 10 list but I could only come up with 5 reasons to commit suicide and 4 of them suck! Now, let’s see what the top 10 reasons for not committing suicide are....

1. If your suicide attempt fails, then your life might be a living hell.... I’ve heard lots of stories of suicide survivors who had their “fool proof plan” fail and the consequences are terrible. If it’s a gun suicide, then it’s pretty common for them to be left without a face or teeth or eyes. The biggest mistake you can make attempting suicide with a gun is aiming under the chin. Please, do not aim under the chin! You will miss your brain and get defaced instead! Also, do not use a low caliber pistol! You should use a powerful shotgun if you want it to work. Also, do not use drugs or try to slit your wrist. Those methods almost never work. You’re just asking to suffer. I wouldn’t try hanging or CO2 poisoning or Innate Gas Suffocation either unless you really know what you’re doing. Jumping can work but you want to make sure you are doing it high enough. If you don’t, then have fun being in a wheelchair for the rest of your life! The coolest suicide method I heard about is decapitation with a rope and a car. It’s really going to leave behind a messy scene though. Same goes for guns. The most effective methods are the most nasty ones to show your loved ones.

2. Suicide attempts usually fail so you shouldn’t assume that yours will probably work unless you are using an extremely lethal method.

3. You might simply be unable to commit suicide effectively. As the old saying goes, ought implies can! If you don’t have access to guns because you don’t live in the good ol Murica where they are easy to get, then you might wanna not risk a less effective method. Also, if you are unwilling to show a blood bath to your family, then you might wanna reconsider as well. Also, if you simply can’t pull the trigger, then you simply can’t pull the trigger. Nuff said!

4. If there is an afterlife, then your suffering might continue after your death. I think there probably isn’t one but there’s always some possibility that it might exist. Though, if it does exist, then it’s probably not an eternal pit of torture that Christian think you will end up in. It’s more likely to be about as bad as your current life. This is assuming that it is probably going to be an embodied afterlife where your “container of experience” flows into a different body and you get to live another life with a different personality and memories that will develop.

5. Committing suicide will deprive you of all the pleasure that you would have if you didn’t commit suicide. Think about the future orgasms that you won’t get to have. Think about all the experiences of love that you will miss out on. Think about all of the pleasant experiences of arguing with people on TPF that you will throw away.

6. Being in a suicidal state of mind creates additional suffering for your life and makes you feel even worse about the circumstances of your life. This is not an argument against suicide directly but it is an argument against encouraging your own suicide ideation.

7. Your suicide will cause your loved ones a great deal of suffering. Especially if you leave a brutal scene. It might be better to wait till some of them die out but then you would have to endure the suffering of the bereavement caused by their death.

8. Your suicide will also deprive your loved ones of all the future fun they would of had together with you if you hadn’t died.

9. It’s a pain in the ass to have to get up and try to plan your suicide. Who’s got time for that shit?

10. Well.... your life MIGHT get better in the future. There’s always a possibility...... However small........