Well the 'controversial' cases are, by their very nature, ones about which we have conflicting moral intuitions. For example, torturing an innocent person for fun is intuited to be wrong by virtually everyone, which is why there is no serious dispute about its morality. But abortions, for example, are cases about which people have no very clear intuitions and thus are cases where people typically appeal to theories rather than intuition. As equally plausible theories deliver conflicting verdicts about such cases, disagreement reigns.
What to do? Well, we can't appeal to intuition, because intuitions are not clear. But we can appeal to imaginary cases (or real cases) that seem sufficiently similar and that elicit from us clearer intuitions. We can then infer from their similarity a conclusion about the controversial case. — Bartricks
I’m still not understanding the distinction. It seems that negative attitudes are also mental representations. — TheHedoMinimalist
I think you are misunderstanding my argument. I’m saying that all moral theories must make evaluative judgements. This is also true of deontological and other non-consequentialist theories. For example, A non-consequentialist philosopher like yourself likely does not believe that all wrong actions are equally wrong. This means that there must be a non-arbitrary way for you to say that some actions are more wrong than others. — TheHedoMinimalist
I argued that you do not have a non-arbitrary way of saying that the wrongness of torturing Tom is more wrong than the wrongness of something like lying to your boss about being sick to avoid work. — TheHedoMinimalist
You seem to think that the extent of wrongness of an action could be reasonably hypothesized by a weird mixture of people’s combined intuitions and a possible dismissal of some intuitions if they gave our ancestors an advantage in replicating their DNA in the past. — TheHedoMinimalist
First, I'd want to say that I think slavery has probably never been morally ok — Bartricks
Note too that our moral intuitions give us insight into the current morality of actions. Just as my eyesight tells me about what's around me 'at the moment' and not last century, likewise our moral intuitions give us insight into what's right and wrong today, not right and wrong last century. — Bartricks
So, by hypothesis, Xing seems wrong to virtually everyone today. Now - given my view (the view that morality can and does change over time) - that is excellent evidence that it is wrong today. Note, then, that I am not dismissing contemporary intuitions about the morality of xing - far from it, I am respecting them. — Bartricks
Most people, of course, are likely to insist that Xing was 'always' wrong. But here, I think, they are simply giving expression to how obviously wrong Xing currently is. — Bartricks
In the past it was intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing was right. Now it is intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing is wrong. Now, given your view one group is mistaken. Which one? Well, it would be quite arbitrary to just assume the past group was the mistaken one. I mean, why think that?? It is just as likely to be those around today who are mistaken. After all, given this variation across time - variation about something fixed - we know that our moral intuitions are quite unreliable. So, you - it seems to me - are now committed to having to say that it is just as likely that Xing today is wrong as it is that it is right. — Bartricks
But what does someone who insists morality is fixed have to say? Well, they could just dismiss the intuitions of the North Koreans. But on what basis? Looks like a prejudice, plain and simple. — Bartricks
A mental representation 'represents' something to be the case, and is thereby capable of being accurate or inaccurate. By contrast 'disliking' something can't be accurate or inaccurate. So, although negative attitudes - such as dislike - are mental states, they are not 'representations'.
An 'intuition' is a representation. Moral theorizers are not appealing to feelings - for that would make moral philosophy a branch of psychology - but to intuitions. — Bartricks
So, what's the best evidence that killing an innocent for fun is wrong? Is it that so-and-so theory says it is wrong? no, it is that it appears to be wrong. — Bartricks
Note, no theory is needed here. And most people - I mean, everyone I have met to date - lack normative theories, yet seem perfectly good moral judges. — Bartricks
I understand that you wish to avoid talking about the emotive issues but I’m actually kinda curious about what reason would you have to dismiss the intuitions of past people regarding slavery. You managed to dismiss the intuitions that people have about procreation being permissible and the intuition that people had in the past about homosexuality by appealing to something akin to an evolutionary bias explanation for why people hold that intuition. It seems that you can’t use the evolutionary bias explanation for dismissing the past intuitions that people had about slavery. At the very least, it is not entirely obvious that thinking that slavery is permissible has evolutionary advantages. — TheHedoMinimalist
Well, if we are going to make an analogy between eyesight and “moral sight” then morality is not only relative to the time period and the culture in which you live but also the immediate space around you. — TheHedoMinimalist
This would imply individual moral relativism instead of cultural relativism. — TheHedoMinimalist
When someone says that it would be wrong for TheHedoMinimalist to torture Tom to make everyone happy, they are really just saying that it’s obviously wrong to them. — TheHedoMinimalist
Well, you seem to be assuming that intuitions about cases of applied ethics are the most important cases for determining morality. I had already given you my argument that certain normative aims are more plausible than others if they have better comeasurabity. If my argument for “The Comeasurability Requirement” is plausible then any moral position which is incompatible with that value theory intuition is false. — TheHedoMinimalist
A library catalogue tells you what works are in a library. It may - almost certainly will - contain some mistakes. Nevertheless, if you want to find out whether a work is in the library, consulting it is a good bet. — Bartricks
Imagine a detective says that his approach is to look at the crime scene and follow the evidence. Does that approach imply that everyone is guilty? No, of course not. But it does not foreclose the possibility that anyone is guilty, that's all. Not foreclosing such a possibility is not at all equivalent to implying it.
My approach - which is just to use our moral intuitions as our guide (except where we have good independent reason to discount the moral intuitions in question) - is like the detective's. It is true that such an approach does not foreclose the possibility that some form of individual moral relativism may be true. But that is not equivalent to it 'implying' it. — Bartricks
And in fact it is a great virtue of my approach that it permits the truth of such views to be discovered, if true they be. Compare that to your approach - you have assumed such views are false, and so your whole approach will never be able to recognise their truth. That's a serious flaw. Not because individual relativism is true - I am not saying it is true - but because it 'may' be, and your approach has put its falsity beyond negotiation. — Bartricks
But many norms are universal in nature, as our intuitions themselves tell us. — Bartricks
But if we stick to the actual evidence, rather than hypothetical evidence, then it is fairly obvious to most that we 'all' have a moral obligation not to torture innocents for fun. Some may not have that intuition - but then it is more reasonable to think that's because their catalogue contains an error than to think that the catalogues of the rest of us contains the error and that theirs is the correct edition. — Bartricks
Morality does not 'have' to be universal - it's prescriptions do not have to apply to us all - but most of them do seem to have that character, and the evidence that they do is that they appear to. — Bartricks
It isn't plausible and I've already argued for my view. You must just make an assumption - an assumption that there is a fixed pattern to morality - and go from there, but that assumption is precisely what I dispute. — Bartricks
There is no evidence that there is such a pattern (if there was a fixed pattern, why has no one discovered it?). There is, by contrast, prima facie evidence that morality is unpatterned. Namely, it appears not to be patterned. The appearances in question are 'intuitions'. — Bartricks
I do not 'assume' that intuitions are our most important source of evidence. I have argued for this. Here is that argument. First, it is by intuition that we are aware of moral norms and values in the first place. We do not see, touch, smell, taste or hear morality, do we? It is by reason that we are aware of it. That is to say, by rational intuition. So, given that this is how we are primarily aware of morality, this is our most important source of evidence into the morality of an action. — Bartricks
Going back to your analogy between the library catalog and what you see as “rational intuitions” about moral cases, why assume that people’s moral intuitions are like a relatively good library catalog instead of an extremely misleading one? — TheHedoMinimalist
Of course, I actually don’t think that people even have intuitions about cases like the torture of Tom. Rather, they either have intuitions about the deeper reasons for why they think Tom’s torture is unjustified or they simply have a negative gut reaction towards it. There doesn’t seem to be any kind of a “rational mental representation” that people have towards moral cases of Applied Ethics. — TheHedoMinimalist
If my arguments for Hedonism do not work to make my theory plausible, then I might also be wrong about individual relativism. So far, I have never heard a good objection to my views on Axiology so I have no reason to suppose that my arguments do not work to properly support Hedonism. — TheHedoMinimalist
I think we shouldn’t confuse my approach regarding normative ethics with my approach regarding meta-ethics. — TheHedoMinimalist
First of all, I’m not sure what you even mean by pattern here. I would define a pattern as being something that allows us to make inferences about something else. In that sense, I do think that there is a pattern to morality but you seem to think that there is a pattern in that sense as well. — TheHedoMinimalist
It seems that your view does not argue that morality is unpatterned. If it was truly unpatterned then I don’t think it would be possible for you to formulate a moral hypothesis. This is because the formulation of an educated guess requires some sort of pattern recognition. Are you not observing patterns in the intuitions of other people regarding moral cases? — TheHedoMinimalist
I think your approach to morality actually makes it very difficult for a Galileo of moral philosophy to come along and challenge everyone else’s gut instincts towards moral cases. This is because he will be continuously dismissed by philosophers like you for arguing for an unpopular opinion regardless of how good his own arguments are. — TheHedoMinimalist
It’s possible that people have moral disgust towards the torture of Tom because human beings evolved to experience moral empathy towards someone getting tortured while not evolving to experience extra strong happiness towards billions of happy people that come as a result. This is because our pre-historic ancestors had no survival advantage by being happy about a world full of billions of happy people who are not their relatives. On the other hand, they had evolved a capacity for empathy towards the pain of a stranger because it made them better at forming cooperative relationships. So, there could actually even be an evolutionary explanation for the disapproval of Tom’s torture as well. Even if there isn’t an evolutionary explanation, we could argue that the gut instinct was simply what Steven Jay Gould might call a spandrel or an accidental by product of the right genes coming together at the right time to form the dislike of using Tom to make everyone happy. As long as this dislike is not harmful to survival and reproduction, it’s possible that an accidental evolutionary trait ends up lasting. — TheHedoMinimalist
I do not understand you here. The intuitions about 'deeper reasons' are going to be rational intuitions, and I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' in this context. — Bartricks
Axiological hedonism is easily refuted - there are abundant refutations of it. For instance, here's one:
1. If Axiological hedonism is true, then it is as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm
2. It is not as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to case someone else an equal amount of harm. (For instance, if I hit myself in the face that's not as wrong as hitting someone else in the face, even if the amounts of pain the act causes - both physical and emotional - happen to be identical)
3. Therefore axiological hedonism is false. — Bartricks
1. If axiological hedonism is true, then equal amounts of pleasure matter equally
2. Equal amounts of pleasure do not matter equally (for example, if two people - one innocent and the other guilty of horrific crimes - are equally happy, their happiness is not equally good, indeed the happiness of the guilty party is arguably positively bad)
3. Therefore, axiological hedonism is false — Bartricks
I think it is undeniable that in both cases the second premises enjoy overwhelming intuitive support and the only basis you are going to find to reject those intuitions is that they conflict with axiological hedonism (which is question begging). — Bartricks
I have not done that. I take a 'normative theory' to be a theory about what all morally right/wrong acts (and good/bad deeds, traits and states of affair) have in common - if anything - apart from being right/wrong. My moral particularism is the view that they have nothing in common apart from being right/wrong. That's a normative theory, at least on my usage. By contrast a 'metaethical' theory would be a theory about what the rightness itself is. — Bartricks
So, I think your axiological hedonism is false on its face - it flies in the face of powerful and widely shared moral intuitions that we have no reason to discount. — Bartricks
So, there is no more a pattern to morality than there is to, say, colour. Some things are blue. Is there anything all blue things have in common apart from being blue? Nope. — Bartricks
Like I say, I think that's wholly unjustified and just bizarre. The core assumption is unjustified. Why assume that all right acts will have something in common apart from being right? They may do - by why assume it as an article of faith at the outset? — Bartricks
And given that any pattern one thinks there may be is going to be justified - to the extent that it is justified - by its being implied by some of our intuitions, it is bizarre to then subsequently ignore the probative force of those that do not imply it. — Bartricks
When we look at the evidence - and look at it 'assumption-free' so to speak - then morality appears to be roughly patterned, but not rigidly so. It doesn't 'have' to have a pattern, but it seems to have a pattern of sorts. — Bartricks
For example, imagine a divine command theory is true (which it is). That is, imagine that moral rightness and wrongness are prescriptions of a god, prescriptions that our rational intuitions give us some insight into.
Now imagine that the god is benevolent (which she is). Well, it seems reasonable to suppose that a benevolent god would issue prescriptions that would benefit us: that is, that she'd want us to do thrive and form meaningful relationships and all that stuff. If we follow prescriptions of that sort, then we're also likely to be more reproductively successful than those who did not.
In this case, then, we have a divine explanation for why it might be that living in accordance with many moral prescriptions has, in the main, proved to be adaptive. And in this case the explanation does not debunk the intuitions at all. — Bartricks
I think there are other things that all blue things have in common:
1. All blue things are made of atoms
2. All blue things exist in the same universe(if there are no other universes with blue things.)
3. All blue things could be perceived by humans who are not color blind as being blue.
4. All blue things reflect light in a similar manner and this is why they are all blue.
5. All blue things are not mental states
6. All blue things are not mathematical equations
7. All blue things are not red things — TheHedoMinimalist
Is there such a thing as “assumption-free evidence”? — TheHedoMinimalist
So, there’s always some assumption that you can claim that a piece of evidence is making and so there simply isn’t such a thing as “assumption-free evidence”. — TheHedoMinimalist
As I have stated earlier, I believe that intuitions that occur within a deeper level of argumentation are better than intuitions that occur at more shallow levels. — TheHedoMinimalist
Ok, now I think you just both defeated your arguments for moral particularism and your arguments for antinatalism. Divine Command theory is a normative ethical theory which argues that right and wrong actions are the prescriptions of God. — TheHedoMinimalist
I suppose you would then argue that moral particularism is simply a method of figuring out what God’s prescriptions are. In that case, why couldn’t my degree of certainty argument and my incomeasurability requirement argument be a better method of figuring out God’s prescriptions? — TheHedoMinimalist
Another question I have now is if there is a benevolent God then why would procreation be immoral? — TheHedoMinimalist
The deeper reason he gives for believing this is because he thinks that God would disapprove of it. — TheHedoMinimalist
Axiological hedonism is easily refuted - there are abundant refutations of it. For instance, here's one:
1. If Axiological hedonism is true, then it is as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm
2. It is not as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to case someone else an equal amount of harm. (For instance, if I hit myself in the face that's not as wrong as hitting someone else in the face, even if the amounts of pain the act causes - both physical and emotional - happen to be identical)
3. Therefore axiological hedonism is false. — Bartricks
I would argue that both premise 1 and 2 of your argument are false. — TheHedoMinimalist
Well, your phrase here that hedonism “flies in the face of “powerful” and widely shared moral intuitions that we have “no reason to discount”” seems to demonstrate why I think your approach to moral philosophy is extremely prejudice against unpopular opinions like the one I happen to uphold. It’s almost like I have to fight an uphill battle for you to even consider my arguments. — TheHedoMinimalist
I have studied the topic of Axiology extensively by reading lots of academic journals on the topic and related topics. I have also spent about 2-3 hours a day in the last 4 years philosophizing about this topic and other philosophical topics. I’m not even claiming to be right about my views on Hedonism though. There are plenty of really good Axiologists who are more dedicated than I am who might have really good objections to my arguments. But, I find it laughable that my arguments could defeated by normal people who never even heard of my arguments or philosophized about the topics that I have philosophized about. — TheHedoMinimalist
I mean, one could point out - trivially - that one thing all right acts have in common apart from being right is that they're all actions, and they all happen in time, and so on. But you can't get a normative theory from that. They're just conceptual truths. — Bartricks
So, of course I agree that all right actions are actions, and all right actions are performed by agents, and so on. But the rightness is not 'supervenient' or resultant from these features, and thus such observations cannot provide a basis for a substantial normative theory. — Bartricks
Yes, lots. It appears that hurting another for fun is wrong. That is, my reason represents me to have reason not to hurt others for fun. This is not an assumption, but an appearance. And appearances are prima facie evidence in support of their representative contents. That too is a rational appearance.
These are appearances, not assumptions. To illustrate the difference, take one of those well-known optical illusions concerning shapes - you know, the sort where there are two objects that appear to be different sizes but are in fact the same size. Now, because these are familiar to most of us, we 'assume' the two objects are the same size. Yet they 'appear' to be different sizes. I mean, mere familiarity with these illusions does not prevent the objects featuring in them from appearing to be different sizes. Likewise, hurting others for fun appears to be wrong. That's not an assumption. It is how things appear (and appear to virtually everyone). Not everyone believes in the accuracy of such appearances (nihilists do not, for instance). But even those who do not believe in their accuracy - so, nihilists again - still typically get the impression the acts are wrong (they just don't assume they actually are). — Bartricks
No, that's just plain false and amounts to a form of the most extreme scepticism. — Bartricks
No I haven't and no it isn't. Divine command theory is a metaethical theory, not a normative ethical theory.
And it is not the theory that morality is the commands of 'God'. That's one particular kind of divine command theory - the kind associated with Christianity and Islam. But divine command theory is the theory that morality is the commands of 'a god or gods'. It isn't a religious view, but a metaethical view - a philosophical theory.
It may help if I point out that I am not religious and neither know nor care what Christianity or any other religious says about anything.
Note too, that a normative theory is a theory about what's right, not about what rightness itself is. A metaethical theory is a theory about what rightness itself is. — Bartricks
As an example, utilitarianism is a normative theory. It says "The right act is the one that maximises happiness". Divine command theory does not contradict this, and is thus not a rival view. For it says that 'a right act is one and the same as a prescription of a god". That says nothing about the content of the prescription. So, it is consistent with utilitarianism (and deontology, and any other normative theory you care to mention). — Bartricks
nihilism is a metaethical theory with normative implications - it implies nothing is right or wrong - but that doesn't make it a normative theory — Bartricks
No, because it is implausible. Your normative view is entirely compatible with divine command theory, but it nevertheless has no good evidence in its support, I think. If you drop your assumptions and just inspect people's rational intuitions they vary from case to case, yes? There's a rough shape to them, true. But nothing very fixed and definite. So, moral particularism is implied by the actual evidence - by rational intuitions. — Bartricks
If divine command theory is true, then what's right is determined by a god's commands, yes? Well, are they fixed? No, or at least, there's no good reason to think they would be. — Bartricks
I mean, if I command you to do something in one context, I am not thereby committed to commanding you to do it in another, or even in the same context on another occasion. So, what goes for me surely will go for a god as well. — Bartricks
Also, it is quite clear from our rational intuitions that the god who exists seems, in the main, to be opposed to imposing things on people without their prior consent. I mean, doing that - even when what one imposes is beneficial - seems wrong in many circumstances, and even in those where it is overall justified, it seems regrettable nevertheless. I find it hard to think of a much more significant thing to impose on someone than a life here. So, given she seems so opposed to imposing significant things on others without their consent, it is reasonable to suppose she'd be very much opposed to procreation on those grounds too. — Bartricks
Anyway, I reiterate that I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' and 'shallower' intuitions in this context. I assume that you probably mean by 'deeper' those intuitions that, if taken in isolation, would imply the truth of a principle and by 'shallower' you mean intuitions about particular cases. But I simply see no reason to accord one more probative force than another. — Bartricks
Note too that the philosophical community seems to be largely on my side, for if someone proposes some moral principle what happens is everyone then tries to imagine a case in which the principle would force us to judge an act wrong that is intuitively obviously right. When such a case is imagined, it is taken to be a counterexample to the principle, and depending on how clear and widely shared the intuitions are, the counterexample will often be held to refute the rule. So, what you would call 'shallow' intuitions that are, in fact, the ultimate test of credibility that any moral rule is held up to. — Bartricks
I don’t think that the 2 actions are equally bad. I actually think that it’s worse to harm yourself than it is to harm others. This is because there is a higher probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing themselves to suffer than the probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing others to suffer. This explains why there are some philosophers who are ethical egoists and moral nihilists and think they have no reason to avoid causing others to suffer but there are literally no philosophers that I have seen who think we have absolutely no reason to avoid causing ourselves to suffer pointlessly. This implies that we have a higher degree of confidence that self-harm is bad than the confidence by which we can say that harming others is bad. To give you a thought experiment, imagine that you and a complete stranger get kidnapped by a sadistic torturer. He says that he will either torture you or torture the stranger and you are the one who has to choose who gets tortured. Assuming that the suffering from the torture will be the same for you and the stranger, it’s seems like you would have more reason to have the stranger tortured instead of having yourself get tortured. Of course, you would probably have a different opinion if I gave you a thought experiment where you have to torture someone yourself in order to alleviate your own suffering. But, why would a different opinion be warranted on the latter of those 2 thought experiments?You haven't provided any evidence that either are false. You have talked about degrees of betterness. But read premise 1 again. It says it is 'as' wrong for me to cause myself a harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm. So, act X causes person A 10 dolors of harm, and act Y causes person B 10 dolors of harm. As an axiological hedonist how can you possibly insist that one act is more wrong than the other? You're committed to saying they're equally bad, other things being equal. Now, how can it possibly make a difference who the agent of the act is? It can't. — Bartricks
So, Tim knows that if he hits himself it will cause 10 dolors of harm. And Tim knows that if he hits Jane, it will case 10 dolors of harm. Don't insist that Tim's act of hitting Jane will actually cause more dolors of harm - that is to change the example. No, in the example both acts cause exactly the same amount of harm. That's why, as a hedonist, you're committed to having to judge them both equally wrong. Yet they're obviously not. Hence the theory is refuted — Bartricks
So the first premise cannot be denied. And as for the second, it seems to me that you provide no evidence against it, you just raise the spectre of scepticism. — Bartricks
It is clear, is it not, to the rational intuitions of virtually everyone that hitting someone else is - other things being equal - much worse than hitting yourself? — Bartricks
On what rational basis are you rejecting those intuitions? You can't just reject them because they are inconsistent with your theory - for that outs you as a dogmatist rather than a follower of evidence. — Bartricks
And you can't selectively use scepticism to reject them, for that is once more arbitrary - you are only a sceptic when it comes to the probative force of intuitions that are inconsistent with your theory, but not otherwise. — Bartricks
Again, you can't deny the probative force of rational intuitions without giving up on all arguments for anything, including your own view. — Bartricks
So, if rational intuitions have prima facie probative force, and if what makes one act right can just as easily make another wrong, and if what has appeared right to most people in one age has appeared wrong to most people in another, then we have good prima facie evidence that moral particularism is true. — Bartricks
Why? Because that 'just is' moral particularism. So, until or unless you challenge that argument, your view is refuted. — Bartricks
Clever people defend false views all the time. There are umpteen normative theories and umpteen metaethical theories under debate in the literature - they can't all be true. They can all be false, but at best only one normative theory can be true, and only one metaethical theory. So, as things stand, we know already that most clever people's theories about these matters are false. — Bartricks
1. Bob thinks that life is bad and procreation is prima facie immoral. Because of this, he avoids procreating and donates his spare money to Project Prevention. But, he has very wealthy parents and they want grandchildren. Those parents would only allow him to have their inheritance if he procreates. Bob knows that receiving the inheritance money would allow him to get far more drug addicts sterilized. So, he decides to have just 1 child to receive the inheritance money and he gives his only child a privileged lifestyle while still ensuring that he can donate very large sums of money to Project Prevention.
2. Mary also thinks that life is bad and procreation is prima facie immoral. But, she really wants to have children. She reasons that as long as she donates enough money to Project Prevention that prevents more people from being born than the people that she creates, it is ok for her to have children.
For the antinatalists in the forum, do you think that the actions of Bob are justified? What about the actions of Mary? For all the non-antinatalists, do you consider donating to Project Prevention as a good action, a neutral action, or a bad action? — TheHedoMinimalist
There is a charity organization in the US called Project Prevention which pays drug addicts $300 to use long term contraception which often includes sterilization. The organization is usually supported by relatively conservative individuals who feel that voluntary eugenics is an effective and ethically acceptable means to improve our society. Sterilizing drug addicts can reduce absolute poverty and tax burdens in our society — TheHedoMinimalist
So, I have 2 questions:
1. How do you know that god or gods are benevolent?
2. Did god or gods create the universe which allowed for sentient life? — TheHedoMinimalist
Yes, you understand right here but why do you not think that we should privilege intuitions that imply the truth of a deeper principle? Why assume that intuitions have no levels and could only be dismissed if they are deemed to be as a result of some bias? — TheHedoMinimalist
But, Peter Singer did not express his most controversial viewpoints until he became popular for his less controversial viewpoints. — TheHedoMinimalist
I’m actually not sure if they actually do agree with you more here. — TheHedoMinimalist
I have challenged your moral particularism above by expressing my pessimism in people’s ability to do philosophy well while arguing that this pessimism doesn’t suggest that we shouldn’t devise philosophical theories. — TheHedoMinimalist
I don’t think that the 2 actions are equally bad. I actually think that it’s worse to harm yourself than it is to harm others. This is because there is a higher probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing themselves to suffer than the probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing others to suffer. — TheHedoMinimalist
But, I think that there is a greater likelihood that it is correct than any other value theory that I had encountered. But, it’s still probably wrong to some extent and maybe even completely wrong. — TheHedoMinimalist
Philosophy is really complicated and so our theories should be really complicated as well. This is our best chance of not having a terrible theory. — TheHedoMinimalist
In answer to 2 - I am not sure, but it would seem not. For the god is benevolent (see above) and a benevolent being would not have created a world like this one and then forced innocent creatures to live in it. Most humans do that, of course - they're well aware of what the world is like, well aware that they themselves did not choose to live in it, yet think nothing of forcing innocent creatures to live in it, partly, no doubt, out of a desire to be admired and loved and worshipped - but I don't think a truly benevolent being would do that. Hence, I conclude that the god who exists, Reason, has not done so. But I am not sure, of course, it is just what seems to be implied by the evidence. — Bartricks
Because that's the default. If you think some rational intuitions count for more, then you have the burden of proof. — Bartricks
Well, in that case, you must have very unusual arguments for the existence of god. — TheHedoMinimalist
I think the burden of proof is shared here because almost every philosopher thinks that some intuitions count for more than others(including yourself). We just have different theories about which intuitions count for more. — TheHedoMinimalist
But, how do we determine which explanations for the intuition are debunking? — TheHedoMinimalist
By contrast, you want to say - it would seem - that rational intuitions that lend themselves to systemisation by some kind of rule or principle carry more weight than those that do not. I simply see no good reason to think that's true. I can understand that we might want it to be true - it would be damn useful if it were true - but that isn't any kind of evidence that it is true (indeed, if anything it should make us even more wary of its truth, given our tendency to engage in wishful thinking). — Bartricks
Fair enough, but are you willing to grant that those deeper intuitions matter as well? — TheHedoMinimalist
it must be pointed out that moral particularism itself is counterintuitive to most people. — TheHedoMinimalist
In addition, I think the majority of people also find your non-religious divine command theory to be counterintuitive as well. — TheHedoMinimalist
For instance, in the debate over Gettier cases in Epistemology virtually no one has the intuition that the agent involved possesses knowledge, but there is disagreement over the correct analysis of why the agent fails to possess knowledge. — Bartricks
I do not see how that's an objection to moral particularism. My case does not assume that people are good at doing philosophy, only that they have fairly reliable faculties of rational intuition (just as I assume people have fairly reliable faculties of sight - and so if the vast bulk of people see a mugging, that's good evidence there was a mugging). — Bartricks
I always felt like being good at philosophy was more similar to being good at trivia than being good at fixing cars. — TheHedoMinimalist
It doesn’t help that I sometimes get mocked by my family for being bad at practical tasks like working on cars, doing basic home repairs, and cooking complicated meals. My family also knows that I’m like a walking encyclopedia of somewhat useless knowledge. — TheHedoMinimalist
Unfortunately, I just don’t enjoy learning practical skills. Even as a musician, I don’t like to hone my guitar and piano playing abilities. Instead, I prefer to hone my songwriting abilities instead and record the instruments in my songs with an app like Garage Band. This allows me to compose music with minimal technical ability. — TheHedoMinimalist
I would disagree that there’s only a few factors to analyze. — TheHedoMinimalist
So, as you can see, there’s definitely a lot of interesting things to analyze regarding this topic. — TheHedoMinimalist
Someone had probably said something like this when e.g. Aristarchus proposed that the earth went around the sun or Eratosthenes, by measuring the earth's circumference, demonstrated it's not flat. — 180 Proof
I don’t think that’s true. I had heard that studies in experimental philosophy had revealed that most people in East Asian countries think that the agent has knowledge in Gettier cases. — TheHedoMinimalist
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