But I didn't ... how do you not understand what I am saying? You can stay here and talk to someone else about something else if you wish, but it would probably serve you better to go somewhere where people are talking about what you are talking about.

Your time, your words.

Not interested in that discussion whatsoever.

Go here: the-argument-there-is-determinism-and-free-will

Not clear what you mean.

Maybe looking into ideas surrounding emergentism would help? Sounds like the kind of ballpark you are playing in.

There is a very real difference as outlined in the OP.

Choice is real.

Choice is not real.

The idea is then to argue why, or why not, BELIEVING in Determinism or Non-determinism is better than the other; if at all?

First, we need to outline what is meant by these terms.

Determinism frames the premise that our futures are set and unchangeable (human choices are not real), whereas non-determinism frames the premise that humans can change their fate (human choices are real). — I like sushi

I made it clear what I was talking about.

It is not "incorrect" you just did not read how I was using the terms.

It makes more sense if you just tell me how this is applicable to the problem I was posing.

More to the point, do you think someone who believes in Determinism would put up more of a fight than someone who believes in Non-determinism? That is what I was asking.

I said, plain and clear, that a believer in Determinism would not because they would not believe they are losing anything.

If there is no discernable difference why would you choose artificial reality over actual reality.

Maybe there are people who wish to float in a vat until they die completely oblivious to reality. I have a pretty strong feeling these people are in the minority though. Their are drug users, so it is not too much of a stretch to conclude that some would opt out of living a genuine life.

If you are a hedonist you are a hedonist. I am not really here to argue against hedonism as the topic is focused on the 'what if non-determinism'.

Do you think someone who believes in Determinism compared to Non-determinism would be more or less likely to enter the 'experience machine'?

It is your job to say what you are talking about.

There is no argument. Just some mundane statements.

This is WAY off topic now.

@flannel jesus Same for you. The conditions are given in the OP and it is quite clear that 'Determinism' in the sense I am categorising it is of consequence ONLY from the proposed 'Non-Determinism' being true.

Huh? The point is you would not enter the machine because it was not real.

Risk is essential in any endeavor.

When it comes to religion, and religiosity in general, altered states of consciousness are the mainstay of the most basic rituals and ceremonies (institutionalised or otherwise).

I'd settle for a step closer than we were before. — Dan

For the potential problems of the kind of non-sentient AI systems that may arise in the relatively near future, this is a worthy aim for sure!

I am certainly more inclined to look toward Moral Scepticism myself btw.

no, I am concerned with solving ethics entirely. — Dan

I am not really sure what you mean by "solve ethics entirely" here? Sounds a bit like attempting to count to the highest possible number. Needless to say where I think that will end.

Finding better methods is certainly possible though I think. I really do not think it takes much to show how irrelevant it is to try and offer up a tangible proof of moral absolutism. If I do then all I can say is where doubt exists doubt exists.

As I have noted to you already, there is scope to push the means of measuring further but there will never be any 100% validated methodology, only one that will work well enough under almost every circumstance (in the manner you framed the problem).

From what I have read fairly recently of Bernard Williams in 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' I am inclined to view morals of obligation and such as not really within the realms of philosophy. There can be a philosophy of anything, but just because there is a philosophy of morality it does not mean there is anything essentially philosophical about Morals.

it is better to consider this freedom being protected rather than promoted. — Dan

It may even be beneficial to reduce freedoms too in some circumstances. The more freedom people have the greater the weight of responsibility.

This is besides the point to the problem you set out though. I am fairly sure you are more concerned with this as a potential use for AGI regarding a robust moral system to protect humans rather than cause undue harm?

I think I might be able to attempt a work around somehow ... might not fit into your criteria but will be fun.

Currently in the process of writing an essay on Liberty so this kinda thing is in my field of vision.

I am curious about what you would say to people who choose to have less choices. Basically they purposefully shirk responsibility and prefer not to choose.

Do we enforce a protection of choices against the will of such people? If so how can you justify this as it seems contradictory to the claims made for freedom consequentialism.

How far does paternalism factor in here if we are assuming rational and able people who are well informed and educated? I understand that it would likely enforce loss of freedom if it was judged such an action would reduce net Freedom?

This is intentionally quite a low bar to set for understanding, and means that people need not be well-informed in order to be free. They only need to understand what choices they are making and what it means to make those choices, such that they are able to apply their rationality to them. — Dan

This is a bit of a stretch considering people need a pretty high degree of understanding to contemplate possible consequences. This makes the whole scheme of Freedom Consequentialism ( as you frame it here) as somewhat elitist.

Regarding Satisficing Consequentialism I think this has better grounding when we define the 'minimal' as a kind of buffer zone rather than as an actual definitive line ... obviously this does not really help you as this is the very problem you posed that you wish to find a solution to!

If it is unsolvable then a cautious approach would make the most sense and then we find ourselves trying to resolve by Occam which side we should cut off or not. The qualitative aspect is really tricky so I do not see any simple work around that would outright counter the demandingness objection.

For these reasons I think a fresh approach may be warranted.

Interesting stuff :)

What if someone proves that it cannot be solved?

There is a phenomenon referred to as Christianity.

Are you saying anything else other than this? I cannot see that you are.

I think it is reasonable to say that a great number of us could give more. I see no reason for feeling guilty about going to the cinema or whatever though.

His argument has good weight to it as we all know the 'out of sight, out of mind' factor is big for all humans.

I honestly think it makes more sense for us to attend to what troubles are happening locally because, in terms of practicality, we are way more likely to contribute where we can immediately see and deal with certain social problems (plus people LIKE to actively help others rather than passively give money).

Ideally, if people have a decent income they should see what they can do and budget for it if they wish. Encouraging people to try once and see how they feel is likely more proactive than appealing to guilt (no matter how slight the appeal to guilt is).

The feel good factor is good enough reason contribute and there is no need to tie people in knots of guilt about what they do or do not do. Far better to merely appeal to people's better nature and ask them to 'give it go' and see if they feel any emotional benefits from such actions.

I see universals as meaning only ONE kind of thing. There are different types of 'walking' but not different types of 'the number one'.

If you cannot ask "what kind?" it is a universal.

Is justification the same as reason, apology, exculpation, defense, plea, rationale, rationalization, pretext, excuse - or something else? — Vera Mont

I would describe it as picture painting. The reasons for doing so vary depending the criteria. Justification can be a statement, a reply or a discussion with yourself. Each is quite different and serves different purposes.

When justifying your own actions or statements, according to what factors do you formulate your argument? — Vera Mont

Who I am talking to, what I want to say and how I may be wrong.

On what grounds do you decide whether a justification is appropriate and valid? — Vera Mont

Cynicism. This is true for my own justifications and others.

The simple truth is humans lie to themselves probably more than they lie to others. Watching how others justify themselves can help us understand some ways in which we fool ourselves.

Examples from any area of experience would be helpful. — Vera Mont

I have no reason to justify myself to you ;)

Some good points and interesting perspective there. Made me think.

I guess I am particularly curious about the Purpose (teleological) and Value (axiological) aspects involved when applying the "Experience Machine" to this question.

Note: let us stick to plain English rather than throwing around jargon though for now (much like with various nuances of Determinism).

Nozick tried to show that raw 'pleasures' are not necessarily what humans are pursuing. He pointed at the belief in the reality of the experience as being a factor that outweighs a pursuit of 'pleasure'.

Extracting this idea and applying to what is 'better' to believe, for the problem I have posed, shift the focus of the argumentation. By this I mean that we decide what is 'better' so how we Value the different positions matters.

Assuming Non-determinism (in any degree) can we provide evidence to state that belief in non-determinism trumps belief in determinism (as outlined in OP). I think we can.

The dynamic between living a so-called good life and living a life adhering to reality seem to be entwined. Reality seems to expose itself as the Purpose we carry for living; or rather, exposing reality is the Purpose for living.

Future is certainly tied up within this. Many people's access to 'pleasure' is generally in the immediate now, in temporal isolation, and in sensation. The Purpose is something more substantial as it is reality seeking.

The pleasure is ephemeral and perhaps an immediate reactionary guide; focus on the visceral experience. The Purpose both concrete and expansive in a temporal incompletion - we are always seeking reality through the real rather than abstractly measuring it in terms of 'pleasure'.

Note: I am trying to be concise here so as not to muddle the line of thinking.

Now, if we view Purpose as both reality led and reality leading - instead of goal driven - believing in no temporal Purpose (Determinism) clearly defeats Purpose as a led and leading aspect of human life. For non-determinism we then have the task of what that means as a Purpose led and leading being and to what extent our strain and stresses of responsibility factor in or not, then provide the evidence for this (if possible).

As an example of the ideas above (in case it is difficult to follow): I had a gut feeling that I should apply the thought experiment of the 'experience machine' to determinism vs non-determinism. The gut feeling is merely 'pleasure' directed, but the underlying mechanism of all this is Purpose. This reveals that a 'better' belief is the belief that drives Purpose, therefore believing in having purpose is certainly better than not believing in Purpose.

The only remaining question then is whether or not there is an optimal degree of belief in non-determinism and whether or not an argument for belief in determinism can be realised within these bounds?

I think it is far more likely it would lead to no decisions at all (which is a decision). We could also then argue that a non-deterministic belief would lead to procrastination and no decision making too though.

I think I outlined fairly well why there is no serious point in talking about Determinism as True in the sense I framed it. If it is false it might still be 'better' to believe in compared to believing in Non-determinism.

The entire point of this thread is to explore this. On the surface it may appear that it is 'better' to believe in Non-determinism. The question is can you provide good arguments for this belief and strongman the Determinism position too?

Nice information but irrelevant to the problem posed. Call it fatalism if you wish. I simply tried to outline what I was saying for this scenario as simply as I could (no need to get into the nuances of jargon).

The question now is not about what is true because we have no current way of unraveling this question in any simple manner. The question posed here is what is better to believe. — I like sushi

Few ask this. In short, believe whatever makes you do the more correct thing. If your beliefs in this matter don't significantly influence your day to day decisions, then the beliefs don't particularly matter. If fear of the wrath of the FSM makes you a better person, by all means make that part of your beliefs. — noAxioms

Yeah, I have not seen many ask this question. They just get tied up arguing about something they have no certainty about. Some prefer X and other mock X for thinking they can prefer X. The argument there is dead in the water.

I believe this problem is a kind of side door into the whole Determinism debate without really caring what is or is not correct.

I can only know that the future is out of my hands, but I can’t say it is set.

All I know is that my present state is not the result of me being free from forces that always precede my present state, and free enough to insert my own choice into the chain and tide of forces that placed chocolate ice cream in my mouth.

But those forces could be random. They could be some other free agent, operating me like a puppet at their free will - who knows? But I need not conclude that my future is set; only that my present was constructed by other than my choices. And that my future is not mine to set by my “choices”.

Maybe this is the same result, but I think it makes it more scientific if a question, and less dramatic with words like “fate”. — Fire Ologist

Irrelevant. Except for part in bold. We do not know so let's not waste our time speculating and see if we can say more about how one belief may or may not be 'better' than the other.

The rest of your post is you arguing with yourself and moving beyond the question posed in the OP. I am REALLY not interested in anything other than the question I asked and its possible ramifications.

Clearly determinism for humans is a moot point if true. The question is really about the belief in either if determinism (as outlined in the OP) is false and non-determinism is true.

@Moliere I am going to get Being and Nothingness printed out this coming week hopefully. Not sure when I can have a serious read of it though because I am really enjoying tackling Hegel atm.

Sartre is cruel with himself and thereby cruel to others as well, because it's justified and consistent I suppose. — Moliere

He seems to say that others see as cruel he simply views as brutally honest. I like the optimism in his take on existentialism and think there was some quite negative attitudes to what was overall a positive outlook on the human condition.

If you have the time and the inclination I recommend reading this:

Existentialism and Humanism

Whether you agree with him or not I believe attempting to understand is useful - for taking the good and critiquing the bad.

In the Q & A, and elsewhere, there are points where I either do not fully understand what he is saying, or he is tripping over himself a bit. Need to look closer after the weekend when I have more time.

Going to be reading Sartre and Hegel in tandem. Trying to think of a good third to read alongside them. I think Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling would be a nice contrast.

it's just I think Sartre is starting on the metaphysics side rather than the epistemology side. — Moliere

They are the same side ;) I think you meant ontological rather than epistemic though?

I have some opinions about this that are not too relevant here. Either way, there is a problem entangled here (which is why I am annoyed with Heidegger tbh). That is a WHOLE other thread so let's not go there on this thread :)

Trying my best to limit the range of discussion in any thread I create from now on.

being-in-itself/being-for-itself — Moliere

It appears Sartre changed the manner in which he applied these terms over time. I have found definitions that state being-in-itself means with 'essence' and elsewhere without (depending on the type of being-in-itself). This is likely to do with what @JuanZu points at above in reference to the 'Other'?

You cannot self-deceive yourself that you are acting in good faith, because that implies that you know what it is to act in good faith. — JuanZu

Huh? That is precisely my point? I am confused by what you are trying to express here. The very fact that you can deceive yourself into thinking you are living authentically is precisely what I am talking about.

You can deceive yourself into thinking you can know. Therefore you can deceive yourself about your own 'good faith' (authenticity).

If Sartre merely meant authenticity as an unreachable absolute target to aim for, it still means we are able to deceive ourselves into thinking we are moving closer to this ideal or further away from it.

Do you see what I mean?

The paradox is actually different. It is that when we pretend to be determined by our circumstances, social roles, etc., we are already making use of our freedom precisely in order to pretend. As in the case of the waiter who pretends to be a simple waiter, but the very act of pretending makes it clear that he is not a simple waiter. — JuanZu

The 'pretending' here is something more complex. I will think on this and see how it applies to what I am getting at. Thanks :)

Heidegger's tradition of phenomenology maybe. Not Husserl's though, and that is why they parted ways (as well as other reasons of course).

Anyway, later ...

So to act in bad faith is to speak dishonesty. — JuanZu

Incorrect. It is self-deception. One cannot always be aware they are acting in 'bad faith'. This misunderstanding might highlight the problem ?

Someone can deceive themselves into thinking they are acting in good faith when they are not - as is commonly done by everyone. We can be 'oppressing' other individuals under the staunch belief that we are acting in good faith rather than 'bad faith'.

It makes perfect sense to be in prone to self-deception that results in believing we are living 'authentically' when we are not.

This is the paradox of the claim of dealing with 'bad faith'. If we cannot truly distinguish between what is or is not an act of 'bad faith' clearly this is highly problematic.

I disagree with this. The idea of human nature is a central one to my way of thinking about people. Based on reading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science plus my own experience in life, I see that we are deeply human at a biological, genetic, and neurological level. I say that so you know why I am resistant to any denial of its existence. — T Clark

Those were Sartre's words btw. Forgot to tag.

Will explain later. Time to go to work now :)

It also strikes me as arrogant. We are who we are, but we are also what we are. Sartre's radical freedom feels like Nietzsche's ubermensch. You can take that with a grain of salt, since I have read very little of either man's work. — T Clark

He was undoubtedly influenced quite strongly by both N and H.

My question was more or less an EVEN IF approach to the whole issue of 'essence'.

Whether we agree or not we can still follow the reasoning and find the paradoxical problem of knowing how to distinguish between a victim of bad faith or someone in bad faith. Clearly to play the victim is bad faith. I am not sure he ever addresses this issue other than to say something along the lines of 'be true to yourself' - as echoes.

Nominalism is nominalism. You will have to be more specific with your question maybe?

From my pov, nominalism is nothing other than the Cartesian doctrine that matter is extension. — Gregory

That is ONE way of using nominalism I guess?

The literal meaning of the term is how we name/nominate items of thought/experience as X. What use abstract concepts are, how universal terms work and how these terms relate to reality are all what nominalism focuses on.

A nominal perspective is a pretty interesting one to take when thinking about stuff.

This might help to better outline his distinction :)

In case anyone is confused by what he meant by no nature/essence:

"Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition. It is not by chance that the thinkers of today are so much more ready to speak of the condition than of the nature of man. By his condition they understand, with more or less clarity, all the limitations which a priori define man’s fundamental situation in the universe."

Human beings have an essence, a nature. To ignore this is simply to be ruled by something that lies outside one's grasp of reality, to be determined by ignorance. Our actions do not spring from the aether uncaused, nor do we. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, what exactly did you mean here then if you know he never suggested we 'spring from the aether' as you put it?

Our actions do not spring from the aether uncaused, nor do we. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note: I do not believe this is what Sartre was saying. I do not believe he denounces obvious physiological facts or differences (such as sex or the human body in general).

If you have read Sartre and can explain why in depth I would love to hear it.

An in depth analysis of your understanding of his argumentation against essentialist ideas in the manner he was talking about them would be great?

The question remains how/if the paradoxical position Sartre gives can be overcome? If not that then merely fortified in some way that is productive?