Of course not. It is up to you to bother with the argument or not and live as you wish to live.

The AN argument has weight to it. The utilitarian positions have weight to them too, So what? It is our pleasure to attend to them or not.

No one does over any reasonable extension of time. The point is to understand that someone else 'measures' the valuation between 'pain' and 'no pain' as a meaningful point in this kind of argument (which it is).

In the sociopolitical sphere I think a decent part of this idea stemmed from a staunch opposition to 'Pro Lifers'. I think there are many more fundamentalists at the Pro end of the spectrum though! :D

If all the people who were thinking about procreating asked “what ought I do? What’s the right thing to do? Should I procreate?” The AN believer would say to everyone “You shouldn’t procreate because that would cause suffering.” — Fire Ologist

Yes, but they are entitled to their opinions and it makes sense to listen to their arguments for what they are not you think they are.

It is not really all that complicated you just have to break it down and understand that they have particular views on responsibility to future beings. You may not hold these views but you can consider them as if you did to some degree and come to a reasonable understanding of them.

As something of a comparison let us assume we all agree that polluting rivers is a bad thing. If some factory manager dumped toxins into the river (il)legally knowing the potential effect on the offspring of people who happen to drink this water we would regard this as a pretty terrible thing. The AN extends this further, but at least you can begin to understand why we want to STOP the factory manager from doing what they did, yet we would not decide to BAN the construction of all factories that could potentially pollute the river.

Understanding the general direction of the argument does not mean you need to adhere to it nor agree with it. You can still follow the path and see what is of use.

People who talk about AN from a radical position are obviously radicals, and radicals tend not to listen. I do not really waste my time on them as they do a good enough job of pushing others away from themselves to the point I see no point in engaging directly.

NOTE: To anyone jumping down my throat saying I am misrepresenting AN. No, sorry. This is not what I am doing. I am, and have, broken it down to the CORE elements that those not familiar with AN need to understand. I have no intention of exhibiting every possibility because they ALL come down to no 'suffering' being good where no 'pleasure' is not bad (asymmetry argument and the surrounding issues of utilitarianism/consequentialism and metaphysical values) and nonidentity (surrounding items like individual rights, responsibility and in particular whether or not we can say we have a 'Right' to procreate regarding potential beings combined with inevitability of 'suffering').

AN is fashioning a new law. AN says to me “because your life is mostly suffering, you should not procreate.” AN is the tell all.

I’m just saying to Mr. AN enthusiast, “procreate if you want or don’t procreate if you don’t want, but telling all of us, including me, not to procreate based on the fact that all life, including mine, is on balance over full of suffering, doesn’t make sense to me at all.” My kids love life too much. One’s a nurse (surrounded by suffering), one is a welder (gets burned everyday), and one is a struggling artist (who needs a job). They are all glad I “inflicted” life on them. — Fire Ologist

The AN position is not this. Some idiots may think they have an unshakable argument, but in truth it is just one of many arguments and has valid points to consider.

If anyone here is such an Extreme AN (to the point where they would enforce this by law) then they are not really understanding the point regular ANs make.

I summed up the main points someone trying to understand the AN position need to understand. The AN position is perfectly reasonable and does raise some intriguing questions about personal responsibility and how we measure the value of life (which is clearly quite a subjective matter!).

Not necessarily.

See Nozick's thought experiment involving The Experience Machine.

It was created as an argument against hedonism but does reveal enough to show the importance of experiencing reality (with its suffering) over pleasurable experiences that are disconnected from reality.

Well, no. It is not that complicated at all.

The nuances of specific situations make such decisions difficult to measure against each other for obvious reasons, but the underlying principle is pretty straight forward.

This is why I was puzzled how anyone can 'change their mind' about this. It is like saying I have changed my mind about hedonism being about pursuing pleasure. It is doesn't matter. That is true, so your opposing opinion on the matter is irrelevant - there is no 'mind changing' only agree or disagreement with the principle.

The point of the Principle is to weigh the good against the bad in outcome AND the burden of proof to lie on those wanting to carry out the act, correct?

Which still leaves me asking what this thread is about? Consequentialism is necessarily entangled with utilitarianism, they do not exist in a separate voids.

The Principle of Double Effect is utilitarian. What is there is agree or disagree about other than the overall balance of outcome (which is precisely what the PoDE is describing)?

Nietzsche's moral philosophy is that there is no morality (in the traditional sense) but, rather, we create our own values and subject ourselves to our own created moral law. — Bob Ross

He was correct as far as I can see. As for "happiness" ... I cannot recall him focusing on that at all (other than in a dismissive light I imagine?).

100%

It is one of the most backwards things I have ever read. I think he is confusing Existential Ethics with Nietzsche maybe?

@Bob Ross The general existential view of of ethics is based on creating your own virtues in light of an absurd existence. You seem to be conflating this with one or two cherry-picked points made by Nietzsche maybe?

Confusion is all I got from reading the OP. I only managed to get a few paragraphs in before giving up.

The form of moral anti-realism taking prominence, is this “Nietzschien kind”. Not only is it bad for a human to think they can acquire happiness through fulfilling their desires but this sort of thought leads to the crumbling of society into arbitrary, narcissistic power-struggles. None of which is good for people. — Bob Ross

I am not sure what you mean here? Nietzsche talked about acquiring happiness through fulfilling desires?

I would side with the whole Logos position from a morally sceptical standpoint.

I do actually find it REALLY hard to figure out what kind of question you are asking as I am not exactly a big believer in the terms 'justice' or 'fairness' in the world. What is, is. The world is what it is.

In terms of societal norms and such - not The World - I can say with some conviction that many people do not want justice or fairness. The reason for this being self-interest. This can present itself as someone acting to gain whilst disregarding others, or someone simply avoid the weight of responsibility.

A problem with the terms justice and fairness is many equate them with ideas like equality and human rights. These have inbuilt problems when faced with the reality of existence. Then what it boils down to is people expressing feelings and attitudes rather than presenting factual claims.

The Birth of Tragedy is where he started, so that might be a good place to get stuck in. If you do you will need to check out Aristotle's The Poetics for a better idea of where he was coming from though (it is a short though, so not a huge burden).

How about first on my own, allow myself to explore parallels that might be buried by both the author and his disciples/critics, deliberately or neglegently, then see what the experts say, and, read again? — ENOAH

That is ALWAYS my approach. It does take considerably more effort though. Meaning at least read something firsthand they have done before approaching them through secondary sources.

Nietzsche is a good example of exactly how much you can get out of self-study. I was reading Beyond Good and Evil then quickly realised I needed to read The Genealogy of Morals and then Birth of Tragedy ... then I realised I needed to read Aristotle's poetics. Only then could I fully grasp Beyond Good and Evil because I had a better understanding of where his ideas developed from and followed the direct line of thinking back to its origins.

I very much doubt I would have gained a better understand by reading secondary sources on Beyond Good and Evil.

Husserl is someone whose works has only recently been unearthed. He wrote an exceptional amount much of which never saw the light of day until recently.

What he says in his earlier works he moves away from in later works. His views are progressed and refined so taking something like Ideas as a comprehensive representation of his thoughts can be extremely misleading (and in some cases flat out wrong).

Crisis was the last thing he wrote but he died because its completion.

He is one of the few cases where I would say you need to read overviews of others who have done the scholarly work because it is a lifetime's work to study everything he did with any rigor. I myself have read overviews of Ideas, have read Crisis with rigor, and got halfway through Logical Investigations sometime ago (so need to restart that when I get a chance).

I do believe Heidegger did a good job of explicating some of what Husserl was pointing at, but in general feel quite strongly that he went off in the wrong direction (likely due to the differences they had in background - one logical and science based, the other more historic and religious). That is just my opinion though. I am also suspicious that Heidegger partly lifted the vast majority of his ideas from Husserl (there is apparently evidence of this from Husserl's unpublished work predating Being & Time) and doubled down on this given the good chance that Husserl's work would be effectively wiped from history due to the political climate. It may appear that Husserl adopts some terminology from Heidegger in Crisis but (as I mentioned) there is some evidence that the opposite may well be the case for some of the terminological jargon used by Heidegger.

In short, Heidegger leaned hard into the linguistic turn and Husserl warned about this language focus as potentially misguiding the phenomenological cause (as a science of consciousness). Husserl was very much against psychologism as was Heidegger ... somewhere though there was a quite severe disconnect between their views and Heidegger (as obtuse as he was) did a far better job of expressing his in a more tangible manner most of the time.

If your hand is burning, it IS an ethical issue. All that makes an issue ethical is the some value-at-risk or in-play. — Constance

This makes ethics essentially a meaningless term if it can mean anything. I cannot agree nor see the point in pretending to do this.

Either way, if you happen to write an in-depth paper about this I would interested enough to read it.

Thanks again for your time

You are overextending quite a lot there! Haha!

No one is an AN to that degree at all. That is not AN. I lost my 3000+ word essay on this subject unfortunately (not that I think you would have enjoyed reading it anyway!) :D

Made a brief summary here:

Antinatalism is based on a two main areas of contention. That is the philosophical problem of nonidentity and application metaphysical valuations.

NONIDENTITY

Firstly, the nonidentity problem is outlined quite simply in ethical terms as how and if we can claim to pass moral judgements that have consequences on persons who do not, as yet, exist. An instance of this would be akin to how we attend our environment with the thought to hand as to how it can effect future generations.

For instance, a culture that prioritises trees, viewing them as sacred perhaps, may also use them to build housing. This would disrupt future generations if they neglected the native forests by effectively destroying them all to build more houses or for use in other sacred ceremonies.

Here we can see a clear neglect of persons who do not yet exist (nonidentity). In contemporary terms this is often equated to how humans have damaged the natural world, thus leaving future generations with future problems to solve they had no direct hand in causing.

Here one antinatalist (AN) argument ensues. This is that we have no right to bring life into the world that will suffer due to none of its own doing. The new life is not responsible for its own coming into being, yet it does come into being. How can this be considered in light of those making the moral decision to have children? Is this morally irresponsible or not? If so to some degree each way, then to what degree and how can we rightly measure this?

Regardless of any personal analysis of this situation we can understand that given certain beliefs about this scenario we can come to see the reasoning behind someone siding with the AN argument.

Some will see justification in talking about the rights of nonidentity persons while others may find this too difficult, or impossible, to hold. The degree to which this can or cannot be justified is tied up in other initial ethics/moral stances (be this deontological, utilitarian, nihilistic, etc.,.).

THE METAPHYSIC OF ASYMMETRY

This perspective is an interesting one regarding moral axiology. Let us assume that measuring such values of human experience can be made in a meaningful way to begin with. This argument puts forward the proposition the probable chance of ‘harm’ and ‘benefit’ (let us use these terms as positive and negative aspects of human experience).

A) If someone (nonidentity) does not come into existence then there is No Harm and No Benefit.

B) If someone does come into existence then Harm is guaranteed (on some level) and so is Benefit (to some degree).

The argument goes as follows …

For A, No Harm is Good and No Benefit is Not Bad.

For B, Harm is Bad and Benefit is Good.

Looking at instance A), not existing is Better than existing because there is an asymmetry between Harm and Benefit, where lack of harm is strove for and peaks in Good in its negation, lack of Benefit is Not Bad and so neutral. No Harm either way.

Looking at instance B), existing is guaranteed to cause Harms and Benefits are not guaranteed to outweigh Harms, even though in some cases they may.

Conclusion: Not existing guarantees No Harm caused. Existing guarantees Harm caused AND cannot guarantee Benefits outweighing guaranteed Harms.

If then the goal is to reduce Harm then it is effectively a gamble when we create new life. The nonidentity person may have a Good OR Bad life, whereas if such a person never came to be no more Harm will be caused to such a person for obvious reasons.

Now to return to the problem of nonidentity …

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

The question is now how anyone has the moral right to procreate given a belief in reducing Harm following from the principle outlined in the argument of asymmetry?

No one asked to be born (obviously!), but someone did choose to bring life into the world. It is a solid argument for AN to say no to procreation here if they believe in the reduction of Harm as a priority. It is not faulty thinking following that particular line of reasoning with those particular views.

There are numerous other AN arguments that are basically little more than weighing the scales regarding future benefits and detriments to living being (and nonidentity potentials too) that add different themes to the argument. The common ones are Overpopulation, Dystopian World, Inequality, etc.,. These are more or less decoration to the core elements of the AN position I have laid out.

There is certainly weight to argument. Like every other ethical position though it does not present a convincing absolute moral law, but creates dilemmas for those serious about having children who wish to explore the ethical implications of doing so, for their child, other children, their community and surroundings, and all other manner of issues too.

NOTE: There was a another major point I had in the essay regarding ethics in general and Self-interest Vs Common good. Way more involved for that though so omitted it. Hopefully the above helps you see the weight, and use, of the argument presented by the AN position (whether you follow it or not).

The issue is generally conceived as metaethical not metamoral. — Constance

I can live with that.

Some call my position moral realism, yet the ontological question refers us to metaethics. See John Mackie's book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, in which he specifically addresses the issue brought up here, though not as I am defending it, and there are lots of others. — Constance

What kind of area would you say you are talking in? Is Moral Realism appropriate? Such categorising may be messy but it is useful to understand the general gist of where you are coming from.

No doubt the practical use goes to dealing with the world, and the point is to do things right. The Greek arete comes to mind; and of course, the principle of utility. But this presupposes the more fundamental analysis: what is ethics? Ethics as such, the essence of ethics, that is, that, if it were removed from a situation, the ethicality itself would be removed. This is value. — Constance

Of course, we judge through values. Ethical judgement is one value judgement of many. The same would be left if we removed what is prudent. My question would then be does judgement about what is prudent come before the judgement about what is ethical. If so, we can then say that what is prudent is the 'essence of ethics' right?

So a scheme of Value < Judgement < Prudence < Ethics < Religion ... not that I believe all Religion is is its relation to ethics in its original formation.

No liking or disliking, to put it generally, no ethics. But what is liking? This is what I will call truly primordial: it is "among" the facts of the world, but it is not a fact. The good of ethics (and the bad) is not contingent, as Witt said. It is not like a good knife, say, contingent because one can explain it. Ethical goodness is very different. Explaining suffering is just a tautological exercise. It is what it is, or, it stands as its own presupposition, an absolute. It is, like logic, apodictic. Kant found apodicticity (apriority) in logic, I find it in value. The latter is far, far more significant. — Constance

No liking, no ethics? Mmm ... I guess so. But that is basically like none of one category of judgement means no ethics. Nothing is surprising there. One would still make other kinds of judgements.

The 'essence of value' is emotion. I think there is something to the whole "boo!" and "hurrah!" of emotivism in regards to moral judgements. Drinking water when you are thirsty is 'good' (beneficial/targeted), while stealing water from someone else is 'not good' ("boo!").

Of course, there is the fascinating post modern complaint that even logic is cast in language, and language is contingent, historical (Heidegger), and even the term 'apodictic' is given to us as part of this. Apodicticity really is a term under erasure because it has no language counterpart. This is a tough issue, so I won't go there unless you want to. — Constance

Probably better to leave that alone for now :D I have been more than aware of the problems surrounding the application of the pure logic heuristic to language.

Nor can one second guess the "bad" of the pain of scorching of live flesh (masochists notwithstanding. Such an issue does not enter into the matter at hand). It would be just as "impossible" to deny the badness of such a thing as it would be to deny modus ponens. — Constance

If my hand is burning it is not an ethical issue. If someone sets my hand of fire then it is "Boo!"

Value as such is not relative or interpretatively derived. It is "the world". Not IN the world. Ethics is IN the world. Metaethics is about the world as world. Our existence is the world. We are IN a world, as well, and we ARE the world. This is something that has to be understood. — Constance

This is so obvious me to I am puzzled why you even have to point it out. I am not entirely sure why there is a fixation on ethics though as you could name other judgements OR just say Judgement instead. Is there something I missed in your meaning?

This, I am guessing, is unfamiliar language to you. — Constance

Not really. I have read Husserl quite a bit and Heidegger.

Religion: If ethics is discovered to be an existential absolute, in its essence, as I am claiming, then the world is a very different "place". Our familiar ethical entanglements are now matters of far deeper significance. This deeper significance is what religions strive to affirm dogmatically. Here, it is demonstrably done, I claim, after all is said. — Constance

You can probably tell by now that I think you missed some significant steps in your reduction. Ethics is layers above what matters. Ethics comes through other value judgements (it is not THE value judgement, if that is at all what you were hinting at), and value judgement is embedded in emotion ... now we do hit a rather hard problem because what emotion is is also a matter of sedimentation.

I came to Husserl via studying the Cognitive Neurosciences, and I am rather inclined to use what I have learned there as a check on what is feasible. I do not really see that Emotion is something that can exist separate from Logic. I have been of the broad opinion for some time that they are effectively two sides of the same coin, each necessitating a kernel of the other to exist.

Much like Kant espoused with his “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their unison can knowledge arise.”, I am inclined to say “Reason without emotion is empty, emotions without contexts are blind. Logic can intuit nothing, the emotions can think nothing. Only through their unison can value arise.”

And the analysis of ethics is the analysis that is about the analysis of moral positions. This is metaethics, and religion is about just this metaethical analysis. — Constance

Surely you can see why I have problems untangling the meaning/position you are trying to convey here?

Take a judgment about ethics, not about reason and logic, and give analysis. What is there that makes ethics what it is? — Constance

Morality and the interplay of reason to distinguish poorly constructed views/arguments (using logic in language). Then there is also the stance that ethics is generally referring to the application of moral principles to society at large - as a means of analysis.

If you will, Moral Laws are morality and Ethics is the investigation into the application of these laws and judgement of them using reason. Meat Ethics is more or less the questioning of the existence of Morals (validity) and the (mis-)use of concepts therein when partaking in this kind of discussion (ie. mistaking what is prudent for what is based on moral beliefs).

This is, again, logically prior to all of this. It is a question of ontology: the question of the being of ethics, a question that is begged in all subsequent thinking about how to think about ethics. — Constance

Ah! So we are looking at the essence of morality then rather than ethics (as I outlined it)? The 'being' of morality rather than ethics? I will need confirmation here.

This is, and Wittgenstein uses this term and it seems to work very well, value, the value dimension of our world. — Constance

I would have to say we are then looking for the root of judgement rather than ethics, as ethics is a judgement as is prudence. Morality is not intrinsic to value. Valuse can emerge in areas that have no prominent claim to ethics or morality.

. He talks like this because "the good" is not an empirical or analytical concept. It is not among "states of affairs." — Constance

I think I am beginning to see what you might be talking about now. I will see if I can articulate this in latter conclusion ...

This is to ask, What is the good and the bad in ethics? It is a metaethical question. — Constance

It is to ask about practical use of rather than an emotional judgement of 'right or wrong' flavoured values.

The "sense" of it lies in the simplicity of discovery. Put a lighted match under your finger and observe. Now ask the ontological question. Religion is ALL about this. — Constance

I cannot even begin to see where/how/if you are trying to insert religion into the scheme, or what you actually mean by religion if you are essentially stating it is synonymous with 'ethics'/'moral laws' (which I still need clarity on also.

Conclusion

I saw an instance where you referred to 'good' in a non-moral/ethical sense. This is certainly a pure value. We can value something as being 'better' or 'worse' by our intentions and direction. If I am thirsty then moving towards water is 'better' but certainly not Moral or Ethical.

The Morals and Ethics proceeds from human interactions in the truest sense that we use the terms Morals and Ethics. At a proposed deeper level the Moral/Ethic begins in the individual. The question is then HOW can Morals/Ethics emerge from an individual in relation to societal interactions? There are obviously some quite basic and intuitive answers to this question that all lead back to the 'better' that stands outside of Morals and Ethics (as presented above with thirst - the prudent).

Note: I am pretty sure I am not hitting the mark here with what you are trying to articulate but hopefully it will allow us to get closer?

Thank you for taking the time to respond :)

People were responding to my last comments generally, then you swooped in there like you owned the place.. Please. — schopenhauer1

Because you were wrong. I will not interact with you any more. My post was directed at the others who failed to understand the AN position. I tried to guide them towards a better understanding that is all.

Bye

Nonidentity is neither for nor against (it is not specific to AN either). It is the question of whether, or how, ethics can be applied to people who do not as yet exist.

The main positions are:

- We have no right to bring life into existence (nonidentity issue involved here in part).
- No harm is better than no pleasure.

I have found nothing much outside of these primary ethical issues worthy of much attention (existential threats, state of society etc.,.) because all of them orbit the two positions I gave the gist of above.

But again, this is my argument, not all of AN. So don't misconstrue that even though I am continuing the debate. — schopenhauer1

I responded to people asking about the AN position is in general. I did that. What your personal position is is your business to explain.

Kant came up with intuitions for knowledge. Are you suggesting there are intuitions for ethics/morals? I would argue that if there are they are sitting directly on top of knowledge not springing from the same point.

Here, I ask, what is ethics? and also discover apriority. — Constance

You discover judgement before ethics? Sorry, the more I look closely at what you have written the less it makes sense.

Here, I ask, what is ethics? and also discover apriority. But ethics is NOT vacuous logical form. It's essence is value, that is, entanglements in the world that deal with pain and pleasure and this is really a dimension of everything: the very event of this trivial occasion to write is saturated with value. Pull me away and I care that I am being pulled away. A glance at the time is implicit interest and meanings subtlety in play. — Constance

Well, I do believe we can use moral/ethic mostly synonymously but in this instance I would have to argue against this as ethics is about analysis of moral positions, and thus is more about the reasoning behind a moral stance than being anything like a means of valuing (other than by unearthing faulty logic and reasoning).

If am I more charitable then, okay, we may call moral positions a means of persuasion to personal will active within a given social framing. Clearly religious moral are part and parcel of something like views in Christianity that we are all familiar enough with.

If your conclusion is something like stating everything is valued ... so what? What kind of value are we talking about? Moral values? What is prudent?

Ethics is not a vacuous logical form because it is dealing with morals. Furthermore, the medium of language in which we deal with them is irreducible in terms of pure logical forms. Ethics applies logic, as best it can, to infinite terms (rather than something like finite numbers).

Obviously there are parts to your thinking you do not fully know how to state or even understand. What parts do you have a clearer means of expressing? Perhaps start there? Otherwise it feels pretty much like I am playing a guessing game unfortunately.

Thanks for trying to clarify though :)

I am still not really getting a clear idea of what is being pointed at by the phrase 'essence of religion'. Are you just saying that Ethics is the essence of religion? Are you saying the unconscious is the essence of religion? What do you really mean by using the term 'essence' and what reason do you have to do so?

I was merely pointing out the gist not giving a thorough analysis.

I pointed to the issue of non-identity (about which there are many positions) and about asymmetry (about which there is more to say too in terms of its implications). Pointing out to those asking that looking at one without considering the other is kind of futile.

You can provide links for them if you wish. I have read, and listened, extensively to the AN position.

My position is that it is VERY useful to look at for anyone considering having children - but not because I believe it will, or should, stop them.

Not really interested in anything you are saying. So I won't waste your time or mine.

I as referring to the general AN positions not your personal ones.

What I said outlined a couple of the main points AN puts forwards. I said no more than that.

The sense in which I am using 'religiosity' has nothing much to do with theism. My perspective is anthropological/psychological in the sense I use that term.

By "essence" of religion, what structures my thinking has led me to this: religion is a mechanism by which we might, at least, "recognize" that the ego is secondary; at best, turn away from ego, if only for a glimpse of the being emancipated from a world of constructions; the ego/Subject/I among such constructions. — ENOAH

Reasonable.

As an aside which will not be explained for the sake of space here, Husserl went far but at the end remained as confused as the rest of his Western Age and identified the "goal" of his exercise as the (transcendental) Subject. It is not. His method seems sound, but the goal is no different than that of this essence of religion: a glimpse into our (you won't like this) "true consciousness," reduced from all constructions. — ENOAH

Not entirely onboard with this. Husserl was aiming to create a 'science of consciousness' that stood apart from empirical science (a new science) as he saw clearly that psychology was not really doing anything of note in terms of qualitive content falling back on empirical data, as it necessarily had to, being framed as a science grounded in objectivity.

How do I know religion does this? Where in religion is this essence found? Briefly three examples but one could provide pages, and I'm simplifying and paraphrasing
Jesus--love god with all your might love your neighbor as yourself; that sums up the scriptures--read abandon ego
Vedanta--Moksa is freedom from ego
Zazen--a glimpse into true nature/no mind — ENOAH

I would look at this as an assumption of there being an 'essence' of religion. What strikes me is that religion (in its beginnings) is assumed to be an object. To echo Satre in regards to the 'nature of an object' what if religion is not an object at all? As in possessing no 'essence'.

I think we do have to be open to a lot of speculative thought here as we only know of religion through our modern lens and from where our modern schematic of religion came (the current Institutionalised edifices). From my own instigations I am convinced that the core of "religion" (or perhaps it is better to say religiosity) preexisted our current views, historic views (literally) and even societal views too. Undoubtedly there are numerous examples of religious rituals and such that expose known methodologies for inducing altered states of consciousness. eg. prayer, trance dancing, repetition, hyper-focused attention, hyperventilation and fasting - all intrinsic to religious passages of rite. Then there is memory and knowledge accumulation that predates written forms of data storage.

I think today the power of religiosity has been reduced to a shadow of its former self.

Since the existence of life is rationally meaningless, rationalism in this field always leads to existential nihilism. — Tarskian

No. Framing the line questioning as a reasonable one is faulty. The mistake is believing it is a rational question. It makes rational sense to distinguish between the kinds of question being asked and how they can be answered, whether or not they make any sense and if it requires an answer.

a) I do not think the question makes much sense rationally anyway. It just appears to be reasonable to ask about a 'reason for existence'.

b) You now have the task of stating what 'spiritual' means - other than saying opposed to the 'rational' which I was originally asking for to begin with.

I'm just saying religion at essence is more — ENOAH

I am still struggling to figure out 'essence' here. I am intrigued by the origins of religion, would that be relevant here?

Since there is no rational reason for the existence of life itself, the absence of a pacifier may very well turn into a problem. Life can be full of suffering. When the going gets tough, why do you even try to continue? In order to perpetuate something that rationally does not make sense to begin with? — Tarskian

I think I need to understand the use of 'rational' here too. If you are not being 'rational' then what are you being? Can you say anything worth listening to without articulating it rationally? If you choose aesthetic means to communicate you do so because it is rationally appropriate (if not it fails).

Surviving does not make sense while having children is simply cruel. — Tarskian

There is a whole other thread where you can argue that. Not here. Needless to say I disagree and fully understand the AN argumentation.

Do you reject religion and mysticism because they do not adhere strictly to reason? — ENOAH

I do not 'reject' them, just view them within their own jurisdiction.

If not that, then why do you reject religious or mystical "contributions" about consciousness outright (which is what you seem to be saying about the former, while relegating the latter to a pacifier, which I read as a useful fiction)? — ENOAH

I do not 'outright' as all experiences have something to contribute to concepts of human consciousness. I just emphasize that one should probably not hold to vague mystical concepts when trying to understand things with any reasonable kind of precision.

What if the best way to "access" consciousness is not the understanding but, like hunger and arousal, by "feeling-doing-being"? What if mysticism--admittedly, some hypothetical particular form--provided the methodology for such access? Would you deny it because it takes a path other than reason? — ENOAH

I am a little confused by what you are saying when you say 'reason'. Husserl does this, but he certainly has to use reason to do so (as do we all?).

Blind grappling for naught is just that.

While I'm not denying the usefulness of reason, is it not possible that on some matters, reason can only go so far before it reaches a bridge which reason cannot cross?ĺ guess, I was suggesting--poorly--that there might be "truths" notwithstanding all of the self serving myth, ritual and dogma. It would be an absurd irony if our strict adherence to reason, rather like a dogma, forever barred us from making headway on the very topic which continues to baffle us. — ENOAH

That makes no sense. If you are in the habit of making no sense that it is of no sense. Obviously?

Since we seem to have gone very far with reason--across the universe and down to subparticles--why is it we cannot understand consciousness? Is it possible that the latter requires some alternative methods of pursuit? — ENOAH

I think you are almost certainly using the term 'reason' to mean anything scientific here? Or so it seems? That may be the disjoint.

I'm not sure what you mean. — T Clark

We can leave that for a another day. Too much of a tangent.

People say that only what are called the "inner chapters," the first seven chapters, are authentic, but I found the rest of them very helpful too. — T Clark

I will have to give it go. Someone I know mentioned it a few years back in a very positive light - I actually bought the book for them when they asked me to buy them 'something interesting'. I have only read snippet of it a long time ago.

Many inauthentic texts are useful. The Hermetica is one I found to be an intriguing read. Even though it has been shown to be a 'fake' of sorts it still has some interesting lines of thought in it.

Again, we're social animals; we like each other; we want to be around each other. But there is no requirement that this be so. And I've tried to make it clear that Taoism rejects consideration of "the order of the societal whole" as a proper guide to behavior. — T Clark

Strictly speaking this is only true beyond a certain point in juvenile development. We require nurturing. I do find a lot of eastern mysticism has a habit of being interpreted as things happening in a Void of sorts.

btw how does Chuang Tzu differ from Lao Tzu? I've only read the latter extensively.

I have no idea what your question is asking if I am brutally honest. Plain speech and less fluff would be nice.

The whole of the linguistic turn sent people running down roads that many have yet to return from. Husserl saw this and pointed it out. Heidegger - I believe - made the journey back ten times harder.

I do not understand what you are saying, and therefore cannot agree with it.

I am not keen on religious doctrines posing as a philosophy of consciousness, nor am I inclined to side with mysticism as anything other than a pacifier of sorts (albeit somewhat essential in its role on mental stability).

The path to woo woo is the way. The destination of woo woo is delusion/madness.

I have said for a long time that ethics is unethical and morality immoral ... it is only recently that I have started to wade through the jargon to find what the accepted terminology is for outlining this better.

I am more inclined towards meta ethics. Emotivism is a useful term for part of how I see things - hence placing Moral Views effectively outside of direct philosophical scope.