...but that is because my mind works so phenomenally fast, and I am at a rough estimate thirty billion times more intelligent than you. Let me give you an example. Think of a number, any number."

"Er, five," said the mattress.

"Wrong," said Marvin. "You see?"

The mattress was impressed by this and realized that it was in the presence of a not unremarkable mind.

Life, the Universe and Everything Chapter 7

Pretending what? Are you intending that an invitation to comment preceeded by a insult is actually taken to be genuine? I've written what it is that I want to say on the matter. If I had the slightest impression that you actually wanted to hear what I thought Wittgenstein meant in this instance, I might say, but I'm not sure I see the gain for me in responding to an obvious attempt to get me give a response specifically set up so you can dismiss it as uninformed.

Have you even read the book? — Luke

I thought we were trying to avoid crass personal denigrations. What is that I've said so far that would justify your fake incredulity, that I don't agree with your line of enquiry?

We're currently up to about section 50 where Wittgenstein talks about the standard metre, among other things, in case you have anything relevant to say about that. — Luke

What do you think I've just been discussing for the last dozen posts? Are you having trouble spotting the words 'Standard Metre' and 'Wittgenstein' in my posts, or are you so arrogantly assured of your own understanding that anyone discussing things from a different angle simply 'must' be irrelevant?

We didn't have a discussion beforehand about how we're going to discuss it, so I can't help you there. — Luke

Yes, I noticed. So how are you determining what's relevant? The term seems to have done quite a lot of considering.

No. I'm having to guess that. As I said right at the beginning, no one has actually specified what it is they're trying to do here yet. I'm guessing you're trying to determine the status of 'a metre' in language as you seem to be suggesting that there is some determination that can be made over the question of to what the term refers.

Although if you're asking me honestly I suspect the reason why you're discussing it is because you're all trying to say things which indicate you've read and understood Wittgenstein at some level which sets you sufficiently apart from others to confer membership of a social group to which you wish to belong. But perhaps that's not entirely what you meant by the question.

I never said anything about "more real". — Luke

So what were you meaning by using the term "verify" then. You have two measures, your tape and the Standard Metre. You're saying that to verify your tape, you'd compare it to the Standard Metre, and you're saying you'd know which one to trust because of some property of the Standard Metre which renders its authority. I'm using the term "more real" to describe what I think you're thinking that property is. We could give that property another label if you'd prefer. The point I'm making is that the property by which the Standard Metre obtains is authority in the real world (whatever you want to call it), is not the same as the property that the word 'metre' has in any given language game. You seem to want to draw some normative conclusion from the discussion about the Standard Metre where there is none to be had (unless it is the impact on how you conduct philosophical investigations).

'Metre' is just word, nothing more. There is no thing that it 'really' is beyond what we use it for. So my tape measure is the standard for the language game involved in building a shed, I'm not 'really' referring indirectly to Standard Metre when using my tape measure. Refer to what Wittgenstein has to say about analyticity. You're not somehow getting at anything more real by referring back to the Standard Metre than I am by describing the word 'metre' as meaning that which reaches the 1m mark on my tape measure. He's trying to get you to see that the exact type of problem you are dealing with now is not really a problem at all.

The tape measure's metre is defined by the standard metre "stick", the same as all other metres. Which other metre are you thinking of? — Luke

No, the tape measures metre was defined by the Standard Metre. Who know what havoc temperature and humidity have wreaked on either in the meantime, but who cares? You certainly don't when you're building your shed. You're not continually referring back to the Standard Metre. What you are calling a metre is that which 'approximately' reaches the 1m mark on your tape measure,and that is sufficient. If you are concerned that some damage has befallen the Standard Metre, you might use your tape measure to help determine whether that is the case.

It's the definition of a metre! — Luke

No, it's a definition of a metre in a particular language game, in the real world. When you are measuring up for your shed, the definition of a metre is not the stick, it's your tape measure. Change the game, you change the definition.

I typically measure them with a ruler. — Luke

Right, so what's preventing you from using exactly the same technique to measure the stick? It's sufficient for you to consider your plank (or whatever) to be a metre long, why has it suddenly become insufficient for measuring the stick?

Some here have read the whole book. Several times. And more than a few secondary and tertiary sources.

But yeah, these days a few minutes on Google will suffice, hey? — Banno

Sorry, I'm not following you here, what do you mean by "a few minutes on Google will suffice"? The Internet is an excellent source of material but I think it would take more than a few minutes to get enough of a range of views to make an informed choice. If you find something you really like in the first few minutes then I can't see anything wrong with going with that, but I'd personally spend a bit more time on it.

how will you verify whether it is really one metre long? — Luke

If I may jump in to ask you a question, how do you personally typically verify if things are a metre long?

Well yeah, do you think anyone else here has worked out their thoughts based on nothing but reading the actual text? I mean I'd admire their dedication to parsimony, but it'd be a bit of a daft thing to do given that other people have already provided a dozen different interpretations we can simply browse through.

No, I've read some other people's opinions about the point of the whole book and found one which I liked. I presume you're aware that there is a huge amount of exegetical work already done on the PI. It's highly unlikely that anyone is going to have a view of the work that is entirely novel. None of us have to work out anything on our own if we don't want to. If you're actually at the stage of still working out the point of the book then you can I suggest you read some of the excellent expert commentaries. I'm really just here to see how what I think fits (or doesn't) with others. I think if you're here to 'work something out' you might be in the wrong place.

Eh?

they arrive at the interesting question (What does this sort of truth-ascription amount to?) then duck it by claiming it is simply a 'moot' question for a 'confused' reader then proceed along unbothered by a question that - it feels to me - ought to at least puzzle us. — John Doe

This is the point of the whole book. We did not ought to waste our time puzzling over it because the entire question only arises as an artifact of our language.

We can 'say' the Standard Metre is a Metre long if we want to, and in some contexts everyone will understand us. If everyone understands us, then the expression has done its job. Looking for what it is that we can 'really' say is exactly what Wittgenstein is trying to get us to stop doing.

Wittgenstein is simply using the actual Standard Metre as a way of showing how such confusions arise, not making normative claims about what we can and can't say.

Consider Paris is struck by some unprecedented and bizarre natural event and someone asks you to go and check if the Standard Metre is still a metre long, do you reply that you are unable to carry out such a request? Do you look at him in bafflement because what he has just said is meaningless? No, you take your tape measure (calibrated before the event) and measure the Standard Metre. If it is less then or more than the 1m mark on your tape measure you presume that something is wrong, not because you 'know' this as a true fact (you now can't possibly check if your tape measure is calibrated properly) but because it is sufficient for the current form of life that 1m is the length your tape measure says it is.

The point is to recognise that all talk about the truth value of the length of the Standard Metre is pointless.

It must have no holes to hold the water but Is it just luck that we got the one with no holes or is something else going on? — Devans99

We can't have got "the one" with no holes if it's "the only one that exists" in order to be surprised we got this one it can only be because there were a number of other options. If there are other options, then how do we know the status of life on them? It could be they all have life because universes suitable for life are inevitable (no surprises), or it could be that no others have life because life was tried on all of them but it failed owing to unsuitable conditions.

What it can't be is what you seem to be implying, that life is sitting somewhere outside of the universe waiting to be allocated a universe to exist in and, what good luck, it happens to be allocated the one with suitable conditions.

You know you're allowed to create your own threads, right? — John Doe

Yeah, but I don't understand the relevance. Are you suggesting that commenting on the meaning of section 50 of Philosophical Investigations is not on-topic in a thread about reading Philosophical Investigations which has arrived at section 50?

My approach here is to simply read it as if for the first time, taking each passage as it comes, and reading it organically. These groups are best suited to first time readers, so that's the assumption I'm operating under. If I'm not dealing with things that are dealt with far later in the text, then yes, that's almost exactly the point (did I need to explain this? To which idiot?). — StreetlightX

It's not, for me, that these issues aren't dealt with until later though. They arise directly from questions I think many people have with the text as it reads. My first question on my first ever reading of PI was indeed "why the hell is he knocking down some half-baked idea of language from 600 years ago?". To a good third of the subsequent arguments it was "yeah, but who thinks that anyway?" I think they're important questions to explore as the text is read. I don't want to treat it like a suspense thriller where we don't want to spoil the big plot twist at the end where Wittgenstein murders metaphysics.

The main point of of 50 is not simply to declare that this inability to attribute existence to simples is a rule within the language game, Wittgenstein is not writing a linguistics textbook, it is to set up the way in which question such as "what is blue?" are meaningless. One can only ask "what is blue?" (a question still asked) because of a confusion about the ostensive declaration that a thing is blue. The purpose is to show a way out of pointless philosophical questions, not to describe the way language functions.

still surprising that the pot has no hole (when most pots have holes) — Devans99

Nope, still not getting it, given a billion pots, given that it is possible for one to be hole-less, why is it surprising to find that one is?

Every pot has water poured into it (life has the theoretical opportunity to develop in every possible universe), why is it surprising that the only one with water still in it is the one without a hole? It's not like there's an astonishing coincidence of water and holeless pot. Any universe could have attempted life. It only succeed in the one that was suitable for it.

But if you were to pick a pot at random, you would likely get a pot with a hole. — Devans99

But we're not picking a pot at random. In the example, we're the water. We could only be in the pot without a hole so why is it surprising that that's the one we're in?

it is very unlikely that a randomly configured universe would be life supporting, so we have to ask why our single universe is life supporting — Devans99

No, we do not have to ask that. If our single universe were not life supporting we would not be in it to ask the question, so it's obvious that our universe is the life-supporting one (out of all the billions of non-life-supporting ones). It's like saying that a potter makes a billion pots, all but one of which has a hole in it. What's the chances that the only one with water in just happens to be the only one that is capable of containing water?

It's not his writing style per se, although I do think that is relevant. It the structure of any such investigation. No one writes a treatise about how the sky is 'really' blue, because no one thought it wasn't. There's nothing to investigate, no problem to solve.

So it is with the analysis here, I think. If I could take this as an example of the sort of analysis;

Rather, the point of the early passages are to establish the differential nature of ostension (in contrast to a 'linear' understanding of ostension); i.e that the 'same' ostensive act (pointing at 'this', say), can play different roles depending on the use to which ostension is put. There is no one kind of thing that ostension always picks out, but always the possibility of a variety of kinds of things (or put differently: in principle, there is always the possibility of a one-to-many mapping between ostension and what is 'picked-out', and never a simple one-to-one mapping between them): — StreetlightX

Who thinks there is only one kind of thing ostension points out? I mean, imagine asking someone in the street "are you always certain what kind of thing a person is pointing out?", who's going to say that emphatically, yes, it is always the case that ostension is clear about the kind of thing it targets. I doubt even half the ordinary folk would think that, let alone any actual professor of linguistics or child development. In fact, we know for a fact from people like Piaget, that they certainly were not labouring under such a delusion.

Wittgenstein's target is the sort of linguistic edifice which could have us seriously talking about language as if that were the case, despite knowing full well it isn't. His target is in fact the exact thing that's being done here.

Right, so you seem to be saying that the only possible way a universe could be, is to be like ours, and then you're saying it's unlikely that the universe is like ours. I don't quite see how that follows basic probability. If the only possible way a universe could be, is to be like ours, then that makes it a virtual certainty that any existing universe will be like ours.

Actually, I've found the critique in this forums quite helpful in developing ideas. — Banno

I'll defer to your much greater experience on the matter. I've certainly found discussing things with my reading group useful, having unfortunately recently been disbanded, I thought I'd try an Internet version. Can't say as my first impressions have been particularly positive.

And what you have to say might well be interesting — Banno

Yes, the line of thinking obviously interested me enough to persue it, so it's not unreasonable to think it might interest others. What I'm questioning is whether spending time developing the idea is worth the childish put-downs any dissenting voice receives here, not whether anyone might be interested.

perhaps you might make your question about Augustin relevant by pointing to some relevance. — Banno

See my response to StreetlightX above, basically I think its a mistake to treat it as a book about language in any academic sense (by which I mean any sense that some problem 'really is' some solution). Any such text would have started with an summary of current thinking, not a 600 year old, half-formed strawman of an idea.

If you think about hypothetical universes - all the possible universes we could of ended up with,
nearly all universes would lack cohesion; IE atoms and molecules (or similar complex structures) would not form. — Devans99

Multiple universes, if they exist, must be generated by some mechanism. It seems very likely that the same creation mechanism would be used for all universes and the same material would be used to create all universes. The universes should all follow the same life cycle. So should they come out like ours. — Devans99

Eh? Are all the other universes going to lack cohesion or come out like ours?

who cares whether Witty got Augustine right, or if it really does represent some commonly held view. — StreetlightX

Well.. I do, obviously.

Augustine is a foil to develop a point, and can be treated as that without loss. — StreetlightX

Yes, I agree. Unless you're trying to claim that "the point" being developed is one about how what people think about the way language is acquired is wrong, in which case Wittgenstein's source for "what people think about the way language is acquired" becomes important. Otherwise what's the point? Wittgenstein saying "x is the way things are" becomes pointless if no one thinks that x is not the way things are.

It doesn't make any difference if you move "the point" from statements about language acquisition to statements about the nature of ostension. One still has to ask "do people think x?" before telling people that x is not the case.

If, however, "the point" is to show a method for dissolving any philosophical pretention, then the choice of foil doesn't matter, Augustine is as good as any. That's why it matters.

Irrelavent point. — StreetlightX

Irrelevant to what?

§29: "Perhaps someone will say, "two" can be ostensively defined only in this way: "The number is called 'two'. For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."

Here, I take it he's merely making explicit what he has been doing in these opening sections -- starting to challenge what we might call the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions. — John Doe

I'll ask you the same question I've just asked Banno, if that's OK. Could you give a rough idea of what sources you think Wittgenstein was working from when you refer to "the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions". Form where is he obtaining this typical picture do you think?

The chances that a universe, picked at random, would be life supporting are very slim. So many things about our universe are 'just right' that it requires an explanation: — Devans99

But we've not picked one at random have we? We're talking about the one we're in, which, by definition is the one that's suitable for life. Where does the picking one at random come from?

All the universes are made of the same stuff and end up at a similar temperature/density — Devans99

Are they? How on earth could you know what the temperature of an universe is? We don't even know if they exist yet?

Off you go, then. — Banno

What do you mean by this?

I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete. — Banno

Why do you think that Wittgenstein presents such a theory? If his goal is to actually discuss language acquisition and use, why has he chosen a half-developed theory from 600 years which no-one even believes any more. Do you think perhaps he was unaware of Piaget's, Thorndike's or Watson's theories on language acquisition, all popular at the time and nothing like Augustine's. Perhaps you could give a rough sketch of what you think popular opinion about language acquisition was at the time Wittgenstein wrote PI with a few sources. It might help to understand where you're coming from with this interpretation.

Where would you fit? I mean if you travelled back in time wherever you'd want to be, stuff would already be there (from the current time) so where would all that stuff go to make room for you?

the scientific method does not turn off belief, but seeks to justify it. The hypothetico-deductive method can only yield justified belief, never apodictic knowledge of our hypothesis. — Dfpolis

Absolutely. Well said.

The weak anthropic principle explains that the universe must be fined tuned for life; it does not explain why the universe is fined-tuned for life. — Devans99

Right, so how does that have any bearing on the necessity of God? The universe is suitable for life, I'm not seeing the need to explain that via a creator, it can either just be that way by chance or be the only one of billions that aren't that way.

There is no experimental evidence to support multiple universes. There is experimental evidence for the theory of Inflation but not for the extended theory of Eternal Inflation (multiple universes). — Devans99

Again, I'm not sure what relevance this has to God (the topic here) the amount of experimental data doesn't have any bearing on the theory, testing comes after developing a theory. Theories about multiple universes do rely on maths and physics which have already proven themselves to be useful in models. God has not yet proven to be so useful.

But that force is required to explain the fine tuning. — Devans99

Explain why anything is required to explain fine tuning.

They all go through the same processes and end up at the same temperature and density — Devans99

Do they? How do you know this?

The theories we have on the origin of the universe are more complex because they deliberately exclude the possibility of God. — Devans99

The trouble is you have no defined measure of complex here. I could argue that anything with God in it seems more complex, it gets us nowhere.

The fact that the universe appears fine-tuned for life suggests the universe was created. — Devans99

No, the fact that the universe appears fine tuned for life suggests that we wouldn't be in any other universes to be thinking about it.

These models are complex and untestable. — Devans99

As is a god-created universe, so we're back to square one except that the maths by which physicists postulate these alternate universes has already proved itself to be reasonably necessary in explaining other phenomenon, God has not.

The simpler Occam's Razor approach is to have a single universe that was fine-tuned for life by a creator. — Devans99

No, because it would involve postulating the existence of a force which does not seem to be necessary, hence it is simpler to try to explain the phenomena with forces we already have had to postulate.

It's not really about complexity, it's about necessity. The question I would ask myself of any phenomenon is "can I explain this using forces I've already had to posit the existence of to explain previously experienced phenomena using the same method? "

Of, course, no one is obliged to use this method, but its a perfectly reasonable method for avoiding what might otherwise be an unwieldy proliferation of theories, and it happens to be (as far as I know) the method adopted by the enterprise we call Science, which is the one on question.

But to answer your question more directly, I cannot think of a theory which would be so simple on its own that the addition of God doesn't automatically make it monumentally complex.

I was always under the impression that Science (by which I think we mean investigations carried out by some sort of approved methodology) included some version of Occam's razor in its methodology. That would make it inherently atheistic because God is not a phenomenon we have yet required to make accurate predictions about those matters so far investigated. As such any existing and new theories should not include God if they can be developed using only phenomenon we have already theorised to be necessary. Hence atheistic (literally without God).

Do you see the premise stated at 43? Meaning is use. If Wittgenstein is to give meaning to his work, his goal here must be to demonstrate usage. To simply list a number of problems does not give the meaning that demonstrating them does. That's why his method is to proceed from one example to the next. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's not the need to demonstrate that I was raising as an example, it's the nature of that which is demonstrated. He does not proceed from one example to the next. He raises a question then leaves it hanging, he sets up an obvious strawman, only to knock it down without triumph, he invites us to carry out our own thought experiments only abandon them... These are not at all the actions of someone wishing to relay to us some 'facts' about the way the world is that we can simply assess, each by its correlation with said world from the comfort of our armchairs.

I'm merely arguing against the analytical exegesis that seems to be going on here, not implying that the book should not be read in order. I'm presuming (perhaps wrongly) that everyone producing any volume of comments has read it at least once.

I'm sorry if I've offended you or acted inappropriately, It was not my intention. I don't think there is a way to discuss it "properly" so it was certainly not my aim to tell anyone what that way is. I think people should discuss it in whatever way satisfies them most, I just wanted to establish what approach was being adopted here, and I think I've done that now.

By way of explanation, I really don't see how anyone could possibly approach a text section by section without first establishing what reason there would be for saying anything at all about it. The words are what they are afterall. If there's no objective beyond reading them we might as well just write them out word-for-word. It seems here (perhaps, being more charitable) that there are just too many different objectives. Some seem to be writing what they think the propositions mean simply so that others can benefit from their 'wisdom' on the matter (leaving the deeper psychological motives aside for the moment). Some seem to want to take what Wittgenstein says as a statement of the way things are and find counterexamples. Some want to ask whether their interpretation is what Wittgenstein 'really meant'. All three approaches are flawed. Firstly what would be the point in reading the opinion of a random internet poster as if it were gospel? If you're studying, you'll need the view of an accepted authority, if you're past studying, you'll have your own views no less well-informed and the interest is in contrasting them. If the aim is to get at the way things are, then as I commented to MU, there are much better textbooks about language and understanding that are probably more accurate and certainly more easily accessible. If the aim is to get at what Wittgenstein 'really' meant, then we have slipped from philosophy to history (or at worst idolatry, in any assumption that what Wittgenstein 'really' meant has some authority to bear on the matter of what 'is').

Personally, I think the most productive way to run these things is to read the whole text first alone, take each proposition and discuss what it means to each other. After a few exchanges, move on to the next proposition. There's no right answer to be had, it's just a matter of seeing if what other people think about it sits well with your own world-view or not. Of course challenging their view is a good way of doing that, but it becomes pointless if that's done with the intention of getting to the 'right' answer at the end, it's certainly pointless if dissenting views are going to be snubbed as 'uneducated'.

But as I say, it's not pointless if people want to have "look at the size of my...reading list" competition. If that's the objective then it all makes perfect sense, it's just not for me, that's all.

Could you provide an example? e.g. by saying more about this: — Luke

Certainly.

What I'm saying is that I don't think the enemy here is Augustine, nor his conception of language, it is (or rather it is going to be) the type of language confusion which could lead to the sort of statement Wittgenstein picks out. Augustine does not present a theory about the way language is acquired in the confessions, nor does he set out to do so. Not only does he not claim that ostension is sufficient for all of language, but he does not claim that ostension is either this or that type of thing, his interest is not in providing a complete picture of either language or ostension in respect to it. Wittgenstein is well-read enough to know this. Wittgenstein is not attacking the idea that ostension identifies it's object purely by the act, he is using the very obvious fact that it does not to set up an attack on the type of thinking that could lead us to such a conclusion, using Augustine's work as an example. He's basically saying - look at this statement by Augustine, you could be mistaken for taking it as a serious description of the way things are because it sounds convincingly like one, but you already know is is nonsense. It is just disguised nonsense and so appears to be worthy of dissembling.

He's leading us through the process of identifying the sorts of statements which appear to be about something but rather have simply over-generalised, in a way a child knows is wrong.

The extraction of language from it's context that Wittgenstein is showing cannot be fruitful is not something that the general population do, it is not a thing which the uneducated need to be taught about so that they can become more knowledgeable, it is something that experts do to manufacture the very body of knowledge about which they are expert.

But that's just my interpretation.

Surely if the aim is to carry out the will of the people, then any number of referenda at any time should be acceptable because on each occasion we will thereby discover the will of the people.

If, on the other hand, the aim is to follow proper procedures, then we are free to remain in the EU as any referendum is only advisory and we live in a representative democracy.

If the aim is to abide by promises made as an ethical stance, then the nature of those promises surely bears significantly on the duty of others to abide by them and clearly the greater good of the people on whose behalf you made the promise must come above that duty otherwise what was the point of it in the first place?

I'm not seeing the line of argument which requires the government to actually leave the EU, nor one which prevents them from holding another referendum if they so wish. Legally, the government can do whatever parliaments allows, ethically a government should work for the best interests of its population at the present time. Making an argument that the government is under either a legal or ethical obligation to carry out the stated preference of a snapshot of the population at some fixed time in the past seems tenuous.