One should definitely avoid actions that:
1) Contradict the lyrics of the Grateful Dead's second album
2) Risk one having to wear a tutu
3) Cannot be performed equally well blindfolded
3) Must be performed on a Wednesday

Turns out this morality lark is quite easy afterall...

One should definitely avoid actions that:
1). Cannot be performed consensually.
2). And are also irreversible.
3). And can also inflict great harm.
4). And one can also not oversee the consequences of. — Tzeentch

1) Why?
2) Why?
3) Why?
4) Why?

All that matters is whether or not the world when not being seen resembles how it looks to us. Are the mind-independent features of the world present in the phenomenological character of experience? — Michael

How would a world resemble how it looks to us? I can't even make any coherent sense of such an expression.

I see a green apple on the table in front of me. You want to claim that there isn't 'really' a green apple there? On what grounds?

That we sometimes hallucinate, or are mistaken? That only demonstrates that sometimes there's no green apple, not that always there's no green apple.

That birds would see it as purple? That only shows that green apples look purple to birds, not that there is no green apple.

That someone else might claim it's blue? That just proves the cognitive scientists notion that we see by active inference, our inferences are not always right.

That Physics describes the apple as waveforms? Someone sitting on the other side of the table would describe the apple differently too, they have a different perspective. You've not yet given an account of why one thing must only have one property from all perspectives.

...

So whilst I can see how we could say that the mind-independent features of the world are not present in our phenomenological experience, I just can't see why we would.

I'm pointing out how even the theory you're supporting doesn't make the metaphysical claims you're trying to make. — Michael

Friston's theory is about how we see. We're discussing what we see. I'm using aspects of his model to constrain the possibilities of the answer to that question. For example, we do not 'see' an internal model. That appears (according to the science) to be impossible.

And I'll refer back to Friston: — Michael

So now we're believing the scientists again. Can we come to some kind of decision on this, I'm struggling to keep up.

The fact that they're unknown is enough. — Tzeentch

So one should avoid all actions which have a non-zero probability of harm? Do you realise what that entails?

the objects you see aren't mind-independent. — Michael

They seem to me to be. So I suppose they are.

Because it shows that colours as-seen aren’t mind-independent. If it were the Standard Model or some other theory would find it. Instead, colour is a product of perception. — Michael

Only according to the scientists. It doesn't seem that way to me, objects don't seem to me to be how the standard model describes them. So I suppose for the purposes of our current conversion, they aren't.

Maybe it’s not in yours, but color is certainly present in my experience of the world. — Marchesk

As I said to @Michael, if we're only talking about the way things seem to us to be, then there's no cause even for debate. It seems to me as if the apple actually is red.

No I don’t. Waveforms are waveforms. Tables aren’t waveforms. — Michael

Then why does it matter what the standard model tells us about how objects reflect light?

I'm trying to understand why your line is where it is. Scientists tell you objects are made of waveforms. They don't seem to be, but you accept they are. Scientists tell you that parts of our brain infer models of external objects rather than see them directly. It doesn't seem that way, but you accept it's the case.

Scientists tell you your 'experience' is a post hoc construction made up of culturally medisted abstractions (such a folk-theories about perception), and you refuse to even consider it.

I know from first-hand experience that colours are present in my experiences. — Michael

So we've left the science behind, and anything that seems to you to be the case actually is the case?

Does it seem to you that your table is not actually solid, but rather made of probabilistic wave forms? You don't seem to have any trouble allowing the most bizarre conclusions of physics undo your most foundational beliefs about objects. Are your beliefs about your cognition so precious?

So people, when asked, use the words 'black and blue', or 'white and gold'. They describe their personal folk psychology, meta theory of perception as 'seeing' those colours.

How does any of that show that colour actually is presented to experience?

Some people see the dress as black and blue, others as white and gold. — Michael

How do you know?

the visible colour that is presented in experience — Michael

No visible colour is presented in experience. It cannot happen (with what we currently know about the brain). Experience is a post hoc construction, no colour is presented to it, it infers colour from an abstraction out of the actual objects presented to it.

indirect realists say that we can’t because these non-hidden states are only representative of and/or causally covariant with the mind-independent nature. — Michael

Why does them being only representative or causally covariant mean we cannot trust them? We can be right.

Because you said before that people can see the wrong colours. — Michael

People do, yes. 'Red' is not the term we use to describe the hidden state that causes birds to see what we would call red (if we had the same ocular equipment). It's the name we give to the hidden state which causes most humans in normal light conditions to respond in a predictable manner we call 'seeing red'. If a bird learned human speech and called those eggs 'red' he'd be wrong.

The 'dress', is black and blue. There's no debate about what colour the dress actually is.

you would have to argue that mind-independent objects are every colour that any organism could possibly see them to be. Are you willing to commit to that? — Michael

Yes. Why wouldn't I be?

Is it ever okay to force recruit people into your projects? I think never. — schopenhauer1

I think your neo-liberal hyper-individualism has been quite well expounded. I have no problem with the logic of your conclusion, given the premise that we are all selfish bastards who ought have no obligation at all to look after each other. I think it quite satisfying, in fact, that if one posits such a culture the logical conclusion is that it ought to wipe itself out. That, as far as I'm concerned, is a win.

Zero. It's your actual playing of the game that will give you a chance of winning, not your intention. — Tzeentch

As I said, there's nothing more I can say. If you don't understand basic probability we can't talk about probable events (such as future harms).

If direct realism is true then the mind-independent world is of the same character as one of these experiences. The eggs have the colour either we or the birds see them to have even when not being seen; they're either cream-coloured or they're red-coloured (or we're both wrong and they're some other colour). — Michael

We're going round in circles. You've still not explained why you think this restriction exists. Why must the hidden state be either cream-coloured, or red-coloured, why can it not be both? we don't know what properties hidden states have (clue's in the name), so you've no grounds at all, as far as I can see, to claim they are such that they can only be one colour at a time.

This is where we run into the first problem: given that the character of the bird's experience differs from the character of the human's experience, one (or both) of these are "wrong" (in the sense that the mind-independent world isn't of the same character as one (or both) of these experiences). As such, at least one of the experiences isn't direct. — Michael

Again, see above.

The second problem is that our best descriptions of the mind-independent nature of the world (things like the Standard Model) do not find that things have visual colours. — Michael

Begs the question. Physics doesn't find what you're prepared to call colours because of the very theoretical commitment we're disagreeing on. I'm perfectly happy to say that "absorb[ing] photons of certain wavelengths and emit or reflect photons of other wavelengths" is what colour looks like when looked at through the machines of the physicists.

our ordinary experiences do not provide us with information about the existence and nature of the external world. — Michael

Then how is that we interact with it so accurately?

If I have at any point made it clear to the builders I was intending to build a house with them, then it's a different story. In a sense I have now taken upon myself a responsibility, because I've voluntarily created a situation in which people come to rely on my actions for their well-being. — Tzeentch

No I wasn't suggesting you told anyone of your intention, why would you get that impression? (Oh yes, so you can dodge the conclusion). If you intended, then you are involved just as much as the other builders. Regardless of whether you let them know.

one may still be doing other things that have nothing to do with the thing one is not involved in. — Tzeentch

So, an act then.

You argued that you could change what is probable without interacting. — Tzeentch

Yep. I intend to put a bet on, what are the chances of me winning? I no longer intend to put a bet on, what are the chances of me winning now?

If you want to introduce this magical realm where intention lives which is not actually a physical state of the brain, then you go ahead, but there's no point in continuing a discussion about made up realms. Back in actual reality, a brain which is in a state of 'intending to do X' is significantly more likely to produce actions yielding X than a brain which is in a state of 'not intending to do X'. Changing your mind about something changes the probability of that something happening, probability being (as you so rightly say) a measure of uncertainty.

Making major decisions for someone else while being ignorant to what one is setting in motion also seems like a foolish thing to do, which is precisely the basis on which I argue procreation is immoral. — Tzeentch

So no decision to not interfere then (no changing one's mind), seeing as that's a major decision which affects someone else?

most importantly car culture, which I would argue is the ontological basis of Western individualism and consumerism (I am not of this world because I am in a car). — boethius

I drive therefore I am.

Yes, one of the more successful campaigns at getting us to buy things we don't need. I imagine a smoke-filled board room in Manhattan somewhen in the late 1920s -
"People have already bought all the labour-saving stuff that makes their lives easier, it lasts a lifetime, we're going to go out of business. Any ideas?". Long silence.
"We could always sell them stuff they don't need...or make the stuff they do need break...".
"Excellent. We'll do both",
"But people would have to either be really stupid or really desperate to buy stuff they don't even need which breaks after a year",
"Excellent. We'll do both".

For whatever it's worth, the indirect/direct dichotomy and/or debate is neither a necessary nor helpful tool for acquiring understanding of meaningful experience. It can be brushed aside, and ought on my view due to the inherent deficiencies in how they talk about experience itself. — creativesoul

I agree (which I think also answers your first question). The problem with 'direct' and 'indirect', which we're seeing here, is that both require a network model (a model of the nodes so that we could say "these two are right next to one another" (direct), and "these two are separated by intervening nodes"(indirect). But the intervening nodes must, by definition, be indirectly experienced (if they were directly experienced, they would not be intervening nodes). So, by definition, we have to derive our network model by some process other than phenomenological reflection - we've admitted by the very subject of our investigation that we won't notice them by reflecting only on that which we experience.

This isn't a problem for many forms of scientific realism because we can infer nodes from empirical studies of the body and brain which we assume is doing the experiencing.

I can't see how a purely metaphysical approach could possibly infer nodes that we've pre-defined, as being hidden from experience, having, as it does, only that which occurs to our rational minds, as it's data set.

Good to know, thanks.

So the problem is with the term 'mediator'? I'm not wedded to the term, if it's problematic.

Does air prohibit us from directly experiencing air? — NOS4A2

No, but it clearly prevents us from directly perceiving the apple. The light from the apple is affected by the air before it reaches our eyes.

There is literally nothing between the experienced and the experiencer prohibiting one from directly experiencing the other. — NOS4A2

There literally is.

Air, dust, microbes, water, oils...

it seemed fruitful anyways to contemplate this criticism — boethius

Yes, it was, in the end, but I apologise for the misdirection.

It's possible all parties are now in a "it has to stop somehow" attitude. — boethius

I think this is one of the oddities in considering modern war. All war is aimed at peace. All wars aim to have peace in which the borders (or political influence) have shifted. The aim is (was) never permanent war. So Russia should always be viewed as trying to gain a better bargaining position in the same power negotiations which preceded the war. As such, it would be insane not to be regularly 'testing the water' to see if they feel they've gained that position yet.

This position ought be unaffected by whether we're winning or not, since at any time the opposing side might feel they have their best case (either because they've gained the advantage they wanted, or because they fear their current advantage may deteriorate). It's like the concept of mean annual increment in forestry, one wants to fell one's crop, not at the maximum size, but at the point where further increase in size isn't worth the risk and cost of keeping the crop up.

So we have to ask, I think, why the US are so uninterested in negotiations. That is the interesting question, and one best answered by looking at what they have to gain from a long drawn out war.

Of equal, if not greater, interest to me are the methods they use to wield public opinion as s tool to this end. Hence the interest in the kinds of pro-US comment collected here.

Surely you can name or point to what prohibits direct experience. — NOS4A2

Air.

There is neither the evidence nor the reason to suppose that he is experiencing it indirectly. — NOS4A2

Until you actually read, like, any science ever...

However, if fighting the Russians is a moral imperative, then compromise would be immoral, so I see this topic as entirely relevant to the matter at hand, as that's how it has been framed in the West: Russia is evil, Putin is Hitler, Zelensky is Churchill, democracy as such is at stake, etc. — boethius

Yes, exactly, but the 'if' question is as yet unanswered.

We have two competing theories. Are people morally outraged and so only able to contemplate a military defeat of Russia, even after a long drawn out war...

or...

Do those in control of the rhetoric want a long drawn out war and so find it convenient to stoke the narrative of a moral imperative to punish Russia.

I'm inclined toward the latter, simply because that group has both the power and the incentive to do this so, holding the view that they could, but just aren't, seems implausible.

Hence what's at stake might be more like how that power can be limited?

But I don't really expect a serious debate about that from you, — Isaac


I have no serious peace proposals at the moment — boethius

I've just realised what a impression that last post gave, quoting you in the middle of my response to @Olivier5. I meant that I didn't expect any serious response from him, not you!

Having said that, your response was interesting, so not entirely a failure.

Sedimentation captures CO2. — Tate

So? So does my potted cacti. What matters is the relative rates.

The environmental movement has been going on a pretty long time spinning the same plans around and around; it is, broadly speaking, become closer to a ritualised mea culpa artistic expression, precisely to avoid effective actions — boethius

This is so true. I don't know what kind of timescale you had in mind, but I think this has been true for some time. I was involved with the road protest movement in England in the 90s and it was (on reflection) exactly as you describe. No one really talked about the solutions to excessive car use, which would have involved a discussion about the break up of communities, increasing social isolation, the erosion of self-esteem, urban growth policy, taxation (public services provision)...etc. The question of which diggers we ought to stand in front of seems almost completely unrelated to stopping the pressure to build more roads. It wasn't that no one considered those other matter problems, but no one had any solutions to them.

Seemed like it was doing good at the time though.

If Russia feels threatened by NATO expansion (it doesn't matter if they are justified) — neomac

Matter to whom, for what?

If we're talking about what those countries ought to have done, then whether they are right about their safety matters, does it not?

So how does whether Russia are right about their fears matter to the countries we're talking about? If they invade because of false fears, how is that any different to invading because of justified fears? Do they use lighter bombs in the latter case?

You wondered why anyone would follow or agree to the recommendations of a peace plan. The answer is obvious. To secure peace.

If you personally think the recommended actions will not secure peace then you need to a) provide an argument as to why, and b) dial down this stupid faux incredulity that other people might have a different opinion to you.

If your best argument for (a) is "the people of that country wanted it and they're not going to be wrong are they", then we can leave it there. You're clearly not interested in any serious discussion, that's been made clear, job done.

If your counter argument is that leaving a defensive alliance is much more significant response than not joining one, then perhaps it might have made sense to actually write that in response rather than this obsequious garbage about the government automatically being right because they're the government.

In the latter case, as @boethius has said...

the war should be ended by a negotiated peace by the parties involved, which would obviously mean a compromise.

Of course, what compromise is achievable and reasonable compared to further war can be debated. — boethius

But I don't really expect a serious debate about that from you, my main point was to counter this absurd notion that we'd be surprised people might be willing to compromise to achieve peace. We're not all like you (think god).

Because it is the builders desire to build a house, and I am an uninvolved bystander, obviously. — Tzeentch

You are now, you weren't before, you wanted to build a house too, and were involved.

Nonsense. It's neutral because it causes no harm, as I have argued. — Tzeentch

Begging the question. That's the argument we're having, you can use its conclusion as evidence within it.

non-interference - not an act. — Tzeentch

Back to this crap again. Non-inteference is an act, that's why you came up with the phrase in the first place, as opposed to 'not acting' which you were previously using. Keep up.

The idea that the chances of winning at roulette change depending on whether you play is the absurd one. They're exactly the same before and after. — Tzeentch

So if I place a bet on roulette, my chances of winning £100 are, say, 1 in 32.

You're seriously attempting to argue that if I don't even place a bet, I have a 1 in 32 chance of winning £100?

Having agreed (below) that we're talking about probabilities, I don't see how we can make further progress if you don't understand basic probability theory.

What a foolish thing to do. — Tzeentch

So we're agreed then that procreation merely increases the probability of harm?

My argument doesn't rest on whether or not I know. — Tzeentch

Then why raise the fact that we don't know?

the builders have incorrectly assumed I was going to help them in the first place, and thereby caused their own harm. — Tzeentch

Why the builders? You incorrectly assumed you were going to help too. So why are you only considering them as to blame?

Because in order to understand a principle (non-interference is neutral) we must regard it in an uncomplicated setting. If we can agree that non-interference is neutral in an uncomplicated setting we can see if there are settings in which it is no longer neutral.

Pretty obvious. — Tzeentch

Ah, so non-interference is neutral because it helps your argument if it is. Got it.

Procreation is a physical, detectable thing. — Tzeentch

So. we're talking about the harm you claim results, not the act. No-one's denying people procreate.

Some interaction must take place for me to become responsible for the harm that befalls someone else, no? — Tzeentch

No. Se my next post.

Your chance of winning with roulette was the exactly the same before and after. — Tzeentch

Do not ever go to Vegas. You're seriously, on a public forum, going to claim that your chances of winning at roulette are the same if your don't put a bet on as they are if you do? Priceless! You really don't disappoint

you'll have to go through some process to prove you can equate the two. — Tzeentch

Why? Why is the default position that they're not equated. Would that have been a sensible position when everyone's teeth and hair were falling out correlated with exposure to radiation?

Then I guess you've gotten yourself in a bit of a pickle, because it was you who assumed I was available to build you a house. — Tzeentch

What?

If I have a child, it is possible that child will go through life completely unharmed, yes? — Isaac


Sure. — Tzeentch

Right. So I haven't definitely caused harm by having the child. I've merely increased the probability of harm befalling someone.

We've talked about both direct causation and the creation of conditions. — Tzeentch

If I have a child, it is possible that child will go through life completely unharmed, yes? A new pill could be invented during pregnancy that eliminates the sensation of harm entirely and that child lives it's life in utter bliss. Are you suggesting that situation is logically impossible?

If I pull the trigger of a gun pointed at you, is it logically impossible for me to miss? Have I directly caused your injury the moment I pull the trigger, or have I merely massively increased the probability that you will be injured?

If I stand up in a boat and start kicking it from side to side, letting water in over the thwarts, it is physically impossible for the boat to remain afloat nonetheless? Must it sink? Or have I merely increased the probability of it sinking by my actions?

You're making assumptions about things that are unknown and attributing harm to conditions they supposedly create, that's why it's relevant. — Tzeentch

All knowledge is an assumption about the unknown. You don't know that a potential child will come to harm. You assume.

You were deliberating. — Tzeentch

So there's no such thing as available? No one is ever available? What a weird world you live in.

Because from the very beginning my argument, the argument that you attacked, has been about a default situation. That means the person is initially uninvolved in any way. — Tzeentch

What? Why is being uninvolved the default, and what's that got to do with the situation I asked you about?

The creation of conditions is a physical, detectable thing. Potentialities are things that may or may not happen in the future. — Tzeentch

So harm to children is a potentiality then, not a condition. OK.

Am I now interacting with the house because I'm also walking while not-interfering with it?

I don't think so. — Tzeentch

Who said anything about interacting? We're talking about changing what is possible (or probable). You can change what is probable without interaction. If I don't bet on roulette, it is now less probable that I will win. Are you really struggling with this notion? It's pretty basic probability theory.

Correlation =/= Causation. — Tzeentch

So radiation was harmless before we understood the causality, when we had merely correlation?

However, that's simply a way of human customs. It has nothing to do with logic — Tzeentch

The meaning of words is not determined by logic. We don't logically work out what the word 'available' means.

Your argument is that a change in conditions takes place through my deliberation, when in fact it is unknown whether the conditions will change until I've made up my mind. — Tzeentch

What's them being unknown got to do with the argument about what they are. The current arrangement of sand on the dark side of the moon is unknown. It still is arranged some way.

That condition was already in place when there were only four builders and they were looking for a fifth. I was never a potential builder — Tzeentch

So what were you when you intended to help build the house, before you changed your mind?

Since each of the other builders could change their mind too, there are really no potential builders. So all houses get built by luck? Random fluctuations? It's no wonder developers need so much money, what an unpredictable business they're in.

appointing random uninvolved people as potential builders — Tzeentch

In the scenario you intended to help. You changed your mind. How is that the builder's 'appointing random uninvolved people'? You were neither random nor uninvolved, you were a member of the community intending to help.

Fine. You've conflated creating conditions with potentiality. — Tzeentch

What's the difference then?

your view is that it is possible to create conditions by not taking a certain action, and that by doing so you become responsible for harm. Is that not your position?

So are you responsible for all the conditions that is "created" by actions you did not take? — Tzeentch

We've been through this, you agreed to use 'non-interference'. Non-interference is an action (it involves doing something else), and so has no problems affecting potentiality.

Procreation is an act. Not acting is not an act. — Tzeentch

See above. Not acting is dead.

It's about both, really. Life has many harms inherent to it, and those can be said to be caused directly by the parents. — Tzeentch

No they can't. You keep reminding us that only direct causality counts.

Before the Geiger counter you could detect it when your hair and teeth started falling out, — Tzeentch

Right. But you said...

An outsider couldn't even detect the nature of the deliberations, let alone suffer harm from them. — Tzeentch

So following your example of what it means to 'detect', then an outsider could perfectly well detect the nature of the deliberations by their effect.

Strictly speaking I don't know if I'm available when my boss asks. — Tzeentch

Then why don't you say "I don't know" when he asks?

my contract created a condition X, that my boss counts on my presence at the agreed upon time. — Tzeentch

Nope, we're talking about overtime. No obligation.

Let's take it away from work. A friend says "I'm moving house on Wednesday, are you available to help?", you seriously telling me that your normal reply to such a question would be "I don't know if I'm available, I suppose we'll have to wait until Wednesday to find out"?