Hmmm. This is not what I understood you to be arguing. — Srap Tasmaner
To be fair, it's not
only what I'm arguing, so there's room for justified confusion. I'm more responding to comments than laying out a case, so have no right to expect anyone to 'get it'. I was a little short in my last post in that respect.
In that light, what I'm arguing is an opposition to the moral case for vaccination in all cases (the idea that a moral finger can be wagged simply because someone says "I'm not getting vaccinated" (outside of any medical reason).
The moral case, as I've heard it is this.
1. You ought to be vaccinated because reducing your risk of disease needing hospital care is a moral obligation and the vaccine achieves that.
2. You ought to take the vaccine because reducing your risk of harming others is a moral obligation and vaccine does that by reducing your chances of transmitting the virus.
3. You ought to take the vaccine because there's a global effort to eliminate (or make endemic) the virus by achieving herd immunity and the vaccine is the most efficient way of doing that.
I think all three lack sufficient normative weight.
For (1):
a) this is not conclusively true for all age groups, there's genuine expert dispute about the balance of risks/benefits for the under 24 age bracket, with the weight of naysayers getting higher as you reach the under 12s. It is not normal practice to morally require any offence against bodily autonomy on the grounds of a balance of probabilities, it's normally insufficient to say "it seems slightly more likely than not that this will cause more good than harm, therefore you ought to do it, even if you don't want to". There's just no precedent for such a norm as far as I can see. Normally it need be overwhelmingly clear and with children it is definitely not so.
b) for other age/health groups, whilst this claim is true, it does not necessarily reduce the risk of needing hospital care from a risk which isn't already below the threshold risk we normally accept for various lifestyle choices and activities. We normally only require people to reduce that risk to below a reasonable threshold, we do not normally demand that it is as low as it is possible to get it. It has been countered that being unvaccinated is not an activity or lifestyle choice, or that it is irrational and so doesn't count. I find both arguments to be pretty arbitrary and post hoc, and so uncompelling. What classes as a lifestyle choice is in the eye of the life whose style is in question, otherwise it wouldn't class as a 'choice', and nowhere is it argued that irrational choices are exempt from this reasonableness limitation.
(2) I find most compelling of the three, but my reservations are;
a) the evidence is again only a balance of probabilities; there has only been a few studies and none of them show a strong reduction, none of them divide that reduction into cohorts who might be expected to have lower/higher transmission rates and none of them are wide enough to capture all such cohorts in any case. Again we don't normally require actions against bodily autonomy on the basis of a balance of probabilities - for example the MMR vaccine is not merely 'more likely than not' to be beneficial to the average child and others at their school, it is overwhelmingly and conclusively proven to be so.
b) there's again no understanding of the threshold of reasonableness which is associated with other moral duties. It is not normally required to reduce one's risk of harming others down to as low as it can possibly go, only to below a certain reasonable threshold. Masking, distancing, and hygiene can already do this. A vaccine would do more, but there are hundreds of cases where we could all do more to prevent harm to others (I gave the examples of health and safety precautions, environmental lifestyle changes...). There's no similar moral imperative on those issues.
(3) is the argument we're having now. I don't believe we can justify just any means of achieving that end, no matter how noble the end is. Getting the world to herd immunity requires equitable distribution and, in our current circumstances, that requires prioritising the needy at the expense of those at lower risk. It has been countered that this is pointless because such prioritisation isn't going to happen anyway, but I don't find that compelling because;
a) I'm not a consequentialist. As I said - "There's not enough x for everyone who needs it. Taking a x when others need it more is wrong". I see this as simply moral a truth, for me.
b) I don't think it's at all clear that this is the case. A lower demand in rich countries could well see the pharmaceuticals look more favourably on deals with the poorer ones.
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I'm also arguing, separately, that there is a finite space of public fora to sway political opinion and spending all of that space of trying to shame a handful of lunatics and smaller handful of legitimate concerned parties is manifestly irresponsible when we are in the midst of a crisis which is almost entirely the result of massive failings by our collective governments and institutions, who are currently sheltering behind the idea that the vaccine hesitant are entirely to blame.
I hope that clears things up.