every given set of causes results in one and only one possible set of effects...If a given set of causes can result in several possible effects, then the effects are not fully determined and thus we are in an indeterminist outlook. — Olivier5

I've not heard this definition anywhere - perhaps you could cite a source? The key aspect is the bolded terms. I've heard no-one ever talk about determinism in terms of 'given' causes, only in terms of 'actual' causes. It's would be an utterly ludicrous claim and refuted within seconds, to say that any 'given' set of causes will result in only one outcome - all I have to do to refute that is give an insufficient set of causes. say a coin flip where the only cause I give is the movement of the thumb doing the flipping (nothing about air turbulence, coin weighting etc). I seriously doubt anyone believes that.

Is it conceivable that there is a world where events have connections, but the connections are not mechanical? That is, for a given state at T0, more than one future state of the system is possible? — Echarmion

Certainly conceivable, I think, but our inability to determine future states based on states at T0 is of uncertain ancestry, we don't know why we don't know. That's why I think the link between our uncertainty (probabilistic relations) and determinism (the nature of those relations, of which our theories are just models) is a poorly supported one.

Any useful injection of an indeterministic interpretation of uncertainty at a macro scale has to compete with (and posit alternatives to) physical causation. The neurological basis of decision-making, for example, which started this discussion, needs, under indeterministic interpretations, some mechanism whereby physical action is brought about without physical causation. QM is often invoked as the mechanism, but so far resolves to classical mechanics at a cellular scale, so cannot account for it.

The alternative explaination for uncertainty (there are literally millions of neurons firing at once and each takes a slightly different route and has done since birth, hence chaos). Requires the invention of no mechanism not already posited and explains the phenomena without flaw.

So, insofar as we don't know what the source of our uncertainty is, it seems odd to invoke new mysterious mechanisms when the ones we already have explain it perfectly well.

A bayesian might well argue that far from the world appearing to be deterministic, it actually appears probabilistic. — Echarmion

This has been cropping up in both conversations currently touching on determinism, so for the sake of getting a different perspective, I'll ask again here - am I missing something in not seeing this relationship? Determinism is the theory that every event is the result it's causes, probabilistic thinking (or stochastic for that matter) is about our ability to know with certainty what that event will be given the causes. The two are not only mutually compatible, they're not even in the same subject area, I'm lost as to why they keep getting treated as mutually exclusive options for the 'way the world is'.

We regularly produce speech errors (I haven't found a solid source on the frequency) — Srap Tasmaner

About 1 in every 1,000 words for adults - according to Garnham A, Shillcock R, Brown GDA, Mill AID, Cutler A. Slips of the tongue in the London–Lund corpus of spontaneous speech. Linguistics. 1981.

Why isn't our speech production better at its job? — Srap Tasmaner

Basically the processes involved in speech production are carried out in parallel as opposed to in series, one of these is the action potential for the motor functions associated with speech production (mouth, breath and gesture). Since some of these functions are started before sentence construction at the conceptual end is even finished, words are selected from 'broad neighbourhoods' as a best guess pending more clear information as to the meaning of the whole sentence. That's why malapropisms are usually similar sounding (or occasionally meaning) words, because a selection has been initiated without the full context of the proposed sentence. Such components are usually held in working memory before the full sentence is articulated and so most of the time no mistakes are made, but if the working memory is occupied or the construction is particularly fast this doesn't always work.

Why do we process in parallel and not series? Possibly efficiency, as you say, but the high necessity of working memory involvement rather negates that theory, it's possibly even less efficient. Possibly it points to the fact that word selection and grammar are secondary to general communication and have been 'tacked on' in evolutionary terms.

Is this sort of passive aggressiveness par for the course around here? — Olivier5

It wasn't passive agressive, just plain agressive. There are people for whom the best science we have indicates diminished responsibility on the grounds of a direct link between mental function and behaviour and you would rather hold them entirely responsible for the choices they make on no better basis than that it 'seems that way' to you. Fortunately in this country guilt (including intent and capacity, where relevant to the charge) must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, not on your personal sketchy metaphysics.

That would in my view make it easier to think through the issue of moral responsibility. One can ask questions such as "should she have reacted differently, or taken the issue more seriously?" And these questions now have a clear meaning, because we assume that she could indeed have acted differently, — Olivier5

Fortunate then that you have no involvement with these troubled individuals, that you would condemn a person on the basis of nothing more than your ad hoc reckoning as to how things are. I sincerely hope you don't ever work with the vulnerable or ostracised.

The basis for such an action seem more like mercy to me... i.e. the poor fellow couldn't help but turn out that way given his upbringing and has it already bad enough as it is without the extra punishment. — ChatteringMonkey

I'm not sure mercy is contingent. There's obviously many different understandings (religious and humanist), but in most the act of mercy seems to be one of abstaining from punishment for abstinence's sake, not because the person didn't really deserve it.

Considering upbringing as something outside of one's preferred choices seems like a strange notion given that, I would assume, one's upbringing is always to some extend part of what determines one's will or preferred choices. — ChatteringMonkey

That's the point. Given a full notion of free-choice we would not be able to make such an argument as, upbringing or not, the person was completely free to choose their behaviour and so can be held entirely responsible for it.

I was thinking of folk theories, as in folk physics or folk theory of mind - intuitive or conditioned but unschooled understanding of how some aspect of the world works. — SophistiCat

Ah, that makes sense now, I took the sentence too literally.

This is where things get complicated. What we hold an individual to be accountable for vs. what we consider to be an external cause can vary quite a bit. — SophistiCat

Indeed, and 'complicated' is certainly right, but is it that you think such a notion of free-choice need be abandoned for that reason? Or are you more in favour of rolling up one's sleeves and getting stuck in nonetheless?

I'm sometimes required to help plead for judicial leniency on the grounds of a person's upbringing or environment. The basis for such action is that somewhere in this muddle we (those involved at the time) can agree that such influences were outside of the person's preferred choices.

The comparison of sounds, and their similarities and differences, happens within consciousness. — Harry Hindu

According to whom?

I haven't caught up on this convo. Is this the usual "<magic thing> is possible because quantum mechanics"? — Kenosha Kid

Yep. Seems to be.

Ah. Yes, having basically the same conversation with the same person on another thread. I didn't really get anywhere with it, but good luck. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, I've been reading that one to see if any progress could be made.

I had all but given up here too, but then I read the last post (above this one). The argument put forward is so exhaustive, well-reasoned and utterly compelling that I've decided to become a monk and dedicate the rest of my life to the service of God!

And yet neither thermodynamics, nor chemistry nor biology are deterministic. They all use probabilities to make predictions. Something does not compute here. — Olivier5

I'm not sure how you're seeing your second statement as anything like a reason to believe the first. The use of probabilities could be down to measurement errors, chaotic systems, accuracy at scale, informational constraints, ...etc. Why would you see it as evidence of those fields not being fundamentally deterministic?

As a matter of fact, none of these "jumps" from one level of organization to the next has been actually understood, let alone 'reduced' by science. — Olivier5

I don't understand what you're saying here. The effect of, say brain damage, on behaviour is quite well understood. Faced with someone suffering from a particular type of brain damage, it's a rare case when the resultant behavioural change will be a complete surprise. You seem to be taking a tiny amount of uncertainty and pretending it means we've no idea what causes what.

Whatever his opinion on the matter, no neuroscientist will ever be able to predict what he will think tomorrow. — Olivier5

Again, I'm not seeing any link here to indeterminism. An inability to carry out some calculation is not the same as randomness.

Thanks.

Quantum biochemistry is a thing but unfortunately not one I know a lot about. — Kenosha Kid

I watched a thing by Jim Al-Khalili about something like that a long while back, but not having much understanding of the basics I didn't really come away with anything more than a very general picture. I didn't get the impression that biochemicals were going to suddenly start reciting Shakespeare or forming an impromptu dance troop any time soon though, so I think we're still safe to presume they'll continue to have the effects we've so far discovered them to have!

I am not aware on any scientific theory saying that the fundamental indeterminism of quantum mechanics resolves somehow into determinism at the biological scale. — Olivier5

To my knowledge, they all do, but I'm no expert. I may be using the terms incorrectly (@Kenosha Kid could correct me if so). It's my understanding that all the quantum weirdness 'resolves' at the scale of cells, that (like Koch says) all such interactions can be dealt with classically.

If you know of any neuroscientist who consider cell-level interactions to be non-deterministic, I'd be interested in some citations. How would they even go about conducting research? What would they research?

Sometimes you may want to conclude that what we've been talking about all this time is not what we thought it was, or that it's just not a well-formed concept, and we may be better off leaving it alone than trying to precisify it with philosophy. — SophistiCat

I've a lot sympathy with that position. 'Not a well-formed concept' I think is something philosophy can often help with, so there's merit in discussing the various ways in which a concept is made use of to see if it can be made more efficacious. Some are, however, lost causes, sure.

What intrigues me is the expression "what we've been talking about all this time is not what we thought it was". I'm afraid I can't quite make sense of this. A word has to mean what we (community of language users) think it means doesn't it? Could you perhaps rephrase?

the concept of free will is heterogeneous and inconsistent. — SophistiCat

Definitely agree with you here. I think, though, it's more of a problem for philosophers and psychologists to make sure they don't equivocate over the various uses than it is for the community of language users to kind of 'get their act together'. Another of my pet hates is philosophers telling other language users what a word 'really' means (not suggesting that's what you're implying).

More importantly, those aspects of free will that matter to us - responsibility being foremost - can be dealt with on their own, with no reference to free will. That is, if you want to consider whether we are morally responsible in such and such circumstances (e.g. when our actions are physically determined by an earlier state of the universe), why not just talk about that? Why confuse matters by bringing up something that no one is quite sure about? — SophistiCat

Absolutely. This thread becomes an example. What really matters morally is the difference between having one's actions driven by desires an thoughts one considers one's own, and having one's hand forced by the unwanted desires of others, or desires and thoughts one does not consider one's own (psycho-pathology). All of this can be dealt with without having to send a single electron through any slits! We just don't need to know, in most cases, anything about ultimate cause, we only need go a few steps back and see if such causes are still within or outside of what we consider ourselves.

What I think does matter, is the opposite. It matters that we can demonstrate a deterministic relationship between mental processes and behaviour, so that we can help people with various psychological or physiological injuries and so that we can have a fair legal system to deal with the challenging behaviour which comes along with such injuries. But you're absolutely right that 'free will' is completely redundant here.

Your philosophy is quite classical, verging on the medieval sometimes. Mine is more current. — Olivier5

I thought I was getting a sense of déjà vu from this conversation so I checked back through my posts and indeed I've had virtually this exact discussion before. Anyway, I found this quote from Chris Koch.

Although brains obey quantum mechanics, they do not seem to exploit any of its special features. Molecular machines, such as the light-amplifying components of photoreceptors, pre- and post-synaptic receptors and the voltage- and ligand-gated channel proteins that span cellular membranes and underpin neuronal excitability, are so large that they can be treated as classical objects. — Koch C., Hepp K. (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature

Or is 2006 too medieval for you?

QM is a little more than "a sketchy and speculative fringe theory", I think. — Olivier5

We weren't talking about QM. We were talking about theories where it doesn't just resolve into determinism at the scale of biological processes. Theories proposing that kind of effect (the kind that could act as initiators for behaviour, for example) are definitely sketchy and speculative.

Your philosophy is quite classical, verging on the medieval sometimes. Mine is more current. — Olivier5

We are talking here about determinism in the context of behavioural causality or neurological decision-making processes. What 'current' experts use your approach?

I don't think so. Complex systems -- eg living organisms -- are not fully deterministic. — Olivier5

That's not something the evidence points towards at all (as in distinguishing true indeterminism from mere pragmatic uncertainty). Notwithstanding that, it would still be the case that the vast majority of biological processes are considered to be classicly causally determined. The whole of science is based on the principle that one variable is a function of another. How far do you think you'd get in investigating biological systems without the presumption that a change in some variable causes a determinate change in the related one?

Your brain is made of quanta. Everytime you see fluorescence, you see a quantic phenomenon. Evolution works through mutations which are mostly due to radioactivity, a quantic phenomenon. Hence mutations can't be predicted. Etc etc. — Olivier5

None of which has any bearing on the extent to which these effects resolve to determinism at the scale of mental proceses.


You seem to have taken some sketchy and speculative theories at the fringe of very specific fields and decided that their existence should shift the presumption of cause and effect on which our entire interaction with the world is built. I just wonder if it's worth it.

Just saying: the evidence so far points to indeterminism. — Olivier5

But it doesn't, not in the least bit. It points to the fact that there may be (perhaps even more likely than not), indeterminacy at quantum scales. All the evidence we have so far, from classic physics to just plain experience, is that this resolves somehow to almost complete determinism at human scales.

What's your evidence that the present state of affairs in the universe - our discussion here included -- was fully predetermined as early a split-second after the Big Bang? — Olivier5

I've never made such a claim, so I'm not sure why you would think I'd have evidence for it ready to hand.

Modern science tells us that not every single event can be predicted, and that kinda points to the indeterminist world view. In this context, determinism bears the burden of proof. — Olivier5

This seems like a very odd approach. Scientific theories suggest the some quantum scale events might possibly be not determined and you take that as reason to presume every pairing of cause and effect in the world is indeterminate unless proven otherwise?

Seems something of an overreaction.

Yes. — Olivier5

So when you said "We can also get rid of determinism" with regards to the causes of our behaviour you presumably mean "...only on the basis of evidence that it can be so discarded in this case"

So what would your evidence be?

I mean: by science — Olivier5

You mean gathering and analysing evidence, yes?

Science, anyone? — Olivier5

Not sure what you mean.

Indeterminism doesn't deny some causation and determination. It just says that "not everything is predetermined". — Olivier5

So how do we decide which things are predetermined and which are not (or to what extent)?

it would depend where the ball goes, what's its trajectory compared to other stuff out there. Like it could get stuck in a tree branch or something... :-) — Olivier5

So you're saying that whether the ball comes down or not is determined by factors in the environment?

Yes, you ought to, if you can send the ball faster than 11km per second. — Olivier5

No, just an ordinary human throw.

You're welcome to — Olivier5

I didn't ask your permission, I asked if you think I ought to.

Indeterminism? — Olivier5

So if I throw a ball in the air I should act as if it may or may not come back down again?

My bad, I thought it was a proper journal, but:

The refereed Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, a major resource for college-level instruction, especially honors courses, builds on the classical paideia of educating the whole person. This educational endeavor aspires to restore Judeo-Christian ethical and intellectual foundations that all can cherish.


it's a religious propaganda thing. Obviously you're going to regurgitate creationist misrepresentations of evolution!!! :facepalm: — Kenosha Kid

Did you not read my refutation of the whole thing recently published in the Journal of Middle-Earth Studies?

Radin. I knew that he was a crackpot, but that was more from the way reasoned more than anything else. — SophistiCat

Yeah, the analysis in that 1991 paper is an absolute gem.

We can also get rid of determinism. — Olivier5

And replace it with...?

Another apriorist giving this dead horse yet another beating. — SophistiCat

Yes, but I was on a train and bored. Occasionally it's interesting to take a swipe at the apriorist piñata and see what kind of word-confetti sprays out.

any actualization of a potency by an agent is an instance of essential causality.

We can now see that free choices are not uncaused choices. They are the actualization of one of several possible courses of action by the moral agent. — Dfpolis

So how do we go about actualising a potential? Talk me through the neurological process.

More precisely, I expect my theories about my neurological processes to give an accurate account of my experience. If a theory doesn’t fit with the facts, it must be rejected or improved upon. — Olivier5

In the first sentence you use 'experience' as the measure, in the second 'facts'. I am to take it from this that the answer to my question is 'yes'? You do deny any sub-concious processes - the 'facts' about how your mind functions are synonymous with the experience you have of it doing so?

We have only one process for delivering oxygen to the brain, — Isaac

There are fours arteries entering the brain, two carotides and two cervical, all connected inside the brain so they work with and even up one another. — Olivier5

I said 'process', not 'route'. I imagine there's more than one neurological pathway by which preferences lead to decisions too.

Initiation? You mean explaining mechanism? — Olivier5

No, not 'explaination', just the initial input to process under investigation.

you also need a process of comparing preferences with one another. — Olivier5

Why? If I put two liquids of different viscosity in a tube, the thinner will reach the end first. No where does any mechanism need to do the comparing, their arrival time is a function of their viscosity. There's no reason at all why a more pressing preference might not have neurological properties which result in it's causing some behaviour over some less pressing preference. There need not be an external arbiter.

And as any process, this comparison can fail to provide usable information... HENCE it stands to reason that it needs a backup. — Olivier5

Again, to demonstrate this model you'd have to show that each process in the brain had an alternative as a backup. You've not yet given a single example, let alone a compelling majority.

I experience, personally, a capacity to choose options at random. — Olivier5

So do you universally trust your experience to give you an accurate account of your neurological processes, or is it just in this matter that you do? Do you deny the existence of sub-conscious processing entirely, or is that you feel you can just identify it's presence (or lack thereof)?

Within this view, it would be simplistic in the extreme to assume that we have one single procedure for making choices, one single logical process that works under every and all circumstances. — Olivier5

I can't see why prima facie. We have only one process for delivering oxygen to the brain, and that's far more important. We have only one mechanism for processing tons of things. One carefully targeted probe and I could remove your ability to see noses. You don't have a backup.

Notwithstanding this occasional lack of redundancy, I never suggested that the processes were simple or even singular, only that we need not impute any other factors than preference when looking to their initiation.

It is difficult, but possible. If... — debd

The start of your second sentence contains a contingency which contradicts the first.

That would be a very different approach indeed (and one that I would endorse): start from the commonsense assumption that there is such a thing as moral responsibility, then work out what it is. — SophistiCat

Yeah, I can't really stand "...therefore X doesn't exist" conclusions (where X is some common feature of our language). I think, 'well what on earth have we all been talking about all this time then?'.

You're afraid to commit? To what? The idea of randomness? — Olivier5

I can't at all see how you got from rejecting certain theoretical neurological mechanisms by which we make choices to rejecting the entire idea of randomness, nor can I see where being 'afraid' would enter into it.

A theoretical process was earlier postulated whereby choices were made on some basis other than preference. Evidence that such a process need exist would only come from demonstrating someone making a choice between (what they judge to be) two absolutely identical options. Since you've not provided such evidence (and I've no reason to believe it even possible for you to do so), I've no reason to commit to the idea of this process existing, have I?

You know what I find hard to commit to?... — Olivier5

Yes, I'd find that hard to commit to too, that I can't make any sense of it being the primary reason.

This is something that does demonstrably happen. — Olivier5

How does it 'demonstrably' happen? We're talking about the mental processes preceding a choice, how do you propose to demonstrate them?

Otherwise how would they chose a plum, do you think? — Olivier5

Nearest to their hand is one option. How is not wanting to appear impolite not a preference? If it is, then the nearest plum to hand might be chosen because it's proximity best satisfies the preference for not appearing impolite by choosing any other.

mine is much much simpler: we just pick plums at random. — Olivier5

I don't see how that's simpler. You have to now commit yourself to the existence of a mental mechanism for initiating random action, the alternative uses mechanisms we already know exist.

This is an argument, though perhaps not a very good one. — SophistiCat

Fair enough, that's kind of where I'd got to.

He apparently believes that the only thing that can bear the "ultimate" responsibility is that which is itself uncaused (but not random/chancy). — SophistiCat

This I struggle with. It seems to 'define away' responsibility. Once one assumes determinism, as Strawson surely does here, then there is no thing which is uncaused. As such 'responsible' becomes a word without a referrent. That, to me, seems silly. Rather, we'd work out what it is we still mean by 'responsible' despite determinism.

is that in life, one frequently encounters a certain type of situation, where one needs to make a choice in a limited amount of time (e.g. one doesn't want another donkey to eat one's barley), and yet the options appears equally valuable — Olivier5

People chose stuff at random all the time. Donkeys too. — Olivier5

You've still not provided any argument that either of these things are the case, only that you believe them to be (which I'm already well aware of). The question I originally asked was why anyone might be compelled to accept such a position, what sorts of arguments there might be in favour of it.

Intuitively, I don't think one could ever present me with two options identical in every way, and intuitively I experience a wide range of preferences all at once (aesthetics, novelty, ease, satiation, privation, excitement, calm...). So I don't see any reason at all why I would ever have trouble choosing between two options when it seems so easy to find some minor aspect of difference satisfying one of my many competing preferences.

Even not having to bother moving my head to check out the other option is a preference for the first one.

You must not have spent much time with donkeys in your life. — Olivier5

The donkey is irrelevant. It's the circumstances you're placing it in that I'm claiming is impossible. If your not going to respond to what I actually write then there's little point in discussion.

Any donkey out there is able to chose between two equivalent options in a nanosecond — Olivier5

How would you know a) that the options are exactly equivalent in every way, and b) that the donkey correctly perceives that they are?

even the people who like green more than red press red once in a while. It’s not like all of them will chose to press their favorite color for the entire damn test. — Olivier5

Why would we be presuming colour preference was the only like/dislike in consideration?