You might have to clarify how you're distinguishing "how?" from "how come?" here.

I understood it. I didn't so much disagree with you. Rather, I found that it was rather incomplete, in that you offered choices for me to agree with, but not one that was close enough to what I hold. You're the one asking me for clarification... I gave it. — creativesoul

I understand that, but I gave you what seemed to me to be the only options (perhaps I should have made that more clear), so any response which simply re-iterates your original position without explaining how you circumvent the issues I raised seems to contribute nothing to our mutual understanding of the issue.

I'm not actually sure we mightn't just completely agree, so far as your actual line of thought on this extends, but I feel like I'm missing some connection, I may be just slow to join the dots, and if so I'd appreciate some clarification, but apologise if it just goes over old ground. To that effect, I want to re-phrase what I think we're trying to speculate on (just in case that's got lost along the way, and that's why I feel like I'm missing something). We're looking at whether, and how, actual structure (real existent patterns in the hidden states) from outside the Markov blanket of an organism are reflected in the models of those hidden states caused by the variance minimisation of the Bayesian functions inside the Markov blanket? If they are, then we can say there's likely to be structure in the hidden states, and, crucially, by structure I mean that they are some way, and not any other (as opposed to simply that they could be 'seen' as some way, but also could be 'seen' as another - which would be model dependant realism).

I know it's not the most complete of replies to your thorough exposition, but I feel like I might be going off on the wrong tangent entirely if I'm wrong about the above.

The reason I'm asking is because you've given pretty much the same understanding as I have in my mind of the process, yet I've drawn one conclusion from it, and you another. The salience modelling you describe is, as we've discussed, definitely a strong indicator that the underlying hidden states outside the Markov blanket must be heterogeneous (here in terms of light reflected), and I think you're right that information density and salience are linked (although see the discussion of edge detection later in the paper, for the difference. Edit - it's not in that paper is it, I've just looked, must be another one). But still that's all we're getting, heterogeneity, not fixed structure (the hidden states being this way not that way).

Let's say our hidden state is h (I can't do that fancy mathjax stuff - you'll have to guide me to some instructions sometime), and we give it some structure represented by a fixed value set, so h={6,10,19,108,4,9}, and this set fully describes the structure of h. Our f is modelling h by sampling. It's doing so efficiently, based on prior densities, updated by inputs from latest samples benefiting from some error recognition. If this were happening purely mathematically, we should fairly quickly end up with the sample set. But...

Firstly - If our priors for the input mechanisms are not expecting numbers above 100, there's nothing coming in to the higher level models (working on what caused the lower level ones) to feedback to get the input mechanism to update its priors to allow for the possible recognition of numbers over 100. We cannot get at the primary input to update it because they're hardware, not software. Their priors are the equivalent of drivers, or firmware, and so don't have the flexibility to be updated to account for any and all potential structures of hidden states outside of those they were created to detect, and, to meet your point about evolution, the physical constraints of the stuff they're made from.

(complete aside here, but this touches on the work Iain Stewart did many years back about morphological constraints vs. natural selection as being far more determinant of final organisms - but that's only tangentially linked)

Secondly - If we were to 'hone in' on h being {6,10,19,4,9}, that's not a wrong pattern, it's an incomplete one. Any interface with h won't be in error presuming that pattern, it simply won't exhaust the possible patterns. Like pointing to the constellation Orion and describing the pattern of the hunter with his belt and bow. It's not an error because the pattern is there, it just doesn't exhaust the possible number of patterns which no less error value.

it asked ‘what is your philosophy?’ — Wayfarer

Yes, and I'm just asking you, personally, what factors have lead you to believe that some people have not progressed in obtaining knowledge of themselves. If they are both the location and the subject of the knowledge, where do you get in?

This gets mopped up by the error terms, no? — fdrake

I don't think so, because the error terms are related to the primary sensory input (box2 in Friston's paper) which are themselves non-updatable models (the model here being determined by the architecture - signal x being built from input y), the function only takes x (and errors related to priors as to the causes of x), not y.

we might be able to representatively sample its dynamics using only our f and g models. — fdrake

We might, agreed. But could we then feedback errors? The sensory inputs are one way, the first internal feedback loops are in the perception cortices. We can correct errors to say "that's not a grey square, it's just a shadow", but we can't update the retina with "that number of photons didn't hit you", or whatever 'real' feature we're tracking. So it comes back to the mechanism by which this update, reduction of errors, could take place. And without updates, we're unable make any claims to variance reduction towards any 'structures' which might be there.

I'm going to just post Karl Friston's paper here, for anyone who's interested - as I said, there's some crossover between multiple threads on this topic, so I though this might be usefully replicated.

Of key note are -

it [the free-energy formulation in box1] shows that free energy rests on a generative model of the world, which is expressed in terms of the probability of a sensation and its causes occurring together. This means that an agent must have an implicit generative model of how causes conspire to produce sensory data. It is this model that defines both the nature of the agent and the quality of the free-energy bound on surprise.

(my bold)

This formulation [also box1]shows that minimizing free energy by changing sensory data (without changing the recognition density) must increase the accuracy of an agent’s predictions. In short, the agent will selectively sample the sensory inputs that it expects

(my bold again)

Also take a look at box2 showing how the neural architecture is geared towards hierarchical model-dependant inference.

So that's my basic pitch - any way of linking that to Davidson's objections?

Perhaps the OP is a but dry. So let's cut to the good bit:This article kills relativism. — Banno

There's some crossover with the other thread in which this is mentioned. If do you ever feel like clarifying your position with respect to my comments, I'm reading this thread too, if it's the better place for you to respond.

So if it's not objective, what prompted your conclusion that "very few advance in it"?

If you have a goal of opening a door, your hand position needs to adapt to where the handle is and how it works; there's an accuracy constraint involved with the door's location, functionality and so on; irrelevant of how it's split up into perceptual features. — fdrake

Yes, absolutely, so we definitely have to have a real world otherwise our models are modelling nothing, our entropy resisting organisation has to have some entropy to resist - we agree so far.

Focus for a moment on the γ, if I've read things right these are "hidden causal states" which are later associated with environmental parameters θ rather than available sufficient statistics x, again if I've read it right. They are hidden, but inferred upon by the whole active-modelling process under some representation ("recognition dynamics"?). — fdrake

Yes, that's my reading of it too - which is good because I'm trusting you to understand the maths better than I do.

Our ability to act well in an environment depends upon having a good model of it; to update our model through some error minimising in response to our current goals and current environment; the model doesn't just take input from previous modelling steps, it takes input from external states with their own dynamics under some processual representation. It would be unable to guide action if it did not have a satisfactory (sufficiently accurate) representation* of the external states as they are relevant to our goals and bodily constraints. — fdrake

Yes, still in agreement here.

I think you're emphasising that the starred representation* is another flavour of model; which it is; but it's also observation process of relevant structures for us in the environment. What would be the point of all this modelling without its ability to promote accurate, relevant action - pulling causal levers whose structures we partially represented in the world? — fdrake

OK so this is where we part, but it's quite nuanced, so I'm going to be as specific as possible.

1. I don't see anything in the maths (and this, I think is what you've been looking at, but I'm not convinced) that requires there to be distinguishable 'structures' in the environment. Only for there to be heterogeneity in the environment (otherwise it would be impossible to model, plus with no randomness, there'd be no probability gradient to work against). All I'm arguing here is that all 'structures' are models of some sort.

2. You're right about 'pulling causal levers', but the upshot of the free-energy principle and it's application to systems is that there is no higher goal. Even evolution is just acting on us as a higher order free-energy minimising system (Friston talks about evolutionary free-energy minimising in one of his lectures, but I can't find any writing on it I'm afraid). So we don't have a primary goal of survival in the environment, say. We have a primary goal of surprise reduction, as does evolution (as a system) and that imposes the goal of survival on us. so...

3. It leads us back to the comment that Bayes optimal solutions have no need for accuracy in the environment, only for variance minimising within the system.

I've used this example before, possibly, but Gravity is a really good one. Gravity (it seems) is totally wrong, completely not how things actually might be according to some very coherent alternative models. But it's a really effective model for how to get about on Earth. Completely inaccurate - very effective. It's quite possible, if not probable, to have completely inaccurate models which serve us very well in terms of variance minimising, and they will remain in place, even in favour of more accurate models (which might be too energy-hungry to actually use)

The first and practically only rule is: know thyself. Anyone can say it, very few advance in it, hardly anyone masters it. — Wayfarer

Classic passive-patronising. So how would you know this (the bolded bit)? If the thing I'm supposed to be knowing is 'myself' and the thing doing the knowing is also 'myself' then how exactly do you know whether I've made any progress in it?

When I talk about my cat, Jack, I'm not talking about a model-of-Jack that sits in my head; I'm talking about that cat. When you talk about Jack, you are talking about the cat, not your model-of-Jack. So we both manage to be talking about the very same thing - Jack; and not two seperate things, our distinct models-of-Jack. — Banno

Do we? Suppose Jack (or Jacqueline for this example) were to have kittens. You're saying that it would simply be universally agreed at what point the fertilised egg ceased being Jacqueline and started being little Jack the kitten?

As I said, I can't see anything in the article you cited that renders models unintelligable and reproducing the author's opinion that he has doesn't really help in that regard. Perhaps you could , in preference to quoting, give a summary of the argument you think lead him to that conclusion, so that I've got something to go on rather than essentially an argument from authority ("Donaldson reckons it's the case so it must be the case")

Primarily, perhaps, if you're going through with this model-less view, which route do you take to deal with the multiplicity of existent objects, dualism or idealism, or do you reject the spatiotemporal model most of us seem intuitively to have?

Being mistaken about X is forming, having, and/or holding false belief regarding X. — creativesoul

That's just tautotlogy. What makes a belief false?

Simply put, you've claimed to think X but not believe X. In addition, you've claimed to not think that others exist, and yet here you are... — creativesoul

Did you not read what I wrote, or not understand it, or not agree with it. If you're not going to actually respond in any way to what I write there's little point in continuing is there?

I reject it because I just don’t like it; it’s anathema to my ego. Pretty piss-poor reason for rejecting a form of relative proof, I know — Mww

On the contrary, I'd go as far as to say it's the only justifiable reason to reject anything that isn't overwhelmingly contradicted by the evidence to the contrary. Pick your model and defend it until it's indefensible. I don't think we can handle any other way of approaching uncertainty.

, you haven’t really learned what you set out to discover, insofar as you’ve got the “how” but not necessarily the “how come”, because your subject himself may not even know. — Mww

I don't think the 'how come' is a measurable thing by any metric, so it's not a relevant investigation. Pick your reason.

Like when an error is observed in Friston's hierarchy and passed down. A prediction is compared to some input data, the error propagates down the hierarchy of models, producing adjustments. — fdrake

Yes, but in Friston's model the sensory input is from perception, not the world, and that's vitally important for the free-energy principle to work. There only any variance minimising incentive between the perception and the cortices which model the causes of that perception. As Friston himself says "There's no reason at all why the Bayes optimal model would be true, truth is not important here". The error that's propagating is one between the perception (low level hierarchy model) and the beliefs (higher level hierarchy model). There's nothing to cause the lowest level hierarchy model to minimise variance, not are there any mechanisms by which it could.

Here, I suppose such a problem would arise, because if belief is held to be a subjective institution, re: judgement, and thereby defined with a priori predicates alone, it certainly cannot lend itself to empirical monitoring. — Mww

Yes, in a sense that's the reason I think it better to 'black box' the whole thing and look at the behaviour as indicative of what the whatever-it-is does to the inputs. I just can't see the need for descriptions of static mental states, they're not something I experience.

there is some error which comes from a comparison of an observable whose value is not an output of some model. — fdrake

OK, I'm quite taken by the factor that errors are modelled as coming from some distribution, that's definitely an important thing for model dependent realism to account for, but... (you knew there'd be a but, right?)

there is some error which comes from a comparison of an observable whose value is not an output of some model. — fdrake

...how? How do we get access to an observable that's not an output of some model? We can't take in any sensory data without it being merely confirmatory of some model.

We could filter data back out again, possibly?

We don't accept raw data, any raw data, so all raw data is both selected and filtered through some model. If we knew what the model did, could we recreate the raw data by extrapolating backwards? Is that what you're getting at by pointing out the equivalent position of e to L in forming T?

I don't know of any neuroscientific support for the idea, I mean we could theoretically 'see' such recal happening because it'd need forward driving connections from the sensory processing cortices, but it sounds possible.

They may be in reality, but brain models of neurons and neurotransmitters don't include sensation. That's just a correlation or outcome that we know exists from having brains. — Marchesk

This is another thing that keeps cropping up in discussions involving neuroscience that baffles me. What isn't just a correlation? If I throw a ball in the air on the moon, compared to the earth its relative falling speed is 'just a correlation' with the gravitational mass of the respective planets. Switching my light on is 'just a correlation' with illuminating my room. What is it that's marking out the correlation between neural activity and mental phenomena that singles it out for such unique inductive doubt?

Simple: the colors, sounds, smells, tastes and feels aren't properties of the physical environment you interact with. Or at least not when it comes to our physical models. — Marchesk

But they're properties of my brain. I mean, when brains are interfered with those things respond differently, so I don't see that as a reason to discard physicalism.

In order to do philosophy, there has to be something real that makes the philosophizing a possibility. — Marchesk

Yep, I've never denied the existence of reality, neither does model dependent realism as a whole (hence the 'realism' bit).

Philosophy doesn't just exist. It exists in response to a world by creatures who are puzzled by their place in the world. — Marchesk

I don't buy this because essentially it leads to dualism (or idealism) and I think either create more problems than they solve. I'm a physicalist simply because it seems a default for me, and I need a good reason to discard it.

The fact that pattern matching occurs means there's some sort of objective organization that results in pattern matching. Model Dependent Realism doesn't exist as a philosophy if nature doesn't produce creatures who do philosophy. — Marchesk

Yep, this seems to be a line many are taking, but it's always expressed in this manner, or similar. I agree it would be a boon to model dependent realism to have an intuitive sounding answer, but I honestly don't get the problem, so it's unlikely one is going to come from me.

I mean, why have you put the word 'objective' in there? It seems to be entirely without warrant. If there is (something we model as) pattern matching going on, then there's (something we model as) a pattern to match. Where's objective come in?

Likewise, if there's (something we model as) modelling going on, then there's (something we model as) a modeller doing that. Still not seeing how 'objective' belongs there.

If folk are interested, it might be worth a seperate thread to work through this. — Banno

Thanks for the link, an interesting article which I hadn't read (although I have been peripherally aware of the idea). I seems to nicely intersect with what @fdrake and I have been discussing about how the distinction between the model, that which is modelled, and that which does the modelling affects ideas of model-dependent realism. I've been reluctant to give it up purely on the grounds of what seems to be a necessary distinction because the alternative seems even less plausible. Something like what Davidson is saying here is what I've been looking for, that we can talk across schemes (what I'm calling models).

What I'm not getting from the article is why you think the very idea that we experience reality through models is fraught. I get why the idea of incommensurability is fraught, but all this seems to require is some 'translating' model with a language which can fit one scheme to the most effective equivalent in another. After all, nothing is available to measure if we've got the translation 'right', so it's appearing to work doesn't mean anything beyond pragmatism.

But it's fine if explaining would take you further off topic than you'd like, we can just shelve it there.

Yeah, not so much. The idea of models is fraught, and ultimately fails, for reasons outlined by Davidson in On the very idea of a conceptual schema. — Banno

Really, so what's the alternative?

Yeah, I wasn't talking about 'define' in terms of language. But anything less than a very superficial reading of what I wrote would reveal that, so I'm not sure it's worth my time pursuing this.

Briefly then, I'm using the word define as in to categorise. A and B in the example do not 'see' @, they 'see' every photon of light that makes it onto their retina from the scene. To see @ requires that they have a prior view as to what might be @ and what might be 'not@'. Their occiptial cortex then receives signals with prior filters applied by the vorbis based on their expectation of what @ looks like. Information wildly opposing that expectation is not given high focus, sometime completely ignored (there's been some delightful experiments on this where people have ignores such things as changes of colour, shape, even large object appearing and disappearing, simply because the scene is set up to create a strong expectation). So I'm just pointing out that what A and B are exchanging is their prior-dependant models of @, not @ itself.

I'm not disputing that A and B can talk to each other about their perspectives, even when there are language barriers to doing so, I'm disputing that A and B are thereby approaching @.

The rules of logic are the same for everyone, and everyone should be expected to follow them, not just some people, when they feel like it, or when it supports their position and abandon it when it doesn't. — Harry Hindu

Well. Firstly, why should everyone be expected to follow the rules of logic? That seems prima facae to be an unsubstantiated claim. To what end?

Secondly, what exactly are the 'rules of logic', and how would they have been derived if only logic can derive true models?

Thirdly, how would you adjudicate in situations where two opposing positions claim to have been following the rules of logic?

But notwithstanding, the above is a distraction because I never said anything about logic at all, I was just saying that what SA identifies as incoherent and not substantive is exactly the sort of thing other people may consider coherent and substantive and that people (in my experience) actually seem more likely to resort to those accusations as a means to reject some discourse here than they do in professional circles.

If nothing concrete or substantive can be said then why say anything at all? — Harry Hindu

Have you never read a poem?

Perhaps you’re drawing off the fact science can monitor the stimulus/reaction complex, and thereby affirming the antecedent, by re-naming the stimuli as disposition to act, hence, belief. (?) — Mww

In a sense, yes, but any problem with doing so would only arise from a position that some previous definition existed whose only flaw was its inability to be thus monitored, and I'm not at all convinced that such a definition existed.

The error we make depends upon there being a true coral size as well as there being a fallible modelling process applied to it. — fdrake

Not necessarily. Could we not do the same thing with some complex function and our predictions of what it's solution might be prior to calculating it? Our T would be the calculated value of the function but it could be some function no-one has ever written before, so no-one knows what T is that data is nowhere in the world, our L would be distributed around our priors about the parameter for function a bit like that (maybe we'd look at the constants and the presence of any factorial functions etc), and our e would be distributed around the extent to which we're prone to miss key elements of a function which determine it's range of solutions. (there's more, but that's a sketch)

The mean of estimates L, would still be a more accurate estimate of T (under the same assumptions about e), but T is not true (in a correspondence sense), it's a mathematical fiction, a consequence of the function it is expressed by only if you follow the rules of mathematics, which, since no-one has yet calculated that function, does not yet exist as T, it only exists as potential T after following some rules.

Could this not be the case the with the true coral perimeter?

Do you believe that we can be mistaken about that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language use? — creativesoul

Depends what you mean by mistaken. Do you mean have the wrong model, or do you mean have a model which is not identical to reality? If the former, yes, some models seem better for us than others, if the latter then definitely yes, the model is not reality and therefore cannot be accurate to it. But to be honest I'm flailing because I have no idea what you mean by "that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language use".

You claimed that you do not believe other people exist. You're now speaking about believing a range of things in different contexts, and not believing a single thing...

Are you familiar with the notion of performative contradictions? — creativesoul

Yes, but I don't see how it applies here, you'd have to flesh the argument out. Are you suggesting that, in order for me to be arguing that there are no objective distinctions in reality I must believe in objective distinctions? I'm not sure how that works. I can have subjective distinctions and act on those whilst still believing there are no objective ones. I can still choose vanilla ice cream whilst maintaining a belief that choosing vanilla is not the thing everyone must do in this situation. I an say that I believe each man should do his duty and yet when some duty arises change my belief to 'each man for himself'. I can at a psychological level believe we are prone to cognitive biases yet fall for cognitive biases. I don't understand why you'd be suggesting that I cannot forward some model of how we think without preformative contradiction, just because I must think to do so. That would disable all philosophy, one could not forward a knowledge claim about what sort of thing knowledge claims are, one could not use language to discuss how language works, one cannot discuss a way one ought to think because one must already have thought hat one ought to discuss that...

We are capable of rationalising in theoretical models despite the fact that we are caught within them, the whole of clinical psychology is predicated on the idea.

I rather think belief is a judgement of relative truth. One’s disposition to act is every bit as much a judgement he makes relative to some truth he has already considered. Close enough? — Mww

I'm trying to ground things like belief in the physical. A disposition to act can be represented (theoretically) in neural architecture, response to stimuli stuff. Calling it a judgement makes perfect sense, but just kicks the can further down the road insofar as what that judgement actually is physically.

we in our human endeavors naturally seek to lessen our own confusion, the means to which we demand of logic, which in turn absolutely requires consistency. — Mww

Yes, absolutely. We seem to dislike inconsistency - sometimes, I think, to our detriment... But then, I'm a psychologist, we get to play fast and loose with trivial things like logic, if it makes people feel better.

I’d say an empirical model, or, a model constructed on empirical principles, should proximate reality as much as the principles admit. — Mww

I'm not sure what "as much as the principles admit" refers to here, so I might be raising an issue you've already covered, but on the face of it, this seems wrong. Take the weather for example, the way it 'really' is (and here by 'really' I just mean according to our most intricate models) is really complex. At the moment, some of the world's most powerful supercomputers are used to process our models of the weather. Now suppose we made that model even closer to reality, that wouldn't make it better would it. It would become too complex for even our fastest computer and so next to useless.

Sometimes reality might be fiendishly complex and so what we really need is a model which isn't as close as we can get, because otherwise it would be too complex to use.

It's impossible to get people to say something coherent and substantive when they have free rein. — Snakes Alive

Funny, I've had a little professional cross-over with philosophers (plus what I've heard in public lectures and seminars on YouTube) and what I've found to be the case is the exact opposite. Maybe we move in different circles.

I've found debate among professional philosophers to be mostly open, accepting of the fact that no concrete or substantive things can really be said, and that most alternatives have their merits to at least some extent.

The idea that, for example, some notion is incoherent, or nonsense, or just plain wrong in an objective sense seems pretty much limited to forums like this, and further, to people with some basic knowledge on a subject annoyed that their 'superior grasp' of it is not being given what they consider to be due respect.

I'm asking what you believe to be the case. — creativesoul

As I explained, I don't think I 'believe' a single thing, I believe a range of different (possibly even contradictory things) in different contexts. So I simply can't answer your question.

What claim and/or assertion are you asking me to argue for? — creativesoul

Implied (but I could be wrong). You're saying that you find it odd, but you're not saying that you'll cast out your old thinking and accept this new 'odd' way of looking at things. Yet you've not presented any justification for finding it 'odd', just the bare declaration. So what I get from that is that you find it odd, and that the mere fact that you find it odd is sufficient for you to reject the idea. So the assertion is that what I've said is not a good way of looking at things, yet the backing for this seems to be just that you find it odd.

Of course, it's possible you're just declaring you find it odd as nothing more than a point of interest. In which case, noted, but do you have an opinion on how useful the idea might, odd or not?

A rubber ball is disposed to bounce when dropped onto a hard surface. According to your definition, rubber balls have belief. — creativesoul

Yes, I don't see any functional distinction in this context, but I'm equally happy to say that 'beliefs' are just such dispositions that occur in brains.

I claim dialectic license. — Mww

Absolutely. A claim which should be allowed with much generosity, I think. We're only writing pithy responses, often (in my case) on a phone whilst travelling, we cannot be expected to write full technical explanations in parentheses to every term. So yes, licence granted...trouble is there are many posts where a charitable reading turns out to be the wrong one, and the term one thought a brief placemarker for a much more nuanced position was, in actual fact, meant as the full brazen assertion it superficially seemed to be... So it was worth a check.

Nature doesn’t inform us so much as we inform ourselves, of errors in our models, when some model of ours isn’t consistent with another of ours — Mww

True, but we mustn't sublime consistency. It is only what it is, no holy grail, nor marker of truth. A whole set of consistent models might still be miles away from reality, or consistent and close to reality but utterly useless to us.

Still, models are useless without something to which they relate, wouldn’t you agree? — Mww

No, I don't think I would, but I get what you're saying. I don't think proximity to reality measures the usefulness of the model. As such, I think it's theoretically possible that a model might be useful without relating to anything at all, but I haven't thought about that much, so my intuition may well be wrong. Interesting question.

what it’s like to experience stubbing your toe is a lot like the experience of hitting your thumb with a hammer, which isn’t saying much, but what the experience of stubbing your toe is exactly like is .......well.....stubbing your toe, which isn’t saying anything at all, because we already knew that — Mww

Yes. Which makes it muchtthe same as what a 'game of tennis' is like. Its a bit like a game of badminton, but not quite, the only thing it's exactly like is a game of tennis, which doesn’t get us anywhere when talking about it. Nothing special about consciousness in that respect, as far as I can see.

First, there's no Friston or amoeba in the real world in your view, is there? — Terrapin Station

It depends on the context of our discussion. As I have said countless times, I hold that beliefs are dispositions to act as if, I can therefore hold different beliefs in different contexts, there's no reason why the model I use in one context (where I assume there are such things as Friston and amoebae) should in any way cohere with the model I might use when discussing the way things 'really are'. You're acting like the nerdy child who says in the middle of an game of Star Wars "you're not really Han Solo though are you?".

We're talking here (using models which we all share) about reasons to think that our model of the world itself is some way or other.

We use language to discuss the meaning of language. We make knowledge claims about what sort of thing knowledge claims are. It's not some new concept that we use some given concept to analyse the wider context within which it sits.

if Nature informs us of an error in our models, we just start over. — Mww

How does nature inform us of an error in our models when we have no direct access to nature against which to check them, only other models?

Unless you think that life had the capacity to create models prior to being able to obtain any sensory data. — Terrapin Station

Yes. Friston has demonstrated active variance reduction in sensory inputs of amoeba, even in programmed automatons. Modelling, in a mathematical sense, does not require any higher cognitive functions.

No member of Nature can act contrary to the forces of the Nature of which he is a member. None of my actions can be distinguished from forces found naturally, even if I am permitted to modify them to my advantage or interrupt their natural progression. Even the act of pure spontaneity, which we formerly considered the ground of pure thought, has its natural exhibition in random....a form of spontaneity.....nuclear decay, and theoretical quantum physics. — Mww

Yes, exactly. So I'm asking Zelebg how that distinction he set up can help him objectively identify a separate object. I can't see any distinction at all myself.

Subjective, perhaps, so what? Decision is not arbitrary. — Zelebg

What is the non-arbitrary aspect then?

I don't see how that question relates to what I said. What problem you are talking about - who has that problem, when, why? — Zelebg

We're definitely getting crossed wires here, sorry. I don't know what part of my writing you think has expressed a problem.

Individual organisms are distinguished from the environment by connections and relations between entities that make up that organism, like shared circulatory system, synchronized motion of all the parts, shape constraints that make up the body... — Zelebg

So you're not 'connected' to the environment? How's that work?

Independence, like you can climb a mountain and raindrop can not. — Zelebg

I'm asking why the forces which lead to me climbing a mountain are not 'forces of nature'.

Is there some point to all these questions? — Zelebg

Yes, I'm trying to clarify what your objection is.

Would the subjective criteria of space and time be sufficient for distinguishing objects? — Mww

Yes, absolutely. What I'm arguing for here is model dependent realism. Not that nothing really exists, not any form of idealism, just that the only way we know reality is through our models of it and so (this is, for me, the important bit) no model can ever be shown to be more 'true' (where that means corresponds to reality) than any other, and no objects distinguished by those models really exist in preference to any other conceivable way of determining objects.

I can't remember why we got talking about model dependent realism in a thread about the expression 'what it's like'.

I find it odd when someone claims that they do not think other people exist. — creativesoul

Yes, but incredulity does not constitue an argument. I'm asking you what your argument is, not what your feeling is about mine.

Do you believe the following statement?

Other people exist. — creativesoul

I don't hold single beliefs about the subject. As I've said already, for me, a belief is simply a disposition to act as if. It is therefore contextual. In the context of thinking about reality, in the widest sense I can, I'm disposed to act (in this case actions are all talking/typing) as if people do not exist, as separate objects. In the context of my day to day life, I'm disposed to act as if other people do exist.

Neither of these dispositions tells me anything about what actually does exist.

That's not the context where you exist as a collective entity. — Zelebg

I'm talking about objective existence, the 'context' in which we determine existence is subjective, it's a decision we make, there's no reason why we should determine objects on any given level of heirachy. We're we justifiably uncertain of our existence prior to having a model of molecules, cells etc? How would our alien, who only senses weak nuclear forces, have any concept of a boundary at a cellular level?

Surely at this level there should be no confusion what is and how much it is different and separated from everything else at the same level. — Zelebg

OK, so describe to me where 'you' end, and why there. Maybe some more detail will help me see where you're coming from.

Which are 'the forces of nature' and which are my movements, prior to identifying me as an entity?


Can you state the problem directly, with some example if possible? — Zelebg

You said that 'I' act against the forces of nature, but that would involve distinguishing between 'my' actions and those originating from the forces of nature. Without begging the question as to my separate existence, I'm asking what features of 'my' actions allow you to distinguish them from actions caused by 'the forces of nature'.