Let’s give it a rest, shall we?

Strong argument against the conceivability of p-zombies?

How can there be one, when successful arguments affirming such conception have been given?

Strong argument against the empirical reality of one, and recognizing it as such…..that may be inconceivable..

….how would logic be able to correct itself….. — Corvus

Judgement corrects itself.

….they are all the contents of thought. — Corvus

Correct. Logic being the rules by which the relations of contents obtains.

Of course logic is the form of a thinking system, but it needs the contents. — Corvus

The thinking system needs content; logic, not being a thinking system, does not.

Without the content, how could you have demonstrated the logic? — Corvus

I don’t demonstrate the logic; I demonstrate my understanding of the content of my thoughts, according to the a priori rules logic provides.

If you empty your thoughts, then there will be no logic. — Corvus

We’re not talking about the emptiness of thought; we’re talking about the emptiness of logic. It is impossible to have emptiness of thought, insofar as to think of nothing is a contradiction, but it is a metaphysical condition of logic that it be empty of determinable content.

All logic must have the contents to operate. — Corvus

Actually, logic doesn’t operate. It merely regulates how human discursive understanding operates, and content actually belongs to that faculty in the form of its representations, which are conceptions.

Without it (re: content), it is a pseudo logic or a shell with nothing in it. — Corvus

No determinable object, but for that, not nothing. Logic is really only that by which our judgement is orderly, and adheres to the means for correcting itself.

Gotta keep in mind….thought is not by means of logic, even if thought is intrinsically logical. All thought is by means of synthesis of representations, logic is merely that which underpins the correctness of the representations understanding adjoins to each other, such underpinning more commonly called just….you know….rules.
(If you’re cognizing a circle, one of the rules of understanding is there won’t be angles cognized along with it)

Which gets us to your world of reason. There is a metaphysical precept, for what it’s worth, that understanding is the faculty of rules, but reason is the faculty of laws. Thus it is the world of reason is that by which cognitions are legislated according to, not rules, but principles. The reason for this distinction is obvious, iff one readily admits to the possibility of misunderstanding, but finds error in his reason inadmissible.
(Upon the cognition of a circle, one of the laws of reason concerning geometric figures in general, having nothing to do with the constructing of the cognition of a circle itself, is it must have enclosed a space)

That seems different from my understanding of General and Transcendental logic in Kant. — Corvus

That’s fine. Yours is further along in the book, whereas mine merely states the initial conditions.

My thoughts on Logic is that, contents is the precondition of thoughts, and thoughts is the precondition of Logic.  Therefore, without content, Logic is impossible.  Contentless logic is pseudo logic, or logic in just a shell with no meaning. — Corvus

Now, I think that’s sorta backwards.
1.) The possibility of thought must be the condition antecedent that which is thought about. Account must be made for the fact that the faculty of understanding generates its own objects merely from the thought of them, re: conceptual spontaneity, thereby immediately eliminating the possibility that content is the precondition of thought.
2.) Under the assumption the human cognitive system as a whole is a logical system, logic is then the precondition of thought. How would it be possible to think logically without logic being the form of the thinking system? Like…..how could you have a square concrete pad, if not for the construction of the very form required to receive the fluid concrete that subsequently solidifies into a square?
3.) Your A = B, B = C, therefore A = C doesn’t work iff logic….plain ol’ logic, all by itself, a critical method in itself….has never been that which has to do directly with objects, but only sets the rules under which objects are thought.

As for meaning, logic in itself, as a function of understanding, has to do with establishment of non-contradictory judgements alone. As with the concrete pad, empirical meaning can never arise without the a priori elimination of contradictions.
—————

…the world of reason…. — Corvus

Out of curiosity, what does that mean to you?

Also, you were going to tell me which type of logic has its content already contained in it.

Logic is possible to be studied, but wouldn't be useful for the practical uses in the real world. — Corvus

No one was disagreeing with that. It is the content in logical propositions by which we know anything at all. Nevertheless, it is by the form the content takes, that certainty is even possible for the human intellect. The content of the conceptions in the subject of any proposition must relate to the conceptions in the predicate of that same proposition, for it to have any knowledge contained in it.

…your view on logic is too narrow. — Corvus

As it must be, I suggest; there is a need for the irreducible ground, by which to judge the rest. The use of logic, on the other hand, the application of the method….the filling in of the content, as you say…..is as wide or narrow as the conceptions represented by however filling the content is, warrants.

Regarding Kantian general and transcendental logic, these are merely differences in the source of the representations contained in our cognitions. The former is with respect to the relations of a priori cognitions themselves to each other, regardless of the source of the representations contained therein, while the latter regards only those relations which have only to do with what makes a priori cognition possible. So while they technically are different types of logic, they still abide by the same rules of logic, which reduces to the congruency of relations of representations even in different types of cognition.

Logic is possible to be studied, but wouldn't be useful for the practical uses in the real world. — Corvus

Exactly right. Logic, the critical method, is useless for knowing, but categorically necessary for making things known.

….what you meant by logic is "contentless"? — Corvus

Simply put, I mean, logic is a method for examining critical thought in general, in the form of…..for that critical thought which is constructed logically, or, which is the same thing, in accordance with a strict logical form, self-contradiction is impossible, and thereby the truth of the construct is given.

Even without knowing what meant by it, I can still agree that logic is contentless, under the presupposition that logic, as such, is only a methodological form in itself.

That there is logic is one thing; that things are logical is quite something else.

My point was there are different types of logic, some contentless, some content given, or filled. They don't work all the same. — Corvus

While there may indeed be different types of logic, I would still ask, which type of logic has its content already given?

If you fill in the contents, doesn’t that imply there isn’t any? That being the case, isn’t that exactly the same as logic being contentless?

Logic…..just that, plain ol’ logic….has been called the science of correct thought. When employed as a countable noun, in which there are assorted forms of logic, all that’s implied is a formal system providing an empirical proof from a corresponding set of antecedent a priori conditions.

Maybe you’re trying to say even, e.g., the formal law A = A contains the content of A and necessary equality, but even so, in order for that logic to be useful as a system of proof, one must still fill in that content for which A alone represents the form of the law.

By the same token, how would it be persuasive that mere “if-then” syllogistic logical form has content exhibited by “if” or “then” all by themselves, when they are merely the necessary conditionals? The systemic proof arises from the “if (this content), “then” (that content), the parentheticals being filled in by the user.

I’ll second the notion that logic….as such, all by itself….is contentless.

…..three note-worthy points:

1. There is a world (independent of 'me');
2. There is an 'I' (or 'me') which is in that world; and
3.There is a distinction between my experience of and the world itself.

Firstly, all three of these are transcendent claims assumed as true….. — Bob Ross

Even if I grant all three points are assumed as true, what makes them transcendent claims?

After all the observable physical determinism, the speculative metaphysical reductionism, all the chatter and nonsense, the otherwise unexceptional human brain ends up being a conniving mass of wetware.
(Sigh)

Honestly, I'm surprised no one has proffered up: "if it tells you how to do everything you want and satisfies inquiry then it is telling you the truth." You could simply object to the supposition that it really lies to you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the book will lie to me is not a supposition of mine, insofar as I’m categorically informed of the inevitability of it beforehand.

The book telling me to my satisfaction how to do stuff and satisfying my inquiries, and by which I’m being lied to, does nothing but cause me to question my own judgement with respect to how I consider myself satisfied on the one hand, and on how knowing how to do something will sufficiently relate to my experience when I actually do it, on the other. Combine those two, and I should find no measure of truth at all in the book, and questionable measure in some respects in myself.
————-

This book will answer any questions you ask of it to your satisfaction — Count Timothy von Icarus

Magical indeed. It’s possible I won’t even know what questions to ask until immediately before I ask them, which requires a mere book to infinitely anticipate. Which would cause me to wonder if I’m asking a book, or something else entirely. Even supposing that me asking a book is a euphemism for just looking in the book for whatever question I have, presupposes the book….or whatever it is…..contains every single question possible to be asked of it.

I wouldn’t worry about the spell; I’d have already backed slowly away, from the mysterious old woman and her lying book, forever giving mystery and magic a very wide berth.

Not sure exactly what you mean here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Universe is a self-contained system without external influence, which serves as the criteria for a conception, in this case, autonomy. Upon stipulation that the Universe is the totality of all possibilities for the intelligence that performed such stipulation, it becomes superfluous to grant autonomy to the Universe, but only validates the conception relative to certain subsystems within it.

The human is a self-contained system in itself, but at the same time, contained within a greater system and is thereby subject to influence by it. If it is the case that the only influence the Universe as a system can have as causality, is the effects of the objects in it relative to each other, which is always and only a physical manifestation, it is contradictory to then assert the Universe influences through its cause/effect, that which the lesser self-contained system exerts on itself, insofar as such exertion is NOT relative to any other object contained in the greater system.

So sets the conditions by which a lesser self-contained system can at the same time be free of influence from the greater system, which justifies the validity of the preconceived conception of autonomy. Nevertheless, while autonomy is a necessary condition for self-determination intrinsic to any self-contained subsystem capable of it, it is not itself sufficient causality. But a self-contained subsystem must have its own causal ground, else the authority for such system to be self-determining becomes internally inconsistent.

That’s what I mean…..

Think of me as one of those two ol’ Muppets in the balcony, nodding knowingly to the other, says, “BRILLIANT!!!”

But alas, there’s an unstated determinant condition for both systems, that which gives ground for both of them to work, each within their own domain. Coming oh so close with the systemic Universe, but not so noticed for the human subsystem within the Universe, tends to unbalance the overall thesis.

Under the assumption you’re not a fan of guessing games, I submit..…..autonomy.

I am not concern with the thing that does the looking…… — Daniel

If I’m looking in a mirror, regardless of what I perceive in the seeing, there is a phenomenal representation given to my intellectual system. This is the way the human system works: the senses relay physical information in the form of sensation, the cognitive part of the system operates in conjunction with it, and by which the representations of things perceived become my experiences.

So it is that in the case of me looking into a mirror and seeing myself, the phenomenal representation is just another set of physical information. The senses do not have the ability to discern identity, from which follows the phenomenal representation of the physical information contains no indication that I am seeing myself. As far as this goes, there is merely an appearance of some thing, presented to my senses, as is the case with every single perception of mine, without exception.

So how does it arise that the perception from the mirror is my body? From the information my senses provide, re: movement, the color of the shirt, the haircut, a veritable plethora of representations corresponding exactly with what I already know.

But no matter what, that which is not a representation from the mirror, is that to which the manifold of representations that are from the mirror, are given. The senses can never enable a representation of that which operates on, and because of, them. There can be no representation of the self given from the perception in the mirror.

I cannot see my self in a mirror. I cannot see my self, ever. And the myself I do see, is nothing but my personal empirical object, which is just my body.
————

But forget all that; you’re asking me to imagine. Fine. To imagine is to make the senses irrelevant, insofar as I can imagine looking at myself in the mirror while skydiving, in which case there is no phenomenal representation of my body, because I’m not actually perceiving it. Nevertheless, imagination does present its own representations, otherwise I wouldn’t have the mere mental image of looking in a mirror while not actually looking.

Ok, so the imagined image of me looking in the mirror corresponds precisely to the image given from the actual looking, which makes explicit the representations from imagination have at least some of their origins in experience. If I didn’t already know what a mirror is, how could I imagine looking into it? Which implies a sort of mental storage facility, which we common folk call memory, philosophers call intuition, and metaphysicians call consciousness.

Long story short…..guess what representation cannot be found in memory/intuition/consciousness, but serves as its representation? And if, even just for the sake of argument and in keeping with pure logical law, consciousness is the sum total of every representation belonging to an individual subject, and, it is thereby impossible for self to be contained in that which it represents as containing all representations, there arises an impasse, in attempting to represent the self as such.

There is a expression representing that which encompasses consciousness as the totality of representations, called “ego”. Ego, then, is a complexity, and in turn is conceptually represented by the simple, called “I”. All three of these together entail the conception of self, whereas any one of them alone does not. Hence the incomprehensibility of attempts to conceptualize a self without the apprehension of that conjunction, and upon that apprehension, the self is given, but not as a representation.

There is no thing that does the looking. There is only a systematic process by which there is that which is its object.

Not sure if that was what you had in mind, though... — Janus

Close enough. When I see “way of thinking”, I interpret “way” as “method”.

I think Corvus and Mww argue that the idea of the self is not an element of the set of ideas. — Daniel

Not what I’m arguing; THE self is a valid general idea, having a myriad of representative conceptualizations from various ways of being understood. MY self is a particular, and as such, is more a logical deduction represented as an object of MY reason, given the name transcendental object in order to distinguish its origin, rather than a conception of the understanding.

the exercise is concerned with the idea of the self. — Daniel

This concern is different from your “The self I am trying to explore is that which is the object of thought when you think of yourself”, insofar as me thinking of myself is incomprehensible. Nothing contradictory in examining the self in general as an object of thought, but to think myself as an object of my own thought, invites the anathema of Cartesian theater.

From my perspective it seems fairly obvious that we affect ourselves — wonderer1

And from mine, I find much more parsimony in the notion my self is affected, or, which is the same thing, I am affected. To be affected by my thoughts, it does not follow that because all my thoughts belong to me, I thereby affect myself.

The argument derives from antiquity, in that the conception contained in the subject of a proposition or statement cannot be at the same time the conception contained in the object, in the same proposition.

Perdurantist. New one on me.

….about things affecting themselves… — wonderer1

I wasn’t being so general, meaning only the self by my comment. See below, if you like.
————

I guess Im trying to separate the idea of the self from the self itself. — Daniel

Which gives rise to my comment. That which is trying to separate is the self, which implies the attempt to separate self from self. Even to separate the idea of self is merely once-removed, and still requires that to which the idea belongs, so you end up with an idea you’ve created about yourself, you then wish to remove from yourself.

Why does self need to be something to separate, or separable? I fail to understand what could be gained by attempting to conceptualize something, when the device for constructing conceptions, or to which conceptions are spontaneously given, is just….well….me.

There is a Enlightenment- era philosophy addressing this exact dilemma, however much it has subsequently fallen from favor. The argument therein is, the self can be conceptualized in the somewhat normal method, but there’s no separability connected to such conception.

Anyway….my two or three ha’pennies.

…..one might say that one needs to form a concept of shape before having a concept of self since it might be very difficult to reference/contemplate/visualize/imagine something if one does not comprehend or has the capacity to comprehend that there are shapes…. — Daniel

It’s almost incomprehensible that there must be that which is affected by itself. How can it be asked about a thing, when the very thing asked about, is doing the asking?

Nature of the metaphysical human beast: look for answers whether or not there are any.

Oh. My fault then. Sometimes I get too analytical. Preferred implies intentionality, but there’s only one way to think, within the confines of the legislation intrinsic to the three logical laws, which eliminates a preferred way of thinking. What is thought about may or may not be a conscious choice, but we can’t choose what to think of what we end up thinking about.

They do indeed 'structure' experience, but they're not derived from experience. That's what makes them 'transcendental'. — Wayfarer

Hume’s dilemma, and a logical snafu: it is impossible to both structure, and be derived from that which is structured. Build a house with boards, and the house gives you the boards? Say wha..!?!?

I jest, but the principle holds.
————-

I could just as easily have said "preferred way of thinking" as I have little doubt that our preferred ways of talking reflect that. — Janus

I might argue that point. Ya know….we cannot think a thing then think we have thought otherwise, but we can think a thing and talk about it as if we thought of it otherwise. You cannot fake your thoughts but you can fake your language regarding your thoughts.

…..it's just my own take. — Janus

Cool.

You'll probably disagree with me (we all have different ways of thinking about these things, apparently) but I see space and time as being for us, just as objects are, appearances. — Janus

Oh, I certainly do, but there’s no damage done by it. Different strokes and all that, right?

Is it a precept or some kind of general rule of phenomenology that space and time are appearances in the same way as objects? Say, as in Kant for instance, appearance mandates sensation relating specifically to it, what sensation could we expect of space from its appearance? Or is it that the precept or rule doesn’t demand sensation from appearance?
————-

I think there is a real cosmos….. — Janus

As do I, and grant the rest of that paragraph, given your perspective.

Lemme ask you this: there is in the text the condition that space is allowed “empirical reality in regard to all possible external experience”. Would you accept that his empirical reality is your appearance?
————-

I think many of these disagreements come down to preferred ways of talking — Janus

Yeah, could be. But you know me….I shun language predication like the plague: rather kill it than put up with it. But you’re right, insofar as there must be something that grounds disagreements, so I vote for disparity in subjective presuppositions. How one thinks about stuff depends exclusively on where he starts with it.

'the eye cannot see itself' — Wayfarer

(Sigh)

Overlooked, or outright dismissed, is our brief exchange on pg. 14, re: brain/appearance.

Pretty common knowledge the brain has no nerve endings as pain receptors, hence we cannot feel our own brain. Hardly likely we’ll ever smell it or taste it, and seeing as how there’s something drastically wrong if it ever makes a sound we can hear, and the implication we’ll actually see it carries some serious consequences as well, it becomes absurd to then suppose our own brain, in which resides all our mental goings-on, can be an appearance to our own sensibility.

The brain sitting on the bench? Sure, there can be a valid phenomenal representation of that. And the comment expressing Locke’s qualities? Of which Kant deems it reasonable to admit the totality, concerns “actual existence of external things”, which…..DUH!!!!…..cannot be my own brain.

What’s really cool, is the converse. The brain on the bench can be an appearance without contradiction, but it cannot contain my thoughts without being one.

Kant didn’t saw off his own branch. He made it so you can take it home and make a killer table out of it, when his peers and successors burn down the tree.

The argument from authority is a weak form of doing philosophy in my view; we need to learn to think for ourselves. — Janus

Absolutely. Concur 100%. You’ve considered a certain authority’s philosophy as wrong in at least a particular instance, which makes explicit you’ve thought in opposition to it.

I have always thought that Kant is wrong about space and time: if there can be things in themselves, then why not space and time in themselves? — Janus

So….he was mistaken in that he didn’t attribute real existence to space and time? Or, you think he should have? The theory holds that things-in-themselves possess real existence, and are the origin-in-kind of that which appears to sensibility. From which follows that to attribute the same conditions to, e.g., space, originating from space-in-itself, we should be able to represent the constituency of it, which is merely the arrangement of its matter according to form residing a priori in intuition (A20/B34), which is what is done with any other sensation. But the matter of space, according the antecedent conception of it, can be nothing other than an infinite aggregate of greater or lesser spaces, from which follows there is no determinable object possible to intuit at all. In common parlance, no phenomenal representation is at all possible for that which has infinite composition, but equally without any substance whatsoever. And here arises the requisite concreteness of that which appears, insofar as without it, we are presented with “…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd.…” (Bxxvii)

On the other hand…..there’s always an other hand…..the thing-in-itself is never that which appears, or is always that which could never appear, and, space is never that which appears, and, never could be, so perhaps they are a sort of in-themselves after all.

All that being said, and speaking without recourse to relevant authority, how do you think space-in-itself to be conceivable? How was Kant wrong with respect to his treatment of it?

My reticence re indirect realism (is) more a dissatisfaction with current theories of perception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

D’accord. The analytic dudes got ahold of it, sent it off into the metaphysical puckerbrush.

I do, however, tend towards the "direct," in some key ways. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As do I, re: perception. Every perception is directly real, from which follows every sensation given from any one of them, is directly real.

I fear we end up in dualism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ehhhhh…I’m a staunch, dyed-in-the-wool, card-carryin’ dualist, so my position is we can’t really end up where we always were to begin with.

…..doomed to end up very blurry. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, but that’s a qualitative judgement describing a subject that holds those representations. Just as the representations change in correspondence to the conception of the entity, usually via experience, so too will the subject’s judgement change in correspondence to his representations. Blurry may then, if not become clear, then at least become different, in which case, what was formally i.e., a recession, becomes merely (a-HEM) a historically precedented temporary downward trend.

But I get your point.

I don't agree with 'indirect realism' because it posits two separate things - the reality and its representation. As if we could compare them. — Wayfarer

Might I rest assured you’re familiar with the so-called “dual aspect’ vs “dual object” theory, regarding transcendental philosophy, or theories of perception in general? If you are, and hold with the dual object scenario, which seems to be the case, re: “…posits two separate things…”, then your objection to indirect realism may be valid. But for he who holds with the dual aspect scenario, in which there are not two separate things, but merely two methods for examining the one thing**, the objection can be overruled.

So saying, transcendental theory, as epistemologically grounded as it is, makes explicit there are not two separate things, the real and the representation of the real, a seemingly ontological consideration to be sure, insofar as the representation is not a thing in the same sense as the thing which appears, is. This denominates representation to a speculative procedural constituent, logically concluded or rationally presupposed, rather than empirically given. It also makes the determination as to necessity vs contingency a mitigating condition in itself, the logic being necessary, the empirical, contingent.

And, while I agree we do not compare them, per se, the real against the representation, there are judgements which follow in due course. It is the judgements on the synthesis of representations, or, which is the same thing, our cognitions, that are compared, and those by reason for their mutual consistency, and to which Nature informs of the correctness, either of the one in particular, or of the one over the other in a series.

(** two methods: thought, and experience)

Is there another reason you do not agree with indirect realism? Or is it simply that I’m misconstruing what you meant by it?

The brain doesn't appear at all. Not unless you're someone who is studying brains. — Wayfarer

No brain has ever been a phenomenon to the subject to which it belongs. The only brain that will ever appear to me, is someone else’s, and even if I intuit it as such, I will still never apprehend its internal machinations.

To the extent I have a problem with indirect realism, it's the fact that it tends to lead to this sort of soft dualism and hidden humonculi who are there to view the "representations" of the world. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To the extent I have a problem with indirect realism, is reconciled by distinguishing the operation of the cognitive system, in and of itself, on its own accord, from talking about the constituent parts that enable its function. The talking about it is that which creates the very Cartesian theater alledged to subsist in it. It is absurd to suppose reason has a partner, or intuition has a twin.

Consider time. At one point the subject thinks, feels, knows….whatever. It is at another time he reconsiders the content of former time, and whether sufficiently identical to it or not, it is still the same system belonging to the same subject in operation for both times. For any times, in fact.

From here, it follows the soft dualism in question doesn’t reside within the system, but dualism proper is the condition resident between the system in which representations are the effects, and that which is given to it, by which representations are caused. There is no “view”; there is merely relation.

I suspect….I’d like to think…..the extent to which you have a problem with indirect realism, isn’t so great.

Somehow, "self-knowledge" tends to be about thinking of yourself the way someone else wants you to think of yourself. — baker

Yeah…hence the closing comment I made to Wayfarer, re: the intrusion of clinical psychology.

No such thing as self-knowledge. It’s a catch-phrase meant to indicate one has an intelligence that gets along with itself more than not. Actually, brought up an excellent point regarding conscience, integrating well with intelligence, which gives….a catch-phrase meant to indicate one has an intelligence and a conscience that get along with each other more than not.

Being able to discern delusions and false hopes is not a tall order, is it? — Wayfarer

Humans are naturally endowed with a relational intellect, for which the capacity, as function, for discernment is integrated necessarily, but in doing so, in enacting, as operation, the functional capacity, re: being able to discern, there must already be that which serves as ideal against which the content under discernment is complementary. Herein, then, against being able to discern delusion there stands extant truth; against being able to discern false hope there stands practical reason**.
(**sidebar: practical reason justified under the assumption “false hope” is an illegitimate cognition, insofar as the attainment of its object is considered given but under false pretenses, which practical reason would expose. The common euphemistic proof being….you can’t get blood out of a turnip)

So it is that these ideals against which discernment directs itself, are purely subjective conditions, dependent only on the aesthetic judgement of he who holds them. Reduce it yet another step, and it happens that even if the subject in the act of discerning isn’t immediately aware of the ideal against which he is relating the particular occasion, there must be one, for otherwise he wouldn’t be in the relational situation in the first place, he being satisfied with whatever happens to have been the status quo. And here is the appropriateness of the Socratic, “know thyself”, and the systemic Enlightenment sapere aude, wherein being able to discern, and, having the capacity for discernment, while two very different functional parameters, insofar as the former presupposes the latter but is not necessarily a manifestation of it, in which it occurs that the subject actually does comprehend a delusion for what it is, and does recognize a hope as having an unattainable object.

So…..before the digression becomes uninteresting, or perhaps any more uninteresting, yes, being able to discern can be a tall order, iff the subject has no immediate awareness….no immediate knowledge a priori…..of the ideals against which his reason directs its functional capacity. On the other hand, Everdayman, who only under the most extreme occasions asks himself to consider any of this, has to think ever-more to determine the ideals against which he is relating his internal controversy, and is apt to just leave it at….as is wont to say…..damned if I know, but it sure don’t feel right.

Being able to discern shouldn’t be a tall order, because we come naturally equipped to deal with it. Speculative metaphysics describes why it nevertheless sometimes is, and, what to do about it using that equipment. But descriptions themselves don’t fix stuff, so now we have clinical psychology. (Sigh)

I always thought the maxim 'know thyself' was simply about seeing through your own delusions and false hopes. — Wayfarer

…..which, of course, presupposes knowing what they are, by the subject, or self, effected by them.

Anyway, just a thought, probably best left aside out of respect for the OP.

Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.' — Wayfarer

Paradox resolved. Self-knowledge is a transcendental paralogism, a logical misstep of pure reason, re: knowledge of self treats that to which knowledge belongs, as object the knowledge is about. (B411)
————

It's not just me then.…. — Tom Storm

Reason: the source of both wondrous insight and debilitating confusion.

It is really difficult to tell if I'm actually learning something or progressing or whether I'm chasing rainbows — Wayfarer

Cool. Cuz I can’t make heads or tails out of self-knowledge.

I got a notification of mention, by Banno, but I wasn’t even aware of this thread. Dunno how that happens, but anyway…..

Interesting thesis, and well-spoken.

I think (@Mww might confirm)…..that it was a pragmatic moral necessity to assume a transcendent moral order, even if it could not be proven by reason alone. — Wayfarer

Not sure how moral necessity can be pragmatic. Moral necessity by itself, says enough, with respect to assuming a higher order.

As for such higher moral order, true enough; what Leibniz called the Kingdom of Grace Kant calls the summum bonum.

“…. Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness), constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible world; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense….”

I think, for him, pure reason is quite different from imagination. For me, not so much. — Bob Ross

So be it.

metaphysics explains only concepts (….) and does not explain any facts of the matter. — 180 Proof

I have no problem with this, since it isn't metaphysics in the more traditional sense — Bob Ross

I am using the traditional term going back to leibniz, Kant, etc. — Bob Ross

“…..We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions….and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone…..” (Bxiv)

If the watershed for the traditional sense of metaphysics is Kant and Enlightenment philosophy in general, and metaphysics in such traditional sense has only to do with conceptions, it follows that to combine metaphysics with, juxtaposition it to, or ground it in, imagination, is very far from the traditional sense.

While it is true metaphysics is not a legitimate source of knowledge, it isn’t so because of the synthesis of it in whatever shape or form, to imagination.

…..how can one distinguish (metaphysics) from the human imagination…. — Bob Ross

Metaphysics is a discipline; imagination is a faculty.

Even if one chooses to deny to imagination the denomination of faculty, metaphysics is still a discipline, and in which case, the distinction remains that imagination is not.

Kant takes some starting points that are not tenable. For example….that moral behavior and inclination-behavior are conceptually separable. — Leontiskos

Observation proves that is the case, either in ourselves or in our observing others. It sometimes happens that even knowing what is to be done, isn’t.

I take an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach and I haven't seen a need to leave it behind — Leontiskos

I can certainly can sympathize with that.