However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nice. Something not often brought about, but a metaphysically….logically….valid premise nonetheless, we generally being more concerned with knowledge.

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition.

Oooo and Ahhhh and HOLY SHIT!!! and the whole plethora of exclamatory representations, the spontaneity of which requires no conscious thought, hence are not proper cognitions, yet are judgements relating to a change in the subject’s condition all the same.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. It can change, obviously, but in its duration, it is as certain as any truth he can ascertain. Furthermore, his feeling regarding some perception may remain consistent even with a change in the knowledge of what caused it, which sustains the distinction in kinds of judgement, discursive or aesthetic.

The foremost exposition of the notion of aesthetic judgements resides…..where, do you think, assuming you accept it isn’t foremost in intuition?

Why "mere" presence? — Manuel

Because the presence of something is pretty much insignificant. Means to an end is all.

Ahhhh….the Treatise. Ya know, and in no way to (not much) pat myself on the back, re: appearances, even ol’ Dave says, “… Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.…”

If the two superior Enlightenment philosophers agree on a thing, while not immediate peers to each other, it is reasonable to suppose by the term appearance is meant mere presence, by them both.

Another thing, while we’re at it: Kant says concepts without intuitions are blind, thoughts without content are empty, or something like that. Hume says simple impressions have their own ideas and all simple ideas are accompanied by impressions, or something like that. Funny how very similar these two grounding conditions are, innit?

As to properties, I’ll trust your higher exposure. I myself don’t recall much being said about properties per se in either the ”Treatise…..” or E.C.H.U.. Lots more readily available in Kant, though, insofar as for his brand of metaphysics, empirical conceptions just are the properties objects are said to have.

Anyway…..ever onward.

Do you want me to argue against that or to comment? — Manuel

Only if I’ve misinterpreted your comments in general. I don’t expect agreement as much as I appreciate correction.

I don't care what words one uses to refer to the colours one sees. — Michael

When Hume suggested a human with otherwise correct vision can install a missing shade of blue, he has already granted that the name of the color doesn’t reflect the capacity. Could have been any gap in the spectrum, which makes the name of it irrelevant.

…..for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

If I may, in conjunction with your quote as it concerns the empirical side, I submit that the only need to make sense of appearances being deceptive, is if they are mistakenly treated as “looks like” as opposed to the intended notion of “present as”. That there is something present to sensibility cannot be deceptive, re:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance without something that appears, which would be absurd…”

…this from the B preface, which sets the stage for the rest of the changes in that edition.

In addition, deception with respect to empirical cognition resides in discursive judgement, for which sensibility in its role as representing external objects as phenomena has none, and by which the subsequent “looks like” appearance is determinable.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350)

The final nail in that Hume-ian coffin, is the condition that if the so-called “Copernican Revolution” holds, in which the human intellect assigns properties to objects rather than objects come already imbued with them, then it is impossible to be deceived by an object’s appearance….presence…. to sensibility, insofar as at that point, no object has a property from which it obtains a “looks like”, or behaves like, hence nothing whatsoever by which to be deceptive, on the one hand, and the absolute impossibility of denying the effect of human physiological sensation caused by the presence of objects to sensibility, on the other.

You, and I honestly think , and perhaps may well agree, that all those pictures on this thread that show objects outside the human skull, depicted as actual named objects, is catastrophically wrong. Anything in those indicators, must be represented as mere matter, some as yet undetermined something, which is impossible to illustrate, so folks imbue the indicators with any ol’ thing that is already known, a blatant contradictory methodology with respect to the human intellect logically explainable by transcendental philosophy.

Which probably explains why it’s pretty much disrespected these days, and perhaps why you feel reiteration of its conditionals are worthwhile for critical thinkers, however lapsed they may be according to their arguments. People insist they see a tree, and they are correct, but only as a consequence, without knowing or caring about the antecedents necessary for how it is a tree, only a tree, and not any other thing.

(Descends soapbox, exists stage right….but still muttering to himself, accompanied by the snaps of assorted Greenwich Village pseudo-bohemian fingers)

there is a world that is not dependent on our understanding of it. — Banno

Which world is that? Existent worlds depend on human understanding, possibly existent worlds depend on human understanding. Even those cursed damnable noumenal worlds depend on human understanding, fercryinoutloud. What other kind of world is there?

To say “there is” is a positive existential inference, to say “there is a world” makes explicit an object related to the inference necessarily. To call out “world” presupposes human understanding as necessary for both the conception the word “world” represents, and the judgement on a given (“there is”) and its relation to an object conformable to it (“a world”).

Still, conception does not imply existence necessarily, so it is that there may be existent or possibly existent worlds not dependent on human experience in order for there to be knowledge of what such worlds entail. But we can think any possible world we wish, every single one of them entirely dependent on the understanding of it, which reduces to….there is no possible world that is not dependent on human understanding of it, but there is no inclusive authority in the understanding, that grants its reality. And do we really give a crap for that which isn’t?
————

…..few have the courage to set out an argument. — Banno

….but not all. And because of this…..

It isn't as convincing as you suppose. — Banno

….arises this….

(probably to no avail) — Wayfarer

Same as it ever was….

only through the way objects affect us are there objects at all. — Banno

Which objects do you know of that exist, but do not affect us? — Manuel

These say very different things. One is more the case than the other.

This is the man wherefrom I get my name — Bob Ross

Cool. Guess the sidebar wasn’t that irrelevant after all.

Guess you get to blame me if I got it all wrong, then, huh?

That’s fine; I’d be blaming me too.

We have direct, but mediated access to objects through representations. What then are we to do with indirect? — Manuel

Hence my favored position, calling a false dichotomy, insofar as it concerns realism. Direct mediated access (to real things, as sensation), yet indirect knowledge (of real things, as experience).

Even if someone called themselves an indirect realist, I don't know what that means — Manuel

Nor I.

So the substance, as I see it, is either there is something going in my brain/mind that plays a massive role in my experience of the object, or there is minimal activity going on inside. — Manuel

HA!!! I’ll see your massive, and raise you a complete!!

Pretty silly of ol’ Mother to endow us with a most seriously complex intellectual machinery, then limit its function to putting one foot linearly in front of the other, or not stabbing ourselves in the face when eating with a fork.

I think this whole debate is better thought of in terms of "mediated" vs. "unmediated" perception. — Manuel

I like mediated/unmediated over direct/indirect, but should they relate to perception?

You’d know better than I, but it seems to me like the same false dichotomy dressed in finer robes.

I'd say, that's much better. — Metaphysician Undercover

Look again. Still much better?

You have no way to assess how the construction of your own CNS compares to the source of the stimulus. — frank

There is a way. Observation for empirical constructs, the assessment from which is experience; logic for rational constructs, the assessment from which is contradiction.

There’s only one way that painting makes sense, right? Actually, there’s two, but one is a whole lot easier to accomplish.

I like it!!!!

Shades of Plato’s Republic: at the point/moment of perception, we know THAT it is, but we don’t know WHAT it is.
———-

After the edit, I don’t like it. In fact, it’s ruined. Or I missed the point. (Sigh)

I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production — Bob Ross

Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.

are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? — Bob Ross

If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.

Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.

That's not direct realism tho. — frank

Most likely not. But, as I said, from analysis of the concepts themselves, the notion is reducible to mere unmediated objectivity.

We can't stand outside ourselves in order to answer it. — frank

Right, but the answers aren’t outside ourselves anyway, so all’s well. For better or worse, the answers are what reason says they are.

I’m cool with that.

I rather think the whole shebang is a false dichotomy anyway, so….

A direct link of causal efficacy is necessary, but that is a different proposition than direct naive realism. — prothero

So is anything necessary regarding direct naive realism? If we’re already given that which is necessary, with respect to an answer to a question concerning some particular dilemma, what else do we need?

Direct realism doesn't makes sense, but it's necessary. How do you deal with that? — frank

Easy. Accept the intrinsic duality of human intelligence, regardless of the various suppositions for its methods.

Direct realism…..merely from analysis of the conceptions….is just unmediated objectivity, despite the mess post-Enlightenment philosophy has made of it. So, yes, it’s necessary for one part of the duality, the purely empirical, but has no business being involved in the other part, the purely rational.

The only way out is to prove the very nature of human intelligence is not intrinsically dualistic, which is fine, as long as whatever replaces the logic that proves it is, is sufficient to entirely falsify it.

How I deal with it…..the senses are directly affected by real things. I need nothing else from the notion of direct realism.

So you have a contradiction on your hands. — frank

Yikes!! Can’t have that. Point it out for me?

…..because as Mww noted, direct realism doesn't make any sense on its face. — frank

Doesn’t make any sense with respect to the central nervous + peripherals system from a physical point of view, nor with respect to some theoretical cognitive system from a metaphysical point of view.

Direct realism is a necessary condition for the proper functionality of sensory apparatus as such, nonetheless, and should be taken as granted from either point of view.

To finesse the noted…..

But your comment does say something about this topic. You can quickly get lost with the representations that people see, except the tree is in their head, but it can't be, so what's that in the guy's head? Is it a representation or is it a tree? — frank

Yeah….something said is the superficial silliness of it all on the one hand, re: the implicit absurdity involved in denying there are real basketballs in my head (like…you know…well, DUH!!!), and the fascinating complexity of an organ that can present itself as, or make it seem like there is, a subject present, that the subject has images of things……when (gasp) there never really is either subject or image to be found anywhere in that organ.

distinction between direct and indirect realism — frank

I do prefer the other names.

What we perceive is real directly; what our cognitive system works with, is real indirectly.
— Mww

How do you know that? — frank

Because I can tell you what a real basketball is, but I promise you there’s never been a real basketball in my head.

He just directly sees the tree. — frank

Everyone directly sees the tree.

I don't think there are any representations in direct realism. — frank

Maybe not, but there are representations necessarily. It is impossible that there are not. Or if not representations, than something that supports the fact that the real object directly sensed, is not what is present in the brain.

The confusion is in what the terms themselves are meant to indicate. What we perceive is real directly; what our cognitive system works with, is real indirectly.

The guy on the left. Take away the figure in his head, put in the cloud with the figure in it. The cloud indicates the figure is a representation of the object, the real object perceived directly but represented indirectly.

Notice there’s nothing indicating the operation of the senses, in the second illustration. And notice the figure is in the head, beyond sensory apparatus. This indicates the brain works with that which is not given from the senses, but rather, works with the representations for which the senses merely provide the occassion.

Do we need a different picture? — frank

Yes. Otherwise, you’d be forced to admit the two guy’s eyes don’t work the same way, and by association, it is indeterminable who’s eyes will see the cloud and whose will not, or, the world itself is different depending on who is looking at it, any one of which gets you into all kindsa trouble.

Why does the indirect guy have that cloudy thing in front of his face?

I find that an “objective norm” (or “categorical norm”) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a being’s faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. — Bob Ross

Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?

In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. — Bob Ross

To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.

I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.

To be a rock….. — 180 Proof

“…And a rock feels no pain.
And an island never cries…”

hidden behind a paywall — Gnomon

https://www.academia.edu/3843328/Watkins0002

Scroll down, past all the other stuff. No registration, no pay.

What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? — Gnomon

Categorical error. Existence for humans is immanent, not transcendent. There may be possible transcendent existences, but impossible that they be empirical for us, and for that contingent existence which is empirical, it is necessarily immanent for us.

Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? — Gnomon

Beyond the partially known is merely unknown, which is not irrational to imagine. It doesn’t make any sense to ask for the unknowable what-if under any conditions, which makes asking for it regarding the partially known, irrational.

Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"? — Gnomon

Dunno about holistic cosmologists, but the speculative philosopher sometimes operates by the construction of his concepts, not solely with the employment of those having been already determined, so he can be said to venture any damn where he likes, leaving the pragmatist far behind.

Still, the reasonable speculative philosophers do have their own regulatory parameters, just that those happen to be other than determined by Nature, even if related necessarily to it, which, if overstepped, ironically enough, allows the pragmatic scientist to catch up.

My thoughts……

A423/B451

Thing is, we are only impartial umpires for someone else’s judgements as expressed in his language. For each of us, for whatever our own reason concludes, there can be no impartiality, insofar as there are no disputants in a singular cognitive system.
—————

“…. In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own internal constitution.…”

So it is that reason always concludes to an answer its own questions, insofar as it is its nature to do so, but may without contradiction invoke different judgements as ground for them, insofar as its internal constitution is always a logical syllogism. It’s no different in principle than considering getting to Chicago from Tampa by way of St. Louis (the thesis), or considering the same thing but instead, by way of Seattle (the antithesis). Doesn’t matter….you get there either way (the conclusion) and while one route may be better in one respect (faster, cheaper, the major premise in a syllogism), it may be better in another (you get to stop in and see Grandma and Grandpa, the major in a different syllogism). As you say, on the one hand, a logical disjunction, but not on the other, a contradiction.

Going to Chicago is of course not a transcendental notion, but the logical method is the same as an antinomy. And while the antinomies themselves in the text exhibit negation…beginning of the world/no beginning, etc….in principle the trip to Chicago is thetic/antithetic as well, re:, go this way/don’t go this way, and furthermore, even if empirically conditioned hence certainly determinable post hoc by experience, the syllogistic method remains cum hoc consistent with reason itself.

The whole point of the antinomies is that for any transcendental idea, not just the four listed major examples of one, there is an antithesis for it, which follows logically from the fact any idea presupposes its own negation. And while it may be only the philosopher that dreams this shit up, every human is capable of it, assuming his sufficient rationality. Just because he seldom if ever does, doesn’t mean he can’t, and pursuant to the proper interest of philosophy, we want to know what we can do, along with the consequence of it, not what we can’t be bothered doing.

I just lose my patience sometimes — Janus

“…. As impartial umpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong side, for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first decided. Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured each other, they will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good friends….”

More of a politician than a philosopher. — Janus

HA!! I was thinking more Lucy to everybody else’s, except a scant few, Charlie Brown. Destroys the game by yanking the football, then thinks it a win.

It is fun, though, seeing how far apart the response is, from what the response is aimed at.

Stand by for the inevitable rebuke.

I do not understand what this is about. — Banno

C’mon, man. Don’t do me like that. The “which case?” is your discussion with , re: , then repeated in kind with , re:

You chastised me for not having an interest in clarifying my account, but I’m faced on the one hand with having it discounted as wrong, making clarification of it moot, and on the other, having the occasion for its relevance repeated, making my account superfluous, hence its clarification irrelevant.

Here’s some proper philosophy for ya:

The Platonic riddle is chock full of propositions representing ideas, which to you, and anyone generally, are only appearances;
At the time, during your perception of the riddle, the world in which you are a participant, is utterly irrelevant;
At some time, between your perception of the propositions constituting the riddle, and your response constituted as “pumice is a stone”…..there were no words. Not a single one.

As soon as one realizes no words are ever spoken that are not first thought, all language philosophy loses its stranglehold on our intelligence.

But it would be an error to conclude that therefore we are, or may be, always deceived. — Banno

Being deceived is already participating in a language game - and so being deceived is participating in a world, and involves other people. — Banno

See…this is where guys like me get lost in the modern shuffle.

I pointed out the error in the one case, where the initial condition was an idea but you forced in a proposition, supposing something of the one would apply to the other, re: negation. Now, you’re doing it again, in this case the initial condition is appearance, but you forced in language, supposing something of the one would apply to the other, re: deception.

As if that wasn’t enough, if being deceived is to participate in a world, and there is nothing whatsoever for any human to particulate in except a world…..why in the HELL is it that we may not always be deceived, if the guarantee of the truth of NOT being deceived relies on the very participation that may deceive us?????

So, you’ll allow me to be justified in quoting you….

quote="Banno;789928"]It remains that much of your post could not be understood, and what could be understood was, as argued, wrong.[/quote]

Ellipsis can be an eloquent tool….. — Banno

Ehhhh….I trusted you not to have any trouble putting the proper words in place of the dots.

….you seem uninterested in clarifying your account…. — Banno

No one asked for it.

But language is the tool of the philosopher, and we ought at least understand something of how it works, and seek to use it well. — Banno

And thinking is the tool of the human being…….