Quite right — Leontiskos

So Descartes was wrong, re: when he said the one thing he couldn’t doubt was his doubting yet you affirm doubting is an act one can be uncertain about.
————

Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms. — Leontiskos

Correct, but irrelevant and beside the point. When I’m walking to the kitchen I’m not concerned with the construction of propositions. To inform you of my activities it may be necessary to construct speech acts with words and in a fashion you can understand, but it is certainty not necessary to inform myself.

…..the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP. — Leontiskos

The presupposition JUST IS the mediation, with respect to the major in the OP. All that’s required is an exposition of the origin of the presupposition in order to justify mediation as properly obtainable from it. Which is the bone of contention overall, insofar as mediation via presupposition cannot be justified in the minor without stipulation that the act the individual knows is itself an appearance, which is the condition met by walking into that which appears as “kitchen”. But, on the one hand, if he knows his act as appearance, the minor contradicts the major, and on the other, it is not necessary an individual knows his act by appearance, insofar as he can know what his act will be without it ever manifesting in the world, which makes explicit his act is necessarily mediated by something other than experience, in which case the minor contradicts itself.

It’s really not that difficult, is it?
———-

…..consciously thinking (….) consciously walking…. — Leontiskos

Consider that for a second.

An error in reason perfectly congruent with the syllogism in the OP.

Now, while it is true Everydayman doesn’t give even half a hoot about such seemingly innocuous rationality, the philosopher should recognize it for what it is.

I’ll leave you to it. Or not.

…..are you saying that the world-in-itself (1) has causality and (2) that our representations of it are (for the most part) accurate? — Bob Ross

I’m saying we have to grant that the things in the world are caused. Even if we don’t know what causes things, if there’s some thing right in front of my face, I’m further along accepting something else caused it to be there, than I would be if I denied it.

Granting the fact we are not conscious of that which transpires from the output of the sensory apparatus and the input to the brain, and supposing the Enlightenment metaphysicians figured this out as well, we cannot say anything about the accuracy of our phenomenal representations. As every Kantian worth his salt can recite verbatim, “….intuitions without conceptions are blind…”.

Otherwise, I don’t know why you would appeal to scientific investigations of the brain…. — Bob Ross

The brain is just another thing, right? I’m just saying there’s some degree of correspondence between scientific and metaphysical knowledge claims. Or, lack of them.

…..would you say you believe that the world-in-itself has relations — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t word it that way. I’d say everything in the world appears related to something else.
—————

I think you have developed (or adhere to) a model of reality, which is extracted from the trusting of one’s experiences, whereof we represent the world to ourselves and our representations are somewhat accurate of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

I’m ok with that. And because you and I will agree on many more things than not, it is more than probable our cognitive systems are congruent in their respective matter, but merely similar in their respective operational parameters.

What would you say is the main reason you’ve read Groundwork a few times, but you’re not a Kantian? Would it be that you weren’t persuaded by it enough to investigate other works, or you weren’t impressed with it at all?

Some questions:…. — Leontiskos

Oh cool. Socratic dialectics. I’ll play along. Briefly.

Do you act? — Leontiskos

Yes.

When you act do you know you are acting…. — Leontiskos

Not always.

…..or are you not sure whether you are acting? — Leontiskos

Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it.

Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? — Leontiskos

Yes.

Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by? — Leontiskos

Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is. How else would it be determinable that I didn’t walk to the bathroom? If I say I did a particular thing, I must already know what that thing was before I did it. If that was not the case, all I’m justified in saying is that I walked into a different space.

And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen. No stoves in the office, no toilets in the pantry.
—————

Do you think people without "systems" are also capable of knowledge? — Leontiskos

No. But still, if ALL people have a system, regardless of what kind of system it may be, then to ask about people without one, is unintelligible.

.

I was not intending by “affected” that you were aware of it (as the ego). — Bob Ross

Yeah…that’s dialectical inconsistency on my part. Properly spoken, it should have been, there is awareness of it, rather than I am aware of it. There’s no I (as the ego) in the senses, to be sure. Recall as well, I’ve said we are not conscious of the machinations of the faculty of intuition, and it is true there is a blind spot between the senses and the brain, but there needs to be something like intuition and with it phenomenal representation, in order to intelligibly explain that of which we are conscious, even if only from a metaphysical point of view.

Let it be resolved that to be affected is to grant the necessity of real external objects effecting the senses. Now it may be clear I cannot notice from the effects of the ticking clock right in front of me, that another identical clock, in some significantly different place and under certain conditions in that place, is ticking at a rate different.
————-

But if it isn’t accounted for within Kant’s view, then doesn’t it pertain to the things-in-themselves; which Kant say we cannot know? — Bob Ross

It could, sure. That’s what Schopenhauer did with his theory of world as will and idea, made it so the Kantian thing-in-itself just goes away. Still, Kant’s view is quite broad, so it’s possible to account for some things within that view using a different method, while discounting others. We know this, because some of his ideas are still in force today. Or, I suppose, to be accurate, some of his ideas haven’t been sufficiently refuted.
————-

It sounds like you are claiming to know something about the world-in-itself: that it has causality. Am I correct in that? — Bob Ross

It does sound like that, but adhering to the theory shows the sound to be just conventional simplicity. You said it yourself, the chain of mental events for knowledge. For me to know the causality of Nature, I’d have to be affected by causality, intuit causality and represent it as a phenomenon, understand causality and represent it as a conception, synthesize each representation into a cognition of causality. Right off the bat it is impossible to represent causality as a phenomenon because causality is not conditioned by space and time. Causality does not have extension in space; things do. So given the interrupted chain of mental events, I cannot KNOW causality, but I can still think it as a conception. Which it is, in transcendental philosophy, being termed a category, and is entirely a function of logic alone.

Just as space and time are the necessary conditions a priori for experience, the categories are the necessary conditions a priori for the understanding of conceptions. So it is in thinking alone, that logically Nature must be causal, because it is absurd, and eventually contradictory, to suppose it is me….or you or Bob or Julie or Sir Charles……that is necessary cause of the things both by which all of us are affected, and at the same time, the things only some of us and possibly none of us, are.

So no, I cannot say I know the world has causality. All I can say is that logically, it must. If a logical system combines with a transcendental philosophy, and if there is a non-contradictory truth given from it, such is a tacit authorization of reason, to call that truth pure a priori knowledge, insofar as given a certain set of conditions, the conclusion could not be otherwise.
————-

”the representations in us presuppose corresponding things external to us, and, Nature is causal in itself, but that doesn’t mean we have to know anything about either of those two things

(…) the first I have a hard time justifying, since all we know is conditioned by are possible forms of experience. — Bob Ross

Yeah, but we don’t know either the representations of things or those real things corresponding to them. What we know, knowledge proper, emerges as the culmination of a procedural methodology. The conditioning of a procedure, then, indicates that which relates the components in it to each other in order for it to be methodological.
————-

I am uncertain as to what it could be in-itself nor as this ‘thing’ that you mentioned. — Bob Ross

Exactly right. To be uncertain is to not know, precisely relevant to the point. It follows that there is uncertainty simply because the means for it has not been called into play by mere appearance. Not that certainty will occur upon such means, but it absolutely never will without it.

Such is metaphysics, which is, after all, what we’re talking about.

….we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument. — Leontiskos

That was never a contention simply from the fact it was never submitted as such, in the original syllogism, which doesn’t even suggest community as a determinant condition. The contention remains, that no one, as individual subject to whom the syllogism is properly addressed, knows anything at all that isn’t mediated by the system by which knowledge itself is possible. Give that system any name you wish, determine its methodology by whatever means…..whatever it is, if knowledge is impossible without it it is necessarily the case knowledge is mediated by it, and consequently, no knowledge is at all possible non-mediately.

That’s my argument, and if it is true, the minor in the original syllogism is demonstrably false because of it, while there being nothing wrong with its form.

So, yes, we know our own actions in a more immediate way that we know others’ actions, but that says nothing about the mediacy/non-mediacy of the our own knowledge of our own actions, which is the implication the syllogism carries.
————-

There are two questions here: first, whether the mediation of the knowledge of appearances and the mediation of the knowledge of first-person acts are different kinds of mediation; and second, whether the knowledge of first-person acts are mediated. — Leontiskos

Absolutely, different kinds of mediation, and thereby, the second question is redundant.
————-

It is an attempt to explain what has already occurred. — Leontiskos

Ever tied to explain what hasn’t occurred? That isn’t, instead, a prediction?

Fun talkin’ to ya, but let’s not get too carried away, huh?

Not that either of us would have noticed…..
-Mww

But this concedes that it does affect you! — Bob Ross

How do you figure I’m affected by the very thing I didn’t notice? I concede a thing happens, an effect on me, but from that I don’t have to concede I am aware that it happens, an affect in me. The food I eat has an effect on me, but I’m not aware of it.

the whole the point is that it is relative to other inertial frames; and if it affects you, then it must be explained (or accounted for) in Kantianism — Bob Ross

Nothing in a different inertial frame affects me in mine. My watch ticking at its rate at 450mph has no effect on your watch at 0mph. The only affect on me when returning from 5 years in space, is DAMN, you got OLD!! It is absolutely impossible for me to justify, given only the account determinable from my frame of reference, that I simply didn’t age as fast as you. It is the case, therefore, there is no way to explain the relativity of inertial frames from a purely metaphysical Kantian point of view.
————-

I have a hard time with this, because there is no ‘thing’ and this denotes the thing-in-itself as completely irrelevant to what we are representing: so, in your view, the ‘things’ becomes effectively what the ‘things-in-themselves’ were supposed to be. Now the ‘things-in-themselves’ are just imaginative, unprovably existent, “objects” of the world. — Bob Ross

But there is a “thing” iff there is a sensation. Or, technically, there is the appearance of a thing iff there is a sensation. Which does make the thing-in-itself completely irrelevant to what we’re representing, yes.

Yes, things effectively represent what things-in-themselves SHOULD be, iff intellect doesn’t conflict with Nature.

Yes, things-in-themselves are existent in the world, necessarily presupposed by our phenomenal representations.
————-

I would say that this entails that we do not reverse engineer, ever, the things-in-themselves but, rather, only the best guess based off of the limitations of our senses and understanding; for we cannot start anywhere else but the representation in “front” of us. — Bob Ross

Reverse off our best guess presupposes we’ve already made it. If we’ve already made our best guess, we’re way past representation, which is the starting point for what the best guess is going to be. Reverse means backwards. Backwards from best guess, that which we’ve already done, gets us to representation. To say we start from representation when in reverse, contradicts the method by which we arrived at the best guess.

What do you mean by “start with knowledge”? — Bob Ross

Because knowledge is the systemic epitome of best guess!!! You had a chain of mental events ending in representation, but that’s wrong. The chain of mental events ends with knowledge, so in reversing, THAT is the start. But still, reversing from mere sensation does not involve the whole series of mental events, in which case, reversing does not start from knowledge. But it cannot start from representation either, insofar as, at the point of sensation, there isn’t any representation to reverse from.
———-

I think the root of the problem, as I noted before, is that Kant is presupposes a causal kind of relationship when transcendentally determining our a priori faculties and then using them to say that causality is only valid within those representations: kind of self-undermining. — Bob Ross

This is kinda hard to unpack, but here goes…..

Ok, causal kind of relationship: in determining our faculties, he presupposes they work together. Nothing wrong with that.

Then he uses the faculties as he has determined them to be, to make it so causality only works within them. But that can’t be right, because if it is, there is no way in which there can be any other kind of causality working outside those faculties, in which case, it becomes impossible to explain the ontology of natural objects. Even if there is a limit on our knowledge of what they are, there is no uncertainty in the fact that they are. If we deny or even doubt the appearance of objects because Nature is not itself causal, we destroy the very notion of an internal cognitive system, relying on pure subjective idealism.

…..why think, if Kant is right, that there are things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

Two reasons: the representations in us presuppose corresponding things external to us, and, Nature is causal in itself, but that doesn’t mean we have to know anything about either of those two things. In fact, whatever it is that we do know about, comes from us, and there is nothing whatsoever that qualifies what we know, except what we know. No wonder we’re such a bunch of potentially confused creatures.
————

”Hence, you don’t have knowledge of the thing to which the object of the sensation belongs, repeating the fallacy of knowledge production.
-Mww

This just circles back to the major problem that Kant demonstrates, but adamantly tried to dogmatically refute: that we cannot know a priori that we sense, intuit, nor cognize: we are stuck with being conditioned, ultimately, by the two pure forms of experience and they shape how we understand ourselves after that. — Bob Ross

We cannot know a priori what we sense or intuit, but we can certainly cognize a priori.

There not two forms of experience; there are two forms by which experience is possible, which indeed we are stuck with. Theoretically.

The two forms by which experience is possible do not condition or shape how we understand our-SELVES, but only how we understand real objects external to us. Our-SELF is a subject, and no subject can at the same time be an object, therefore our-SELF, as mere subject of which can only be thought as conception, has no need of phenomenal representation, hence is not conditioned by that which makes them possible. And this, among others, we cognize a priori, or technically, transcendentally.
————-

”Ask yourself whether, right here, right now, it can be said what that thing is.
-Mww

No. Because this test is still dependent on your sense of site (at a minimum); take that away, and the mosquito returns back to a giant question mark: something insensible. — Bob Ross

Correct: no. But if no, where the does “mosquito” come from? The reversing doesn’t turn back into a giant question mark; it never was anything but that, an undetermined something, from which you have no warrant to label it as a named thing. It was always and only just a thing. What…..you think that sensation came ready-equipped with a name? And we knew of it just from the sensation given by it? If that’s the case, why is there a cognitive system, and by association, an intellect, at all? What’s the brain for, if “mosquito” is given immediately from a sensation? I know you don’t think that’s how it works, so….where did “mosquito” come from in your view?

Truth be told, I don’t have Metaphysics of Morals as a completed volume, so am not qualified to compare it with the Groundwork, which I do have. I have the first division of Metaphysics, The Science of Right found in the Philosophy of Law, Hastie, 1887, but not the second division, The Science of Virtue.

From what I do know, I say my position on the relation between the two is….the Groundwork is personal, the rest is anthropological, or perhaps more precisely, the rest shows distinctions between the personal and the anthropological. You know…..Kant and his incessant dualism: whatever this is, there is always going to be that. All that, in juxtaposition to The Metaphysics of Ethics, which I also have, tends to keep ‘em separated.

As to the development of his thought, there is the mention in the secondary literature that it isn’t so much a development, but an elaboration, re: Palmquist, 1990. Development carries the implication of significant change, as you say, being superseded, whereas mere elaboration doesn’t necessarily. But still, just the conceptions themselves, Groundwork for morals on the one hand and Morals themselves on the other, is highly suggestive of at least a progression, which is a sort of development.

My primary interest has always been reason itself, and always my reason. Not yours, not anybody’s; just lil’ ol’ me. As such, I don’t care about your knowledge, or your morals, or your ethics, but leave them to you or them, to do with as you, or they, wish. Because of that, Groundwork has always held the most sway for me, which probably explains why I haven’t bothered to examine Metaphysics with the same zeal.

Sound about right to you? You see it differently?

If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated...
— Mww

If this were the case then the minor would simply be false. But it is not false, because we do have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner. — Leontiskos

Which is the whole point, as far back as your metabasis eis allo genos in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, in which there is found in the minor a “change into some other genus” other than the major, which doesn’t affect the form of the syllogism itself, which remains unexceptional, but renders the argument invalid at the level of individual instances.

Aristotle calls this an error in scientific reasoning, meaning it only shows up in demonstrations of the premises. Here, the major premise, that appearances are known mediately, is true as demonstrated by means of some theory, but the minor, an individual knows his actions non-mediately, is demonstrated as false by that same theory. Or, upon demonstration by a different theory, contradicts the major, which is like using geometry to prove arithmetic propositions. Or, the judgement relating the price of gas going up/down in the major, is judged in the minor as a function of butterfly migration. Either is an example of turning a legitimate syllogism into a mere sophism.
(Ever listened to speeches on the floor of the U.S. House? Yikes, I tell ya; one instance of illegitimate reasoning right after another. The more serious the topic, potentially the more silly the logic)

And perhaps this is why the OP references Kant via Allison, in that Kant posits that this kind of logical error is the fault of reason itself, and not the thinking subject, who is seldom conscious of his mistake.

Bottom line….knowledge of any kind, is necessarily mediated by the system which makes knowledge possible. There is no such thing as immediate or non-mediate knowledge, or, that knowledge given to a subject without the intervention of his own systemic intellectual methodology. And if one wishes to sharpen to a finer point, even in the case of sheer accident or pure reflex, a subject’s knowledge, without methodological intervention, and thereby merely a harmless post hoc ergo propter hoc deduction, is still mediated by time.

Again I’ll ask….how do you think it is possible to have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner?

I don't think the syllogism is "just a hot mess." — Leontiskos

What do we wish, by means of proper reason, to extract from a syllogism? If it is truth, the syllogism at hand contains a true conclusion, but that conclusion is not possible from the premises constructed to obtain it. Hence…the hot mess.

As to equivocation, I was thinking more regarding mediate/non-mediate, rather than distortions of the singular conception, knowledge. If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated, the term non-mediate cannot serve as ground for a judgement concerning knowledge.

It follows that while the major is true in its use of “mediately”, the minor remains equivocal insofar as “non-mediately” has a different relation to knowledge than the relation in the major, hence is a fallacious sophisma figurae dictionis, especially if “non-mediately” doesn’t relate to knowledge at all.

As to demonstration, if we exchange “non-mediate” for “immediate”, as one might reasonably expect, the minor transforms to, “an individual knows his acts immediately”, in which case the error….errors, there are two…..becomes quite clear.

Having said all that, what do you think “non-mediately” means, and do you think knowledge is possible by it?

I didn't understand that this was a Kantian discussion. — Ludwig V

Ehhhhh…..the discussion begins with, “saw the following in a Kant book”, so makes sense to relate the following to what was actually in the Kant book. Not to mention, what’s wrong with the following, is specified in the Kant book. And from there, the best answer to the query implied in the OP, is given from the Kant book, which is….the stated syllogism is indeed invalid.

There are other ways to prove the error, sure; I just gave the one I knew about.

it does affect you in the sense that your time is ‘sped up’ or ‘slowed down’ relative to another person. — Bob Ross

Again, not if that person and I are in the same inertial frame. As I said before, it is true there would have been a ~12 x 10-8sec (dunno how to type exponents, sorry) discrepancy in elapsed time in my age upon flying to Rome, and yours, if you didn’t. Not that either of us would have noticed…..
————

I know you think we are saying different things, but hear me out… — Bob Ross

Bob: ‘thing-in-itself’ > sensations > intuitions > understanding > representation
Mww: ‘thing-in-itself’ > sensations* > intuitions > understanding > representation
*The reverse engineering of what was sensed does not produce knowledge of the thing-in-itself but, rather, the mere ‘thing’.

If your asterisk holds, mine should read, thing > sensation > intuition > understanding > representation, which would then be right if, in addition, representation is exchanged for knowledge. It’s a methodological sequence, start here, end there. In either case, the production of knowledge doesn’t belong here, re: the proposition, “reverse engineering of what was sensed produces knowledge of the mere thing”, is false.

Where do you start when you reverse engineer what was sensed? If in the series as you’ve given it, starting at representation and working backwards is inconclusive, in that which of the two kinds of representation, phenomenon or conception, is not determined. If the start is knowledge, on the other hand, working backwards arrives at understanding represented by conception, then intuition represented by phenomenon, then sensation, then the appearance of the thing, and the sequence is upheld.

Nevertheless, the experiment doesn’t work as stated by the totality of the sequence, insofar as reversing the sequence eliminates the possibility of knowledge of the thing, effectively reversing the system to its inception, to wit, the occasion for its use, which is the mere appearance of some undetermined thing, hence the fallacy of knowledge production.

Furthermore, metaphysically, if we adhere to the conditional as written, reverse engineering what was sensed, under the implication the reversal begins with the sensation itself irrespective of the remainder of the methodological system, we haven’t accomplished anything at all. The ol’…..you can’t unring that bell. Now reverse engineering isn’t engineering, but reversing time, which gives, say, in the case of the mosquito bite, that time before the mosquito bite. It should be clear we cannot say, after the sensation of being bitten, we were not bitten, but only that there was a time before being bitten.
(Easy to see where this could go, given sufficient interest)

So….switching to science, surround yourself with all sorts of test equipment. The experiment is restricted to the reversal of sensation, again, say, of the mosquito bite, which focuses the equipment right down to the pores and little tiny hairs on the skin, at the epidermal level and the nerves at the posterior epidermal level. The sensation empirically manifests as an object having penetrated the skin and affecting the nerve endings, so reverse engineering that, is backing that object out of the skin, removing the affect on nerves, insofar as the non-penetration of the skin is exactly the same physical condition as not even having the particular sensation the experiment is meant to depose.

Do you see you have to stop right there? And because you have to stop right there in order to conform to the demands of the experiment you prescribed, you STILL don’t know to what the object that penetrated the skin belongs. You wanted to reverse what was sensed….that’s what you stipulated….which does not give you the initial cause of it. Hence, you don’t have knowledge of the thing to which the object of the sensation belongs, repeating the fallacy of knowledge production.

And you think we’re done here? Oh HELL no, we’re not!!! Expand the test equipment focus to include the immediate surrounding space. Now you got proof of the initial cause, now you perceive the thing to which the reverse-engineered, skin-penetrating, sensation-giving object belongs. Ask yourself whether, right here, right now, it can be said what that thing is.

Perhaps other people have recognized what seems to me to be obviously wrong, but I haven't picked it up. — Ludwig V

Perhaps because the OP stipulates a Kantian source indirectly through Allison, which means it should for all intents and purposes be “picked up” in Kantian terms.

A syllogism suffering premises with no relation to each other, is a paralogism;
The conceptions in the premises of a paralogism determine the subset of it, here it is a transcendental paralogism, that is, a remarkable error in content-kind while its form is unexceptional.
A paralogism is an error in reason, a systemic flaw which manifests when the minor treats of its conceptions differently then does the major, and this is called sophisma figurae dictionis, re: ’s equivocation.
It follows that in any case where the conclusion is true but is not derivable from either of the premises because they do not relate to each other, whether the syllogism is valid/invalid, sound/unsound, is completely irrelevant. The whole thing is just a hot mess, but is usually passed over in the everyday use of reason.

The source in Kant for this, is B411, with the explanation in the footnote at B412. Allison uses a different syllogism, but it contains exactly the same error of equivocation.

…..time dilates even at the scale of our normal lives. — Bob Ross

Not in my inertial frame it doesn’t, hence, it is not an effect on me, hence I am not affected by it.
————

…..it seems like, to me, we are saying the same thing. — Bob Ross

For what you said, I said “Nope”, which makes explicit we said very different things.

You seem to be (saying)…..sensations are what comprise the ‘thing’; whereas I am saying that the sensations are what comprise our limited knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Aren’t we saying the same thing? — Bob Ross

No thing is comprised of the sensation caused in another thing by its appearance. That’s like saying a mosquito is comprised of an itch on my arm.

You’re probably trying to say the itch tells me there’s some thing on my arm, and of that thing at the very least I will know its capacity for biting me. That’s all well and good, but not what I want to know. By sensation alone, an effect, I still don’t know what exactly the thing is that bit me, a cause necessarily related to the effect. All I can say at this point is that there is the appearance of an unknown thing, but not a thing-in-itself, insofar as the thing-in-itself is that unknown which would never have bit me in the first place. I mean….how does it make sense that the thing-in-itself has my blood in it?

This sounds like the same thing I said….. — Bob Ross

It is. Exactly what you wrote. You quoted yourself.

…..why postulate a ‘thing’ then (on top of a thing-in-itself)? — Bob Ross

Bottom line…..to affirm the methodology of a representational cognitive system.

How do you even know there are two different faculties doing it? — Bob Ross

Because there are two kinds of knowledge, that which involves things, that which does not. For the one there must be things to know about that do not belong to me, that are external to me; for the other there is that which does belong to me, is internal to me, that which I create or construct myself. I have no need of sensations for that what I only think, even if I do need sensation to prove there is a real thing that corresponds to it.

Think of the science. For every bee sting or sweet taste there is a difference between what the senses do and what the brain does. But the brain can do stuff even if the senses don’t, and, the senses can do stuff the brain doesn’t recognize.

I don’t understand how this isn’t pure speculation…. — Bob Ross

It is pure speculation. Even given certain observations upon which the speculation is based, it remains speculation because there are no empirical proofs for any of it. Even SR and GR were speculative upon their respective initial composition….I mean, c’mon man….riding a light beam????……and subsequently obtained in experience.

We just love to say we KNOW the car is in the garage for no other reason than that’s where we left it. But it is an illegitimate claim, lacking any empirical warrant whatsoever. And THAT, my friend, is NOT speculative.
—————

how do you go about explaining that? — Bob Ross

Schopenhauer’s theory works well if one hasn’t already been exposed to how Kant’s theory works.

From my personal, well-worn armchair, this makes no sense at all…..

“….. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is also, at once and immediately, a visible act of the body. And, corresponding to this, every impression upon the body is also, on the other hand, at once and immediately an impression upon the will. As such it is called pain when it is opposed to the will; gratification or pleasure when it is in accordance with it.…”

…..in that there are a whole bucketful of impressions on my body that are neither pain nor pleasure. And although S acknowledges this circumstance here…..

“….. There are only a few impressions of the body which do not touch the will (…). These impressions are, therefore, to be treated directly as mere ideas, and excepted from what has been said. The impressions we refer to are the affections of the purely objective senses of sight, hearing, and touch, though only so far as these organs are affected in the way which is specially peculiar to their specific nature. This affection of them is so excessively weak an excitement of the heightened and specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will, but only furnishes the understanding with the data out of which the perception arises, undisturbed by any excitement of the will….”

….which is indeed unfortunate, should I will that stupid fence to be a different color, in order to remove the necessity of driving by it in order to experience the change.

Not only that, but he’s incorporated exceptions to his own rules, anathema to any theory meant to be taken seriously. And while Kant says the same thing….

“….We may especially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted)….”

…..he goes on to say what the reason for the exceptions are, that being an entirely different rational methodology given in an entirely separate critical exposition, but S merely says those impressions are just conditions of relative degree.

I know, huh?!! If S wanted to refute K, or at least forward a different brand of transcendental philosophy, why didn’t he start by falsifying the claim “the feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, are not cognitions”, perhaps by somehow showing that they are???? If he had done that successfully, which means with sufficient logical integrity, K’s second critique on pure practical reason and thereby his entire moral philosophy would have been destroyed.

Simplest explanation which says it all….if one likes K he won’t like S and if he likes S he won’t like K.
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This doesn't make sense to me: for the reason that you perceived it differently is exactly because someone did something to it. — Bob Ross

Which was the point: I perceive it differently, regardless of why it is different, therefore it is a different experience. There is the purely logical argument that because I perceive the same thing at different times the experiences are correspondingly different. Nevertheless, with respect to the content of experience, for there to be a difference the content must be different.

(for that case where the fence was repainted but I didn’t drive by) You didn't have a new experience of it that was different than your previous experience because you haven't experienced it again. Once you do, then it will have a different color. Are you talking about memories? — Bob Ross

Yes. Memory would be a mere recollection of an antecedent experience, the recall of a cognition already given. Throw enough metaphysical reductionism at “memory” you arrive at “consciousness”, right?

Different color, new knowledge, new experience, consciousness not memory.

‘Til next time…..

…..how do you accept general/special relativity as a Kantian? — Bob Ross

As I wrote a few days ago, I’m not directly affected by, therefore care very little for, e.g., gravitational lensing and assorted SR/GR relations. It is true the world acts the way it does, but only under those conditions which are not available to me or you as general experiences.

The world as the manifold of all real objects operates under a wide set of laws in merely possible relations to me, re: I will be taller than I am now iff I am ever under the effect of a much greater mass; I as an individual subject operate under a narrow set of rules in necessary relations to my world, re: if I kick a rock I will suffer a broken toe. While both conditions are true in relation to me, they remain apples and oranges in relation to each other.
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quote="Bob Ross;838190"]You said the things-in-themselves are “NOT a thing of which we have a sensation”; but, as far as I understood, the sensations (the raw input) are a approximate of the thing-in-itself.[/quote]

Yeah, it’s been a bone of contention ever since its conceptual creation. Technically, phenomena are approximations of things, whereas sensation just informs there is something for which an approximation is determinable.

It’s just logic, man. Just logic. Why should it be, that even though you look at a thing and learn what it is, that it must be the same thing next time you look at it? On the one hand you’d expect it to be the same, but on the other there’s no reason why it absolutely must. Hell, driving by a fence one day is one thing, driving by the next day somebody repainted it. Even if it’s the same fence, your experience of it is different, which reduces to the fact all your experience is ever going to be, regarding that fence, is predicated on your perception of it, no matter who does what to it.

So….say the fence is a different color but you don’t drive by. How you gonna get an impression from the fence you didn’t drive by? Now it is that the condition of the fence changed but your experience of it didn’t. You know that fence in one way, but the fence isn’t the way you know it. Why don’t we just say there is a fence you know about and a fence you do not. The fence you know about you’ve perceived, the fence you do not you have not. Back up to the point where you never perceived anything and everything is unknown to you. But there are still things nonetheless. So for every single thing that becomes a perception for you, is one less thing that doesn’t. Of all the remaining things that haven’t yet been perceived by you, are still things you may possibly perceive, but until you do, you will know nothing of them, and they are thereby called things-in-themselves, and conversely, that which you do perceive is not longer a thing you have not, or, which is the same thing, the thing you perceive is no longer the thing-in-itself.

Now, it is true you may infer the bejesus outta all sorts of stuff….never having been there, you still know the moon exhibits shapes of illumination hence it is likely spherical…..but need I remind you that inference, a purely logical enterprise, is not experience, which is entirely predicated on the necessity of phenomena, which is turn is a strictly empirical perception?

The fence is a particular example, but the particular holds in general. For any object, your experience of it, how it is known/what it is know as by you, is predicated on your intelligence alone, the state or condition of the thing itself be as it may.
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My exposition of Kantianism with regards to this representational process would be as follows:

1. The thing-in-itself “impacts” us. — Bob Ross

(Nope. The thing impacts us)

2. The “impact” trigger our receptivity and sensibility to receive and produce raw input of, within the limits of what it is capable of, the thing-in-itself.
(Nope. The impact triggers our receptivity to produce representations of the raw input of whatever sensation the thing gives us, depending on the mode of sensibility affected, re: which sense is affected by that thing, the representation herein we call phenomenon. The key here is to realize not even memory is established yet. Receptivity and thereby sensibility in general is singular and successive, which is to say, receptivity works the very same way whether the received raw input is already an experience or it is not.)

3. The intuition and the understanding both process the raw input.
(Nope. Intuition processes the raw input, understanding processes the representations of the raw input. Intuition informs of the raw material of the thing; understanding informs that intuitions can or cannot have conceptions related to them.)

4. A representation is the aftermath of the aforesaid process.
(Nope. Judgement is the immediate, cognition is the subsequent, experience is the consequential, aftermath of the antecedent intuition/understanding process.)

2a.) We are not conscious of the process of receptivity; phenomena are generated without any intellectual activity. Sensibility is merely the faculty by which that out there becomes this in here the system can work with. Understanding must be capable of coping with five different kinds of intuited phenomenal representations determinable within the confines of five different kinds of sensory devices. The only way….or at least the most parsimonious way, theoretically….in which one kind of understanding can cope with five different kinds of phenomena, is to have the means for it arise spontaneously in accordance with the form the phenomena present to it, AND, to have contained in it a set of rules by which the phenomenon from one sense is to be judged differently than the phenomenon of another.

3a.) Simply put, intuition says how things are, given some raw input, understanding says how things are to be thought because of some raw input. Intuition is concerned with the thing, understanding is concerned with what is done with the thing. Judgement is that by which the relation of the two coincide, that is to say, if the validity of what is to be done coincides with the possibilities contained in the raw input. At the lowest level, this is what prevents us from cognizing a ham ‘n’ cheese sandwich as heavy, or, cognizing the moon as combustible.

4a.) There are but two kinds of representation, phenomenon and conception. It is possible to have a conception with no phenomenon conjoined to it, but it is impossible for a phenomenon to have no conception belonging to it. This is because phenomena are representations of that which is given to us and hence cannot be dismissed….you cannot un-see what you’ve seen…..but conceptions can and often do spontaneously manifest in mere thought without connection to a phenomenon, re: imagination. Like….all that contained in metaphysical speculation.
———-

Yep, him. Although, upon closer inspection, it turns out $9.8M was the asking price, not the sale price. It was for “A Walk in the Woods”, 1971, currently held by a museum gallery, purchased from a legitimate former owner for….(gasp) $1000.

Your namesake. The one I asked about awhile ago? One of his pieces just sold…….$9.8M.

But wouldn’t Einstein’s argument also be explained metaphysically as….. — Bob Ross

That isn’t so much Einstein’s metaphysical view as it is his precursor to his own empirical view. I’m not sure he even posits a metaphysical view in juxtaposition to a philosopher from Kant’s era, but he does regarding religion and whatnot.

It seems like they are incompatible views, but Einstein’s empirically verified views can be reconciled with Kantianism insofar as one denies Einstein’s metaphysical views. — Bob Ross

The views are incompatible, as we’ve already established. Einstein’s empirically verified views cannot be reconciled with Kant’s, because Kant never entertained an empirical view anywhere near Einstein’s.

Again, my disclaimer: I am more familiar with Einstein’s science than his philosophy, and regarding his philosophy I am more familiar with his views on things having little to do with Kant, and regarding his little views on Kant I am more familiar with the exposition of his denial of Kantian a priori transcendental predications and on his denials, I object to them insofar as I think he missed the point.
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….sensations are supposed to be the raw input of things-in-themselves…… — Bob Ross

No they are not. Raw input of things. Things-in-themselves are exactly what is NOT a thing of which we have the sensation. Why do people have such a hard time with IN-ITSELF? MY-self, YOUR-self, no problem. Along comes the notion of IT-self, and folks just go all bonkers. Makes no damn sense to me.
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But isn’t ‘nature’ the totality of the ‘things-in-themselves — Bob Ross

Capitol N Nature is the totality of real natural things; little n nature is the composition or constituency or manner of being, of things caused naturally or conceived rationally. I suppose there’s nothing suspiciously untoward in calling Nature the totality of things-in-themselves, but in doing that, we’d immediately lose access to knowledge of any part of Nature, insofar as, all being things-in-themselves no part of it can appear to us as phenomena, which is a theoretical contradiction.
—————-

Only if by ‘nature’ your claims are restricted to the possibility of experience…. — Bob Ross

I’m ok with Nature being restricted to the possibility of experience. I’m not going to experience the nature of, say, justice, but I’m perfectly qualified to think how its nature would or would not be represented by an experience.
——————

I think kantianism operates implicitly under the assumption that causality is not merely the pure forms of our intuition — Bob Ross

You’d be correct, as far as I understand it. Kantianism, per se, operates under the assumption causality is not a pure form of our intuitions, of which there are only space and time. In Kant, cause, and its various derivatives including causality, is a category residing in understanding represented by and subsumed under conceptions, a function of logic in the form of discursive judgement, whereas the pure form of intuition resides in sensibility represented by phenomena but subsumed under imagination, an “arrangement” in the form of aesthetic judgement. Schopenhauer is the one that formally includes causality in the pure forms of intuition.

I don’t know why a Kantian would even think that they are “fathoming” properties of a thing-in-itself — Bob Ross

He wouldn’t. And if he does, he has lost sight of what he professes to know.

….these do not seem to be compatible views….. — Bob Ross

Yes, as we talked about a few pages ago.
…..Kant didn’t have the vision in physics Einstein had, and Einstein didn’t accept the vision in metaphysics Kant had;
…..Kant didn’t find a need to think about a stationary clock here and a moving clock out there, and Einstein didn’t find a need to grant that in order to think mere possible events requires an absolutely necessary precondition in human reason itself;
…..Kant understood perfectly well if there was a clock here and a clock there, one moved and the other didn’t, there must be the experience of change in a perceiving subject, the change relative to the clocks themselves utterly irrelevant except as the representation of an internal logical human principle. Einstein used mathematics to prove if there is a stationary clock here and a moving clock there, there must be a change relative only to the clocks but not as an experience of the subject, who only experiences the verification of the mathematical logic but not the relativity of the clock’s times to each other, which is a function of Nature alone without any regard whatsoever for principles of human reason.

…..as if Kant is right then Einstein cannot take the viewpoint of ‘everything is relative’ since it speaks of the things-in-themselves—not the individuals’ experience. — Bob Ross

Ehhhh….I suppose there’s some truth in that. Einstein’s math with respect to objects determines a mere possible human experience, or in some cases no human experience at all, re: events at or approaching the SOL, so at that point, perhaps the objects must be considered as thing-in-themselves. On the other hand, insofar as in Kant knowledge is experience and there is no experience of events regarding objects at or approaching the SOL, it follows that all we have as humans is the validity of the pure mathematical logic, which has nothing to do with objects themselves but merely represents a deductive inference for them, hence removes the thing-in-itself objection.

Furthermore, upon the successful exhibition of that which was formally only mathematical logic, makes necessary actual real things, which again removes the thing-in-itself objection, re: Hafele–Keating, 1971.

Anyway….I’ve reached the limit of my formal physics.
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”So, yes, human reason is the only means by which the properties of real things is fathomed.
-Mww

It is a very, prima facie, appealing argument I must say; but it fails because the “proof” of reason actively determining things’ properties requires that the representations are somewhat accurate of the things-in-themselves, which, if Kant is right, there is no way to determine anything about them — Bob Ross

Representations are somewhat accurate….yes, but only of the sensations evoked in us of a thing, not a thing-in-itself. It reduces to reason not “proving”, but merely justifying, the accuracy of representations, but not necessarily the accuracy of the actual constituency of things-in-themselves. Nature Herself will inform if the properties determined as representing objects is accurate or not, as shown by evolving experiences of the same object over time.

I figured you’d glean from “the properties of real things is fathomed” presupposes those properties, which makes explicit that which fathoms cannot be the source of that which is fathomed. Understanding actively determines things’ properties, not reason, which only shows conflicts in such determinations and thereby conflicts in understandings. Now it should become clearer that regarding the properties of objects, “fathom” means “to find uncontested”.
(Too loose a definition? Yeah….maybe. Or, too tight an analysis. Not sure which, but it made sense at the time.)
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”that Nature only showed him a thing of a certain shape…..
-Mww

…..the ‘nature’ you refer to is reduced to….an incomprehensible nothing….which cannot be understood to even “show him a thing of a certain shape”. — Bob Ross

What….I can’t free-wheel with language, just a little? Nature doesn’t technically “show” me anything, but when things make their presence perceivable to me, are they not shown to me? While it may be a stretch to say that because those things that make their presence known to me are in Nature then it follows that Nature showed them to me.

And why should Nature be an incomprehensible nothing? If I can think a conceivable representation then it is necessarily something, and it being a conception that doesn’t immediately contradict any other conception it must be comprehensible. Right?

Sorry for the dialectical delay.

All good.

I don't believe that there need be real objects which we represent. — Manuel

There might not NEED be real objects we represent, but are there in fact such objects?

We already know we have the ability to image real objects…..for all practical purposes to “see” them….without an immediate perception of them. We call it imagination, but it reduces to electrical stipulation of the brain. Or electrochemical. Or both. Doesn’t matter; we can do it. My position is humans think in images, which makes explicit we “see” objects mentally as if they are the same objects we perceive sensibly.

But you’re probably thinking of some sort of external machine that stimulates the brain in such a way that a real object appears in our heads. That’s fine by me, in that I don’t think the brain cares much where the stimulus comes from, as long as what happens with that stimulus is the same no matter where it comes from. Thing is, though, under normal conditions, this perception enables this stimulated neural pathway, so….how to direct the external stimulation along the same pathway in order to generate the experience of the same object but without the perceptual conditioning event.

Does this change synthetic a-priori knowledge? — Manuel

Assuming external stimulation, I’d have to say, yes, it makes it irrelevant. Synthetic a priori knowledge is the synthesis of certain conceptions relative to each other, but with an external stimulation of the brain we can’t say we’ve synthesized anything insofar as we couldn’t affirm the employment of our understanding from whence the conceptions and their relations come from.

On the other hand, we’re not the least conscious of the synthesis of conceptions, which is a purely speculative metaphysical methodology, so external stimulation, while it doesn’t prove that speculative system is not the case, it doesn’t disprove it either. All that can be said is the brain does all the real work, which nobody contested anyway, even without knowing how it does its work.

we have are dispositional states which objects "awaken" or "make clear", when we have experience of them. — Manuel

“….. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions?…”

Those dispositional states reside in us as a condition of our human intellect. Metaphysics doesn’t call them states, per se, but something consistent with the theory which suggests their necessity. Kant calls them pure intuitions with respect to the perception of objects, the categories with respect to understanding the perceptions, pure reason as “the One to Rule Them All”.

Scientifically, what would a dispositional state look like? How would we know it?

Hmmm….I see what you mean. Does it change anything, though, regarding synthetic a priori knowledge? I mean, even if we give ideas empirical content, being a mere idea, it shan’t have a real object represented by it, which prohibits a posteriori\ knowledge of it.

“…. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is called notion. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason….”.

I’m sure there are better, or, at least, different, ways of using the concept “empirical”, but textual consistency here requires Kant’s version, which I’ve tried to maintain.

Principle. The common name.

it's not clear to me that a-priori knowledge need not have "emprical content". — Manuel

By Kantian definition, and in relation to synthetic a priori knowledge, it cannot. Use another definition, perhaps it can.

“…. By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience….”.

All experience is of empirical content, so if independent of all experience, independent of all empirical content.

It may be good and detailed, but….does it ring true enough like a dainty dinner bell…a little tinkle, or resoundingly true like The Great Hour Bell….15 tons of deafening clang?

HA!!! I don’t visit this category, so never saw the thread. Which would have got my attention forthwith, donchaknow. If only you’d done that notification thingy I don’t even know what it’s called but people do it all the time, kinda thing.

So….in response to the opening query, re: the author recounting Hegel (although without the Hegelian context), “synthetic a prior knowledge regards the formal cognitive structures which allow for experience."……it is somewhat ambiguous, I think.

A priori in CPR is stipulated in the text as pure, meaning absent any and all empirical conditions. Experience, in Kant, is entirely empirical, therefore, in Kant a priori knowledge has nothing to do with experience, which would include the possibility of it. The possibility of experience is determined by the categories, which are certainly pure a priori, but are merely conceptions, and while part of the formal cognitive structure, are not constituents in the relations inherent in judgements, cognitions or knowledge.

So now it becomes….does synthetic a priori regard the formal cognitive functions themselves, without regard to experience. Here the problem is, those same formal cognitive functions are used for both experience and pure thought, as befitting the admitted dualistic nature of the human intellectual system. Notice, however, that “cognitive” by definition precludes sensibility, and by association, intuition, phenomenal representation and productive imagination, none of which have anything to do with understanding, the faculty of thought, hence, cognition in general. Which serves as warrant that synthetic a priori conditions do not relate to experience, which does necessarily mandate phenomenal representation.

Knowledge is just knowledge, the distinctions for it being the relative sources of it. It is an end in itself, with means determined by the objects with which it is concerned. Empirical knowledge, or knowledge a posteriori, is legislated by Nature, in that if our knowledge is mistakenly determined, Nature will inform us of it. Knowledge a priori, on the other hand, having no empirical content, cannot be legislated by Nature, which is manifested empirically only, hence, must be legislated by something else, which is therefore theoretically allocated to logic, and the LNC in particular.

So knowledge a priori, because it is legislated by logic and can have no empirical content, must get its content from representations that do not arise from anything sensible, which leaves only understanding as its source, the representations of which are conceptions. Because there is no knowledge possible at all from a single conception, it follows necessarily that knowledge a priori is the conjunction of a manifold, or a plurality, of conceptions, the relations between them logically conditioned by the LNC. Insofar as the conjunction of conceptions to each other, commonly called the synthesis of them, must also consider the relation of one to the other, with respect to the possible distinctions in them, and the degree of that distinction, is found the relative truth contained in the proposition the synthesis obtains. Where the conceptions relate to each other with sufficient accord, they are analytical, are called tautological, and are true in and of themselves without the necessity of additional support. Where the conceptions do not relate to each other with such sufficiency, but the conception in the subject of the ensuing proposition does not relate to the conception in the predicate even at all, but rather, adds to it in the completion of the proposition, it is synthetical.

The Grand Finale…..synthetic a priori knowledge is that in which the synthesis of dissimilar conceptions constructs a logically valid proposition, judgement or general cognition. All without any experience, or related to it in any way, but carrying with it a HUGE caveat just the same.

And what is the common name for a proposition in which the subject/predicate relation of dissimilar conceptions results in a logically valid conclusion? The answer to THAT, is what synthetic a priori knowledge, is.

By “impossible for that thought to not have occurred”, you are referring to math being a necessary precondition for the possibility of experience? Otherwise, I am not sure I followed this part. — Bob Ross

Nothing to do with the objects of thought, but only of thought in general. Was there ever a thought you didn’t think? Of course not, which is to say every thought of yours was both a priori and certain, which is its form. Now if the content of each thought is included, it follows necessarily that the object thought has the very same certainty as it relates to its form. But singular thoughts are very seldom of any use, and thus it is almost always the case the human understanding conjoins a series of thoughts, in which the certainty then becomes the business of logic, particularly, the LNC.

In the quote I provided….. — Bob Ross

By which I’m supposing you mean Einstein’s opinion. I never found anything particularly impressive about it, actually. Mathematics can be certain in its mere form, but is only true insofar as it conforms to Nature. All logic to be thought….which is all mathematics is…..needs its content verified empirically. So the opinion reduces to, mathematical propositions refer to understanding for their certainty, so they do not refer to reality, and, insofar as mathematical propositions refer to reality, it is not for the certainty of them, but for the empirical verification of their certainty, which is their proofs. His opinion is shared by the enlightened metaphysicians of his day, just…..you know…..stated differently.

Is human reason, then, without experience, merely by taking thought, able to fathom the properties of real things?

Well……..yeah. How else does a thing get its properties, if the human thinker doesn’t decide what they are? Basketballs as such don’t exist naturally without immediate human causality. Basketballs have the properties that make a real thing a basketball only because a human logical reason says what those properties must be. So he gets the idea that because Nature has shown him round things that roll, he can make a round thing of leather and fill it with air. But that’s not quite right, in that Nature only showed him a thing of a certain shape, but not that it was round, which he came up with all by himself, and assigned that as a property inherent in things of that shape, without regard to whether he, or Nature, was its causality.

If Nature gave the properties of things to us along with the thing itself…..why do we assign spin to an elementary particle as a property of it, when spin as rotating mass has no relation to what spin as this property, is meant to indicate?

So, yes, human reason is the only means by which the properties of real things is fathomed. That there are natural conditions of real things, to which properties are the means for comprehending those conditions, is true enough, but it remains the one is not the same as the other.
————

”If Einstein held that math didn’t relate to reality with certainty, on what ground, then, did he actually invent mathematical propositions to explain certain aspects of it……
-Mww

Because he thought it could be empirically verified, not that the equations themselves, nor math in general was a priori certain. — Bob Ross

That’s the cool thing about Einstein’s avant-guarde thought experiments: there is no way to empirically verify them. Otherwise, they’d be actual scientific experiments. Which leaves naught but the internal logic of mathematical propositions a priori for the certainty by which the physical experiments may even eventually prove the math, while logically certain in itself, doesn’t correspond to Nature. I don’t see how it empirical verification can be thought that doesn’t necessarily presuppose the mathematical logic to which the verification, whether affirming or negating, relates.
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wouldn’t Einstein’s viewpoint be impossible under Kantianism, since there is no way to know anything about the viewpoint of the things-in-themselves (i.e., Universe)? — Bob Ross

I don’t see a relationship here.
…..I think Einstein admits his philosophical view is Kantian with respect to mathematical propositions, but he won’t admit the Kantian methodological predication from which it obtains;
…..the viewpoint of things-in-themselves doesn’t make any sense, insofar as things do not have a viewpoint;
…..to say the Universe is a thing-in-itself confuses what a thing-in-itself is supposed to represent. For us, every object of perception presupposes that object as a thing-in-itself. If the Universe is not ever going to be an object of perception, such as are those objects contained in it, then there’s no necessary presupposition for it to be a thing-in-itself. We can think Universe as a conceptual representation, but we’re never going to intuit it as a phenomenal representation. That is to say…the Universe will not be an appearance to our sensibility, hence will never cause a sensation in us, which means it is not a thing, which makes a thing-in-itself corresponding to it, meaningless.
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But they weren’t obtained in experience….. — Bob Ross

Did you mean to say….were obtained?

Nahhhh….not your fault, so much as a difference in conceptual domain, perhaps. I think of perception as a mere effect, without regard to a internal process of its own. For whatever it is we think of as empirical knowledge, all perception is for, is to be the occasion by which we become aware there is something lending itself to being known.

Perception doesn’t think, judge or cognize, doesn’t experience. it’s just a bridge, from the outside to the inside.

An eye doctor, or a general physicist, may beg to differ.

Einstein didn’t share Kant’s view that math is a priori certain…. — Bob Ross

All ‘a priori certain’ is meant to indicate, is if it comes from human understanding, for whatever is thought, it is impossible for that thought to not have occurred, which is the same as saying that thought is certain. From there, because both Kant and Einstein recognized mathematics is “a product of human thought”, it is for that reason, both a priori and certain. Then the question becomes, for whatever is thought, does Nature support that thought, such that rational…..logical….certainty relates to empirical conditions, without contradiction.

Gotta consider the times: Galileo knew of relativity respecting a single subject relative to the world, and Kant knew of spherical geometry respecting geometric formulae, but neither had experiences of velocities greater than that of a running horse, so both are relieved of not having the occasions for Einstein’s thought experiments, re: trains and station platforms, and, Einstein’s relativity (of simultaneity) relates two subjects to a common worldly event, from a perspective outside either affected subject.

If Einstein held that math didn’t relate to reality with certainty, on what ground, then, did he actually invent mathematical propositions to explain certain aspects of it, re: w = c - v? And, because that formula had no existence, had never been thought, and for which therefore there could be no possible experience, how is it not a priori?

Not an issue, really. Einstein didn’t approve of a priori mathematical certainty, merely because the content of the formulas he envisioned and constructed had no chance of being obtained in experience. He grounds “Relativity: the Special and the General” on assumptions, re: “….. it had always tacitly been assumed in physics that the statement of time had an absolute significance…..”, and, “…. based on yet a second assumption, which, in the light of a strict consideration, appears to be arbitrary, although it was always tacitly made even before the introduction of the theory of relativity…”

Kant thought in consideration of his current time, in which his mathematical proofs were readily available without technical support; Einstein thought in consideration of times in which his ideas must wait for proofs, pending technological support. What…a scant three years for GR, but 35 for SR? Something like that.

The term “universality” in Kant meant wherever a human is, in Einstein it meant wherever the Universe is. In the one, it is a logical concept, in the other, an empirical. Nowadays, man has been on the Moon, and Voyager left the solar system without falling apart, so, with respect to the certainty of mathematical proposition as they relate to reality….whose thinking was the more precise?

Anyway….rambling.

What you experience is the end result of an intensive assembly line of computational processes.” — FrancisRay

We’re talking about perception, which is the initiation; he’s talking about experience, which is the end, of knowledge acquisition. Experience is indeed a process in which time is a necessary element; perception is not.
————-

If there is a time of no perception and a time of perception then would this not suggest the necessity of time? — FrancisRay

Absolutely. But the question is to whether time belongs to perception…..

Does perception not require time? — FrancisRay

…..which implies time as a condition of perception itself, rather than as a condition of that which perceives. Taken a step further, if we say perception is that which happens to us, we have no need of the time element of it, insofar as all we are concerned with, is that it did or did not happen. When taken in such sense, it is more existence than time, which holds as primary condition. Notice also, that existence is a category, by which perception of things is even possible, but time is a mere intuition, which only makes possible distinguishing the co-existent or the successive perceptual representation of things from each other, for which the existences are already affirmed.

From some speculative points of view, it is. Objects are given to us via perception, The most we need to say, is there is a time of perception and a time of no perception, which tacitly denies time belongs to the perception itself, but rather, to that which the perception effects.

From a physical science perspective, regarding the translation of energy by the sensory apparatus, time is an element of the process, agreed. But the human intellect doesn’t perceive scientifically, but treats perception as a mere occasion for the application of a speculative metaphysical knowledge system.
————



Just like that, yes.

It seems indisputable to me that perception requires time in order in order to to happen. — FrancisRay

Ok. What do you think perception is?

Does perception not require time? — FrancisRay

Not metaphysically, it doesn’t, with which the thread topic is concerned. We perceive a thing, or we do not. Perception requires an object, and even if the object requires time for its relations, it does not follow that the mere perception of the object does.

I'm not sure it would be possible to doubt the reality of time without doubting the reality of the entire phenomenal world. — FrancisRay

Agreed. But that doesn’t say much. We don’t doubt the world, and if time is a necessary condition for the manifold of phenomenal representations of that world, the the reality of time is given. But, real in what sense?

I’ve just only ever heard of Einstein’s space/time as a fabric — Bob Ross

Actually, in his 1926 Britannica entry, he calls it “four-dimensional continuum”, derived from the fact things are described in a space and in a time, simultaneously. Kant said the same thing, in that nothing is ever given to us empirically that isn’t conditioned by space and time.

In Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, 1786, Kant say……

“… Thus, for all experience and for every inference from experience, it can’t make any difference whether I choose to •consider a body as moving or rather to •consider the body as at rest and the space it is in as moving in the opposite direction with the same speed. The two ways of looking at it are strictly equivalent.…”

…..which can be found, in a way, in Einstein’s equivalence principle: elevator gerdankexperiment, 1907, and theoretically posited in Relativity: The Special and General, 1916:

“…. If, relative to K, K’ is a uniformly moving co-ordinate system devoid of rotation, then natural phenomena run their course with respect to K’ according to exactly the same general laws as with respect to K. This statement is called the principle of relativity (in the restricted sense)….”

It is documented that Einstein read philosophy, had favorites in it, but would he ever admit to taking a hint from Kant? Nahhhhh….I doubt it. But, there’s the two texts; make of it what you will.
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So, under your view, space curving and time dilating are not classified as behaviors? Then what are they classified as? — Bob Ross

The effects of gravity on objects in space for the one; the difference in measurable durations relative to objects of significantly disparate velocities, for the other.

The devil is in the details. Same as it ever was…..

…..what you think of space/time fabric? — Bob Ross

It isn’t a fabric, it’s a mathematical model of a gravitational field under specific conditions. The Universe, reality in general, in and of itself….whatever there is that isn’t us…..doesn’t need space or time. We as calculating intelligences, do.

But then, the Universe doesn’t need mathematical models or gravitational fields either, so……
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……space and time are a posteriori (since we only understand them better via empirical investigation)? — Bob Ross

Thing is, we’re investigating objects a posteriori, in order to understand them better, not space or time. All we need from those two, is the understanding, the recognition, that because of them, things don’t happen all at once, and things aren’t all in the same place.

Are they still a priori insofar as they are forms of our experience….. — Bob Ross

Technically, forms of the representations of objects, or phenomena, but, a priori, yes.

…..but their behaviors are a posteriori? — Bob Ross

Space and time don’t behave, don’t possess behavior. Things possess relations between themselves or between them and us, which is what we’d loosely call their behavior, but is really our representations of their responses to force.

Long ways from moral realism, aren’t we?

there absolutely no way for a person to willfully obey a moral principle in and of itself without having a taste to do it. — Bob Ross

There is an established metaphysical system in which this condition is precisely descriptive of true moral agency, re: Enlightenment deontology. The only limitation therein with respect to a moral act, is the physical accomplishment of it, which makes explicit obligation to a willful principle, the ground of such system, has no regard for the contingencies of taste, but only the necessities of law.

Of course, established is one thing, practiced is quite another.
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as a transcendental idealist, do you deny Einstein’s general/special relativity? — Bob Ross

Oh heck no. The science is good. Far and away beyond the bounds of my possible experience, but good science nonetheless. Time dilation, which held for our flight to Rome a couple years ago, is….what, a couple picoseconds? My sons here in their frame, and me there at a 500mph frame, a difference in age disparity noticed by some dude with the most sensitive time device available but not the least noticed by me or them.

And ya know what? I don’t have the slightest need to locate Bobby’s Badass Burger Barn with a 3-foot margin of error, but I recognize that I might want that precision if I’m planting a Hellfire on it. Like….after one too many messed-up orders.

If anything, I’d take exception to Einstein’s dismissal of the transcendental nature of pure mathematics, as Kant authored the notion. He stated for the record mathematics is discovered, but in fact I rather think the proofs of mathematical relations are discovered, but math, in and of itself, is a purely rational construction by, and manifestation of, human intelligence.

Shall we chalk up the disparities to a mere domain of discourse?

so are you saying that there is an ‘interest’ devoid of ‘will’ which is a part of the structure of being a will? Is that the idea? — Bob Ross

That’s not what I’m tying to get across, no. Interest…..you know, that certain je ne sais quoi, that which underpins a consideration, a focusing of attention specifically. So, yes, interest is devoid of will insofar as having an interest is not to will anything, nor is it the structure of will, which is reducible to pure practical reason. Accordingly, before anything is to be willed there must be an interest in the manner in which it is to be done, hence, interest in a principle which grounds the will’s determined volition.

If there is really an ‘interest’ (i.e., a desire) which pertains to the structure of being a will and not to a will itself, then I think that would be, by definition, a moral fact (in its own right). — Bob Ross

That may be right. If a structural component of will is desire, and if will is the source of moral behavior, then it follows desire serves as possible ground of such moral behavior. However, desire takes no account of good in the attainment of its objects other than the satisfaction of the agent, but mere ‘feel good’ satisfaction can never be deemed truly moral behavior, which is ‘good’ in and of itself regardless of the feeling derived from it.
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But under Einsteinien space/time fabric, they are not synthetic judgments—they are not isolated ‘pure’ forms of one’s experience (like Kant thought): they do pertain as properties to the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Yes, that’s true, and further instance of space/time conceptual irreconcilability of the two geniuses. In fact, in the 1920 essay, he wishes his system to be understood as paying no attention to space, but rather, to relations of objects to each other. Kant does that as well, but stipulates relative to each is meaningless without the space n which they are extended.

For an interesting read, see…..

https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/article/58/12/34/394660/Albert-Einstein-as-a-Philosopher-of#:~:text=By%20the%20age%20of%2016%2C%20he%20had%20already,on%20Kant%20in%20the%20summer%20semester%20of%201897.

….and find it isn’t the relative space/time distinctions that distinguish these guys, it’s the mathematics by which space and time are useful, that does.

On strong indications…..agreed. Seems reasonable.

Yeah, Kant is my go-to philosopher.

At what point should we abandon the metaphysical assumption that matter can be conscious and/or generate consciousness? — RogueAI

I’m not aware of a metaphysics assuming that. If it doesn’t, it can still be abandoned, just not for those reasons.

If there is a subjective condition by which behaviors are legislated, and these conditions come into conflict which results in argument, does it then follow that they are in some sense objective? — Leontiskos

I would say the argument is objective, the conditions in conflict be what they may. On the other hand, here is an proposition that states any cognition or series of cognitions shared by all members of a set capable of them, are for that reason, objective cognitions. I’m not so sure about that myself, but, it’s out there. Some folks rejecting that form of objectivity favor a thing called “intersubjectivity”, which just looks like subject/object version of Frankenstein’s ogre.

What categorical error were you thinking as possible?

…..all interest is of a will, but the desire to do something irregardless of whatever surface-level pleasure/pain is better, correct? — Bob Ross

The interest isn’t of the will, which is the autonomous faculty of volitions. The interest residing in the agent, is in a principle, with which the will determines a volition. The desire to do something, regardless of pain or pleasure, still needs to be informed as to what is to be done, which returns to will.

I also, nowadays, find the moral facts, if they do exist, to be irrelevant as long as the person has committed themselves to being rational. — Bob Ross

In a way that’s fitting, but I’d probably say….as long as he has committed himself to being moral. If there are moral facts, however subjective they may be, and one adheres to them by his actions, he would be deemed moral antecedent to being deemed rational.

Maybe that’s the key: subjective moral fact equates to moral commitment; objective moral facts equates to rational commitment. Or is that just adding yet another chef to the kitchen?
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….how do you reconcile Einstein’s general/special relativity with Kantian notions of space and time? — Bob Ross

They can’t be reconciled, because Einstein invoked a geometry Kant didn’t use in his construction of the conceptions of space and time. Which is odd, in a way, in that Kant taught mathematics, which implies he knew of spherical geometries, so it is more likely he used plane geometries as examples in his theoretical tenets in CPR merely for simplicity, to only go as far as he needed to prove a point. In other words, it doesn’t matter one whit that the interior angles of a spherical triangle add up to more or less than two right angles, if it is still necessarily true the interior angles of a Euclidean plane triangle equals two right angles, and it is also quite true the thought of that sum cannot ever be found in the mere fact there are three interior angles.

“…. Of course the conviction of the "truth" of geometrical propositions in this sense is founded exclusively on rather incomplete experience. For the present we shall assume the "truth" of the geometrical propositions, then at a later stage (in the general theory of relativity) we shall see that this "truth" is limited, and we shall consider the extent of its limitation….”
(Einstein, 1920: Einstein’s equivalent to Kant’s Prolegomena: relativity for dummies in one, transcendental philosophy for dummies in the other)

Einstein had a problem with Kant’s derivation of true propositions more than his notions of space and time. Just as SR and GR took Newton’s physics further than Newton himself but didn’t disprove what was originally given, so too did Einstein demonstrate that Kant’s notions of mathematical truths were limited, but also didn’t refute them as given.

Nevertheless, there is a clandestine categorical error in Einstein’s claim. Kant derived true propositions in order to prove their possibility, and because the proof of their possibility stands, they can be employed as ground for something else relative to them. Einstein disputed the propositions as being true in any condition, but they were never intended for any condition, but only for one.

Another thing. Einstein didn’t like Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori propositions….the ground of all mathematical proofs….yet had to use that very philosophical derivation for his own gedankenexperiment, which he drew from Ernst Mach, 1883, who was……waiiiittttt for it….an acknowledged Kantian.

Go figure.

I am just curious: is she a transcendental idealist too? — Bob Ross

Nahhhh….oil and water. She’s a retired Fed in the intelligence services with U-Dub Masters in history and library science, for her, it’s facts and nothing but the facts.

….both a “interest” in a “principle” and a “desire” in a “’good’ feeling” are both mere acts of “taste”, just separated semantically by what it is directed towards. — Bob Ross

Conventionally, I suppose that’s close enough, insofar as either may be reducible to aesthetic judgement. Still, in proper philosophy, I submit it is not so much the directed towards, but rather, the arising from. The difference manifests, and for which philosophical account should be taken, in those occasions where one feels pleasure for doing a bad thing, or, conversely, feels pain or displeasure about doing a good thing. Simply put, it follows that interest in a principle it that by which a moral act is given and its negation impossible regardless of circumstance, but mere desire for a good feeling is just as likely to invoke an immoral act as a moral one, which makes negation of one by the other not only possible, but increasingly probable, conditioned by the difficulty inherent in the circumstance.
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So is “shall”, for you, a command with literally no alternatives (e.g., a person being forced to do something, etc.)? If so, then that doesn’t seem like the word is too often applicable. — Bob Ross

Yeah, humans: sorryful bunch, to be sure. Even if they know what’s right, they’ll sometimes manage to talk themselves out of doing it, or allow someone else to do the talking. A command of reason is always applicable, but not always effected.
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I’ve been thinking about “moral realism”. Is morality a real thing? Even if it isn’t, per se, it seems the case there is in all humans a condition by which certain behaviors are legislated, so if the behaviors are real in one sense of the term, wouldn’t that condition by which behaviors are caused be real is some sense? I dunno….it’s a fine line between granting the realness of behavior but denying the realness of behavior’s causality.

I think there must be as many moral facts as there are acts in accordance with subjective moral commands. But that is not sufficient reason to grant objective moral facts in general, to which one is morally obligated. While I am perfectly entitled to say my act is in fact a moral act, am I thereby entitled to say my act is derived from a moral fact, and if I am not so entitled, by what warrant is my act, in fact, moral? If I then fall back on moral command as necessary causality, am I then forced to deem a mere command of reason, a fact?

Leporidae excavation if there ever was one.