Everybody’s entitled to disagree as they see fit.

No need to explain. I hold with most of your position in real/reality philosophy, reject any position calling for those silly marks bracketing those words, in everybody’s grammar philosophy.

The biological structures, which include the senses, must be ordered in such a way so as to fulfill each one's purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough, but couldn’t that be conditioned by natural evolution?

The argument is that it can only be an intellect which creates this biological order, the order which is necessary for these parts to serve their various purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, true enough, but that kind of intelligence isn’t human, nor could it be, and human intelligence is the only one we have non-contradictory grounds to discuss.

this places an intellect as prior to the brain, and impossible that the intellect is a product of, or dependent on, the brain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that’s been a logical inconsistency for eons. Hence....epiphenomenalism and such like. But whatcha gonna do when there’s no answer that doesn’t ask its own question. Speculate, of course, also been done for eons and with just as much logical inconsistencies between them.

Pick an explanation, I guess, run with it ‘til you trip over it. Metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it defeats itself, right?

different individuals aren't using a common basis of understanding when they each refer to 'reality' — sime

If this is true, it is impossible to explain how it is that there are commonalities in every human’s understanding of reality. No human ever, in any culture in any time, ever jumped up in the air...and didn’t meet with the inevitability of coming down. While some of them may indeed reason differently than others as to why they all always come down, the common basis of understanding the reality that they will, remains, no matter the why.

That there is a common basis for any human’s understanding is simply that each one of them is human. Irrealism, on the other hand, wants to thwart the rules of understanding, the common basis of it, by granting exceptions to the rule the authority to negate the rule. This absurdity disappears by restricting reality to a mere general metaphysical conception, re: , constructed and apprehended by humans alone. Then those silly marks bracketing the word, which carries the implication it isn’t a valid conception in the first pace, can disappear as well.

Now, it may be the case that humans aren’t using a common basis for understanding when they each refer to the content of reality, what can be said about that which belongs to the conception, that which is subsumed under it without contradiction, while the concept of reality itself remains untouched.
———-

But isn't even this supposedly aperpsectival concept of 'shared reality' relative to perspective, and thus not a defence against irrealism? — sime

Irrealism, re: Goodman 1978, is just another speculative metaphysical theory, having less logical support than its predecessors. Rather than the parsimony of many conceptions of one world’s reality, the theory suggests there are as many worlds as there are conceptions of the reality of them. Rather than granting the validity of the notion my experiences in this reality are different than your experiences in this same reality, it just might be the case my experiences relate only to my world but your experiences relate only to your world.

A possible defense against irrealism begins, then, with the fact that experiences....or perspectives if you wish.....belong to and are processes of the owner of them, predicated entirely on understanding. The world, and the singular reality of it, whatever it may be, reduces to naught but the necessary condition for all of them.

Not that irrealism is unjustified under its conditions; just that it’s less justifiable under others.

Agreed.

Hence, the non-reciprocity I brought up way back. Reality is the real, but the real is not necessarily reality.

Carry on, then?

I guess I tend to think of reality in material terms, but that doesn't mean I reject the reality of things like itches. — T Clark

Very well. But then, do you not have to resolve the logical dilemma of material things connected with a immediate and necessary causality, but itches, and the like, that are not? Seems the more consistent to reject as material reality that which has no connection to a causality, while acknowledging its being real, insofar as if it wasn’t real, with respect to the case at hand......where would you know to scratch?

Most fun I’ve had with a thread in ages, so, thanks for that.

Bees don’t bite.

Just wondering whether the itch you had...assuming you admit to it....was real. And if it was, would it at the same time, be a member of reality in the way a statue or a ‘57 DeSoto, is.

‘Tis a veritable playground here, aye.

Seriously. Ever had an itch?

that what we mean by "real" and "reality" only has meaning in relation to everyday human experience. I think that's a metaphysical position, so I wasn't looking to see if it was right, but if it is useful. — T Clark

.....I'm the most ruthlessly rational figure on the forum? — T Clark

The first goes a long way in supporting the second, I’ll wager.

That neither of you highlighted me I understand indicates mutual non-solicitation of a response, but some of this is getting out of hand. You guys are exhibiting inconsistencies between comments.

I really didn't understand your use of "tool". — Metaphysician Undercover

A tool is just some means that facilitates an end. Morality is, then, merely that tool in a human such that an act he actually performs is in accordance with the means for determining what that act should be. I need no sensibility, and indeed sometimes it’s even better....more comfortable for me.....if there is none, for the accomplishment of my moral ends. We may, or indeed even may not, witness our own acts through sensibility, but the witnessing of them is very far removed from the tool employed for the determination of what they should be, from which it follows that not witnessing at all, removes sensibility from consideration entirely, while the determining tool remains in full force.

I didn’t get from your comments, that you hold the senses are existentially dependent upon an intellect, or that the intellect orders the individual parts, that is to say, the biological structures, of the senses. What is done with the product of the sense’s biological structures, which is nothing more than mere mental/cognitive stimuli, considered as initially ordering the parts of that which is sensed, is nonetheless the dedicated purview of the intellect. In which case, it does hold that the intellect is antecedent to that which stimulates it. That senses don’t think and intellects don’t perceive, should be perfectly obvious to those examining the human condition, from any justifiable point of view.

I don’t see it as unreasonable that the intellect can exist in the complete absence of physiological sensory perception. In the first place, sensory perception is redundant, insofar as all sensation is from perception and all perception is sensory, the reciprocity of them being impossible, and that which affects the brain is physiological, re: cognitive neuroscience, but that which affects the intellect is not, re: pure speculative metaphysics. It is possible for the intellect to operate on that which is impossible to perceive, but it is absurd to suppose there is that perception upon which the intellect cannot operate. We all think in our sleep, or, more accurately perhaps, there is precedent for the justification that any human can think in his sleep, which is the same as saying the intellect is functioning in the complete absence of the physiological senses and perception.

That there is no intellect without the physiological structures sufficient for it, is given, but that structure is the brain and ancilliary connectivity, not mechanistic sensory devices.

I now return you to your local......ehhhhh, you know.

Is not a preposition that is true, linked to a fact? — PhilosophyRunner

That every change is a succession in time is true. An instance of this change is a truth linked to a fact; any instance of any given change is a truth linked to its fact, but not every instance of every change can be a truth linked to its fact. No inductive inference is factually provable antecedent to its experience. Analytical, or tautological, truths have no possible ground in fact, but only in logical form.

That fact exists, if nothing else. — PhilosophyRunner

Facts don’t exist; they merely represent the relations under which physical objects exist, in accordance with the intelligence that affords such determinations. “It is a fact that.....” just says some conditions relative to physical objects are such that their negation is contradictory.

While, conventionally speaking, true propositions are related to facts, but it is not necessary that they do, insofar as it is not necessarily a fact that makes a proposition true. Philosophy proper does not concern itself with convention.

Is there a truth value to "Objective reality is not a question of fact." — PhilosophyRunner

Yes. It is true objective reality is not a question of fact.

If there is a truth value to the above statement, does that not show objective reality does exist. — PhilosophyRunner

No. The truth value of a proposition is not sufficient for proof of existence. Truth value is nothing but logical relation to the LNC and resides nowhere else than propositions. Proof of existence, for humans, is experience.

Objective reality is merely a conception, a thought by which the manifold of possible existences is contained. The manifold of possible existences does not make objective reality itself an existence, from which follows necessarily, re: proof of existence, that the manifold of all possible existences is an impossible experience for humans.

Objective reality is not a question of fact, because no mere conception is ever a fact. Objective reality is a metaphysical idea, technically a category of pure reason, hence whether or not there is an objective reality is a metaphysical question, re: is an aggregate of all possible existences itself a possible existence, which will have a truth value relative to the premises in the argument, given the condition that any argument grounded in possibility, cannot be argued as fact.

Does the notion of objective reality seem real to humans in general? Sure it does, and that’s the point of the OP, innit?

Which tool do we use without requiring us to trust and use our senses? — creativesoul

Morality.

Which thought can we have without using our senses? — creativesoul

All of them.

It is one thing to imagine a way of proving Fermat's last theorem, and then spend years actualizing that proof..... — Srap Tasmaner

OK. Standard rational methodology: hypothesis, reason, conclusion.

.......another to have written out some mathematics you mistakenly imagine is a proof of Fermat's last theorem. — Srap Tasmaner

Non-standard rational methodology. Or, which is the same thing, standard irrational methodology. Imagining a way to prove, which presupposes a method, is very far from imagining a proof, which doesn’t.

The norm in humans is the standard, which makes the proper direction of fit go one way. If the conclusion contradicts established criteria, as in the case of pure mathematics, or fails to conform to observations of Nature, in the case of the empirical sciences, the hypothesis is falsely premised. Back to square one, change the premises in the hypothesis....carry on.

But you’re right. There are two ways of doing things. One adheres to the rules, which may be sufficient for an end, whatever that may be, the other is the exception to those rules, which is sufficient only for acquaintance with the difficulty, or downright impossibility, for that end. Being aware of the exceptions should serve to inform as to what not to do.

You can wedge direction of fit in there somehow, if you wish. I don’t see what good it does; we already do all direction of fit says anyway.

Disclaimer: I’m up on this modern linguistic jazz just as much as I’m up on set theory, so I have a self-prescribed out.

Santa Claus is a real fictional character..... — Srap Tasmaner

Yep. Keyword....real. All I was going for all along.

When the tag on the present is signed "from: Santa" that's supposed to mean it's from the person — Srap Tasmaner

Technically, all it’s supposed to do is explain how the present didn’t get there all by itself. It answers the question, “who is this from?” before it needs to be asked. The reasons for using an imaginary character, if only to circumvent the asking...... that’s another topic, and sorta beside the point anyway.

That's what I mean when I say "reference": an expression that picks out one of the objects in the world. Santa is not one of the objects in the world, so the expression "Santa Claus" does not refer. We pretend it does. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s fine. I, on the other hand, find nothing wrong with using mere conceptions to refer, and with them, I don’t have to pretend. The onus is on me, nonetheless, to insure the conception I use doesn’t freak out whoever I’m talking to.

Wonderful faculty....imagination. Always in use, seldom given its due respect.

In "This ball is red," "... is red" is a function not an object..... — Srap Tasmaner

Ok. “...is red” functions as a predicate in a proposition, then. The function of a predicate is to describe the subject to which it belongs, such that “this ball” has at least one certain identifying condition.

.....the characteristic function of the set of all red things. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, but we’re only concerned with “this ball....”. The statement says so. Rather simplistic to say the least, but if I hold out my hand with a ball in it, and tell you in no uncertain terms this ball is red, the last thing you’re going to do is consider the set of all red things, just as I did not upon determining something certain about the ball. And you, all you’re going to do is say, yeah, ok, I see that (iff the ball appears red to you), or, yeah, ok, I’ll take your word for it (iff the ball does not appear red to you).

But you’re trying to show me something, and you’ve done that well enough for me understand what you’re saying. I must say though, it’s far too complicated and quite an unnecessary elaboration of simple human constructs to be of any beneficial use. Or, as a question of mere interest, of what benefit could it be?

I mean....Santa Claus does refer, and without any annoyance I should think, if the sticker on the gift-wrapped present says “from: Santa”. And if considered from the standard subject/copula/predicate logical propositional format, any conception contained in a predicate, and is thereby the object of it, must refer to its subject.

So I wonder....what’s the point in deviating from the standard? What profit is there in it, over and above what’s already there?

non-referring expressions are annoying. — Srap Tasmaner

As in....infinities with respect to mathematicians, and universals to philosophers? Can we say that which refers to every single thing of a kind is non-referring?

Muddle indeed, circumvented to some extend by modifying the domain of the conception. Limiting existence to the empirical, being to the non-empirical. That way, a thing can be, without the necessity of existence, its being conditioned only by time.

The real in real numbers was originated by a mathematician, equally well-known....if not more so....as the father of modern, or at least post-Scholastic, philosophy. Odd, innit?

I only meant that we can talk about the set of statistical anomalies that the Bermuda Triangle is thought to be a member of and then discover that it is not. — Srap Tasmaner

Understood, thanks. Some aid in distinguishing the real from reality, then?

As my ol’ buddy Janis Joplin once said....”of great social and political import”....regarding Frederick: So....of all the scientists and philosophers gathered around the throne, unless Kant was off on some sabbatical, he was most probably the one told his “philosopher-king” the fish weight had nothing to do with its being alive or dead. Kant dedicated pre-critical papers to Frederick; Fredrick influenced Kant’s appointment to the chair of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg. Kant thought Frederick the epitome of enlightened monarchs; Frederick thought Kant a hero for supporting Newtonian physics, which was anathema in purely philosophical circles, the gap between the two having yet to be critically established. But it put Prussia firmly on the continental academic map, so Frederick was all for it, plus, locally, it bruised the Pietist ego, which couldn’t possibly be a bad thing.

The point: no matter how the mind wanders to come up with stuff, another mind can do things with it the originator hardly intended.

Reality is that which corresponds to a sensation in general..... — Mww

I don't believe reality is what corresponds to sensation. I said reality only makes sense in comparison or relation to sensation. — T Clark

Yeah, my bad. I was speaking from an ontological perspective (reality is....), you were speaking from an epistemological perspective, (making sense by relation). We each are justified in our perspectives, in that your making sense of reality is far down the methodological line from my sensation of it. You cannot make sense without my sensation, and my sensation is worthless without your relations.

Discussion of anything presupposes its being real or possibly real enough to discuss.
— Mww

Except when that's clearly false?..... — Srap Tasmaner

I don’t understand. If there is a discussion, there must be something to discuss. The presupposition is the necessary conceivability of the object of the discussion. It is impossible to discuss that for which there is no conception. What is “clearly false” in any of that?
————-

You and I, discussing whether the Bermuda Triangle is a thing, with a mysterious ship- and plane-eating property, cannot be assuming that it is real: that is the question we are addressing. — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not addressing anything other than limitations for the state of being real. The B.T. may not be a thing that devours real objects, but it is necessarily a real conception, insofar as if it weren’t......how could we be discussing its properties? Can’t be a property that doesn’t belong to something, right?
————

The set of things to be explained exists but is empty. — Srap Tasmaner

Can a set of things to be explained be empty? The set of explanations of things that exist may be empty, but that thing to be explained must be a member of the set of all things.

But I’m not a set kinda guy, so....

I suspect the problem resides in our not knowing well enough how to categorize "purely" mental objects. — Manuel

Yeah, that, or, we don’t bother with them in the first place. The senses govern our lives, right?

the use the word often obfuscates the phenomenon it is trying to discuss. — Manuel

Agreed. Discussion of anything presupposes its being real or possibly real enough to discuss. But then...what does it mean to discuss, and the dance continues.

Reality only makes sense in comparison to what humans see, hear, feel, taste, and smell — T Clark

Agreed. Reality is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; and that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a real being in time, that is to say, a representation of that sensation, and the sense it makes is proportional to the manifold of representations contained in the conception, and the relation of them to the sensation, and to each other.

It’s a priori knowledge, by which I mean it’s because I say so. — T Clark

Because I say so, yes, and it is knowledge a priori that I say so, but knowledge of reality, by means of sensation, is of empirical objects, so not a priori knowledge. That which is not from any sensation whatsoever, on the other hand, but is nevertheless a conception, as a representation is a real being in time, and is a priori necessarily, and if an object can be predicated as belonging to that representation without contradiction, that is knowledge a priori.
————

I’ll define “reality” as the state of being real. — T Clark

Agreed, in principle, the caveat being the state of being real does not necessarily imply reality. Non-reciprocity kinda thing, doncha know.

So.....what does “real” mean? It means that which satisfies the criterion of being in a certain state, and that state is representation in time.

Im not sure how deep the metaphor goes..... — introbert

That’s what’s so interesting about it. Can go wherever one wishes to take it, then figure out whether it conforms to the conditions you presented, and, why it does or does not.

Metaphysical reductionism writ large. Satisfied by imagination on the one hand, killed by sheer boredom on the other.

Ahhhh...ok, that’s better. Still, to attack a fact/pawn with reason/bishop, an awful lot of antecedent conditions must have already been aligned. The rules of reason/bishop movement are quite restricted, which makes explicit the reason being used must relate to the fact it is attacking.....the colors of both must have a correlation, or no bishop attack is even possible. It’s like.....you can’t take a picture with a sewing machine.

That was kinda fun.

I am able to defend my irrationality with rationality, eliminating the facts directed against it. — introbert

This says a queen’s defense, but there’s no defender named “rationality”. What’s defending the queen, sufficient for eliminating pawns/facts directed against it? It’s cool to attack irrationality with facts.....I get that.....but it’s usually an exercise in futility to attack a queen with a pawn, especially without knowing what allies the queen might have.

Seems a waste of power to have reason stand for a direct challenge against any other piece, then don’t use it for defense of your own concept.

Anyway.....something out of the ordinary, making it worthy just for that.

Hey.....always lookin’ for a different way of lookin’.

And no, I didn’t send tickets to his favorite Vegas show to post that comment.

Should I actually be defending thinking for myself here? — Srap Tasmaner

If you’re doing philosophy, you are thinking for yourself. No need to defend it. If you’re speaking from exegesis, as I readily admit for myself, you’re merely philosophizing.....which I also have to admit.

Or were you making some point about the conceptual scheme I ought to admit I'm stuck with? — Srap Tasmaner

Truthfully, I wouldn’t have any warrant to do that; I don’t even know whether you consider yourself operating under that condition. I might suggest.......er, you know, from my own exegesis.....that every human does, but, there is no proof for it, so.....

Still, if you’re going to come up with properties “from scratch”, that sorta implies thinking for yourself, which in turn implies some sort of conceptual scheme you’d obviously be stuck with.

Just curious, that’s all.

May I invite you good Sir, to read Lacan and Derrida? — Manuel

Knowing my denkweise as you do, what do they offer that might interest me? Or....what about them interests you?

Yeah, but after 3000-odd years, the corpus of philosophy texts is so vast, it’s really hard to do philosophy that hasn’t already been done.

I was really just trying to see how I could come up with properties "from scratch". — Srap Tasmaner

Have you come up with anything in that respect....from scratch?

HA!! I feel ya. We’re still breathing, so we don’t qualify as OLD guys.

.....take a ball and you imaginatively delete its location.....
— Srap Tasmaner

Just curious. Where did you get the idea for doing this?
— Mww

It's sort of the way empiricists like Hume talk. — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, thanks.

FYI....in case you didn’t already know, and not that it matters....doctrines other than British Enlightenment empiricism start from that very same thought experiment for the development of purely rational theories. It’s just that I’ve never seen it presented by someone other than The Old Guys.

.....take a ball and you imaginatively delete its location..... — Srap Tasmaner

Just curious. Where did you get the idea for doing this?

We know that humans have a tendency to think in dualistic terms, but I see no reason to think that says anything about anything beyond the nature of our thinking. — Janus

Agreed. How could it? Anthropomorphism on one hand, transcendental illusion on the other, both catastrophic no-no’s in their own way. The former attributes our dualistic nature to which it doesn’t belong, the latter attributes to our dualistic nature that which doesn’t belong to it.
————-

Does our language reflect the primordial nature of thinking itself or does our thinking reflect the dualistic character of language? Chicken or the egg? — Janus

What dualistic character does language have?

If one accepts his fundamental form of thought is image, then he holds language only reflects his thoughts. Or, perhaps more acutely, represents his thoughts. If our thoughts are internal, there is no need for the conveyance of them. It is impossible to convey images beyond oneself, hence the necessity for language, as a correspondence to those images, which can then be conveyed.

So....if we wish to convey our thoughts, we must have a language. If we do not wish to convey our thoughts, we have no need of language.

Want proof? Ever notice when what appears to be us talking to ourselves, which is the sole reason supporting the argument thinking reflects language, there is never, ever....not once....any personal pronoun used in it? But when we use language to convey our thinking, it is impossible, in a meaningful sense, without some form of it? Sufficient evidence that that appearance is not language use proper, but mere representation of what it would be.

There’s more....add a reasonably small number to another in your head. Betcha a million bucks you don’t use a formula....the language of mathematics....to do it. Construct a figure....the language of geometry. In your head you don’t use the word circle when enclosing a space with one curved line.

So, yes, from this armchair, language reflects thought rather than the other way around. Psychologists and anthropologists will not agree, but....ehhhh.....what do they know. (Winks at Issac)

On. a common, probably analytic, account, certainty is a "propositional attitude", in that it involves both people and a purported statement, and indicates a certain attitude of those folk towards that statement. — Banno

I’m aware, and you’re correct in it. I, and indeed as well I think, are arguing from a purely metaphysical position, involving a person, and by association each and every individual person of congruent rational integrity, but without statements, based on the notion no meaningful statement is even possible without the means for its construction.

The common, probably analytic account....
.....assumes proper human rationality; I’m making sure of it.

.....describes truths as they are discovered by a fully functioning human intellect, I am describing how a proper human intellect discovers truth.

......relates this to that and from the relation something is true; I’m relating this human function to that human function from which truth is given.

......admits only the contingent conditions IN a statement (if this, then that, a non-fallacious post hoc ergo propter hoc logical proposition); I’m making necessary the conditions OF the person (when this, then that, a non-fallacious cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical condition) from which the statement follows.

Bottom line....on the one hand is an end, re: this is true if.....represented by symbols but without the method used to create them; on the other is an end, re: all truth must be....represented by conceptions reason then arbitrates insofar as it is the method.

All that being said, it nevertheless reduces to efficiency, a euphemism for dismissal of metanarrative theory. If we can arrive at truth with knowing how, what difference does knowing how really make. Maybe none, but it aids in the explanation as to why folks disagree. If disagreement arises merely from incompatible experience, experience being that which every logical system requires for the possibility of its proofs, that’s one thing and easily surmised. But with similar experiences, disagreement can only follow from dissimilar associations in the judgements of the participants, for which the analysis of propositions themselves have no power, insofar as stated propositions do not contain the reason of their own construction.

History supports the notion that vastly dissimilar human cultures nevertheless imbue congruent truths across them. Whether a supreme being, a undeniable-whatever-the-case may-be, it matters not. The distinction in culture manifests as distinctions in experiences of the members of such culture, from which follows the experiences ground the logic of each, generally. But every member of every culture is of the same kind of intelligence, from which follows their respective truths are all formed the same way, which is sufficient explanation for the congruency of them, regardless of the object which represents them.

The point being, of course, the propositions that are going to be necessarily different amongst different cultural dynamics, have no business being the determining factor in the foundation for truths inherent in all of them.
————

It's the phrase "certainty grounds truth" that I find puzzling. — Banno

You would, and you shouldn’t be faulted for it. Just as I, for holding a position no one cares about. But considering the dialectical medium in which this diatribe just sprouted, and the category by which it is known........I am at least the more consistent with it, methinks.

treating extensa and cogitans attributes of the one substance which show up for us when considered from their different perspectives. — Janus

What substance can have both attributes?

someone might be certain of something that is not true. — Banno

But not at the same time, in the same subject, complete and proper rationality being given.

There is the thesis that certainty grounds truth from the notion that human cognition is in the form of logical syllogisms. If the major and the minor do not conflict, there is relational certainty, and if the conclusion does not conflict with the premises, there is truth relative to that certainty.

Metaphysics doesn’t care about empirical content, which involves that which one is certain about, only the method by which any content may or may not become intelligible to us, which involves certainty in our judgements.

Spinoza's notion of substance makes more sense:deus sative natura, 'God or Nature. — Janus

Descartes said the same thing initially, but qualified it because we have no knowledge of God’s attributes and attributes are that by which substance is known. Everything under God, sure, but that doesn't help with the sense of substance as he wants it to be understood, that is, with respect to the differences in mind and body. Which would be, then, their respective attributes, and the interaction of those attributes, if not the substances themselves.

Not sure how Spinoza could have solved any problems by bringing in infinite stuff.....but I trust ya, so....good enough.

He was as much a scientist and mathematician, if not more so..... — Manuel

True. Even both in “First Principles....” and “Meditations.....” he uses accurate anatomical terminology. In the 1600’s no less.

I'm saying that he postulated res cogitans as a way to account for the things which could not be accounted for by res extensa. — Manuel

Good enough for me. All he ever meant to prove was body, which we know, and mind, which we don’t, are nonetheless very different.

.....it was a sensible approach. — Manuel

True enough. Nowadays we call it reification, in that mind per se isn’t reducible to substance, therefore thinking substance is moot.

Kant fixed all that....kinda sorta.....by calling mind or reason, and other similar abstracts, conditions for a particular kind of substance but not a physical constituency of it.

But do you think Descartes treated res cogitans as a principle, or an actual substance? In First Principles 1, 52 he defines substance, then in 1-53 qualifies the differences with the attributes each can have. The attribute of a thinking substance is thought, so....is he calling it out as the case, or a principle which grounds the case?

I just never thought of cogitans or extensa as principles. Maybe I should have....dunno.
————

I happen to think that his dualism is often misunderstood. — Manuel

As do I. But what can ya do, huh?