experiences are post hoc constructions, they're narratives we use…. — Isaac

Interesting synopsis.

our word 'red' acts as an off-the-shelf ready-made narrative — Isaac

So the child learning. Is it his teacher/parent/sandbox buddy that puts “red” on his shelf? If the sociological theme for the ground of our experiences is true, is it the case the child doesn’t need that “disparate/contradictory process” for his constructed narrative? And, of course, if he does need it, simply from the fact he has a brain and thinks for himself, the sociological theme would surely be false.

I agree “red” acts as an off-the-shelf narrative for use post hoc, along with every other possible “__” experience. But ‘tis a veritable beggar’s banquet, I say, not to consider how they were one and all put there in the first place.

C’mon, man.

When we accept that premise of human deficiency it is necessary that we believe in things which cannot be grasped by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..and when we accept the natural limitations of a given system, we don’t need to lament what it can’t do.

This, the human mind is a continually evolving system. — Metaphysician Undercover

….but can never evolve out of the kind of system it is. (Remember….dialectical consistency)

we can take your premise, that the human mind is deficient — Metaphysician Undercover

….which was never my premise.

If, whenever something appears like it is unintelligible — Metaphysician Undercover

….an unintelligible can never be an appearance. If something appears to us, it is a phenomenon, hence possibly intelligible. So, yes, I can neglect your use of appearance, because I don’t consider intelligibility and appearance related to each other.

the human mind has the capacity to know all things — Metaphysician Undercover

….an unjustified assertion, insofar as it is impossible to know all the things there are. The very best to be said is the mind has the capacity to know all things presented to it.

I posited a situation in which something appears to be unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

….and I’m arguing the conditions for what unintelligible necessarily is.

If the philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and understand all things, then what is the point to accepting a premise (human deficiency) which forces the necessary conclusion that there are things which cannot be known? — Metaphysician Undercover

….it is absurd to suppose understanding of all things. The occasions in which some things are misunderstood verifies limits. Nothing ever being misunderstood is the only sufficient ground for the possibility of understanding all things.

how do we allow for evolution of the human mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

The human mind adapts; the human body evolves. The mind adapts in conjunction with experience.
(Remember….I detest the use of “mind” anyway, always preferring “reason”).

On and on it goes. Give it up and go have a turkey leg or something.

On inconsistency:

It may be the case I should have been more attentive to the clarity of my writing, or, it may be the case you should have been more attentive to the subtleties in your reading. Call it a toss-up?
————-

Let's say that it is possible that there are things which could never be brought into the mind, cannot be known by human intelligence. And lets respect this as simply a possibility. Now here's the tricky part. You say that you've been advocating this possibility, yet you then say that you see no point to "believing in" it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmmmm….I wasn’t advocating the possibility of things.

things which could never be brought into the mind, not even though the use of mathematics? That might be the true ineffable.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. What I’ve been advocating. — Mww

I was advocating the truly ineffable, which manifests as a certain impossibility of the mind.
—————-

quote="Metaphysician Undercover;758401"]….you then say that you see no point to "believing in" it.[/quote]

quote="Mww;758343"]What would be the point in believing in the ineffable then?
— Metaphysician Undercover

I can’t think of one.[/quote]

To believe in THE ineffable is to believe in things that are ineffable. If truly ineffable is only the condition of the mind for the reception of certain things, what point is there in believing in the very things the mind could never receive?
————

Let’s say it is possible there are things…
Let’s say there are possible things that can never be known by the human mind….
Let’s respect this as a simple possibility….

“respect this” is singular, which implies a singular mind’s knowledge. If you meant “respect this” as pertaining to possible things, you should have said “respect them”. It is contradictory for it to be simply possible that the mind cannot do an impossible thing, while it is a simple possibility there are things.
————

quote="Mww;758343"]Is it possible, that there are such things…
— Metaphysician Undercover

(…) we cannot declare such things are impossible in themselves….[/quote]

To state the existent of a thing as not impossible, is not to advocate that it is. There’s no logic in positing a possible existence when it is absolutely impossible to form a judgement with respect to it. How could we ever say a thing is possible if it has absolutely no chance of ever being an object met with our intelligence? What could be said about a thing for which we couldn’t even begin to speculate? To say such is not impossible carries more truth value than to merely say such thing may be possible.

we will never know whether we can actually understand things where it appears like they might possibly be unintelligible to us — Metaphysician Undercover

We DO know we can never understand the unintelligible exclusively from the reality of that which IS intelligible. Pretty simple really. If intelligibility is this, anything not this is unintelligible. Besides…doesn’t “unintelligible” factually denote a non-understanding? Absurd to posit the unintelligible, then turn right around and say maybe we just don’t understand it. There may be a veritable plethora of reasons for not understanding, but the irreducible, primary reason must necessarily be because it was unintelligible to begin with.

THAT is what the ineffable is all about. Hasn’t a gawddamn thing to do with things, but only with the limitations on the system that comprehends things.

So, let's assume the possibility, that there is a huge part of reality which is completely undisclosed to our senses, and never comes to anyone's mind in any conception, sense image, or anything like that. Would you agree that this logical possibility validates the notion of ineffability? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Validity of the notion, not the conception itself. Point being, the notion of impossibility carries the exact same implication as the notion of ineffability. Impossibility in turn, carries the power and weight of a pure categorical conception, whereas ineffability is a mere logical construct.

Further, we have mathematics which produces evidence of this large part of reality which is not sensed, nor has it entered into human minds, concepts like spatial expansion, dark energy and dark matter. (…) It's not truly ineffable because for everything which hasn't yet entered the mind there is a possibility that it may. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. This is elaboration of ’s knowledge in practice.

Is it possible, that there are such things which could never be brought into the mind, not even though the use of mathematics? (…) That might be the true ineffable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. What I’ve been advocating. There’s even an example of what something like that would be. Those cannot be named as existents, simply from the thesis that our manner of naming things could not possibly be applied to them. It is tacit acknowledgement that we have no warrant to claim our intelligence is the only possible kind of intelligence there is, from which follows that we cannot declare such things are impossible in themselves but only that they are absolutely impossible for our kind of intelligence. And it isn’t because we don’t know how, but that we are not even equipped for it.

What would be the point in believing in the ineffable then? — Metaphysician Undercover

I can’t think of one. If a thing is already impossible, what’s the point in calling the same thing something else?
————

The point though, was that you know I am referring to a particular called "the box", not because I have not pointed out this particular and given it that name, but because you know the type of thing which is called a box. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I know you’re referring to the box, but no, there’s nothing contained in what you told me that justifies I should have already known what the word you wrote, “box”, stands for. Dialectical consistency demands I work only with that which has been given to me, and from that, I couldn’t deduce the type of thing you’re talking about is something I should already know. I brought this to your attention with the parenthetical.

So in order for the word to do its job, you need to respect both, that "box" refers to a universal, and that it refers to a particular. And the need to know both is required for one specific instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I need a universal in order for a particular to be possible on the one hand, and cognizable on the other. My contention is only that “box” isn’t it. Put another way, box is a conception itself subsumed under a more encompassing conception, e.g., “container”, hence cannot be a universal, which is not subsumed under a conception, insofar as there are none greater than it.

And if I do know what the word “box” stands for, which means your signification and mine are congruent, I know what I’m expected to get.
— Mww

But the congruency in many cases is a feature of the conception, rather than pointing out a particular, and the conception is what allows you to identify the individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, but being feature of congruent conceptions reduces to congruent understandings, which I hinted at by prefacing my comment with the necessity for congruent intelligences, which includes understanding.

I am referring to a particular, my car, but I lead you to it through an understanding of the conceptions, "black", "Civic", "far corner of the lot", not by physically pointing out the particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

And there it is: precisely the missing conceptual schema of “box”. And while the inclusive schema with respect to the car isn’t physically pointing, I have a much greater chance of locating it because of them. Besides….you didn’t point to the box either. You just told me to go get one.

Good stuff. Socrates would be happy.

Every animal has a natural limit to its intellectual powers — RussellA

Yep, and overstepping those limits determines the extend of subterfuge….self-deception….and recognizing them prevents it.
———-

As Javra writes, there is the unknowable in principle and there is the unknown in practice. The unknowable in principle cannot be put into words. The unknown in practice can be put into words but only after it is known, meaning that when unknown it cannot be put into words, but when known it can be put into words. It remains true that "only the unknown cannot be put into words" — RussellA

We’ve already agreed it is necessarily true only the unknow-able cannot be put into words. Anything else is either redundant or superfluous, sustained by….

…..Unknown in practice is merely a condition of experience, susceptible to possible amendment.

…..Unknowable in principle is altogether unsusceptible to any condition of experience.

…..Unknown in practice, an a posteriori condition, and unknowable in principle, an a priori condition, are completely distinct from each other and have no business being intermingled.

……The unknown in practice is not conditioned by, and does not adhere to, the principle that the unknowable is impossible to conceive and thereby represent in words.

……The unknowable in principle absolutely cannot change its state by becoming known in practice, but the unknown in practice, can.

That lightning was not manifestation of the anger of the gods was not unknowable to the ancients in principle; it was merely a matter of unknown practical knowledge.

But none of that you didn’t already know. I’m just reiterating the maxims grounding an seemingly inconsequential conclusion.

There aren't any words for the thing to be talked about, making people think that it can't be talked about, but really we're just free to make the words up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, just as we do for every single word ever. Which leads inevitably to….under what conditions is it impossible for a word to be invented, such that the object the word would represent, remains impossible to talk about. Then and only then, does the notion of ineffability attain its logical validity.
——-

The word representing a universal conception won’t refer to a particular example of it.
— Mww

The issue though is why, or how. Suppose I write here, the word "box", and I tell you that this word signifies something, it stands for something. How do you know whether it signifies a particular which I have named, or whether it is a concept which the word refers to. You say it can't be both, but why not? — Metaphysician Undercover

That you are communicating with me presupposes congruent intelligence.

That being the case, and under the assumption I don’t know what “box” indicates, nevertheless, by perceiving the expression itself and alone, I immediately understand “box” presupposes a conception you have denominated, however arbitrarily, by that particular representation. Otherwise, I surmise you couldn’t have expressed the word, insofar as, due to our congruent intelligences, I couldn’t if it were me. If left at this point, I may or may not consider “box” a universal conception, because I don’t know what the word indicates.

On the other hand, if I already know what “box” means, I also understand it isn’t a universal conception, because I know it is a particular thing and the Principle of Complementarity tells me the one can never be the other.

If I say "get me the box", I refer to a particular, but you know what thing to get me because of the concept — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. Depends on the extent of my experience. As before, if I don’t know, without experience, you informing me that “box” signifies something, while reducing the conception to a particular in the class of things, doesn’t inform me as to what kind of particular thing in that class it is. So I wouldn’t know what to get merely from the signification of something.

And if I do know what the word “box” stands for, which means your signification and mine are congruent, I know what I’m expected to get.
————-

Suppose I write here, the word "box", and I tell you (what this word signifies) that this words signifies something, (what it stands for) stands for something. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you’d written the parentheticals rather than the crossed outs, I wouldn’t have that argument to make.

HA!!! Nice try.

Isn't "ineffable" reserved for stuff that we cannot in principle say? — Banno

I’m gathering that’s the consensus opinion, yes. Just seems rather silly to overburden what was already impossible, with another word that doesn’t change anything.

Anything at all, that cannot follow from principles, is impossible. So why does it need to be ineffable too?

I can't put that "knowing" into words that could communicate what she looks like such that you could, on the basis of what I told you. recognized her on the street. — Janus

To your personal subjectivity, your experience is unrelatable to me. But you’re not relating an experience, you’re relating a certain understanding of the properties you have already thought as belonging to an object I will eventually perceive. If our intelligences are sufficient congruent, which they very well should be, I should be able to transpose your words back into my standing intuitions, such that I will perceive exactly what you are enabling me to do.

As for generalities, the more properties you relay to me, the less general the description becomes, hence the easier to recognize the person.

Still, in one respect, you’re correct, in that merely perceiving the correct person in a crowd is very far from knowing the person. But, technically, that wasn’t the knowledge you enabled me to acquire with a mere descriptive appearance.

So I submit that you can put your knowing into words, at least for that which you want me to do with it.

See? — Banno

If we were playing ball, I’d have to concede a score.

if I know how to describe a painting but also know that I don’t know how to describe the particulars of how the painting makes me feel, then the painting’s properties will be effable to me but not the precise aesthetic experience which the painting provokes in me. — javra

Understood, and that’s the common argument, yes. The counterargument is that feelings per se are not cognitions, hence that part of understanding from which conceptions and the words representing them arise, and from which cognitions follow, is inactive with respect to feelings. So, while it is the case feelings cannot be put into words, the aesthetic judgements which follow from them, can, and those are to which we put words.

Simply put, we don’t speak apodeitically of feelings because understanding doesn’t treat them as objects of reason. Another way to look at it, feelings regard the condition of the conscious subject, whereas understanding regards the condition of the conscious subject’s intellect. This has support when we consider that sometimes it just doesn’t make sense to feel a certain way about a certain thing, e.g., doesn’t make sense to cry over beautiful music.
———-

….need to stipulate the criteria for determining how the unknowable isn’t a mere subterfuge?
— Mww

It need not be unknowable in principle, just unknown in practice - and we would need to know that it is so. — javra

Doesn’t the unknown in practice still require an explanatory principle? I should think that if it is the case that knowledge is only possible in conjunction with principles, the criteria for the unknowable must be either the negation of those, the validity of its own, or the absence of any. But principles at any rate.

Only that which is unknown cannot be put into words. Only that which is unknown is ineffable. If it is known, it can be put into words and is expressible. — RussellA

All well-said.

Do we….or do we not….still need to stipulate the criteria for determining how the unknowable isn’t a mere subterfuge? Seems like that would be the logical query to follow, “only the unknown cannot be put into words”.

It's not the conception that's ineffable, nor any part of the conception. It is the difference between the conception of what the word refers to, and what the word really refers to in a particular instance of use, which is ineffable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok…..need the rest of the paragraph to unpack this.

There is a number of ways to look at this. If the conception is a universal, and what the word refers to is a particular, there is a difference between these. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure there’s a difference, but there’s nothing ineffable about it. The word representing a universal conception won’t refer to a particular example of it. The universal conception represented by the word “change” says nothing about particular instances of that which changes. The manifold of conceptions involved in the proposition, “the branches swaying in the wind make a joyful noise” has no need for, and forwards no cognition of, “change”.

If the conception is a representation, and there is something represented, then there is a difference between these. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough. Herein is the limit of metaphysical reductionism. Conceptions represent thoughts….but there is no justifiable hypothesis for the origin of thoughts. If one wishes to call the origin of thought ineffable, insofar as there are no words to describe it, that’s fine, but we’ve already understood we just have no idea from whence come thoughts, so why bother with overburdening the impossibility with ineffability?
———-

The problem is that we try to talk about things which we cannot conceptualize The lack of conceptualization is what makes it so we cannot talk about it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, well….proof positive folks generally put more stock in their talk than their thought. Pity them, I say.

That is the ineffable, we try to talk about something which we cannot talk about, due to a lack of conceptualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

Truth be told, I don’t agree that’s what we’re doing. You say the problem is we try to do this thing we can’t do, I say we can’t even do, in any way, shape or form, what you say we’re trying to do, so the problem itself you say we have, should just disappear and along with it, the very notion of ineffability.

This is just as much fun as trying to fathom why some of us are right-handed and some are left. Why some of us like spinach and some of us gag on it. Only product there can be is fun; we ain’t gonna solve anything here, are we.

I don't think it's usually about greatness. — frank

Ehhhh….just one of several predicates in a definition. Any qualitative superlative would work.

It's just that words are sometimes like fingers and some of experience falls through the open hands of language. — frank

Oh, you silver-tongued devil, you.

This inability to account for the entirety of the context is what validates the claim of an "ineffable". — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it not follow, if all that’s needed is sufficient context, rather than entire context, that the claim “ineffable” is invalid?

If it is the case that all thoughts are conceptions, and all conceptions are represented by the word(s) that refer to them…..how can any conception be too great to be described? The representation just is the description. How can any conception, then, be ineffable?

So that which is ineffable has no word by which it is referred. For that of which there is no word, there is no conception that is the necessary presupposition for it, for otherwise, there must be conceptions without representation, which is self-contradictory, hence, unintelligible.

Imagination is that which presents objects without there actually being one. Imagination can present any thinkable object, which makes explicit imagination can present any thing that can be conceived, can be represented by words, can never be too great to be talked about.

Ineffable: a useless euphemism intended to obfuscate the fact it is impossible to conceive anything too great to be talked about. It merely indicates a way to escape the explanatory pigeonhole.

Well enough to make the list of only three choices. I’d say he still doing quite well.

Also, depends on which main question is asked about. For instance, for “a priori knowledge”, for which Kant is the more or less established authority, 72% find it acceptable.

Might be fun. Although, the analytically inclined on one side, the critically inclined on the other doesn’t bode well for meeting in the middle.

Dunno; don’t care. Too many courts, half of which are held on what he said anyway, so….

Mww is still interpreting Kant — Banno

‘Preciate the noticing.

Words are public yet meaning can be private — RussellA

Agreed. I’d go so far as to say the origin of meaning is exclusively private, even by extension over a domain of congruent communities. Words merely represent the relation of conceptions, and the reason for them is given simply from the fact communicable expression of the images, technically, the schema, of pure thought, which is itself the originator of words, is altogether impossible. In general, public use of words is only manifestation of constucts of representative schema.

My concept of "mountain" is private and subjective, inaccessible to anyone else — RussellA

Also agreed, but beside the point with respect to communication proper, the point being that all human brains are operationally congruent, all mental activities given from brains are operationally congruent, therefore all logically derivable inferences are formally congruent. No matter the constructed word as representation of its conception forwarded by one subject to be received by another, the rational activity which generates its phenomenon in one fashion, re: saying a word, and the rational activity which receives the very same phenomenon in a different fashion, re: hearing that word, is synonymous between them. The sound of each phenomenon, the affect it inscribes on each sensory apparatus, may be different between the two subjects, but it doesn’t matter, insofar as no cognitive relation….the meaning of the word….is contained in a sensation. Nevertheless, they are treated by each subject’s cognitive system exactly the same.

Hence it is, that meaning is public only insofar as the donor inferences are expressed, or, as you say, objectified, albeit empirically. The recipient’s inferences are, obviously, not expressed, but are nothing but subjective inferences of their own, also objectified, not empirically, but rationally. The ol’ bottom up routine by the one, top down by the other.

It could be that meaning is said to be public, because that entire operation is reversible. The recipient becoming the donor often enough, implies publicity? Even if the case, the whole schebang then belongs to empirical anthropology anyway, so….who cares.

If x is contingent upon y (e.g. motion is contingent upon space), it doesn’t mean that y causes x — TheGreatArcanum

Yes. Can we say y is merely the necessary condition for x? If there’s going to be an x, there must first be a y?

the method is defined in relation to itself, in a circular fashion, but it isn’t fallacious — TheGreatArcanum

Agreed. Reason is like that, intrinsically circular, and the basis of my position that metaphysical reductionism taken too far leads to absurdities. So…don’t take it too far, and it is non-fallacious.

can something be is identical to itself…. — TheGreatArcanum

You’d have to unpack that for me. For that which is identical to itself just is itself, fas as I can tell.

can something be is identical to itself and not possible, necessary, or contingent? — TheGreatArcanum

So if something identical to itself just is itself, then we have….can something be that is not possible, not necessary or not contingent. To possibility and necessity, I would agree, absolutely not. As for contingency, not sure. There is no possible knowledge of uncaused causes, so it may be possible for something that just is itself not to be contingent on any cause. All predicated on the conception of time as a relational qualifier.

I think that the purely logical categories do share modal relationships with each other. — TheGreatArcanum

I’d agree modal categories share the relationship of time with each other, but that’s the extent of my agreement so far. Mostly because I don’t consider the categories in accordance with your thesis.
————

there is no method like mine — TheGreatArcanum

What method? There may be an irreducible first principle employed by the method, but first principles do not describe the method that uses it.

Precedence. As in ordered sequential priorities? So…Law of Ordered Sequential Priorities? Sounds an awful lot like plain ol’ cause and effect to me. Why isn’t it?

And…..

the law of identity (for example) (X=X) — TheGreatArcanum

….is straight outta Aristotle, unequivocally applicable to objects whether in concerto or in abstractia

that which exists is necessarily defined in relation to what it is not — TheGreatArcanum

Yeah, that too. For any given conception, for whatever can be thought, its negation, is given immediately by it. It follows as a matter of course the relation of a definition is that it simultaneously defines its opposite. It’s the complimentary nature of the human intelligence itself, writ large.

As long as you are a human being, reason is the irreducible starting point for the construction of your philosophical method, as it has ever been for anybody’s method. Even principles themselves precipitate out of reason, or, to put in other words, you had to reason to your first principle.

Even if I got all that wrong, it shouldn’t be so easy to compare something claimed as new, with something already established. If it’s new, it shouldn’t have anything to compare with, insofar as the new cancels the established, or at the very least, makes it obsolete.
(Sidebar: like Hume’s philosophy, positing that interrupted impressions of a particular is proof subsequent impressions of it are always new relative to its antecedent impression, when in fact, a new philosophy showed each impression is merely a member in a series of successive identicals, therefore not new at all.

On a new philosophical method. Interesting? Yeah, somewhat, sure. A paradigm shift? Nahhhh, I don’t think so.

My main categories of the mind are memory, understanding, and intentionality — TheGreatArcanum

That’s fine, although I myself see your distinction as exchanging category for faculty, but to each theory its own definitions, right?
————

I would never claim that intuition is conditioned by time alone unless I’ve made a typo. — TheGreatArcanum

Cool.
————-

time is given whether or not there is intuition, if and only if the mind is not an eternally existing entity. I can show that the mind is eternally existing — TheGreatArcanum

In my parlance, and perhaps I should have made it explicit, the time I talk about is no more than the time I conceive as ground for something else also of mine that I can talk about. Hence, a mind considered as eternally existing is not a required antecedent for this conception of time.

Perhaps in your parlance, time is being treated as a completely self-subsisting something-or-other, then the argument could be made that kind of time needs an eternally existing mind for its possibility. Dunno how an eternally existing anything can be shown beyond logical conditions. And logical conditions alone have no warrant for ontological existences.
————-

….(time and intuition are) co-necessary for each other — TheGreatArcanum

Yes, I’d agree with that, with the caveat that time is also co-necessary for the objects of the understanding, which are usually called conceptions.
————-

my conception is that consciousness pertains to the logical relationships between the categories of the mind and the categories of sensation….. — TheGreatArcanum

Ok.

…..while subjectivity, or the mind in itself, pertains to the internal relationships between the categories of the mind considered in themselves — TheGreatArcanum

Ok, with qualifications, in that you assign categories differently than what I’m used to. Usually, the categories proper have no internal relation, at least to each other, which I take you to mean.

Anyway….this new philosophical method. How does it work? What’s the irreducible starting point?

my method is grounded (….) in the axioms that mediate the categories of the mind. — TheGreatArcanum

That would be interesting. What does a propositional account of such axiom look like? In a tripartite logical human cognitive system, the categories are the mediator. Being pure conceptions themselves, it would seem self-destructive of the system for the pure mediator to be mediated.

But I see why you might attempt such an exposition, insofar as no established philosophical doctrine has been able to state that by which the categories are themselves legislated. I might caution, perhaps unnecessarily, that metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it becomes logically absurd.
————

I would say that intuition is conditioned by time alone, but also by memory, and also, that time and intuition are co-necessary. — TheGreatArcanum

“but also by” negates “alone”. Minor self-contradiction, to be sure, but might warrant some re-consideration.

If you say intuition is conditioned by time alone, are you referring to the faculty of phenomenal representation in itself, without regard to sensibility? I ask because intuition of real physical objects by which our internal phenomena are possible, are also equally conditioned by space.

Time and intuition are co-necessary…..for what? For cognition in general, sure. Intuition, whether faculty or representation created by that faculty, without time is impossible for humans, but time is already given whether there be intuition or not. Your thesis should demonstrate how time is in fact a given, if it is, or, how the system would operate if it is not.

Finally….do you have a connection between the conception “memory” and the conception “consciousness”?

I have created an entire system of philosophy — TheGreatArcanum

Perhaps, but in order to have accomplished such a feat, pursuant to the query in the OP, logically consistent refutation of CPR B288 should be presented, or at least be expressed in abstentia.

The Kantian provision says….

“….. It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding….”

….which is to say, entities A and B, and the relations between them, are irrelevant without an exposition beforehand on the faculty of understanding, such that A and B are entities determinable as conceptions in a predicate, or entities as simple stand-alone subject.
————

On the other hand, if this should be the case provable in your thesis…..

does logical necessity not necessarily also imply temporal priority — TheGreatArcanum

….then you haven’t created an entire system of philosophy at all, but instead, merely clothed an established transcendental philosophy in a different colored dress, insofar as the understanding, being conditioned by time alone, makes temporal priority explicit in the deduction of its categories.

Still…..cheers for diving into the metaphysical deep end. Most folks don’t much care that there is one, and thereby don’t realize how deep it can be.

imagination is a topic which deserves more discussion- it is a very curious fact of human beings — Manuel

Cool as hell, ain’t it? One of several of those abstract conceptions talked about all the time, a veritable plethora of theories fall apart without them, while there being no such thing.

Minimum stimulation…certainly. Deer, for instance, if they don’t move, you can look right where one is and probably not see it as such.
————

it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday.
— Mww

The problem though is that the dog is not the complete perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, but you’re over-generalizing. Doesn’t matter what the complete perception is, when the judgement of congruency in successive cognitions of a single object, re: “the dog”, requires only the appearance of that object.

Of course we can view a general scene, not picking out any particular object, but picking out particular objects is Hume’s philosophical implication. The mind wouldn’t have an interest in a general scene, or an expanded perception when cognizant of a certain thing.

The reality is that we can perceive with all of the senses at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, no doubt. Maybe the best reason to remove Hume’s notion of perception having to do with the mind, and place it only in that which has to do with sensation. Then, while we may receive sensations from any combination of our five physical sensory devices, other faculties decide which are to become our cognitions.

Something changing is what causes a noise. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, but this works for sight as well. Technically, the irreducible principle is…the intelligibility of any cause is the change of which is its consequence.

I've given it considerable thought, and I just cannot understand Hume's description of perception as a succession of individual perceptions, related to each other through resemblance. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s easy enough to understand, just not easy to accept. Superficially, his account works well enough; it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday. Oversimplification, I know, but still a place to start.

He doesn't properly consider the continuous act of sensing and proposes interruptions to break this act it up into distinct perceptions. (…) this is only done to make perception consistent with thought — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe that’s exactly the key. If Hume understood it is only possible in humans to have one thought at a time, and asserting the mind to be the container of thoughts, Hume very well could have figured the mind can only do one thing at a time, which must include receiving impressions one at a time, otherwise he suffers self-contradiction. Even though this is logically consistent given the set of premises Hume worked with, it subsequently became obvious the premises were not as sufficiently explanatory as they need to be.

Beginning with the notion that the mind itself doesn’t explain anything that doesn’t depend on that which is supposed to be the constituents of it, or, if not constituency, than at least working in conjunction with it, it becomes clearer that whatever the constituency happens to be, it is that which is doing all the work, and it would behoove the philosopher to start his speculations by naming those and qualifying on their respective function.

It only took less than half a century for that shift to come about, met with almost as many objections as Hume himself caused with his philosophy. Metaphysics is indeed risky business.

Is that so clear to you? — Manuel

I think, sure. Add nails to a bucket; wait a few minutes, add some more. As far as the bucket is concerned, the second batch is a bunch of new nails. Still nails, but new compared to the original nails. Also, however full the bucket is, is contingent on how many batches of nails get put in it.
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Some animals see way more colors than we can (….) Or is this fact of perception contingent on the nervous systems they have? — Manuel

Yep. Each kind of animal’s nervous system is necessary for whatever that kind of animal perceives, but each animal’s perception is contingent on the system it has. It’s like….an object is an effect on our sense organs, while our sensory organs are affected by that object. Outward mind to object we have the necessity of being affected; inward from object to mind we have contingency of effective objects.

“….When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become
double….”

True story: when I was 12, I was in the basketball line-up, listening to the coach. Somehow I got absolutely fascinated by rapidly forcing my ears to open/close as fast as I could move my fingers, such that the coach’s voice was an on/off of sound, in which I heard only bits and pieces of words. It was soooo comical in its oddity; I wasn’t LOL, but I was obviously not paying attention. I got thrown off the team.

So we all receive impressions into our minds, contingent on the effect the object naturally has. In addition, now is included the falsified machinations of their respective deliveries. Our mind’s workings don’t change; the input to it, does. Tantamount to….falsified deliveries may indeed be exceptions to a rule, therefore can be deemed a form of contingency, but still not saying much about what the treatment of the deliveries by the rule is, hence the necessity that any and all deliveries are treated by the same rule, remains constant.

But Hume and I both were conditioned by something that never actually happened in the world beyond ourselves. For him, there were not two objects to look at, and for me there was not broken speech and the coach certainly wasn’t saying anything comical. These were treatments by minds, according to a rule, by which something follows necessarily as an experience. In what form the necessary experience manifests, is contingent on the treatment the mind endows to the impression.
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Kant did talk about it, but gave it a lesser role than Hume did… — Manuel

I’m not sure what Hume did with imagination itself other than stipulate its overall usefulness, but Kant split imagination itself into two separate and distinct forms, pursuant to the domain within the cognitive system. He gave us the reproductive imagination with respect to empirical phenomena, and productive imagination with respect to conceptions that arise absent phenomena. For whatever that’s worth, which isn’t much, insofar as the concern here is with Hume.
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…..imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it.
— Mww

Yes, and this may be putting too much power in the imagination. — Manuel

Imagination has no self-control, else it wouldn’t be imagination proper. If Kant gave more overall usefulness to an aspect of the system than Hume, it would be judgement, which became theorized as imagination’s governor. Then of course, judgement needs a governor, for which we shall designate the faculty of reason, but that only works in a tripartite logical system, so….futuristic indeed, for Hume.
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In the Enquiry, of the "missing shade of blue", which destroys his own theory — Manuel

It’s also presented in T. H. N. 1.,1.,1., towards the close of the section, but I didn’t bring it up due to the stipulation carried by the thread title.

If one just grants the mind will supply the missing shade, he can move on to other things about the mind. If one stops to wonder under what authority the mind provides it, then moving on without the required explanation jeopardizes the validity of all that follows. Back in 1738, the mind supplying the color was good enough, so…..onward and upward he went.

we have new perceptions every time we close and then open our eyes. — Manuel

In skepticism regarding the senses, “new” is used once…..

“…. I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observed in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another….”

….and if a new impression resembles perfectly a former impression…..what is new about it?

Despite my sympathy with regarding identity, which undercuts the standard notion of “new perceptions”, it appears that Hume intends us to understand “new” to merely indicate the difference in existential quality of the impression alone, a contingent condition of the mind, rather than existential quality of that by which the mind is impressed, which is a necessary condition of the object causing the impression.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next?

Now…..how do we describe this operation, when the interruption lasts for a week? And in an extreme case, how does this strongest relation “constant conjunction” work for a single impression, e.g., a visually discernible passing comet, or, the death of a particularly important person, in such case as the mind has nothing to which to “roll over”? Imagination must then supply its own ideas, and connect them to each other. But if “impressions are the cause of our ideas, not our ideas that cause impressions”, for any singular impression for which constant conjunction of its ideas doesn’t work with congruent certainty as with repetitive impressions, imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it.

There was subsequently a metaphysical theory perfectly describing how this works, but what would Hume say about it? I suspect he would have rejected it, insofar as having already granted imagination extraordinary power, he would have insisted that power cannot merely be the ground of the greater one the new theory prescribes, especially seeing as how he’s already denied its validity.

You know…..consign it to the flames kinda thing.

There is no neat way of introducing a new object while separating this strictly from continuity in time….. — Manuel

Separating this….what? Introduction of a new object? Time itself is continuous, so, no, there is no way to introduce a new object that doesn’t occur somewhere in the continuity of time. But time in general, while itself continuous, is not the series of continuous times of any particular object. For any object that did not exist, then it does, its time is only continuous from the time of its existence. So under these conditions, re: introduction of a new object to the mind as an impression/sensation, such introduction can be separated from the continuity of time in general.

because again, to register something as new would require us to recognize that the object in front of us is not exactly the same, as the object we were looking at mere moments ago. — Manuel

What do we use to qualify newness when we cannot perceive the difference in exactness regarding the object in front of us? If we’re talking impressions, we can’t use logic, insofar as logic has no bearing on mere perception, its sole domain being reason. Which raises another point: if we can’t distinguish exactness of successive impressions, and if impressions are the source of ideas, then it follows that there would be successively indistinguishable ideas corresponding to those indistinguishable impressions. Then….how would we know there was anything new?

In the case where a new object is nothing at all like the object we were looking at, in which case exactness is irrelevant, makes explicit the registration of change belongs to the perceiver, not the object. An object that changes in successive perceptions by the same perceiver, on the other hand, would necessarily be new at the logical level, but may still be represented by the same conception. Healthy apple on a tree, same rotten apple on the ground, is still an apple. Sorta like Descartes’ wax, right?

If you introduce cognition in addition to impressions….. — Manuel

That wouldn’t be fair to Hume. I don’t recall his use of the concept, do you? If so, be interesting to read the context.

However, each perception we have of the object is new…. — Manuel

Nevertheless, the moment of perception, if you will, is still new: the object ever so slightly changes, and so do we. — Manuel

Even from a Hume-ian point of view, in which a perception is that which is given to the mind, in this case as impression rather than idea, which contains a sensation involving the stimulation of sensory apparatus, from the perspective of that system in its operation, as it is performing its function, is it better to say a perception/impression/sensation/stimulus is new, or just in a successive time? If every successive perception is new, what is left to say about a perception that is in fact new, re: a stimulus that has not yet been an impression?

It is still very curious that each perception is new….. — Manuel

Yes, but the representation of these perceptions, is not, re: consciousness. The implication of each new perception is that we have to learn a thing every time we perceive it. Not very efficient of Nature to force that upon us, methinks.

…. and that IN our reasoning, we cannot connect our perceptions, though we can postulate an internal cognitive power, which does such binding for us — Manuel

You mean an internal cognitive power like, “… This resemblance is observed in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or passage of the imagination along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception.…”?

The problem of the connection of perceptions pointed out by Hume remains, or so it looks like to me, in terms of it being fiendishly difficult to focus on each perception and looking for the connection of perception of object O at T1, T2 and so on. — Manuel

Perception is impression and/or idea, so are we really looking for connection of perceptions, or are we looking for the connection of impression to idea, or, impressions/ideas to each other? Imagination, then gives us the connection between an impression, re: “sensation, emotion”, of O, and its idea, re: “thinking or reasoning” about the sensation of O, in any time of our relation to O, which gives us something about object O.

I don’t see this part as very difficult, so you must have meant something else.

….interested in your point of view regarding these questions…. — javra

You know what they say: careful what you wish for.

In the absence of all present and past impressions, what reasoning might such a hypothetical human yet engage in? — javra

I’d probably go with the notion there wouldn’t be any reasoning going on at all. Or, maybe, given how it is with us normally, I’d say if there was reasoning going on absent past and present impressions, it would be utterly unintelligible to us. I don’t see how I could think, if there was nothing to think about, which is what impressions give us. And I don’t think I’d understand a thing, if it were possible to think stuff like ideas, if those ideas never were presented with an object given from an impression I’ll never have.

The second part of your question, then…..

And this via what content? — javra

….becomes moot, insofar as if reasoning is not possible it may be because it lacks content, or if it is unintelligible, its content would be just as unintelligible as the reasoning to which it belongs.
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in Kantian terms, to paraphrase, (…) is it to be assumed that we’d yet hold the ideas of time as space as contents to reasoning? — javra

In Kantian terms, space and time are not the contents of reasoning. They are nothing but the necessary conditions for the possibility of reasoning. And even that’s not quite right, but close enough to what you’re trying to say. But to answer directly, I might say we might well hold the pure intuitions of space and time in abeyance until there is an impression given to us, which would extend to if even if that never happens. But then, it’d be pretty hard to call ourselves….or that hypothetical human…..human at all. Be a different kind of intellect, no doubt.
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But I’m here addressing the issue in what I take to be Hume’s favor: where it's argued that reasoning is brought about by impressions - such that there can be no reasoning in the complete absence of impressions and of that which is derived from impressions — javra

That’s just it. While it may be the case no reasoning is possible in the complete absence of impressions, reasoning is still very possible without an impression being given that represents the reasoning. We know what a beautiful thing would be upon perception of it, because we already have a sense of what it is to be beautiful. We can conceive infinity but never be impressed with a thing that is infinite. And, above all that, we dream things we’ve never done.
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I personally neither agree with empiricists nor rationalists, instead viewing both experience and reasoning as essential to epistemological content. — javra

I also view both empiricism and rationalism equally essential for empirical knowledge, or knowledge of the empirical content of our cognitions. But I think we have just as much capacity for pure rational thought in the form of logical relations, which have no empirical content. But, if I want to prove that logical relation, I must subject it to empirical conditions, let Mother Nature be the judge.

That’s my story and I’m sticking to it.

I do not like the idea of classing all things which appear to the mind, together as perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Neither do I, and nowadays, most people don’t. But in 1738……

Clearly a sense perception has a completely different type of existence from an emotion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, and they were duly distinguished beginning in Germany, mid-1700’s, not long after Hume’s Treatise. In fact, emotions…..for better or worse…..were removed from empirical cognitions entirely. Ramification here being the post-Renaissance reinstatement of an intrinsic human dualistic nature. Anathema to the then up-and-coming scientific/industrial revolution, indeed.

And I really think we need clarity on what Hume means by "reasoning". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, my question as well, as relayed to . He says what we get from it, re: ideas, but doesn’t go very far in describing what it is. Nowadays, we understand the missing exposition of reasoning in Hume, simply from the texts not having a theory specifying a system capable of it. He’s content to say this happens because of that, but not how this happens.

It is remarkable, that Hume often says stuff like….no one in his right mind can argue with me here….but that’s exactly what his successors did. Nevertheless, it is impossible to tell whether his successors argued because Hume was so obviously misguided, or because arguing is just what humans do.
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Without a separation between the different types of things which are present to the mind, we have no basis for saying that some perceptions are produced from the senses, and some are produced by reasoning — Metaphysician Undercover

Not only a separation in things presented to the mind, but separation in the ways the mind treats those things. Senses present to the mind nothing but empirical data; the mind presents to itself everything except empirical data. We know both of those kinds of things happen, so the account for them must accord with the differences, from which arises the internal/external, subjective/objective dichotomies.

And we’re off to the races…..

the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do. — javra

Overall, a well-thought post. Nothing in it to counter-argue conclusively. That being said, it might be worthwhile to consider the different between reason the faculty, which the infant hasn’t developed, and reason the innate human condition, by which development of the faculty is possible.

The infant human brain is sufficiently complex to imbue an autonomous nervous system, which is itself sufficient causality for the infant to breath without either reason or instinct.

That an infant doesn’t reason to the development or use of his faculty of reason, makes explicit something by which such development and use is possible to begin with. It becomes, then, perfectly logical for there to be an innate human condition, not itself a faculty but that which is antecedent to the faculty such that the faculty is possible. Such must be the case, for otherwise all humans would be born with immediate empirical knowledge, immediate language use, and the immediate ability for abstract constructs. They are not so born, which makes necessary nothing but the possibility for all that stuff they eventually do accomplish.

On the other hand, instinct, supposed as that by which an action is prescribed, but without any judgement whatsoever. Instinct says….do this, do this this way and do this now. No negotiations, no explanations, no if-ands-or-buts.

With these notions in mind, it is clear reason the innate human condition, and instinct the innate human capacity, are very different. Or, if not very different, then different enough such that it is unintelligible to interchange them. Like….can’t use a baseball bat to tell you what time it is kinda thing.

Which gets us inevitably to Hume, in that, being an empiricist relying exclusively on experience and observation for his philosophical precepts, says while it is not perfectly legitimate to use a baseball bat to tell him what time it is, he doesn’t have much choice because he doesn’t have a clock.

Anyway…..Hume came so close “…to consider the matter aright…”. Reason is wonderful and unintelligible in itself, but it is not so much an instinct in our souls, as a necessary condition of our humanity. Reason the faculty, then, reduces to merely a necessary condition of our intelligence, our humanity being presupposed.

”… Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding…." — Manuel

The times. Always the times. It was difficult for Hume and everyone else of those times, for none of them gave space and time, for the missing principle of simple inherence, and matter and form, for the principle of common connection, the re-consideration required to construct the foundation of a new and sufficiently explanatory theory.

Still, neither of those hypotheticals would work if the mind was not relieved of its being the seat of perceptions. Once perception became the purview of sensibility, the physical apparatus alone, then it became possible to separate cognitive functionalities, and at the same time connect them all together into a system.

And you know as well as I, that unless the power and absolute necessity of a priori reasoning denied by Hume and continental empiricists in general, became part and parcel of the rational human condition, there wouldn’t be a sufficiently explanatory theory, ever.
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The way it looks to me, is that he has presented us some rather big problems — Manuel

Exactly right: he presented the problems better than anyone else, in which his true claim to fame resides, but realized his inability to solve them. Highly commendable, I should think.

…..two important premises (…) The first one (...) we cannot doubt the existence of body, that to do so would be unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kinda-sorta. What he says first about the existence of bodies, is, “…it is in vain to ask whether there be body or not.…”, which is a weak euphemism for, don’t expect an answer if you do ask. It isn’t so much unreasonable to ask, as it is unreasonable to expect an answer.

This section regards skepticism with respect to the senses, which follows the section on skepticism regarding reason, so the beginning of this section carries over from it, in which it is reiterated that, “…so the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason…”. It appears then, that Hume, after tacitly relegating reason to an indefensible power, yet acknowledging that it is reason itself that allows one to ask about the existence of objects, the implication is that it is in vain to ask an indefensible power, pretty much anything at all. The skeptic continues to reason and believe, but simply cannot justify his reasoning and believing with the very tool he used to acquire to them.

I agree Hume intends it to be the case we cannot doubt the existence of bodies, insofar as he explicitly states, “… but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.…”. So yes, we take for granted that there are bodies, but under one and only one condition, which is…as long as we don’t reason or believe. Which still leaves us to prove what we’ve merely taken for granted. And how do we prove anything, without the trust of reason, for which we have been rightly shown we should be skeptical.

Do perceptions of the mind, re: impressions and/or ideas, count as reasonings? If they do, then bodies are granted. If they are not, bodies are not necessarily granted. Hume says, “…. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul…”. Apparently, then, impressions are not reasonings, from which follows the existence of bodies is not granted to impressions.

Ideas, on the other hand, he says, “…. By ideas I mean the faint images of these (impressions) in thinking and reasoning….”. Here it appears bodies are to be granted, insofar as “in all our reasonings” is the condition necessary for taking bodies for granted.

Now we got a problem, caused by, “… it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas...”, and, “…. impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions…”.

Holy Crap, Batman!!! We cannot grant the existence of bodies to sensations, where it belongs as a seemingly “first appearance”, because impressions are not reasonings, but the existence of bodies is granted to ideas, because it is reasoning, but impressions cause those ideas, so….sensation of an object cannot be so low as to be the same as its idea, impression of an object causes our reasoning to an idea of that object……the very reasoning of which we have already been shown we should be skeptical of.

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas?

Disclaimer: It must be in the “in all our reasonings” by which this apparent absurdity arises, to which I admit. I hope you notice that by quoting Hume verbatim I am making a concerted effort to suppress my Kantian prejudices.

Where did I go wrong? And if I didn’t, or not enough to bother, then is it any wonder that dogmatic slumbers awoke?

Agreed, neither drawn from, nor extracted by, experience, and both innate conditions. I might add that the animal has instinct moreso than reason, while the human animal has reason moreso than instinct. He became civilized, donchaknow. Instinct no longer serves as well as reason.

Like Hume…..diminuating degrees regarding instinct, but accumulating degrees regarding judgement, kinda like the argument in your 1. 4. 1.

My reading of Hume is that he does take reason to be a faculty on its own, but he consistently tries to show how weak it is — Manuel

Ahhhh….cool. Thanks. There are places where he seems to give that impression, but doesn’t come right out and say it.
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….reason told us for thousands of years that we were the center of the universe, which is not at all a silly view due to the evidence available at the time — Manuel

Yep. Judgement parsed the evidence, reason found no contradictions. POOF!! Knowledge.

Later, judgement parsed new evidence, reason found no contradictions: new knowledge.

Evidence, judgement and knowledge changed over time, reason did not.
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The reason we trust is reason the human condition, not reason the cognitive faculty. The former is a logical system, the latter is an aspect of the system. That’s what I meant to say, but I strayed from a thread concerned with a philosophy that doesn’t have this as a precept. My bad.

substituting 'Nature' for 'God', so it's not such an advance as it might seem. — Srap Tasmaner

Hmmmm. 1., 3., sec XIV intimates Hume considers them as quite different, even if one follows from the other.
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Hume is quite clear that the belief in body does not arise either from the senses or from reason, but from a sort of instinct, and much of this chapter is in some ways a description of how we adapt ourselves to having this instinct — thus the 'double existence' theory. — Srap Tasmaner

I’d have to examine deeper, to affirm adaptation to instinct suffices for a cause. I can see where he denies senses and reason as being sufficient cause of belief, but not that some kind of instinct, is.

But your comment is quite beautiful in itself. I’ll work on incorporating as much of it as I can justify.