The ghost story remark was meant to emphasize that it's superfluous. — Pie

What’s superfluous? Experience? The remark? Doesn’t matter; I’m not interested in the superfluous.

I do believe that norms govern our claims..... — Pie

What norms; what is a norm and from whence do they arise? And for that in which you merely believe, what governance can there be?

Do you believe in some kind of wordless angelic 'language' of 'pure' concept, unsoiled by the filthy outerworld ? — Pie

What.....you don’t? That can’t be right; you’ve already admitted to it, calling it “one and universal”.

'Experience' is a ghost story — Pie

Yes it is, as are all such abstracted explanatory devices regarding proposed speculative methodologies. So what? Must it be said, then, that there is no such thing as experience, simply because talking about it removes it from its occurrence which isn’t and can’t be talked about?

Even if there isn’t, as the cognitive neurobiologists are wont to insist, still we are predisposed by our very nature to call out by name whatever it is that seems to be happening in us, not to judge an obtained internal understanding, but iff such internal speculative mechanism is accompanied by a wish to promote an explanation of that judgement.

I can be right or wrong about the world all by myself.....
— Mww

I don't dispute that rational agents can make true or false claims. — Pie

That I make empirical mistakes relative to the eternal world says nothing about a private language nor about whatever normative reports....or even internal rationalizing excuses.....I may offer following from such mistakes.

Do we not bark and hiss in these inherited norm-governed, sound patterns known as English ? — Pie

Sure we do, but it is never necessary that we do, with respect to the aforementioned minimally rational intelligible epistemic situations.
—————

The problem is when the solipsist tells me that I can't know there's a world beyond me. — Pie

We rational ones ought not care at all what lil' Rene smarty pants figures out just for himself. — Pie

Smarty Pants paved the way for disappearing the problem. Even if a good god or a bad demon rather than a merely foolish solipsist is the source of your apparent deception, there is recourse, and you are it. Nothing more than, hey!! I jumped the shark, so can you!!!

Can’t blame the late Renaissance or Enlightenment folks that removed the deistic impediment to human intellectualism, for the nonsense of the post-moderns who, in fancying their supposed progress, did nothing more than install a different one.

I claim that the minimum rational intelligible epistemic situation is a plurality of persons subject to the same logic and together in a world that they can be right or wrong about. — Pie

Your view is so close to mine. Do you not see that ? — Pie

I can be right or wrong about the world all by myself, thank you very much. So, no, I don't see it, sorry.

It's not 'I think' but 'we think.' — Pie

You stipulated Descartes’ cogito, so it follows from the original French (1637) Discourse on Method, Pt 4.....

“... je pense, donc je suis....”

.......and subsequently in First Principles 1. 7., 1644.....

“....So this item of knowledge—I’m thinking, so I exist—is the first and most certain thing to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way....”

....that ol’ Rene intended it to be understood cogito relates to individuals, even if speaking in general regarding all individuals. So...it is “I think”, not “we think”. You know.....philosophizing in an orderly way.
———-

Unless of course it's not just babble...and you appeal to a reason or logic that binds us both... — Pie

I do so appeal, but only insofar as it is at least counterproductive, and at most utterly absurd, to suppose we are not of the same intellectual character. In whatever form that character manifests, does nothing to detract from the fact that there is one, and it is common to all of us. Otherwise, one relinquishes his claim to being human.

That being said, philosophizing in an orderly way completely destroys.....

....the assumption that the external world, the one beyond 'my' experience, is merely a more or less reasonable hypothesis. — Pie

.....insofar as the external world in toto is the ground of my experience, which makes explicit the external world beyond my experience, is no less the external world, but only of my possible experience. What the external world beyond my experience, and thereby the possible experience of it, can be....is a reasonable hypothesis. Conditioned by changes in time, not the permanence in reality.

Philosophizing in an orderly way reduces our minimal epistemic commitment to.....granting that for which the negation is impossible. Which, ironically enough, gets us right back to Descartes’ philosophy that everybody hates.

But then, “in an orderly way” is a subjective judgement, so, there is that.......(sigh)

It doesn't make sense for us to use logic (...) to a argue against the (...) force of logic.... — Pie

It makes perfect sense, for us, taken as a community of identical intelligences. It makes no sense for each of us, individually, with respect to ourselves alone. The intrinsic circularity of human reason, formerly called its illusory nature, in the most basic construction and use of logic and logical principles a priori, has been exposed for centuries.

We need to go back to the absolutely minimal notion of whatever there is to make correct or incorrect statements about. — Pie

How to know that, without the antecedent conditions for making correct or incorrect statements. Getting back to the minimal notions for that which justifies the conditions for the correctness of statements.....
————-

I claim that the minimum rational intelligible epistemic situation is a plurality of persons subject to the same logic — Pie

The absolutely necessary ground for the possibility of skeptical opinion, the very thing said to not make sense for us, insofar as any one subject operating from congruent logical form yet employing dissimilar objects premised by his own logical principles, can readily, and possibly successfully, argue against any other subject’s logic.

Affirming cogito, while not doing much to “fix” it.

More cart-before-the-horse metaphysics.....

Less like truth, more like meaning. — creativesoul

Short, sweet, to the point....the boon of good philosophizing.

Scopes......(chuckles to self).

Still, at the end of the day, I’m more convinced by my own logical reasoning than I am persuaded by another’s semantics. I never question my own meanings, for then understanding must question itself insofar as it is the source of all my meanings and is therefore a self-contradiction, but invariably question another’s logical reasoning.

consistent language use alone is insufficient evidence to conclude that what's being said is true.... — creativesoul

True enough, insofar as determinations of what is true has nothing to do with what’s being said in the first place.

Counterpoint: the bane of philosophy doesn’t reside in wrong kind of value placed on consistent language use. It is that consistent language use is valued at all.

Is there an external material world? (....) Such questions are the bane of philosophy. They are consequences of placing (...) the wrong kind of value upon consistent language use. — creativesoul

What would the right kind of value look like?

philosophy must be done within the limits of our concepts and language, — Hello Human

Philosophy can only be done within the limits of reason, philosophizing is done within the limits of language.
———-

It's a matter of what existed in its entirety prior to, and thus regardless of, all accounting practices thereof thereafter. — creativesoul

“Its” being experience, the assertion is true iff the accounting practice is reason itself, brain machinations aside, insofar as it would be very difficult to establish neurological function as an accounting practice.

We select from among a range of options which phenomena, to use (possibly abuse) your terminology, we are to make a concept. — Isaac

I see what you’re saying, but I find it rather inefficient. According to the Old Guys, each perception generates only its own phenomenon, so a range of them, for any one perception, generates inefficiency. But we do, on the other hand, select from a range of options what constitutes each phenomenon, which is the purview of the productive imagination, so there is a selection process in there.
————-

The boundary separating tree from not-tree is real, a phenomena we sense, but it is not the only available real boundary. — Isaac

Again, I somewhat agree, your boundary being my limitation, both being real. Each property of any object has its own boundary/limitation, the totality of them determining te phenomenon as such, and from that, how the object is to be named.

Something like that?

I think a major sticking point between Old Guys and New Guys is.....where are phenomena to be found, in the complete picture.

Some things we think about are themselves existentially dependent upon words. — creativesoul

Special Relativity...a physical relation of the Universe to us....does not need words. To think about Special Relativity and form his theory thereof, Einstein used his imagination; to record the objects of his imagination as a theory he used words and symbols. When I think about the theory, I use the words of it, but not the symbols because I am not proving the hypotheses contained by the theory, to form in me the images the words represent, just the reverse of what Einstein did. So, yes, my thought about SR depends on Einstein’s words, insofar as the images I think for myself are given from the affects the external words perceived as mere objects prescribe, to which I assign my own understanding. This works quite well for SR and GR, but not so well for QM. At least for me.
—————-

the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience". That cannot be right. — creativesoul

It could be right, if experience is define as having content. Or, if a principle of a theory of experience mandates that an empty experience is impossible. Herein, experience is not so much defined, as necessarily conditioned, is susceptible to certain criteria in order to be an experience. Biggest mistake in metaphysics, is reification; experience is not a thing, it is an logical end given from consistently determinable logical means.
—————-

Those and many other experiences existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices.
— creativesoul

No. Something existed prior to our naming practices. — Isaac

Keyword: practices. The practice of, the innate ability to, name, may be as necessary to human intelligence as reason itself, but the actual employment of that ability does not occur absent that which is to be named. And that is conditioned by time, insofar as there is only and always a mere undetermined something prior to its name. That which is a mere something, is phenomenon; that which is named, is conception, which may or may not be given from phenomenon, but is so necessarily with respect to real objects.

how could non-verbal images be used to symbolize abstract notions.....generality — Janus

(grain of sand/beach)

specificity — Janus

(Grain of sand/this beach)

exception — Janus

(Grain of sand/not this beach)

pattern — Janus

(Grain of sand/beach; this beach; not this beach; any beach; all beaches)

All parenteticals can be images, obviously. Now, perhaps I’m treating your “abstract notions” as universals, which may have particulars as their objects. I did that because, technically speaking, abstract notions are pure conceptions that do not have objects of their own, which makes explicit they cannot be represented by either words or images, but only the relations which constitute them, may.
————

Now my claim has just been that a complex argument or train of thought involving abstract concepts cannot be followed except in symbolic language terms. — Janus

Agreed, with the caveat “cannot be followed”. It remains that while it is rather absurd to suppose I have a complex argument with myself, I can nonetheless have a complex chain of thought comprised of a series of conjoined images, which, of course, no one else could follow. Or, in fact, even know about. To objectify my chain of thought, such that another could both know and possibly understand it, language would be necessary.

There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about. — creativesoul

True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? While it is true every thought must have its object, it does not follow that ever object must be a word.

We're considering whether or not any thought needs words...... — creativesoul

It’s been established that some thoughts need words....thoughts with wordsk as their object.

......any and all meaningful coherent answers to that particular question are based completely upon what counts as thought that needs words, as well as what counts as thought that does not. — creativesoul

Ok....the kind of thought that has words as its object counts as the kind of thought that needs words. The kind of thought that has anything but words as its object.....why does that kind of thought need them?

It seems to me that the difference between thought that needs words and thought that does not is one of existential dependency. The former is existentially dependent upon words, and the latter is not. — creativesoul

Ok, fine. A thought that needs words to exist is impossible without the words that are its object. This is true for particular thoughts of a certain kind, but does not hold for thought in general. It follows that the existence of thought in general is not necessarily existentially dependent on words. Which is exactly where we began this dialectic.

Here we face a 'problem' though. If we claim that simple thought existed prior to the first words...... — creativesoul

That’s not the claim, which is simple thought doesn’t require words. Simple thoughts occur whether or not words exist, and regardless of their temporality relative to thought in general.

......and we aim to set out that kind of thought, then we are taking account of that which existed in its entirety prior to our taking it into account. — creativesoul

Yes, we can do that. Aim to set out, and, take account, are just about the same thing, so when we do either we are describing something. So we are describing an antecedent. Can’t account for that which hasn’t occurred, I wouldn’t think.

Thus, we can get it wrong! — creativesoul

This carries the implication that the occurrence and the account of the occurrence can be incompatible. I submit this only possible from a distinction in chronological reference frames. I have often taken account of an existant thought and found it wanting, but only from the perspective of a successive, and conceptually differentiated, thought. Commonly called instruction if from external source, or introspection if from the same internal source.
———-

if we're using the term as a means to take account of that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking it into account...... — creativesoul

I understand this as....if we use thought to take account of thought, to which I agree wholeheartedly...

......then whatever we say about such thought must not only be consistent with the ability to exist in its entirety prior to words, but our account must set out how it can/does. — creativesoul

.....but now it is that what we say that takes account. So what we say must be consistent with our thoughts...yes, it should, in order to be productive. The account sets out the consistency between the thought and the account we take of it, by relegating words to the representations of the conceptions that are the content of our thoughts. In this theory, the consistency in the account is given, under the assumption of an otherwise rationally operative intelligence.

You’re a tough nut to crack, mon ami, and hopefully I did some justice.

Ahhh, yes, thanks. Both my guess that’s what you meant, and my assertion observational statements are not what Kant is “splitting” between analytic and synthetic, is validated.

You may have a valid argument in its own right, just not with respect to Kant. Something more modern than Enlightened, more analytic than continental, more conventional than metaphysic.....

Yeah....I don’t know what an observational sentence would be, except maybe sentences regarding observations. I hope it’s not that, because that has nothing to do with what Kant split.

That a triangles angles add up to 180 degrees was an analytical truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

“.....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical....”
(CPR.....referential pagination unavailable, cuz I’m not at home. Sorry)

Except that non-euclidean geometries were later developed where triangles' angles don't add up to 180 degrees — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kant knew of spheres, and knew triangles could be drawn on spheres, and surely would have noticed the difference with respect to planar triangles. Doesn’t matter if he didn’t, and does nothing to negate his proofs, insofar as his exposition respecting triangles stipulates straight lines. In fact, to even arrive at the truth that interior angles on a sphere sum to more than 180 degrees, involves exactly the same synthetic a priori deductive judgements as demonstrated in the text.

It's unclear if there are analytical truths. Or rather, even if there are, there is no clear way to distinguish then from arbitrary dogmatic beliefs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Doesn’t matter. The only reason for analytic truths in Kant, is to set the stage for the possibility of what isn’t that, but at the same time, uses the LNC for its logical validity. Even if it’s a dogmatic belief, albeit hardly arbitrary I should think, while still susceptible to the LNC, it is a valid dogmatic belief, therefore useful for subsequent hypotheses, particularly in regard to the determination of principles.

As far as Quine is concerned, you were probably directing that to the Josh, I already know it, so I’ll leave it alone.

Observational sentence?

How would that look? — Marchesk

The solution looks like some form of transcendental idealism, insofar as it uses, rather than disregards, an intrinsic logical dualism in the human intellect.

First....because it is a metaphysical problem, it must look like a metaphysical solution;
Second....it would look like an epistemological solution, if it explains something we want to know;
Third....it would look like a logical solution, if it is predicated entirely on logical conditions;
Finally....it looks like a solution based on, or incorporating, relations, because that about which we want to know involves conditions that do not belong to us, in juxtaposition to conditions that do.

There is an established metaphysical solution, predicated on logical conditions, sufficiently explanatory for what we want to know, which effectively combines direct empirical realism with indirect representational idealism in a single intelligence.

Whether the solution is worth a damn has nothing whatsoever to do with how old it is, or whatever name by which it is called, but is a function of how many of its core tenets are held in common by its opponents, which merely exemplifies the very human intellectual duality upon which the proposed solution is predicated.

And the fact none of a metaphysical solution’s core tenets are susceptible to empirical proof is irrelevant, because all physical sciences with co-relevant procedural constituency, are equally unprovable. Beside the point that the dialectical discourse is in a philosophy medium, not one in which empirical proofs for the validity of its arguments, is absolutely necessary.

That’s how it would look......to me.
———-

nobody can quite agree on the terms under dispute — Marchesk

Same as it ever was, throughout the ages, right?

Mighten it be a fundamental misconception, to attribute to “appearance” the notion of “looks like” as opposed to the notion of “makes present to”? If so, what a thing “looks like” may be considered an imputed logical relation by a system of intelligence capable of it, but to be “presented to” may only be a direct effect on the system, having only a physical relation to it. From that, it is hypotetically feasible that both indirect and direct relations occur, with respect to things real, insofar as logical relations cannot manifest in mere physical presence, and mere physical presence cannot authorize logical resemblance.

What is perceived is real directly, insofar as that thing is not mediated by a system; what is experienced is real, but mediated by a system to which it is given by its presence, thus, with respect to perception, is real indirectly.

What really....I mean REALLY....is the problem here? How come, in 50-odd pages, consensus that the possibility of both forms of realism may be incorporated necessarily in the human cognitive system? If each form is justifiably refutable by the other, and the exceptions to each as a general rule are rampant, then the ground of the possibility of both, each limited to its own specific domain, but functioning in unison towards a given end, becomes the better option.

(Back in the day, on the tv show Taxi, Danny Divito and Judd Hircsh were arguing about something, and Cristopher Lloyd, butts in with some comment. They both give him The Look, to which he says, completely deadpan, “oh, I’m sorry, am I still here?”. Call me Lloyd)

One entity represents a massive thought complex. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. Mathematics comes to mind.

I would whole heartedly agree that words presuppose thinking.... — creativesoul

My major premise, the fundamental ground of my argument. I shall call that a win, and issue an exuberant....and wholeheartedly honest....thank you.

.....to be more precise and consistent, some does anyway. — creativesoul

I might agree some complex thought does not presuppose words, but rather, ensue from them, insofar as the words are given to me, from which my complex thoughts arise, in which case, I may treat of those words as any of my perceptions. Still, the dialectical continuity should limit the relation of word and thought to individual subjects.
————

Acknowledging that some thought is existentially dependent upon language does not force us into saying that all thought is. — creativesoul

But it does force a sufficient explanation as to the relation between the quality of thoughts wherein words are necessary and the quality thoughts wherein they are not. Parsimony...the elimination of self-contradiction...should suggest thought does not have a quality, such that it follows words perform no qualitative conditioning on them, or, the quality of thoughts resides in some other procedural constituent.
————

Wondering about time is a kind of thought that needs words. — creativesoul

Does it? The first thing that occurs to me, is an image of a device by which a change can be demonstrated. Never does the representation arise in the form of a word. I will agree, nonetheless, that wondering about time, as the subject of a series of propositions, might elicit a series of representations of words I’ve experienced concerning what others have said about it. But then, when I do that, in effect, all I’m doing is treating my own private cognition as if I am in the process of expressing myself.

Which leads inevitably to this: do you see where ego might explain the position that complex thoughts require words? Complex thoughts would require words, merely from the seeming that whatever is being thought, ought to be expressed? Or, perhaps, I am so desperate to be understood, I treat my thoughts as if they were words, in order to facilitate the congruency of the recipient’s understanding. Dos the sound of a thought carry the same weight as the thought?

Given those possibilities, it is clear words may adjust the quality of a complex thought, thus can be said to be necessary for such adjustment. But not necessary for the thought itself. Also given is possible sufficient reason for simple thoughts requiring no words at all, insofar as the quality of simple thoughts is determined by its simplicity. If one does not understand how I arrived at the word “BOOM!!!”, then he will have great difficulty with how I understand, e.g., religion, should I talk to him about it.
—————

Not all opinions are equal. — creativesoul

Oh, but they are. The correspondence between the truth of them, and that to which it is directed, may not be. Opinion is merely a relative judgement, after all.

The disagreement in our respective frameworks, is predicated on the differences in our definitions. Still, given that.....

the human brain has not undergone much evolution at all over the past ten thousand or so years. — creativesoul

...it remains that our brains work compatibly with each other, which implies our thinking must, if thinking is only a production of brain mechanics necessarily. How we think about things, on the other hand, is governed by the contingency of our experiences, and not the stationary condition of our physiology.
————-

this is not our first exchange. — creativesoul

And time well spent, I must say, even if this....

You misunderstand the modern argument. Mine anyway. — creativesoul

....is the case.

Set out that transcendental argument for us again.... — Banno

“....we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition....”

Now that’s only a premise in the transcendental argument, but you know how it is, that....

The arguments are detailed, and get lost in the noise of the forums. — Banno

On your view... — creativesoul

In my view.....
......it is preposterous, bordering on the catastrophically absurd, that the totality of that of which I am aware, re: the entirely of my cognitions, requires that I read, write and speak;
......if language developed as a means of simplex expression by a single thinking human subject, or as a means of multiplex communication between a plurality of thinking human subjects, then it is the case language presupposes that which is expressed or communicated by it;
......if language is assemblage of words, and words are the representations of conceptions, and language is the means of report in the form of expression or communication, then language presupposes the conceptions they represent, and on which is reported;
......thinking is cognition by means of conceptions. If language presupposes conceptions, and conceptions are the form of cognitions, and cognition is thinking, then words presuppose thinking.
......that which presupposes cannot be contained in that which is presupposed by it;
.....there is no language in thinking; there is language in only post hoc reports on thinking.
————

If language is so all-fired necessary for the formation of complex thoughts, why did we come equipped with the means for the one, but only for the means of developing the other? Why did we not come equally equipped for both simultaneously, if one absolutely requires the other? The robotics engineer manufactures a machine with pinpoint circuit board soldering accuracy; the toddler has somewhat less accuracy but still understands the distinction between thing-as-object and thing-as-receptor-of object, and the congruency of shape for both, to put a round object in a round hole.

So I come upon a thing, some thing for which I have absolutely no experience whatsoever. Maybe something fell to Earth, maybe I discovered something previously unknown in the deep blue. The modern argument seems to be......I can form no complex thoughts about that new thing, can have no immediate cognition of it, unless or until I can assign words to it. But, being new, which words do I assign if I don’t cognize what the new thing appears to be? What prevents me from calling the new thing by a name already given to an old thing?

And, of course, everything is new at one time or another.

Views: Like noses. Everybody’s got one.

Everyone has a box with something in it.....major premise;
The something is a beetle....minor premise;
The box might be empty....minor premise.

Conclusion?

But the major is not an either/or propositional dichotomy. Everyone has a box with something in it, so the box that one has, has something in it.

The reconciliation is that “beetle” might be not anything (“...the box might be empty...”). Hence arises the absurdity, for then the box, being empty, still contains not anything.

(Double sigh)

Ahhhhh...so Erwin plagiarized Ludwig. Bet they weren’t best of friends.

There’s still something inside each person’s box — Michael

Yeah.....about that....

“.....Suppose everyone had a box with something in it....
“.....the box might even be empty...”

In what sense, given a box, can that box both have something in it and not have something in it?

(Sigh)

I suppose. I really don’t have a trust-with-my-life kinda thing for this question. I’m stuck between what appears to be the intrusion of anti-narrative, OLP philosophy in the analytic tradition onto theory-laden speculative metaphysics in the continental tradition. That is, regarding the latter, a simple thought vs a complex thought is merely a matter of content, any thought at all being nothing more than a “cognition by means of conceptions”. With regard to the former, on the other hand, the distinction between simple vs complex thought seems to be a matter of form, one only possible with, the other possible without, words.

I guess I fail to understand why it shouldn’t be the case that an aggregate of simple thoughts possible without words, couldn’t become a complex thought, which then would necessarily itself be without words. Maybe the simple/complex distinction is merely a condition of time. Maybe the longer there is a simple thought, the more complex it becomes.

But then....time itself, being a mere condition for, cannot be considered a content of, so we are left with the notion that the time of just indicates a time to adjoin an aggregate of simples. Which is probably where the notion of intentionality...an altogether post-modern precept...originates, insofar as even if time to amend is enabled, there is nothing about the pure intuition of time that demands its fulfillment.

But then....isn’t that exactly what understanding is, at least from the meta-narrative continental POV? The most thorough combination of amendable conceptions possible? Such that there can be no contradiction in the cognition that follows from it, the combining making time to combine, necessary?

I think I shall remain content that a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought. I affirm that complex thoughts are indeed possible, but deny the necessity of language as the ground of their possibility.

Best guess: pick somebody, ask ‘em. “Meant by” is always a subjective judgement, so.....be ready.

HA!!!! It’s only 51 pages. You haven’t found a definition in there anywhere? What ever happened to due diligence, huh???

Kidding.

Mouse running behind a tree....wordless image....united schematicized conceptions......simple thought.

“Mouse running behind a tree”....construction of a proposition.....united schematized conceptions.....discursive judgement....complex thought.

Gold star????

Could you think all the thoughts (or any) in the CPR without language, for example? — Janus

CPR is all language representing Kant’s thoughts, so no, I cannot think Kant’s thoughts. But I can, and have, represent(ed) Kant’s words, thus indirectly his thought, with objects of my own imagination. Like.....you know those new-fangled downspouts on fancy houses these days, that are just painted plastic chains, where rain water travels down them without falling off? The rain all over the roof is objects out there; the gutters are the sense organs, collecting and directing all the objects where they need to go, rather than just overflowing and falling all over the place; the chains are the nerves that transport the collected stuff to the only destination appropriate for that stuff. The collected stuff traveling down the chains is.....of course......phenomena.

Yes, words are tools.
—————

My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language. — Janus

Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words?

We accessed what Kant had taken to be an inaccessible world. — Banno

“....That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only, that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some future time....”

The hypothesis is that what we see might be totally different to a conjectured, inaccessible world about which we can say nothing. — Banno

Not a hypothesis, but a logically provable axiomatic principle.

“....we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition....”

If this world is inaccessible, and if we can say nothing about it, then how could it be the cause of what we do see? — Banno

The cause of what we do see must be accessible.....

“....For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd....”

The cause for perception in us, re: human sensibility (cause = object/effect = representation of object), is not the kind of cause for that which is perceived by us, re: principled natural law (cause = object/effect = object).

The corrected hypothesis, therefore, should be......for us, apodeictic certainty that what we know corresponds precisely with what actually is, is impossible.

Kant has a lot to answer for. — Banno

As does anyone who isn’t perfect.
(Cue soundtrack of one hand clapping)

I am curious as to whom your "muttered insults" are directed. — Janus

Ehhhh.....nobody. Me being flippant.
————-

How could we possibly be constantly aware of the stream of thought, when we need to be aware of other things — Janus

3B neurotransmitter connections per mm3 at somewhere around the SOL....brain can handle just about anything the senses throw at it. Experience enables relative disassociation....you no longer have to think about getting the fork squarely into your mouth. Comb your hair without a mirror. Add more and more complex numbers with less and less paper and pencil. Or, I guess, these days....reference to a phone with a calculator embedded in it.

All awareness of things just is the stream of thought.
—————

None of this makes any sense to me, or accords with my own experience of what is involved in thinking. (...) I cannot see how it is possible to think anything discursive without language. — Janus

Fine, no problem. One metaphysical doctrine may be more logically sufficient than another, but it can never be proved as more the fact.

My experience is:
Since I was a kid, when reading something, I never saw the words, but pictured what the words say. Skim right over the words, like they weren’t even there. Now you might say that’s what you’re talking about, thinking by means of words (even if not noticed they are still causal), but there is congruent functionality when I tie my shoe (I never speak about “right hand this way, left hand that way, twist wrist, pinch with finger”....I just “see” the physical interaction and “seeing” without eyes is thinking by imaging).

But you might come back with....well, somebody had to tell you, with words, how to tie shoes way back when, right? But if that is true, and nobody told me anything about tying shoes....I’d never be able to do it? It would be absolutely impossible for me to ever put two strings together in some fashion that prevents my shoes from falling of my feet, if no one told me how or I never read the instruction manual?

Go to the grocery store. Got your “honey-do” pick-up list, full of words. Upon arrival at the appropriate aisle, you look at the list, perceive a word that represents the thing you want....you’ve been told....to load into the cart, look up on the shelf, find the thing that relates to the word. But word is nowhere to be found, it is not the word you put in the cart, it is the thing represented by the word. Off you go, next aisle, put a thing in the cart that wasn’t represented by a word on the list. Impulse purchase; spontaneous determination....Oooo, that looks yummy!!! How did you accomplish the exact same function, but under two different conditions? If you put two particular things in the cart, one because of a word on a piece of paper, and the other without words or paper, then the word cannot be the cause of things in the cart necessarily, which is the same as words are not necessary for the end result of a cognition....even if, as in this case, a mere desire.

So if...IF.....for those working scenarios so mundane as reading and shoe-tying and spontaneous whatevers.....mighten it not work for every damn thing? If it is indeed possible to acquire knowledge without spoken or written language, as is the case for the first time for everything, for everybody, then it is the case that language is always a secondary cognitive functionality.

Besides the obvious....nothing ever got a name that a human didn’t give to it, language is nothing more than an assemblage of names, therefore language is a product of, thereby related to, but not the cause of, human cognition.
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Your own experience is.....?

thoughts cannot be understood except as they are expressed in language. — Janus

You must mean one’s thoughts cannot be understood by another except as they are expressed in language.

Content just is symbolic, linguistic; what else could it be? — Janus

What else it could be is precisely what it is. Content of any particular thought is the schema/schemata of the conception/s representing it. The schemata are represented by images. Therefore the content of thought is the schema/schemata of the conception/s contained in it. A symbolic, linguistic representation nowhere yet to be found. Images as representations are rational, imbued in all humans; language as representation is cultural imbued in particular humans. Images are common across all subjects, words are not.

But surely you know all that, so.....what gives?
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It seems we are thinking all the time, while not being conscious of most of it — Janus

Yes, we’re thinking continuously while conscious, and the fact we’re not aware of most of it is reflection on our laziness on the one hand, and the simplistic, repetitive lives we lead on the other. So busy impressing everybody else we overlook ourselves. Got this one-of-a-kind intellectual gift, and don’t know shit about how it works.
(Wanders off, muttering insults, kicking the fake rubber tree pot and the way out.....)

Is it possible to examine thoughts by introspection? — Janus

The only way to study anything at all, is to represent it as a phenomenon if it’s a real object, or as a conception if it’s an abstract object. But the human system, predicated on relations, can cognize nothing by a single representation, insofar as a single representation doesn’t have anything to which it relates. So to study a thought, considered as an abstract object in itself, and without regard to the content of it, it must be turned into a conception. How can we conceive of something that has no content?

(“...Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind....”)

And if we think of the thought we’re studying as having the relation which made it a thought in the first place, such that it is not an empty nothing, all we’re doing is re-creating, not studying, what we’ve already thought. All that does for us is confuse the matter, insofar as that which we re-create cannot be distinguished from that which is already in consciousness, which means we might not have re-created anything, but just recalled it. In which case, we’re studying something we already know all about.

Which brings up another issue. If it is the case that thoughts are singular and successive, then each thought is of its own time. If it is impossible to jump back to the time of a thought and to jump to the future of a possible thought, then no thought can be studied insofar as its time is not the time of the thought that studies it. We can study the contents of any thought, provided such content is common to a multiplicity of thoughts......but not the singular abstract conception itself.

Much more parsimonious, and less self-contradictory, to study what it is to think, rather than study a thought. We might be alright if we limit introspection to the examination of the relation of faculties to each other, but introspection becomes hopelessly tangled if we use it to examine the faculties themselves.

Besides....best to keep it as simple as possible, but no simpler than necessary. Somebody mentioned that some time ago...can’t remember who.

Truth be told, I must admit to only being able to articulate someone else’s model. I ain’t nowhere’s near smart enough to come up with a decent, original myself. But then, I don’t need to repeat what’s already been done.

OK, so....a model.

First, some assumptions:
.....does a human being think (or whatever one choses to call that pesky voice in his head that never seems to shut the hell up).....check;
.....does a human being receive sensory data (or whatever one choses to call that oh-so-subtle imaging process in his head that only goes away when he chose not to need it).....check;
.....does a human being ask himself, even if only once in awhile, about stuff for which he has no answer, and then, if he has no answer, creates one that makes him feel good....check;
.....is there stuff in the human intelligence in general, no matter which head contains it, the denial of which is impossible....check.

Given those assumptions, enter the guy that figures out a bunch of parts, assembles them into an explanatory method sufficient to turn those assumptions into succession of logically consistent internal mental events.

And there’s your model. Which fine for the talking, but means not a damn thing to the doing. I’m mean.....you gotta use the very thing you’re trying to model. Every abstract cognitive notion suffers the same map/territory paradoxical circularity. But whatcha gonna do, when you don’t even know with apodeictic certainty what you have to work with.

Hey.....

Yeah, I read the paper, happy with it, good for some to hang his hat on, but, I’m good with what I know.

Thing is....mind is just a catch-all, a logical placeholder to prevent infinite regress, having nothing to do with speculative theoretics as a system. For instance, in searchable Guyer/Wood (1998) CPR, brain has four returns, mind 176, but reason has 1400+.

So there is no metaphysical trap, per se. Mind is just that which is conceived when we....carelessly......step one idea over the explanatory threshold.

My opinion only, of course.

cognition can't be an active state because it doesn't interact with the external states — Isaac

True, it doesn’t. But external states are absolutely necessary for the representations (empirical) cognition does act upon. Activity herein being internally systemic. All in accordance with a specific speculative theory, hence not necessarily the case. Feasible, possible, non-contradictory....sure; the way things really are........ehhhhh, maybe not.
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it's a wonder either of us can understand a word the other says. — Isaac

And here is a perfect example of the depth of Kantian metaphysics. Think about it for a minute: you say you are amazed you can understand a word I say, but it is probably closer to the truth that you understand perfectly well what I say. The possible obscurity resides in the judgement you make upon receiving what I say, when you compare it to what you mean by the same word or conception you already possess.

The tripartite system in action:
(Deleted for being too long and dawn out, and perhaps only of passing interest anyway)

To study the mind presupposes it. So.....if mind is the unconditioned relative to human cognitive systems, what is there that can presuppose? To posit an antecedent to an unconditioned is a contradiction. Which relates to introspection, in that the mind ends up studying itself, which must be impossible. Now we got all kindsa metaphysical roadblocks, in that we are mistaking the replication of the doing of the deed, for the deed itself being done.

It just may be Kant’s greatest philosophical gift was not to try to explain stuff that didn’t need it.

Nice.
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How would it be possible to study the mind other than via observing behavior, if introspection is ruled out? — Janus

The answer is in the paper. Simply put: we don’t.