“If willing is to be possible ontologically.....”

So what on earth does this mean? — Joshs

Nothing, if willing isn’t possible ontologically. What does it even mean for the ontological possibility for willing anyway?

Where’s the profit in classifying that which is merely a metaphysically determinable doing, under the auspices of a discipline concerning itself with that which is a being? If it is true humans will, the necessity of its means are given immediately, the matter of it being quite irrelevant.

Or.....how to make a mess of it, by overburdening what we do, which is determinable, with that which we do it with, which isn’t.

You may understand Special Relativity correctly, but just can’t get it into English quite right.

Look for the contradiction in your comment, as it was written.

Without natural cycles, life might be somewhat more dreamlike, chaotic, and it could mean time would also be experienced quite differently. — Srap Tasmaner

I think....speculate....that without us, there are no natural cycles; there are only natural events, occasions. With us, or because of us, natural events are susceptible to being ordered according to rules, which reside a priori in such a rational agency as ours.

But then, what’s to say natural events weren’t already naturally ordered and we just perceived them as such. There are argument both ways, same as it ever was.

wont you agree, because time we can think, not around ? — Nothing

Hmmm. I’m guessing you’re asking if I agree we think about time and can’t get around it. If that’s what you’re asking, then, yes, we think about time as a conception, which is represented in us as change. I don’t agree we think time, but only the co-existent or successive relation of something to its parts.

western people think to much of a thought - it gives all luxuries we have, but how to get deeper ? — Nothing

I’m one of the western people, and I hold that we can’t get any deeper than thought.

dont think to much of yourself-i ment me also, — Nothing

Yup. But don’t think too little, either.

think one time you consider cycles and another time you say there is no cycles. — Nothing

That is only the time of my thinking. This now I think cycles, that next now I don’t. Doesn’t mean the cycles are dependent on what I think.

If it is only now, tomorow never comes, past doesnt exist — Nothing

Logically correct, insoar as when what is now tomorrow arrives, it is no longer then tomorrow, ad ininitum . Past time doesn’t exist if time itself doesn’t exist, also logically correct.

time exist because cycle exist — Nothing

Cycles merely represent determinable repetitive change. But change presupposes a necessary condition for it, and for us, as humans, that condition is time. So technically, cycles exist because of time, not the other way around.

Just to show you’re being read......

I can’t show you a time that is not right now. I can’t show you a time at all.

I can show you something that is in time now, and was in its own time before and probably will be later.

Sorry.

Ok. Thanks.

Sense impressions being given, and from them, comparatively speaking.......

So what is an example of intuition operating in this way?
— Tom Storm

The simplest sense impressions; color , sound ,touch sensation, are examples of basic intuitions for Husserl prior to their being synthetically connected into higher order objects. — Joshs

....what is it that connects?
....connected synthetically, with what?
....connected into what higher order object?
....where does the higher order object reside?
....what is the function of such object?

Quick little one-word answers, or short phrases, would be fine.

I'M not the one who believes in the unknowable, lurking beyond us, forever a mystery. — Ciceronianus

Yeah, me too. I am quite certain I cannot think the unthinkable, and the unknowable suffices as that to which there is nothing to direct my thinking, for to do so is to immediately contradict myself. To believe in the unknowable is to form at least a minor judgement with respect to it, but without any possible object to which the judgement applies. Also self-contradictory.

But back down here on Mother Earth, where regular folk most often find themselves, here’s a little mind-game for ya: I will think something....any ol’ something....represent it in myself with a single concept, then transmit that to you, which you will receive as a single word, which you will apprehend and judge in accordance with your own standing abilities. At that time, with respect to that particular occasion, would you be one who believes in the unknowable?

The point being, of course, is that to believe in the unknowable is possible iff in relation to that which is already known. In this case, I know what you do not, and never will. Having established the validity of the unknowable, even though only as a condition of things in general under certain conditions, rather than a class of all things as themselves, it remains whether the unknowable is just as reasonable under other conditions.

Cool what you did with the title.

Cool. Just making sure it is perception that establishes, not the world. The world establishing being how I read what I commented on initially.

Perhaps the most commonly referenced one ever.

But our interaction with the rest of the world establishes that our perception of it is valid enough for there to be no concern, except perhaps for those who are naive enough to think otherwise. — Ciceronianus

Would I be naive, in thinking there is no concern, at least generally speaking, because our perceptions are valid enough to establish our interactions with the rest of the world?

I didn't know of the debate...... — RussellA

It’s all the Good Professor’s fault. He took care to say exactly why and how he wanted noumena to be understood (A249/B306), in accordance with a brand new approach to metaphysics in general, then proceeded to make it seem like not that. So people fall back on, “See? Toljaso!! He said ‘the thing-in-itself (noumena)’, right there!!!” (B315).

As to the debate, the whole thing boils down to.....understanding did something, while not contradictory, yet for which it had no proper authority. The text subsequently makes clear that noumena have no legitimacy in the metaphysical nature of human cognition, the debate itself grounded in noticing the former and disregarding the latter.
————

perhaps I should have written "In Kantian philosophy, a noumenon is a thing on its own". — RussellA

According to the text, the best to be done along those lines is, noumenon is that which understanding thinks on its own.

In Kantian philosophy, a noumenon is a thing as it is in itself..... — RussellA

There are nineteen uses of the concept “noumenon” or its derivatives in CPR. None of them equate noumena with the ding an sich.

I have no argument for how you personally wish to think of noumena; the idea has been tossed helter-shelter for centuries. I’m merely calling attention....rhetorically at that.....to a conflict with the stated reference.

What Kant fails to do is to take away his notion of space
as and idealized abstract geometry in order to reveal how it is produced by primordial acts of synthesis. — Joshs

Yeah, the common counterargument. Acts of synthesis are phenomena given by imagination, as far as the notion of space is concerned. Failing to show how space is produced by imagination prevents it from having to be phenomena, hence alleviates the possibility of space being represented in us as an object of perception, and from that, experience. Pretty hard to justify space as an phenomenal experience, methinks.

Besides, to say “primordial” acts of synthesis requires faculties correspondingly primordial, more so than those to which such acts are already accountable. That, or, the present faculties would be required to accomplish acts of synthesis, the primodality of which is beyond their respective capacity. Can’t synthesis something not given, or something not within the capacity of that to which it is given. Both of which may be speculated, but iff authorized by a theory with sufficiently different initial conditions.

Idealized abstract geometry is the science of quantifiable spaces on a priori grounds, which allows there to be a notion of space in general, as idealized intuition, that isn’t itself a science.

I was just showing one analogy pre-dated by one just like it, that’s all.

When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.”(Nelson Goodman) — Joshs

“...Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori....”
(CPR B6)

Maybe interesting......Goodman makes this analogy on pg 118 of his 1978 text, to which it may be considered as conclusion, whereas Kant states the similar analogy as a 1787 introductory major premise upon which an entire thesis is built.

.....maybe not.
—————-

'First there is a field....... — Wayfarer

Keyword: first. The subtlety being ghostly or explosive.

Oh oh. Now you went and done it. You hinted he may have made a mistake. To which, of course, invites the response that you, rather, may have not understood.

I just don’t get how a thesis of a lousy couple hundred words, that’s been around in its various iterations for millennia, and argued to death, can be misunderstood, but apparently half of us, have.

Guess we weren’t as smart as we thought we were.

The principles themselves don’t really exist either.
— Mww

Of course they exist. We're talking about them right now. — Philosophim

Whatever we can talk about, exists? Something like this, you mean:

If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must. — Philosophim

Yikes.

That an old system such as Kant’s has never been proven wrong doesn’t make it correct, just continuously useful, if only against which new systems are judged.
— Mww
It doesn't seem right to use Kant's system as standard to judge other systems merely on the bases that Kant's system hasn't been disproved. — Wheatley

Not a standard in juxtaposition to its falsification, but to its explanatory novelty.

: That science makes breakthrough challenging extant intuitions, is sufficient presupposition for them,
— Mww
How so? — Wheatley

Can’t challenge something that comes after the challenge, right? Seems like any challenge of anything implies a necessary temporal order.

The fact that Kant has never been refuted is just a testament to how hard it is to refute a philosophical position. — Wheatley

Generally speaking, yes. On the other hand, it could be a testament to how hard it is to refute a logical proof that grounds a philosophical position.

There are other senses of intuition than Kant’s. All I’m saying is that the link can be interpreted as conflicting with one of its referents.

If you're trying to say causality doesn't really exist..... — Philosophim

I considered this on pg 4. Really exist? Not like billiard balls and acorns, no, the concept abstracted from principles does not really exist. The principles themselves don’t really exist either. But post-post moderns these days like to recklessly pretend the term stands for a real thing, so.....ehhhh, I understand what they mean by it even while it grates on my supersensitive metaphysical nerves.

With respect to this dialectic, no, I’m not trying to say causality doesn’t exist.
————-

I don’t care about one X.
— Mww

Well, the argument does. — Philosophim

As a premise or condition, sure. The argument cares more about its conclusion, “that a causal chain will always lead to an Alpha, or first cause”, which presupposes all the X’s. They are necessarily given as links in a causal chain, so not much reason to care about one of them.
————-

The proof is in the fact that those words would not have appeared on the screen without some cause. Isn't that a perfectly reasonable thing to logically grant? — Philosophim

I considered this on pg 8. It is reasonable to logically grant, but it is an empty proof, in that the proof of empirical conditions is not served by merely logical conclusions. Such proofs begin with them, not end. Of course there’s some cause. Big deal. What is it?
————-

How many clues do you need, to see where this inevitably leads?
— Mww

I don't see where this inevitably leads at all....... — Philosophim

You wouldn’t. Your inferences are inductive, starting at the bottom with an effect (a word on a screen) and ending at the top with the 3c plausible: some alpha such that there is a time when there is nothing prior to the cause of the word. Somewhere in that chain the empirical mechanisms....physical causality.... necessarily become exhausted. THAT’S what you haven’t yet seen, apparently.

.......Please point out where this leads to, and also point out why this counters the OP. — Philosophim

Not counter. Satisfy. By finite regressive causality. Like I said. You claim a time and place for an alpha but not the when or the what; I can show an alpha plus the when and the what. But we both know you’re bound to reject my argumentum ad verecundiam, hence the aforementioned dead horse.

Demonstrate to me that your fingers were not one X in the chain that caused those words to appear on the screen, and then you'll have something to stand on. — Philosophim

I already have something to stand on, and I don’t care about one X. I want to determine a possible alpha. That said, fingers cause the keys to be struck, but do not on that account alone, cause the words. A damn axe can strike keys, as can a feather.

How many clues do you need, to see where this inevitably leads?

What caused the words — Philosophim

Yeah....about that. What caused the words? And PLLL—EEEEEZZZEEE...don’t say my fingers caused the words. Finite causal regression writ large.

And a logical iteration for your sacred alpha.

Thank me later.

I do not agree that you can know about cause and effect apart from experience. The idea boils down to whether there is a state prior to another that caused that secondary state to be. — Philosophim

It is true the cause of an effect cannot be known absent experience. Still, it remains that no singular object of perception, in and of itself, can inform as to its cause, nor that it even had one. That relation is what we think as appended to objects, which makes explicit the relation itself resides in reason, not in experience.

Our language that we use to describe cause and effect can only exist because the world exists with cause and effect independent of our realization of it. — Philosophim

If that is the case, you’ve created a false dichotomy. In its fullest extent, if independent of our realization, we wouldn’t have the language at all, and, in its simplest extent, if we merely realize it, whether it exists in the world becomes irrelevant.

Food for thought.....all respectful and friendly like.....of suspicious standing is he who brings billiard balls and acorns to a metaphysics arena.

Immediate edit:

HA!!! We both used false dichotomy almost at the same time. Scary!!!

A Y is merely a state that has the question of whether there is an X or not. — Philosophim

Not what you said. Y has a cause, even if the cause is unknown.

That which has an unknown cause is a Y. That which has no prior cause, is an alpha. — Philosophim

Therefore no alpha can be a Y, but you also said an alpha is a Y but a Y with no cause. But a Y has an cause. You’re making a valiant effort in having your cake and eat it too, and THAT’S what I ain’t buyin’.
—————

you haven't accurately ascribed what a priori knowledge is. — Philosophim

It is true left out the pure/impure subdivisions, but I didn’t need such accuracy to know what he meant, because the topic ultimately reduces to the principle of cause and effect, which in and of itself, because it is a only a mode of human cognition, has nothing to do with experience. Experience is certainly required for its objective validity, but not for its constructions a priori, re: Hume’s mistake.

Anyway....in passing.

Y: represents an existence that has an unknown prior causality.
X: represents an existent prior causality to Y.
Alpha: A Y existence that is identified as having no prior causality.

The only hard rule for an alpha, is that its initial existence for being has no X. — Philosophim

Something with unknown prior causality is that which has no existent prior causality, and for any causal chain, there is at least one of those things identified as such.

Nahhhh.......you couldn’t pay me enough to agree with that, if I’m being honest. The same thing cannot both have an unknown cause and no cause at all.
————-

I agree that the changes you observe all have causes, I just think that's apriori knowledge.
— frank

No, this is not knowledge at all. That is belief. — Philosophim

And with that little tidbit of philosophical wonderment.....I’m out. I recognize a dead horse when I see one. Sorry.

I agree that the changes you observe all have causes, I just think that's apriori knowledge. — frank

Oh absolutely. Good point. What the changes are, how they manifest, is knowledge a posteriori.

Plato Enlightened.

I don't think we learn through observation that every change has a cause. — frank

True enough, but not quite what I said. We don’t observe every change, but the changes we observe all have causes.

What I did was take cause up to its logical conclusion. — Philosophim

Yes, you did. That conclusion being there is a necessary first cause. Which is the same as, if a first cause is necessary, there absolutely must be one.

There are only two alternatives. If one is logically eliminated from actually being possible, only the other remains. — Philosophim

The two alternatives here being necessity and possibility? The logical necessity for a first cause automatically and immediately eliminates its possibility. Problem is, necessity and possibility are not proper complements, they are properly speaking, different and separate modalities. Necessity and contingency, on the other hand, are directly complementary. That which is necessary cannot be merely possible, but that which is possible is not therefore necessary. That which is necessary, on the other hand, can never be contingent, and that which is contingent can never be necessary.

This makes a difference because to say a thing is necessary automatically eliminates its possibility, but it is not equally true to say that which is necessary automatically eliminates its being contingent. To be a first cause presupposes it is not itself an effect, but presupposition doesn’t serve to eliminate it from being one. Experience validates that for ever effect a cause is necessary, and that cause itself always contingent on it being itself an effect of something antecedent to it. It follows that if the validation given by experience is continued in kind into the infinite range of effects contingent on causes, it is logically impossible for there to be a cause that is not itself an effect.

Your argument for first causes is negated, and your philosophy fails, insofar as one logical determination is offset by another with equal justice.

TA-DAAAAA!!!

Or not. Six of one, half dozen of the other.

But we can only conclude logic with what we know today correct? — Philosophim

We don’t know there is a first cause, yet we conclude logically there must be one. What we know today is that, in our experience, every change has a cause. So it is the case that what we know from limited experience contradicts what we logically conclude regardless of experience.

do I fail at philosophy here? — Philosophim

Define “fail”. There’s nothing patently new, no paradigm shift; there’s nothing supported by experience; there’s nothing to which a complementary negation doesn’t equally fit, so while there may be no logical failure, per se, there is just as little evidentiary success. If the only condition humans seek more than happiness is knowledge, and this purely logical exercise grants none, then yes, it fails.

Fortunate for us, methinks, that human reason by its own nature wanders hither and yon in epistemic wastelands, and at the same time by its own nature, curtails itself from becoming lost in them. It remains only a wish such rational camaraderie obtains in the same subject.

There are certain theories (...) showing certain things are impossible....
— Philosophim

If the bridge is washed out, my path across it is impossible — Mww

Yeah, well, you know. I want to know stuff. That first causes are logically necessary tells me not a damn thing about stuff. I’m aware of some theories that prove impossibilities, but whatever isn’t, doesn’t tell me what is. The bridge...an empirical circumstance the complete knowledge of which is immediately available to me....attempts to falsify your claim that demonstrations of impossibilities necessarily gives alternative knowledge, which the bridge-path impossibility apparently does not provide.

If the bridge is washed out, my path across it is impossible.
— Mww

That's not really the same thing as the OP's points. — Philosophim

No, it isn’t, you’re correct. The OP uses universals, re: X,Y,Z, Alpha....forms of things. Could be any damn thing. And if any thing, then all things. If there is one exception to the rule conditioned by universals, that rule fails. It follows that if there is no alternative knowledge given from a particular bridge wash-out, the demonstration of alternative knowledge from impossibilities in general, fails.

Thing is....there’s no possibility of demonstrating a failure in pure logic predicated on universals alone, all particulars in succession must be substituted to falsify the proposition/theory, which effectively reduces the logical necessity for first causes to a worthless tautology.

I think pointing out that there must be something in our universe that does not have a prior explanation for its existence is a pretty big thing to say. — Philosophim

And I say it isn’t. Well...ok, it is a pretty big thing to say, but it is just as empty as it is big. Be nice to prove the assertion, with the same justice as the bridge disproves alternative knowledge given from impossibilities.

“...Because, however, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this (...) that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied....”

Hence, the bridge. Well-grounded information obtained independent of logic.
——————

If it turns out that all of causality is infinitely regressive, what caused it to be that way? — Philosophim

We do, of course. Turns out, we as the cause of this, is as big a thing to point out, as pointing out that our universe must have something that does not have a prior explanation. And just as empty.

“...Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever....”

With respect to this topic, formal conditions of the understanding means only that for any thing in existence, a cause of it is logically necessary, and in the continuation of that, we understand the logic of a first cause of that thing, and by association, all things.

With respect to logic itself, its illusion means only that whatever truth is taken from logic alone cannot be taken as proofs in the world of things.

But never fear: I am “prating” as much as the next guy, insofar as attempts at refutation of a claim is just as much an attempt to extend the range of knowledge, as the affirmation of it.
————

If you introduce an X, or a prior explanation, then its not really infinitely regressive right? If we continue for an infinity of infinities, we still can only come to the conclusion, "it simply is, because that is how reality exists". — Philosophim

Right.

The nonsense of “an infinity of infinities” aside, if we continue the series of causes without concluding to a first cause, whether infinitely or merely indefinitely, all we’ve done is determined a series of causes. We are not justified in saying “that is just how reality is” because there may very well be exceptions to the rule we have not reached, in which case, we really didn’t know just how reality is at all. Remember the logic of illusion? There it is, right there. Eliminate the illusion by saying that is how we are, rather than that is how reality is.

Actually, parsimony suggests, and experience makes explicit, the indefinite extension of causes a posteriori is highly unlikely, and the infinite extension of causes a posteriori is impossible, which makes affirmative empirical judgements with respect to things contained by such causal extensions, categorically false.
————

I'm just trying to steer it back tot he original point. — Philosophim

I never wandered from it. I support the logical necessity of first causes; followed by a great big fat gigantic....so what? Even if true, we can do nothing with it, it makes no difference in The Grand Scheme of Things, and as an intellectual exercise, ended as soon as it began. Anyone with a modicum of metaphysical prowess already knew all about it, and no one else cares.

Still fun to play with, though, so...thanks for that.

Two further technical senses of intuition may be briefly mentioned. One, deriving from Immanuel Kant, is that in which it is understood as referring to the source of all knowledge of matters of fact not based on, or capable of being supported by, observation. — Wheatley

“....Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition....”
(CPR, A50/B74)

I guess it is left to us whether the power for the “receptivity of impressions”, is theoretically distinguishable from observation. If it isn’t, then intuition as a source of knowledge “not based on, or capable of being supported by, observation”, is false.

Objection: The idea that we all possess intuitive faculties is a considerable assumption. How does on go about substantiating such a claim?

Rebuttal to the objection: That human sensory apparatus is affected by the impressions the world makes on them is provable scientifically and justified logically, hence not considerable as an mere assumption, and at the same time sustaining the claim for some sort of intuitive faculty or power by which such impressions are necessary constituents in a system.
———-

Objection: Science often makes discoveries that are counter-intuitive. In fact, history shows us that scientific breakthrough are made by challenging traditional assumptions and intuitions.

Rebuttal to the objection: That science makes breakthrough challenging extant intuitions, is sufficient presupposition for them, which supports the rebuttal to the first objection. That which is counter-intuitive doesn’t negate the power of intuition itself, but at most merely some content of it.
————

My question is, is it necessary to postulate intuition as a mental faculty that allows us to obtain metaphysical knowledge? — Wheatley

No. Intuition is for empirical knowledge alone, which concerns itself with the physical domain. Metaphysical knowledge, in its proper sense, is a priori, which concerns itself only with conceptions and their relations to each other. What we perceive requires intuition to understand; what we merely think, does not.

That an old system such as Kant’s has never been proven wrong doesn’t make it correct, just continuously useful, if only against which new systems are judged.

There are certain theories of math and philosophy that have succeeded by showing certain things are impossible, thus leaving us with a known alternative. That's essentially what the argument is doing. — Philosophim

If the bridge is washed out, my path across it is impossible. That the path is impossible doesn’t leave me with a known alternate for getting across what the bridge allowed. I’m left with knowing I need one, but only to continue despite the loss of the bridge. But I could just turn back, in which case not only is there no given known alternative to the bridge, there isn’t even a need for one. Now, one could say retracing my steps is the known alternative to the impossibility of crossing over the bridge, but that is merely experience. I would have that exact same alternative knowledge even if the bridge hadn’t washed out.

If this is what the first cause logical necessity argument is showing.....is it really showing anything I didn’t already know?
————-

There is no necessary existence. It is simply that if we are to think about the end logic of causality, it is necessary that there must be a place in the chain that has no prior explanation for its existence. — Philosophim

Granted already; there is a first cause logical necessity. But only in the case of a chain comprised of a regressive series. Doesn’t work that way for a progressive series. Next month cannot be explained without the priority of next week.
————

The argument is that there essentially is the possibility of infinite regressive causality, or finite regressive causality. Yet the argument concludes that even when we propose an infinite regressive causality, it is impossible to escape that fact that if it is infinitely regressive in causality, that there can be no outside reason for this, but the fact of its own existence. — Philosophim

Again, I just don’t see how this says anything. The possibility of infinite regressive, and even infinite progressive, causality, is logically given. Do you mean there is no outside reason other than its being logical? What other reason could there be for that which is merely a logical proposition?
————

that which exists without at least a logical reason is utterly incomprehensible....
— Mww
I've heard things like this before, and I consider it wrong. If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must. — Philosophim

How can it be wrong, when it is you providing the reason, in the form of a logical conclusion? Technically though, mine has existence antecedent to the conclusion, hence logically sound, yours has existence post hoc ergo proper hoc conditioned by the conclusion, logically fallacious in that mere logic is insufficient causality for phenomenal existence. Yours would be true if you’d said, “...it must logically exist”. Or, “logically, it must exist”.

I am suddenly and inexplicably rich. The conclusion I reach that a rich uncle I never knew willed me his fortune, is sufficient reason for me being rich, but the rich uncle does not necessarily exist, nor is it necessary I was even a beneficiary. But there being no reason whatsoever for me being rich, is incomprehensible, whether I care about the reason or not. I simply cannot suddenly be rich (a change) without a reason (a cause), whether I conclude anything respecting it, or not.
———-

At this point I think you've strayed too far from the OP. — Philosophim

Yeah....I get that a lot. Don’t mind me none; point/counterpoint is the name of the game.

See Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason"
— Artemis
I have read it before, and I have a good understanding of the subject matter. — Philosophim

The subject matter in this case makes clear you are correct, a first cause is logically necessary. The continuation of the subject matter also makes clear you are not correct, in that a first cause is logically impossible. Not sure why the discussion, if you’ve understood the argument pre-dating it, that says it better.
—————-

The argument shows that the only thing which must necessarily be, is that something within our universe has no reason for its existence, besides the fact of its existence. It has no prior cause for being. I note that this is logically necessary, because the only alternative that I can think of, "infinite regression" does not in fact have a prior reason as to why the universe should be infinitely regressive. — Philosophim

Check me on my reduction: the only necessary existence is something that exists, because it exists? If that’s correct, it’s merely Aristotle revisited: that which exists, exists necessarily. That doesn’t say that which exists necessarily doesn’t have a cause. To do so implies necessity is causality, a most serious categorical error.

Besides in the first....if that something is in our universe, how is it impossible the universe isn’t the necessity of its cause?

Besides in the second......the only thing that must necessarily be, is something that has no reason to be, is indulgently self-contradictory. The best one can say is, that which exists without at least a logical reason is utterly incomprehensible to us as humans, whose intellect is entirely predicated a priori on the principle of cause and effect.

Infinite regression wouldn’t have a reason for the universe being infinitely regressive? The universe, as a phenomenal existence, exists necessarily, as already established by the condition of something which is contained in it, thus eliminating infinitely causal regression for it, so who cares about the fact infinite regression has no prior reason for why it should be? Infinite regression itself has no priors at all, but the universe does, it being the effect of something, be what it may.

If there is something said to exist within the universe necessarily given from the fact of its reality, why not the universe itself? If that something’s cause isn’t infinitely regressive, why should the universe’s? The cause of the cause is not at issue; the subject here is a given real existence, whether a something, or a something known as “universe”.
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Causality is the idea..... — Philosophim

A first cause would be if the 8 ball moved and there was no reason why it should have moved, internally, or externally.

Does that clarify causality? — Philosophim

Why would it? A first cause is unconditioned, true enough, but the unconditioned necessarily presupposes the series of all possible conditions, which says nothing whatsoever about the idea of causality. All causes, as principles, have objects in their respective effects; causality, as mere idea and not in itself a principle, has no object. To claim causality has an object is reification of an abstraction in concerto, a logical no-no. That certain temperature or pressure is necessary to turn water into ice doesn’t clarify necessity. That jumping up is followed by falling down doesn’t clarify unity.

Anyway.....the same dance but to a different tune, is still the same dance. It just looks funny.

Ok. Glad I been set straight.

Thanks.

Metaphysics is “....any speculative science based on principles, independent of experience....”, under which is the metaphysics of knowledge and the metaphysics of morals. Under the metaphysics of knowledge is that of the natural sciences, the objects of which are given, and that of pure theoretical reason, the objects of which are constructed. Under the metaphysics of morals is that of pure practical reason, the objects of which are determined.

Metaphysics is grouped with epistemology merely because while natural science requires electronics and stuff to discover what it is, the human himself to which that knowledge belongs, does not.

So futility is kind of built-in anyway. — Manuel

Yeah, pretty much. So...pick battles that can be won rather than wars that can’t.

Ahhhh. Exercise in futility?

Thanks. Not bad so far.

So tell me.....are there folks here that bother with reality requiring observers?

Great. Now I get to wonder about it.