I had one all written up, it I couldn’t access proper references to support it. I have some books by Russell, just not pertaining closely enough to this topic. And, of course, without them, my recourse is the inevitable cognitive prejudices, which, while loosely pertinent, isn’t fair.

Ok. Fine. Regarding this......

why does the necessarily given need to be developed?
— Mww

Because if one isn't careful, they will begin to think that they are looking directly at a brain and that non-mental activity (neuronal and electrochemical activity) is mental activity. — Manuel

.....in a nutshell, the professional already is careful, due to an irreducible given, and the commoner doesn’t need to be, due to mere disinterest, so why the necessity to develop the distinction between mind and matter.

Ok. Thanks

Ok, that’s fine. Russell is saying the development of a certain point of view for the distinction between mind and matter, gives an illusory result. The development of a different point of view may be sufficient to relieve the illusory distinction, but it may just as well raise another one.

Which begs the question....why does the necessarily given need to be developed?

Curious......how much of this Russell do you support? Re: is the conclusion that the distinction between mind and matter is illusory, true?

I do have a philosophical source I've found helpful - "Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. — T Clark

You might have made the happiest man in the Bay State.

I regret the flippant tone of my OP. I've offended people and made it harder to have a friendly discussion about this. — T Clark

For the record, I wasn’t offended, and I didn’t consider the tone flippant. It is my contention that the quote you used, “...be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking...” is precisely what happens when all one is doing, is engaging in pure thought. Which is itself, just daydreaming. Even if not often done, it is done nonetheless, and serves as a reference and fundamental ground for philosophy itself.

Regret if you wish, but I remind you......there’s no crying in metaphysics.

In keeping with the times, circa1793, fifteen thousand words to say, the good man already has what religion prescribes, the bad man already rejects what religion prescribes. The text of the essay shows man reasons to religion, not from or because of it, and contains cleverly sufficient platitudes to alleviate the possibility that the church would accuse him of heresy, and the state accuse him of sedition. With bloodbath and demise of the ruling class in the French Revolution still fresh in the continental mind, it’s not healthy to piss off even an enlightened monarch such as Frederick II claimed himself to be, plus having recently established Prussia as a bonafide European power, and, of course, it’s never good to piss off the Pope.

In short, Kant displayed some serious brass balls here.....

“...Hence it is no wonder that the complaint is made publicly, that religion still contributes so little to men’s improvement, and that the inner light of these favored ones does not shine forth outwardly in good works also, yea, preeminently, above other men of native honesty who, in brief, take religion unto themselves not as a substitute for, but as a furtherance of, the virtuous disposition which shows itself through actions, in a good course of life. Yet the Teacher of the Gospel has himself put into our hands these external evidences of outer experience as a touchstone, by telling us that we can know men by their fruits and that every man can know himself. But thus far we do not see that those who, in their own opinion, are extraordinarily favored (the chosen ones) surpass in the very least the naturally honest man...”

.....all the more so because he was as yet no where near as well-known and influential as he was eventually to become.

All that being said, “Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason” is beyond the scope of Everydayman, as is the majority of Kant’s catalog, who probably wouldn't accept it even if he were capable of understanding it, even while being aimed directly at him.

Interesting, so....thanks for that.

“...We enact a self in the process of awareness, and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware....”
(Précis of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, https://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/thompson.pdf)

“...I argue that although the self is a construction—or rather a process that is under constant construction—it isn’t an illusion. A self is an ongoing process that enacts an “I” and in which the “I” is no different from the process itself, rather like the way dancing is a process that enacts a dance and in which the dance is no different from the dancing....”
(ibid)
————-

Enaction: "....to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela, et al, 1992)

How far do you think “a growing conviction” is, from a metaphysical theory? How provable is a conviction?

If on the basis of a history, wouldn’t it be a reenactment? There is a precedent for reenactment, under different conditions and terminology, but still extant and philosophically relevant.

Anyway....interesting read. Took me into three hours of some of this, some of that, some I knew, some I didn't. Still....good to hear confirmation that the self is a construction, and at the same time, isn’t an illusion.

‘I experience through my body therefore I am.” — Tom Storm

So.....I am not if I do not experience?

Or, I am iff I experience?

IknowIknowIknow.....it’s just me, but I find it quite absurd, that just because “I” is not always active and participatory, re: absent experience, and it cannot be explained where it goes when it isn’t, re: deep sleep, then there must not have been one in the first place, re: final and irrevocable dissolution of the Cartesian mind/body dualism.

Yet no one has ever functioned as a standard issue, run-of-the-mill human being, without it.

Go figure.

to say he was concerned with words as opposed to the world is a mistake. — Manuel

Not to put too fine a point on it, but Kant’s pre-critical period had much to do with the world, whereas his critical period had only to do with our human relation to the world, which pretty much left the world out of the picture. In that respect, one could say he was more concerned with words, insofar as no one before him had put so much focus on the cognitive system as a systemic whole.

It was said, or at least hinted, by his immediate peers that he was more concerned with words than the world, from the fact he was notorious for changing the meaning of established conceptions on the one hand, re: noumena, freedom, consciousness, etc., and severely restricting the domain of others, re: forms, ideals/ideal, the a priori, on the other.

Also, the times. Science was relatively new, just coming into that which is now taken for granted, which made empiricism the rule of the day. Kant comes along, invents a new philosophy which, while not rejecting empiricism, removes it from primary importance. So everybody, newly amazed at, e.g., the profound immenseness of the Universe, was then being told.....ehhhhh, it’s only immense because that’s how it appears to us. It wasn’t so much that he was more concerned with words, but rather, that he wasn’t concerned with the world. The world is. So what. What are we doing with it, is a much bigger deal.

Fun fact: it took more than two years for a peer review of the first edition of the first critique. Even his BFF Mendelssohn declined to comment, admitting that initially he didn’t understand a word of it, and subsequently, after becoming familiar, was reluctant to endorse so sketchy.....so blatantly radical....a metaphysical overhaul. The philosophical community in general, thought themselves not so much dazzled by brilliance as baffled by bullshit. Towards the end of his life, when asked who he would list as his “best defenders”, he picked not a single, well-published, known-name, chaired, philosopher, but instead, a credentialed mathematician.

So, putting it all together, it’s not all that hard to see how the folks from that era at least, claimed he was more concerned with words than with the world. These days, though, after all the study and microscopic dissection, it is quite unfair that Kant was, as you say, stuck with confusing words with reality.

I think attention, awareness, is at the heart of philosophy. — T Clark

I don’t think these are the same, and although either of them is necessary for their respective doing of philosophy, neither is sufficient for standing at the heart of it. Both are empty, without something to which they relate, and that relation, is the heart of philosophy.

Not directed at you, just using your words as the firing line.

Just pay attention. To the world and to yourself. — T Clark

The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other — T Clark

All empirical philosophy in general and cognitive metaphysics in particular, is contained right there. If the world can do no other than present itself, the fundamental paid attention needs be only to oneself, by oneself, in the receipt of such presentation. The benighted psyches diminish, making intellectual sand kingdoms predicated on them less likely, by the quality of attention paid, and the world necessarily becomes unmasked in direct correspondence to it.

Still, attention paid is the ends, which says nothing of the means. That attention is paid as ends is given, insofar as ignorance of the world’s presentation of itself is impossible, but the form attention takes and the method for its being paid, as means, are not. If the ends are deemed sufficient in themselves, insofar as we are taught about the world, the means under which the possibility of being taught, reduce to merely an interest, and, of course, interest doesn’t teach. The story could end there, under certain restrictive conditions, but in general, it doesn’t.

Interest in the means, can be called speculative metaphysics. Satisfaction in speculative metaphysics, theoretical philosophy. Satisfaction presupposes investigation relative to it, as is always the case, which reduces philosophy to investigation. At the very least, even if only in humans, the agency that pays attention to itself can be supposed to contain the capacity to investigate itself, though not necessarily, and at the very most it can be supposed that such agency actually exhibits that capacity. It follows as a matter of course, that the human agency can at least call himself a metaphysician, because he has an interest, and upon satisfaction with his investigations of that interest, entitles himself as a philosopher.

So here is exactly half the story, which supports the thread title. The other half, assuming the investigative pursuit of it, serves to support its negation. Are not other philosophers themselves presentations of the world, to be unmasked? Fundamentalist extremism aside, does the fact that getting run over by a philosopher carries different implications than a bus, make him any less something to investigate? Could be he’s just running over in a different way. And it could be that knowing something about buses and knowing something about philosophers, occurs by exactly the same method.

Cease fire!!!!

Stop building little intellectual kingdoms out of the sand of your benighted psyches. — T Clark

I imagine my ol’ buddy Father Guido Sarducci would say....that’s just farging beautiful, man.

Good talk. Thanks.

My parents went into a serious hole paying for the house I grew up in, and the land included with it. My first reenlistment check would have paid for it three times over. Now, that amount would only partially pay for a decent used car.

My dad gave me a quarter once, for not lying about wearing this ungodly stupid rain hat when I got off the bus. I gave my son $10 for raking leaves, and people used to give me $100 just to walk through their door.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

HA!!! What’s the average human worth? 23 cents, or some such? Inflation....19?

Not a statement known or judged to be true or false, so, not a statement (is there any other); the idea of a declaration is more appropriate, announcing to everyone that it is me staking myself to this truth. — Antony Nickles

In the same way that a statement could have no meaning to the subject receiving it as it may to the subject constructing it, to stake a claim to a moral truth by a subject, could have no meaning to the subject receiving that declaration. I don’t care what truth you stake yourself to, but at the same time, recognize the necessity of a truth you stake yourself to. But I sure as hell might care how you express it.

a moral claim-ing can be general, which means anyone can do it, which is certainly a true moral statement.

I meant general, as not specific (see discussion above re Wittgenstein), but also that I claim it to be a truth for all of us, which is a claim to community as much as it is to truth. — Antony Nickles

Ok, I see. Your statement, “Diamond proposes that a moral claim can be general, as universally claimed (...), most importantly, is that I am claiming it”, merely indicates the declaration that a universally claimed moral truth is also claimed by you. You are declaring your pledge of responsibility to a moral truth generally claimed by everyone, or, claimed universally.

Yeah, but if there was a universally claimed moral truth, you saying you’d also claim it, is superfluous. It’s universal......you’ve already claimed it. You’re advocating a tautological condition, from which withdrawal is impossible. That’s herd mentality writ large, at the expense of the very intrinsic human condition of moral autonomy, is it not?
—————

Your responsibility is your own, but I hold this truth to be available to both of us, acceptable to both of us, but that you must come to it yourself or reject it, and, though, your reasons may be yours alone, that you are categorically answerable to them. — Antony Nickles

What truth? The truth Diamond proposed, or the truth that my responsibility is my own. For dialectical consistency, I shall suppose the former, the latter of course being uncontested.

This is to have cake and eat it too, which are mutually exclusive. For any universally claimed moral truth, such as Diamond proposed, the reasons for the claiming of it are irrelevant, insofar as the judgement arising from those reasons, will always and only end in responsibility for claiming of that truth, no matter what it is. Otherwise, it is not universally claimed, hence, self-contradictory.

Furthermore, there inhabits a categorical error: in the first there is said to be a universally claimed general moral truth, the rejection of which would be impossible, in the second there is the assertion of the availability of a possible general moral truth, but universality is not found in it, which permits its rejection. That I am categorically responsible for my reasons and by association my judgements given from them, does not immediately demand I am categorically responsible for accepting a general moral truth.

If I must come to a truth of my own accord, under the auspices of my own reason, and that necessarily a priori, how is it possible for you to claim it must be acceptable to me? The only way you can know whether or not I accept, is the action I exhibit in response to it. But I can act as if in acceptance, but rationally reject the truth asserted as available to me.

So, inevitably, we arrive at the Kantian rabbit hole, as all proper philosophy seems to do:

“The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: "What is truth?"...”

————-

no principle can be itself a judgement... it's easy to lay claim to a principle without ever considering the source of it, and consequently, the truth of its necessity.
— Mww

There is no necessity for it except that which you see in it, or are willing to be answerable for in its rejection, — Antony Nickles

Absolutely. The necessity contained in principles is as we see it, as we understand them, insofar as they are born from us. From that, it follows that granting the exception is negation of universality (of a general moral truth). Willingness to be responsible for rejection is negation of validity (of truth).

Universal claiming of a general moral truth is not impossible. There can be a moral truth available and acceptable to everyone, although I argue its possibility is vanishingly small. The onus is on those advocating that it isn’t, to present, not a mere claiming of, but a justification for, why it isn’t.

Before getting started here, let me reiterate my appreciation for your philosophical acumen. I consider you as one of the few actually doing philosophy, even while disagreeing with, or perhaps not fully understanding, the philosophy you do. That being said, going back to the beginning....

the structure of a moral claim is not a statement (known to be true) — Antony Nickles

.....does that mean not a known true statement, or, not a statement at all? I took it to mean not a statement at all, insofar as I hold the structure of moral claims to be grounded in the moral feeling alone. The expression of my poverty or well-being is also derived from feelings, but the pledge respecting that expression is a statement, and because it expresses a subjective condition a priori, it must be known by me to be true.

Then you continue with.....

the structure of a moral claim is not a statement (known to be true), but that it is a claim that expresses my/our poverty or wellness — Antony Nickles

...which appears to say, the structure of a moral claim is not a statement but it is a claim that expresses. But a claim that expresses can very well be a statement known to be true. Continuing....

a claim that expresses my/our poverty or wellness(...). My claim is not a theory but my pledge to be responsible for its state — Antony Nickles

.....it must be assumed my poverty or wellness regards a moral condition, for it is certain the moral condition is the only condition for which full responsibility can be pledged.

But still, the structure of a moral claim......not a statement, an expression by pledge, a pledge of acceptance, acceptance of responsibility, responsibility of my poverty or wellness, my moral poverty or wellness.
————-

Diamond proposes that a moral claim can be general, as universally claimed (...), most importantly, is that I am claiming it — Antony Nickles

This is what happens when language philosophy is treated as something useful. That a moral claim can be general, is very far from the claiming of it, and is the root of the haphazardness of the entire discussion. Diamond.....or you.....should have said, a moral claim-ing can be general, which means anyone can do it, which is certainly a true moral statement. Everyone DOES claim his morals, comes implicit in being a moral agent.

When you say, “I am claiming it”, you intend to be understood as staking a claim on, taking possession of, subscribing to....some personal moral dictation. Which is what every moral agent already does; it is how he IS a moral agent in the first place. The claiming you’re doing, the claim you stake, the subscription to which you hold, is merely the principle of your responsibility for your moral poverty or wellness. All well and good, couldn’t be otherwise. But to say you are claiming responsibility for mine, or that I pledge anything about yours, is outside the realm of moral consideration. Hence, the question concerning the relation between morals to ethics.
—————-

It’s easy to lay claim; it’s impossible to lay claim without thinking about it. Given enough thought, a theory falls out naturally, and from that, it is clear....

The claim of a moral principal and an aesthetic judgment are expressed in a similar structure — Antony Nickles

.....is only superficially true, insofar as aesthetic judgements are grounded in a subjective condition with respect to empirical predicates, re: the beautiful, but the claim of a moral principle, claim here taken from your implication of staking a claim in a moral principle, claim-ing a moral principle, taking possession of it implicitly re: the sublime, in your case apparently, responsibility, are grounded in a subjective condition predicated on pure practical reason. Similar structure in subjective condition, but nonetheless very different in their respective expressions, the former being a judgement expresses as a cognition, the latter being necessary ground for the judgement, expressed as a feeling.

Even language philosophers, with all the needless verbiage of context and usefulness and whatnot, must acknowledge that no principle can be itself a judgement. Still, without a theory to show how, which Everydayman doesn’t care about but still feels, while the philosopher must because he feels, it’s easy to lay claim to a principle without ever considering the source of it, and consequently, the truth of its necessity.

The structure of a moral claim to truth....is its principle.

That is one of the reasons underlying this thread. — Michael Zwingli

Understood.

I’m just happy the subject here doesn’t have “free” attached to it.

...what right do I have to pledge to be responsible on behalf of everyone?
— Mww

It is, as Kant would say, expressed in a universal voice (the 3rd critique) — Antony Nickles

At first glance, that’s a confusion of aesthetic judgements with strictly moral judgements. Are you saying the willingness to be responsible is an aesthetic quality?
—————

the moral realm, and its claim on us, is when we are lost as to what to do — Antony Nickles

Are you saying it would be better if moral claims did contain truths, and from that, given the general inclination to follow the law contained in truths, we’d be less lost as to what to do?
—————

Compliments on the infusion of the third critique. Can you say what percentage of your philosophy with respect to this thread is influenced by it? I mean, you did bring it up.......

terms, or sets of terms, that have a habit of stagnating discussions in philosophy — I like sushi

Take the guy making the greatest impression of his time, find the premier terms he uses....done deal.

Regarding Western philosophy, Classical: matter/form; Medieval: mind/body; Enlightenment: synthetic/analytic; Modern: meaning/use.

Loosely speaking.

I agree with Diamond in that the structure of a moral claim is not a statement (known to be true), but that it is a claim that expresses my/our poverty or wellness — Antony Nickles

Yep. Me too. Except.....

My claim is not a theory but my pledge to be responsible for its state (its life or death), ready to act in its defense, to explicate what is summarized. — Antony Nickles

......if it is my claim, and expresses that pledge, why isn’t it only my poverty or wellness my claim expresses? Furthermore.....

And the claim is not my individual thought, but in the terms of, and in it's place in, our history, our culture, our means of judgment, (all) our interests embodied in life, etc. It is not made just (only) for myself, but on behalf of everyone — Antony Nickles

.....if it is my (moral) claim, how can it not be from my (moral) thought? And if that is the case, what right do I have to pledge to be responsible on behalf of everyone, for that which only expresses only my (moral) poverty or wellness?

The problem he worried on was the fear of relativism. — Antony Nickles

“He” being the author critiquing Diamond, sounds a lot like the opening comment. It looks like spreading MY moral claims, or the personal claims of individuals represented as each “my”, over everybody, is fear of moral relativism. I must say I admit to making no moral claims for anyone else, and reject the notion of anyone making any moral claims I must regard without self-counsel, which makes explicit moral relativism.

Do you think there is an intrinsic gap between moral claims and ethical claims?

rather than trying to reconcile physicalism with idealism (...) can what we consider to be physical and what we consider to be mental (consciousness) actually be identical? — Paul Michael

On the one hand, that just seems like the ultimate reconciliation, doesn’t it? I doubt they’d be considered identical to each other, on the other, so the implication is they each would be identical to something else. But that’s merely extending the rabbit’s hole, from that which we don’t yet know, to that which we have much less chance of ever knowing.

Why not leave them separate? Maybe there’s a clue in the fact no one has been able to sufficiently meld them, logically or empirically.

Dunno....maybe someday.

what would seem to be the best, most unique (lacking semantic overlap) definition of the term? — Michael Zwingli

Best, most unique definition presupposes there is one. Yet.....

the term has been used to mean different things by different people at various times. — Michael Zwingli

....suggests there isn’t.

Each be satisfied with what each thinks? It’s what we do anyway, so......

What is meant by will depends on how it is understood, either as a determining faculty (pace Kant), or as a determined identity (pace Schopenhauer), or something other than these. The first informs as to what I should do, the second informs as to what I am, the third is neither of those.

What should we mean by it, follows from all that.

Could we consider consciousness to be entirely physical in nature..... — Paul Michael

Yep. Been considered as, but not provably so.

under this view all that exists is physical, but the physical is itself one whole ‘field’ of consciousness — Paul Michael

All that exists is physical, which means one whole field of consciousness necessarily presupposes physicalism.

The second part of the compound proposition has “physical” as subject, the copula “is”, and predicate as “field”. So the physical is one whole field (of consciousness) doesn’t necessarily mean the whole field, which permits fields of consciousness to contain something of non-physicalism nature. In order to reconcile this, some definition of existence, or of consciousness, would be required to eliminate such possible non-physical content.

So....physicalism is reconcilable with idealism if consciousness exists, insofar as idealism is falsified, but not reconcilable if consciousness does not physically exist but is nonetheless real, insofar as idealism is obtained.

Physicalism is reconcilable with idealism if the entire field of consciousness is existentially physical, the possibility of abstract field content, is falsified.

Plus....what said.

Devil’s advocate.

This is to say that emotions aren't merely feelings (...) but rather that emotional processing (...) can cohere with and use imagination, just like reason does. — intrapersona

Doesn’t this reduce to the possibility I am merely imagining my anger or joy?

If this process does what, or does as, reason does....why isn’t it just as much reason as reason itself?
—————

how can meaning be non-conceptual? (...) An example I would give is that when you look at a sunset, it is beautiful because of an emotional connection to visual imagery. — intrapersona

The sunset is beautiful prior to the concept of what a sunset it. — intrapersona

While this may show visual imagery is antecedent to conceptualization, it still leaves to show the meaning of beautiful is non-conceptual, or that the meaning in imagery in general is pre-conceptually emotional.

Two words: aesthetic judgement.
—————

This type of processing would be pre-linguistic in nature (as reason is) and it would also be pre-conceptual (in a similar way to how logic is). — intrapersona

Granting that reason is pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual implies being generally aware that, but antecedent to being particularly conscious of, insofar as to be conscious of a thing is think a conception belonging to it. If emotional processing is, as stated, “a possible means to make sense of the world”, how can sense be made of that for which no conception has been thought? That there is a world, and that we are affected by it, is certainly given pre-conceptually, but that says nothing about making sense.

Nothing wrong with thinking outside the box, so....good for you on that.

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" — Janus

Yep. In other words, in order to do philosophy proper.....stop talking.

Doesn’t mean we shouldn’t philosophize as best we can.

I know. Offering proof of agreement.

Interesting, yes, and thanks for that.

Still, that we used to grunt over who gets to sit where around the campfire, but now we talk about parallel universes....doesn’t say much more than evolution is a natural occurrence.

Ehhhh....reason can’t tell us what not to think. It does a fine job of telling us how silly our thinking might be.

To say I think about myself thinking myself, is easy, considering myself thinking myself is merely the object the subject thinks about. It is, however, the premier transcendental illusion, insofar as me thinking about me thinking about myself, is the same as me thinking me that thinks. To say I think myself, is to have the subject that thinks, “I”, and the object thought about, “me”, be identical. And at least as far back as Aristotle, a subject cannot be an object, for all objects of thought are either phenomena or conceptions, which makes “me” as the object I think either derived from sensibility, in which case I must have an intuition of “me”, an impossibility in that all intuitions are sensuous, or derived from understanding, which is the source of conceptions. But that which is derived from understanding must always inhere with the categories, which, while transcendentally deduced, are only empirically employed. Hence, either way, the “me” that the “I” thinks, ends as being impossible to cognize, hence, a transcendental illusion, or, an example of one of the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason“, when it is claimed to be a legitimate object of thought.

“...From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance—which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness—the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of time has its basis, cannot determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, if the latter is impossible, the former, as an attempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so....”

We can think thinking in general, the fundamental ground of speculative metaphysics; we just cannot think our own thinking.

When a word for tree was developed and applied to many kinds of trees, the recognition of the patterns of configuration that trees manifest must already have been in place. — Janus

True enough, but what if the care isn’t for words, but the origins of them, be what they may? Even to say words are mere inventions, they are always invented in reference to something. The word tree may very well refer to an object of experience, but what of words that refer to immaterial objects? And furthermore, what of immaterial objects that have words, which cannot be experienced at all, as opposed to immaterial objects that have words and we then physically construct their objects in order to acquire experience of them? In any case, because of the manifest distinctions in the references words represent, there must be something in common to them all, and at the same time, must be sufficient causality for their invention.

it isn’t recognition of patterns we want to know about, it being common across species; it’s word development, which is not common at all.
—————-

We are not born with the ability to count and calculate, even though we are obviously born with the capacity to develop these abilities in our interaction with the perceived diversifies and similarities of the environments we inhabit. — Janus

And we’re back to development, this time, abilities. Sounds like we’re justifying Locke’s notion of human tabula rasa, insofar as we’re all mentally empty when we arrive in the world. Which raises the question....if we’re empty and have to develop everything, how is that possible without the innate means to develop? Because the means for experience is necessary, and given the logical necessity of time, it follows there must be something like a first experience. How is....for convenience...our earliest experience possible in the first place, without that which is already present to make it possible? It is contradictory, or at least abysmally circular, to suppose we develop the means for experience, when it is the means for experience claimed to make them possible.
————

But no abstract universal or notion of an abstract universal needs to be there for that. That comes later with the elaborate abstract analysis made possible by symbolic language. — Janus

If all the above is the case, this part cannot be true. There must be abstract universals, having nothing whatsoever to do with language, in order to make human experience possible, and in order to make it possible for humans to develop language.

Now, back to Plato and by association, Kant, which in both are found the conceptions of universals and forms, albeit of different configurations and locations. Not sure about Plato, but in Kant, universals and forms are found in the human mind, more accurately, in human pure reason a priori, and exactly, forms are found in intuition and universals are found in understanding. Forms relate to what we sense, universals relate to what we think.
————-

Sooooo........
(...are you ready hey are you ready for this
Are you hangin’ on the edge of your seat?...)

These abilities, I think it most plausible to believe, are developed in our concrete embodied interactions with the world; they could not be developed in abstraction. — Janus

How can the contingency of concrete embodied interactions with the world, EVER serve in the development of necessary (analytic, irreducible) truth, which formal logic and mathematics ALWAYS gives? Again....Hume’s mistake. Relying on empirical inference derived from mere habit, to justify that of which the contradiction is impossible.

Nahhhh....the justifications for our developments are found in their conformity to experience, insofar as we can’t buck Mother Nature, but the development themselves must always arise from abstractions antecedent to experience.

A = A no matter what A is.

That this is caused by that says nothing whatsoever about every possible this.

1 + 1 will always equal 2 no matter what 1’s and 2’s look like or stand for.
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That's my take on it anyhow. — Janus

Yep, me too. It’s all good. Something to pass the time, waiting or football to come on the talkin’ picture box.

Doesn't the synthetic a priori, according to Kant, require prior actual experience to be able to then realize what is necessary to all possible experience? — Janus

Man, get ready to dodge the tomatoes.....bringing Kant into a discussion analyzing strictly Platonic shadows. Much of Plato is found in Kant, to be sure, but not this.

Yes, we need experience of objects. We need something for synthetic a priori cognitions, principles and such, to have a bearing on, something to which they relate, as a means to understand reality. But the objects.....reality...... don’t give us either those principles or the numbers we use them on.

Iff mathematical principles are created by human reason in response to observations, then the grounds for them must already subsist in reason. Observation isn’t sufficient, in that there is no cognition in perception. Even if mathematical principles are contained in reality, some rational human methodology must still subsist in reason in order to first make sense, then make use, of them. Parsimony suggests they arise in us, not reality, from which the sense of them is given immediately. Which is why I brought up primes. There is no way for us to derive the limitations contained in a number, just from the number itself.

Mathematics is proof of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions, but not the only use of them, once their validity is proved. Hume’s mistake.

So the qualities of divisibility of six objects is immediately perceptually apparent. — Janus

I suppose. From a further metaphysical reduction, however, any quantity that has been assembled can be disassembled. So the divisibility of some quantity of objects is only immediately perceivable iff an aggregate of them has already been assembled.

But as long as I’m speaking number, and you’re speaking number of objects, we’re passing in the dark. I have no problem with the claim that math needs immediate perception to verify its principles, but I’m talking about the source of those principles a priori, which is why I started out with primes.

Anyway......I’m ready to let this rest if you are.

if we (neuroscience!!) could figure us out, or how we can't see the real world, then we will understand how we are certain, or could compensate for our imperfection, or, as you say:

What ground do we have to prove certainty, when what we use to prove it, isn’t certain.
— Mww — Antony Nickles

The root of the whole problem, isn’t it. Neuroscience wants to be able to figure us out, insofar as we are composed of that which adheres to natural law, but if and when it does figure us out with the certainty of natural law.....will “I” disappear? Even if proved illusory, not needed in conformity to law, superfluous with respect to determinism writ large.....do we then relinquish relative truths?

Beat the clock: shitcan “humanity” by proving roboticism? Yeahhhh-no, that’s just never going to work.

do we begin with that which is given to us, or do we begin with that which is in us, that it is given to.
— Mww

I tend to think that what is in us is given to us as much as what is external. — Janus

Yes, agreed, at first glance. We all are given the same kind of brain, all brains work the same way, reason manifests as brain function, therefore we all reason the same way. Nevertheless, while Nature may have seen fit to equip all of us equally, she has not seen fit to cause the manifestations of its use, to be equal across its capacity in each of us.
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My point was that we can arrange them in all the ways necessary such as to show the attributes that go to define the quantity six. — Janus

I don’t understand how merely arranging six objects in various ways shows the attributes that defines the quantity “six”. Arranged as a four-sided figure, arranged as a pyramid, arranged with each other as a succession of points.....there’s still just a quantity of objects represented by some number. A quantity can be conceived a priori as a mere succession of aggregates, a particular number just indicates a place in such succession. No need to arrange anything.

And we couldn’t even conceive succession without antecedent relation, so....that takes care of that.

All in good fun.

Generally being affected by feelings is considered as being irrationally affected. — Janus

Agreed, but qualified by circumstance. Feelings getting in the way of reductionist empiricism, that is, the study of our relation to and understanding of the external world, is irrational, but feelings are nonetheless the necessary determinant factor in moral judgements.

I understand categories as being abstracted from perceived differences of material and form, so I think of them rather as material than immaterial. — Janus

Such may be common practice, yes, and may be true under the auspices of certain cognitive theories. It’s all a matter of answering the age-old question......where to begin with metaphysical inquiries: do we begin with that which is given to us, or do we begin with that which is in us, that it is given to.

Eenie, meenie, miney, moe......
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Are you saying that one example of say five objects cannot ground our understanding of number? — Janus

Yessiree, bub, exactly what I’m saying. I’m of the opinion we must already have the concept of “quantity” resident in understanding, or if you prefer, resident in basic human intelligence. As such, objects don’t ground our understanding of number, but number grounds our understanding of objects. What five represents would have precious little meaning if its place in a series of units didn’t relate to something beyond itself. It must be easy to see all particular numbers, therefore number itself in general, presupposes quantity. A bunch represents quantity, as well as a group, or a set, even a bucketful, but none of those make numbers necessary, which is sufficient reason to authorize something common to all of them.

There is further reduction, if you’re interested. There is a logical proof that knowledge of anything is impossible, if represented by a single conception. In other words, I can never know what a thing is, if I can relate to it only a single word. It is from that proof, that quantity must be both naturally intrinsic to, and a necessary speculative constituent of, human intellect.
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So all the abstract attributes of the number six can be perceptually shown. — Janus

Certainly. What this shows, is empirical proofs for logical conditions. This in turn shows “quantity” in not the only concept naturally resident in human understanding. So saying, there is nothing contained in the mere perception of six objects, that some relation exists between them. There must be a relation between the objects and us, but when we perform operations on numbers, it is the relation between them alone that makes possible the operations we perform.

There is nothing whatsoever given from, e.g., 29, alone, that says it is a prime number. That is it a prime, can only arise from some relation it must have. That it must have that relation comes from us, and what that relation is, can THEN be perceptually shown.
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Hopefully I'm not misunderstanding you and addressing something you weren't talking about. — Janus

Ehhhh....no worries. Hopefully I’m not over-analyzing. A vain hope, cuz I usually do, which explains why folks usually back gently towards the exists. (Grin)

“...Thus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms....”
(A296/B353)

Not to let a silly -al ruin a good acquaintance.

No. This is true.

Look closer. Your other one is......different.

but some Platonic immaterial objects are real insofar as we are affected by them.
— Mww

This is an important point, as it implies that the immaterial has causal power over us — Metaphysician Undercover

Which illustrates with perfect clarity, that the principle of cause and effect is not necessarily bounded by phenomenal constituency. The misunderstanding of which the Renaissance empiricists incorporating the newly-founded scientific method generally were guilty, and subsequent Enlightenment metaphysics remedied, even while maintaining that very same method.