Two further technical senses of intuition may be briefly mentioned. One, deriving from Immanuel Kant, is that in which it is understood as referring to the source of all knowledge of matters of fact not based on, or capable of being supported by, observation. — Wheatley

“....Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition....”
(CPR, A50/B74)

I guess it is left to us whether the power for the “receptivity of impressions”, is theoretically distinguishable from observation. If it isn’t, then intuition as a source of knowledge “not based on, or capable of being supported by, observation”, is false.

Objection: The idea that we all possess intuitive faculties is a considerable assumption. How does on go about substantiating such a claim?

Rebuttal to the objection: That human sensory apparatus is affected by the impressions the world makes on them is provable scientifically and justified logically, hence not considerable as an mere assumption, and at the same time sustaining the claim for some sort of intuitive faculty or power by which such impressions are necessary constituents in a system.
———-

Objection: Science often makes discoveries that are counter-intuitive. In fact, history shows us that scientific breakthrough are made by challenging traditional assumptions and intuitions.

Rebuttal to the objection: That science makes breakthrough challenging extant intuitions, is sufficient presupposition for them, which supports the rebuttal to the first objection. That which is counter-intuitive doesn’t negate the power of intuition itself, but at most merely some content of it.
————

My question is, is it necessary to postulate intuition as a mental faculty that allows us to obtain metaphysical knowledge? — Wheatley

No. Intuition is for empirical knowledge alone, which concerns itself with the physical domain. Metaphysical knowledge, in its proper sense, is a priori, which concerns itself only with conceptions and their relations to each other. What we perceive requires intuition to understand; what we merely think, does not.

That an old system such as Kant’s has never been proven wrong doesn’t make it correct, just continuously useful, if only against which new systems are judged.

There are certain theories of math and philosophy that have succeeded by showing certain things are impossible, thus leaving us with a known alternative. That's essentially what the argument is doing. — Philosophim

If the bridge is washed out, my path across it is impossible. That the path is impossible doesn’t leave me with a known alternate for getting across what the bridge allowed. I’m left with knowing I need one, but only to continue despite the loss of the bridge. But I could just turn back, in which case not only is there no given known alternative to the bridge, there isn’t even a need for one. Now, one could say retracing my steps is the known alternative to the impossibility of crossing over the bridge, but that is merely experience. I would have that exact same alternative knowledge even if the bridge hadn’t washed out.

If this is what the first cause logical necessity argument is showing.....is it really showing anything I didn’t already know?
————-

There is no necessary existence. It is simply that if we are to think about the end logic of causality, it is necessary that there must be a place in the chain that has no prior explanation for its existence. — Philosophim

Granted already; there is a first cause logical necessity. But only in the case of a chain comprised of a regressive series. Doesn’t work that way for a progressive series. Next month cannot be explained without the priority of next week.
————

The argument is that there essentially is the possibility of infinite regressive causality, or finite regressive causality. Yet the argument concludes that even when we propose an infinite regressive causality, it is impossible to escape that fact that if it is infinitely regressive in causality, that there can be no outside reason for this, but the fact of its own existence. — Philosophim

Again, I just don’t see how this says anything. The possibility of infinite regressive, and even infinite progressive, causality, is logically given. Do you mean there is no outside reason other than its being logical? What other reason could there be for that which is merely a logical proposition?
————

that which exists without at least a logical reason is utterly incomprehensible....
— Mww
I've heard things like this before, and I consider it wrong. If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must. — Philosophim

How can it be wrong, when it is you providing the reason, in the form of a logical conclusion? Technically though, mine has existence antecedent to the conclusion, hence logically sound, yours has existence post hoc ergo proper hoc conditioned by the conclusion, logically fallacious in that mere logic is insufficient causality for phenomenal existence. Yours would be true if you’d said, “...it must logically exist”. Or, “logically, it must exist”.

I am suddenly and inexplicably rich. The conclusion I reach that a rich uncle I never knew willed me his fortune, is sufficient reason for me being rich, but the rich uncle does not necessarily exist, nor is it necessary I was even a beneficiary. But there being no reason whatsoever for me being rich, is incomprehensible, whether I care about the reason or not. I simply cannot suddenly be rich (a change) without a reason (a cause), whether I conclude anything respecting it, or not.
———-

At this point I think you've strayed too far from the OP. — Philosophim

Yeah....I get that a lot. Don’t mind me none; point/counterpoint is the name of the game.

See Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason"
— Artemis
I have read it before, and I have a good understanding of the subject matter. — Philosophim

The subject matter in this case makes clear you are correct, a first cause is logically necessary. The continuation of the subject matter also makes clear you are not correct, in that a first cause is logically impossible. Not sure why the discussion, if you’ve understood the argument pre-dating it, that says it better.
—————-

The argument shows that the only thing which must necessarily be, is that something within our universe has no reason for its existence, besides the fact of its existence. It has no prior cause for being. I note that this is logically necessary, because the only alternative that I can think of, "infinite regression" does not in fact have a prior reason as to why the universe should be infinitely regressive. — Philosophim

Check me on my reduction: the only necessary existence is something that exists, because it exists? If that’s correct, it’s merely Aristotle revisited: that which exists, exists necessarily. That doesn’t say that which exists necessarily doesn’t have a cause. To do so implies necessity is causality, a most serious categorical error.

Besides in the first....if that something is in our universe, how is it impossible the universe isn’t the necessity of its cause?

Besides in the second......the only thing that must necessarily be, is something that has no reason to be, is indulgently self-contradictory. The best one can say is, that which exists without at least a logical reason is utterly incomprehensible to us as humans, whose intellect is entirely predicated a priori on the principle of cause and effect.

Infinite regression wouldn’t have a reason for the universe being infinitely regressive? The universe, as a phenomenal existence, exists necessarily, as already established by the condition of something which is contained in it, thus eliminating infinitely causal regression for it, so who cares about the fact infinite regression has no prior reason for why it should be? Infinite regression itself has no priors at all, but the universe does, it being the effect of something, be what it may.

If there is something said to exist within the universe necessarily given from the fact of its reality, why not the universe itself? If that something’s cause isn’t infinitely regressive, why should the universe’s? The cause of the cause is not at issue; the subject here is a given real existence, whether a something, or a something known as “universe”.
————-

Causality is the idea..... — Philosophim

A first cause would be if the 8 ball moved and there was no reason why it should have moved, internally, or externally.

Does that clarify causality? — Philosophim

Why would it? A first cause is unconditioned, true enough, but the unconditioned necessarily presupposes the series of all possible conditions, which says nothing whatsoever about the idea of causality. All causes, as principles, have objects in their respective effects; causality, as mere idea and not in itself a principle, has no object. To claim causality has an object is reification of an abstraction in concerto, a logical no-no. That certain temperature or pressure is necessary to turn water into ice doesn’t clarify necessity. That jumping up is followed by falling down doesn’t clarify unity.

Anyway.....the same dance but to a different tune, is still the same dance. It just looks funny.

Ok. Glad I been set straight.

Thanks.

Metaphysics is “....any speculative science based on principles, independent of experience....”, under which is the metaphysics of knowledge and the metaphysics of morals. Under the metaphysics of knowledge is that of the natural sciences, the objects of which are given, and that of pure theoretical reason, the objects of which are constructed. Under the metaphysics of morals is that of pure practical reason, the objects of which are determined.

Metaphysics is grouped with epistemology merely because while natural science requires electronics and stuff to discover what it is, the human himself to which that knowledge belongs, does not.

So futility is kind of built-in anyway. — Manuel

Yeah, pretty much. So...pick battles that can be won rather than wars that can’t.

Ahhhh. Exercise in futility?

Thanks. Not bad so far.

So tell me.....are there folks here that bother with reality requiring observers?

Great. Now I get to wonder about it.

Sorry.....what???

Interesting video, so thanks for that.

I feel what Kant wanted was to draw limitation on our capacity of knowing. — Corvus

We don’t really know the limits on our capacity of knowing, for to grant that we even have a limit, we may then question the irrefutably certain, and if we do that, we lose the warrant for any knowledge at all. While we know empirical knowledge is always contingent, we also possess knowledge that is universal, re: mathematics, and necessarily true, re: pure formal logic. From that, the limitations become referenced more to contradictions, and less to the innate capacity for knowing.

Having a limitation on our capacity for knowing is given from the kind of system by which we know anything. But that kind of limitation is not addressed by Kantian epistemological metaphysics. He is concerned with the limits on reason itself, and from that, limits on permissible knowledge claims.
————

But to go deeper asking what is behind in the external world, we hit the walls of TII. — Corvus

In a way, I suppose. That which is external to this world is unknowable, as is the TII. But the TII is ontologically real in this world, whereas that cannot be said for that which is external to this world. Hell....there might not even be an “external to this world” to contain things, which makes the TII immediately disappear.

The TII is not external to this world, they are each and all right here in it. The only difference between the thing and the thing in itself, is us.

I was under impression..... — Corvus

I would agree with your impression, in that WE....humanity in general....have no conscious need of TII. It is only metaphysics, and that only under certain theoretical conditions, that finds it needful, and from that need, finds it necessary.

When I see the monitor in front of me, it is a monitor itself. — Corvus

That’s experience talking, reason...conscious thought..... taking the backseat. Your eyes do not have the capacity to inform of a thing, but only that there is a thing to be informed about. Eyes don’t think, plain and simple. It follows that reason quietly informs that the thing you are seeing now doesn’t conflict with what you know that thing to be. In effect, Nature doesn’t waste time repeating itself. This explains why we don’t have to learn what a thing is at each and every instance of its perception. Neurobiology aside, which is something of which WE REALLY don’t have any conscious need.

All you’re logically entitled to say, in this particular case, is....the thing in front of you is a monitor. Anything else is superfluous, or wrong. Wrong here meaning claims for which the justifications are suspect.

Science: a system of study the ends of which are determinable;
Philosophy: the organon by which systems of study are determinable.

when you say "logical", it implies a system dealing with / related to truth and falsity. — Corvus

Not so much dealing with, or related to, but determination of.

It seems hard to imagine, Thing-in-Itself can have anything to do with truth or falsity at all. — Corvus

It doesn’t, truth being nothing but a human epistemological cognition a priori, whereas the thing as it is in itself, is merely a necessary ontological condition of that thing, a posteriori.

If something is unknowable, how could it fall out from logical system — Corvus

That which is unknowable falls out of the system by which things are known, merely because it doesn’t meet the criteria mandated by the system.

Not that difficult, really: for any representation of a thing met with in experience, there is that very same thing-in-itself that isn’t. If not, then representation itself is sufficient empirical causality for things, which is catastrophically absurd.

It's C.I. Lewis I have in mind.... — Manuel

Oh. The qualia guy. Might be interesting.

which version of "transcendental philosophy" we prefer version 1.1 or version 1.12. — Manuel

HA!!! Yeah....pretty hard to think of a trash can as a thing-in-itself, n’est ce pas? I mean, we built the damn thing from the ground up, so why would we say we can’t get to it as it is, re: your “I don't think we reach the actual objects.”? ‘Course, that’s not what is meant by invoking the idea.

Let's say, we order the given. — Manuel

Yes, I think that fits. The Book says we arrange the matter of the given, but, close enough.

Good post. I’d like to read you when you’re a lot better, rather than a bit. I’m sure I’ll learn something.

What's relevant is the sensory impressions we transform, more so than the object itself. I don't think we reach the actual objects. — Manuel

Philosophically relevant, but try telling Mr. or Mrs. Suburbia that thing just put on the curb isn’t actually a trash can. Even his media-crazed Gen Z offspring isn’t likely to put out the lawnmower when coerced into the minor chore of putting the trash can on the curb. ‘Course, he’d probably put it out too late for pickup, but still......
(Awwww, c’mon, Dad. You should be glad I was late, cuz, look!! We still own a lawnmower!!)
————-

we simplify sense data into something intelligible, in effect taking away "noise" from our interpretation of things. — Manuel

Could be, sure. On the other hand, perhaps we start out as simple as possible with our sense data, and add to the simple. That way, “noise” isn’t even there such that it needs to be filtered out. Perhaps we cognize bottom-up rather than top-down. Doesn’t seem very efficient of Mother Nature, to strap us with a system that assumes everything then removes the useless, rather than starting from a minimum then adding only as much as necessary. We do, after all, wish to know what a thing is moreso than what it isn’t.

It sounds like you’re saying we reduce sensations, but I don’t think we actually do that. Whatever the sensation is, is what we use in determining an object, so it would seem we need the entire sensation, and I’m not even sure how our physiology, that upon which impressions are made, would simplify sensation anyway. Our eyes don’t tell us we didn’t see green when perceiving the blue sky.

Respect? Ok, fine, sure. Why not. Mercy? Not a chance!!! (Grin)

Whatever is given to creatures like us (...), must be of a nature that it can partly be apprehended by us in perception. — Manuel

Not sure what you mean by apprehended here. That something can even be perceived requires that thing to be of such a nature we can perceive it, sure, but that’s bordering on the tautological, isn’t it? But that something is of such a nature to facilitate its perception says absolutely nothing whatsoever with respect to understanding what that thing is.

We assume that "downstream" something "stands in" for what we perceive, but that's a logical postulate, not an empirically verifiable claim. — Manuel

It is not an assumption: there are no empirical objects of perception in my head. How that downstream something relates to that which it stands in for, is a logical postulate.

I'm not as fluent as I would like to be. — Manuel

Makes two of us.

I kind of can understand why Kant had to postulate Thing-in-Itself. — Corvus

I wouldn’t agree he had to postulate it; it falls out necessarily from a logical/representational cognitive system, under the assumption, of course, that the human system is that.

On the other hand, I grant you might be on to something, if Kant had premised his critical theorizing on things, in which case postulating a thing-in-itself might be merely comparative to the thing. But he didn’t begin with things; he started from Hume’s claim of “lack of philosophical rigor” for, and therefore the rejection of, a priori notions in general, and those with respect to causality in particular.

I'd say that there is the given.... — Manuel

Yep, seems right. That would fill the niche of that which doesn’t depend on us.

The given is already shaped by us.... — Manuel

I’m going to assume you mean the given is shaped by us, and not that the given is already shaped by us antecedent to its reception in us, as the transcendental realist would maintain.

Thing is, even if the given is already shaped by us, say, by imagination for some other internal use downstream, that in itself doesn’t say what the other use is, nor that such shaping is sufficient for specific so-and-so’s. Even while the grounds for them lay in imagination, the specifics cannot be so lawless. But you knew that.

treating reality as a conscious being. — Corvus

Yeah......sorta like that thread asking, “how does a fact establish itself as knowledge”.

(Sigh)

I'd say our considerations do (obviously) depend on us, but that which gives rise to the considerations does not.
— Janus

Put in that way, it is true. The issue is articulating what is that "which gives rise to these considerations". Sense data? I don't know. — Manuel

Whatever gives rise to our considerations, insofar as they belong to us, and given the inconsistency among us, must be as much ours as the considerations.

I don’t know either, but I would vote for imagination over sense data, for sensations provide merely that which is to be considered, and even that not necessarily, but say nothing at all about the methodology by which considerations themselves come about.

I don't find anything to disagree with in that.... — Janus

Nor I, this:

I would say experience is not a thing, although it involves things. To describe an experience you describe the things involved in that experience. — Janus

‘Til next time. Your turn to buy.

Some likes and dislikes may change overnight...(...) I wouldn't call such fickle likes and dislikes "aesthetic judgements"). — Janus

That you are fickle with respect to your feelings regarding cauliflower....
— Mww

......You seem to be claiming that liking or disliking the flavor.... — Janus

As is plain to see, I made no mention of, nor did I mean to implicate, the mere sensation of the taste of a thing, with an aesthetic feeling of like (pleasure) or dislike (displeasure) of (in) it. I chose cauliflower because it is more apt to resonate with the course of the dialectic. My fault, I suppose, insofar as such mundane examples of cauliflower in your case, and hairstyles in Josh’s case, didn’t get my point across. I was initially going with beheadings, or some such that invokes a very authoritative aesthetic judgement, yet without the burden of experience confusing the view.

The mode of intuition with respect to the flavor of an object, is every bit the sensation as vision, but whereas vision has the chance of synthesis with a veritable plethora of conceptions, that is, the formulation of a rational discursive judgement from which a cognition follows, such that the subject can then report exactly what he has seen, the sensuous phenomenon of empirical taste, or flavor, has no proper manifold of conceptions, no more than the physiology of that sensuous mode permits, hence no definitive reportable cognition, from which occurs that the subject reports no more than a general subjective condition, re: tastes good, I like it/tastes bad, I don’t like it, or some mediation between those extremes, but without a categorically intelligible understanding for it.
—————

The taste may simply be unpleasant and you might simply avoid it without any conscious thought about it at all — Janus

Exactly. Avoidance, or partaking, without any conscious thought at all, because of the above, re: you simply may not be able to report on exactly why you avoid the unpleasant dislikes and partake of the pleasant likes. Hence, the burden of experience with respect to the phenomenon of taste, as opposed to the purely subjective aesthetics of it. Now, the common rejoinder is, the like or dislike of a thing presupposes the thing, which is true, but presupposing the thing does not carry the implication of forming a cognition as to what the thing is. Re: “here, taste this/what is it/never mind, just taste it/JEEESSUSSS, that’s disgusting!!!!!!

In my view an aesthetic judgement always carries a discursive dimension, and I don't see a discursive dimension being involved in simply liking or disliking foods. — Janus

Which supports your assertion that “fickle likes and dislikes” are not aesthetic judgements. As the example immediately above shows, on the other hand, aesthetic judgements as to pleasure/displeasure may arise without any discursive judgement as to its object. That most times they do, but that sometimes they don’t, removes necessity as a condition.

That I dislike falling off a bike because it is accompanied by the distinct possibility of pain, but that I dislike pain doesn’t require that I fall off a bike. I find pain a dislike to avoid for nothing other than I am discomforted by it. Ironically enough, there are those that feel just the opposite, in finding pleasure in circumstances for which pain should be the normative prescription. Go figure, huh?

Taken to a sufficient metaphysical reduction, we find the old adage, “there’s no accounting for taste”, to be quite true. It is the case that human aesthetics is directly correlated with subjectivity, but damned if we have the slightest explanation for it.

Same as it ever was......

Then I am embarrassed for not making it clear I wasn’t talking about flavor.

What larger cultural norms shape your response to someone else’s hair style? — Joshs

Trust me....not a single one. The sole relevant criterion, in this case, is....that hair style’s affect on my inner sense. Technically, my subjective condition. Conventionally, how it makes me feel.

And the same principle applies with respect to the news, and everything else. You may be correct in general, and perhaps even with respect to my response. But it is not necessary for me to respond at all, thereby eliminating any shape it may have, and as I said, I’m only interested in the general as far as my particularity within it.

Of course they do. Aesthetic judgements switch....
— Mww

Some likes and dislikes may change overnight (...) I wouldn't call such fickle likes and dislikes "aesthetic judgements"). — Janus

They aren’t, likes and dislikes alike .......see what I did right there??......are the objects of judgements. They are that to which the judgement pertains. That an attitude regarding some like or dislike, such that altering from affirmation to negation with some relative ease, says nothing about the format under which the end result manifests. That you at one time like cauliflower, then at some later time dislike it, may indeed be a fickle assessment of cauliflower, but the judgement by which the change was even possible, cannot be said to suffer that same quality.

That you like cauliflower now, but dislike it later, are each nonetheless aesthetic judgements. That you are fickle with respect to your feelings regarding cauliflower over time, does not carry over to the fickle-ness of the judgements regarding the stuff, insofar as each judgement arises simultaneously with, and necessarily representative of, the feeing.

A clue to the difference between aesthetic and discursive judgements.

And what are the background discursive , valuative conventions ( knowledge relative to the times, as you put it) that makes such things as ‘news cycles’ and ‘technological gadgets’ comprehensible in the first place? — Joshs

This is a confusion of what I said, but can be clarified somewhat, in that it is entirely possible that aesthetic judgements are not comprehensible at all, between separate subjects each in possession of his own. Case in point.....some guy wears his hair in some weird-assed configuration, and when I see it, I say to myself....wtf’s that guy thinking!!! He and I each apprehend his hair style as a personification of his character; he judges it cool; I judge it stupid. Aesthetic judgements, each.

Confusing, in that understanding is the “background discursive valuation conventions” which grounds the knowledge of its time, but that has nothing to do with the way one feels about news cycles and the newest gadgets. There is a vast disconnect between the comprehension of what a news cycle is, and the personal impression it makes on a subject’s condition.
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You are aware that an entire movement within the arts argues that what art is in the first place is cultural critique. — Joshs

No, I’m not, but that’s ok, cuz I don’t care about entire movements or cultural critiques. I grant their reality, but assign them to social anthropology, whereas my sole personal interest is epistemological metaphysics.

whatever an artist for their own ostensive reasons decides to create of aesthetic value addresses and in some sense differentiates itself from a set of culture conventions., whether that is what they have in mind or not. — Joshs

For which there is no reasonable justification, which reduces that entire proposition to a mere personal aesthetic judgement, in this case yours because it’s your assertion. Although he may, there is no reason to suppose an artist always, creates in order to address, or distinguish from, cultural conventions, re: Chihuly glass. Now, if the artist declares he intended to differentiate from cultural conventions, the empirical confirmation resides, but then the claim he made not have had that in mind, becomes false.
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Every aesthetic or other kind of judgement that we make, no matter how trivial, gets its sense form a larger set of shared social values, and at the same time reinterprets those values. — Joshs

Some do, insofar as some material which reason uses in the formation of them, is obtained in a social environment. To say EVERY judgement so arises, makes explicit no judgement is possible WITHOUT a larger set of social values, which is quite absurd, for then it is necessarily the case I cannot make the determination of left-turn/right-turn on a split trail, in the backwoods of the Allagash wilderness, when in fact, I have perfect authority to make an purely aesthetic judgement (left turn looks pretty nice, think I’ll wander thataway for awhile), or a discursive judgement (I know the tent’s set up to the right and my knees are killin’ me).
———-

Of course , I didn’t have in mind trivial aesthetic judgements.... — Joshs

Good, because there aren’t any, in philosophy. They abound, in detriment to the discipline, in social anthropology and empirical psychology, the various and sundry pitiful examinations of human weaknesses, as opposed to the internal understanding of its powers.

is by no means advocating pan-psychism. — Janus

Wouldn’t matter either way; it’s beside the point.

so we are left with what would be the more plausible or coherent view in light of our experience and understanding. — Janus

And that’s the point. In light of our experience and understanding. But I understand what you’re saying.

he wants to collapse Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding, claiming that our intuitions (in the Kantian sense of the term) are conceptually shaped through and through. — Janus

Do you think he was successful?

Yep. Different kinds of judgement. Or, judgements predicated on different kinds of conditions.
— Mww

The conditions can’t be all that different. Otherwise, scientific and artistic movements ( Renaissance , Enlightenment, Modern and postmodern) wouldn’t be interwoven in the interdependent way that they have been throughout history. — Joshs

They’re not all that different; they’re only different in two ways.

If one really were ‘agile and capable of pivot on a dime’, and the other ‘entrenched and not easily subject to change’ they would create entirely independent cycles of change , which they dont. — Joshs

Of course they do. Aesthetic judgements switch at the drop of a news cycle, or the newest gadget, or supposed slight from a passer-by; discursive judgements are bound by the knowledge relative to the times. Two different kinds of cycles of independent change.

One agile and capable of pivot on a dime, the other entrenched and not easily subject to change. — tim wood

Yep. Different kinds of judgement. Or, judgements predicated on different kinds of conditions.

Fair assessment, yes.

was just wondering about the something → (intellect) → tree thing. — jorndoe

Oh, that. Nothing more than speculative metaphysics. One man’s garden is another man’s wasteland.

all other things being equal, we have no more warrant to suppose that they don't operate the same way than that they do. — Janus

Yeah, that universal consciousness, mindful matter nonsense has been around as long as man has succeeded in persuading himself toward contradictions. Methinks self-consistent speculation doth far surpass under-powered conviction. But at the end of the day, we are left with the reality that although reason is necessary for our knowledge, it is at the same time the source of inquiry for which there is no possibility of knowledge.

Taste, indeed, at least for the initial premises in a dialectical argument. Accepting a conclusion predicated on mere taste, is just lazy, wouldn’t you agree?

we could reasonably infer that the cosmos is, always already, prior to human experience, logically structured, or "conceptually shaped" — Janus

That’s the very trap I referred to. If it is the case that the human system operates on logical structure and conceptual shaping, it then becomes the proverbial “transcendental illusion” to suppose systems not anything like ours, operate the same way. Just because some method is an absolute necessity for us doesn’t warrant that method’s infliction anywhere else.

But you’re right in a way. We can infer anything we like, as long as we have sufficient reason. Problem is, we could never have sufficient reason, with respect to the cosmos in general. Hell.....we don’t know hardly anything about it, so what warrant do we have for supposing its antecedents?

The whole dialectic I’m involved in concerns perception, so I’m not sure what you’re asking. No one ever senses “me”, and nothing sensed is ever “made”, so......help a brutha out here?

It might have been a configuration of microphysical particles or energy fields, but then even that is part of our experience. — Janus

Yes, overall, but not initially. By the time we get to the experience of molecular structure, trees, as such, are already presupposed. Experience of constituency follows from experience of the object to which the constituency belongs.

But it doesn't follow that it is nothing sans our experience. — Janus

An object of perception can never be nothing, so....

So its manifestation as a tree depends on both its percipients and on its own structure, whatever that might be. — Janus

Yes.

But how could we have logic without empirical experience? — Janus

We could, without experience, iff the human cognitive system is itself logical. We think logically for no other reason than that’s the mandate of the system with which we are equipped. Which explains why we can never use logic to explain logic, insofar as a necessary condition of a thing cannot at the same time be an explanatory device for that thing. Maybe why we don’t know how the brain presents subjectivity.

Kant acknowledged that the synthetic a priori requires the schooling of prior experience — Janus

Yes, for their proofs, their empirical validity. Not for their construction, which are merely logically non-contradictory. Logic alone cannot teach us facts of Nature.

Are you saying that it is knowledge of a tree only because of us? — Janus

Yep. Think about it. What was it before it was a tree? And that thing, why is it a “tree” and not some other named thing? That thing always was a thing, it just wasn’t a tree until some human said it was.

Besides, if it always was a tree, why do we have to learn it as such? Why didn’t we already know it as tree before having to be instructed about it?