Thanks. Still, just because that’s how I understand it, doesn’t mean that’s how The Good Professor meant it to be understood. I wish, but I don’t know.

distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental characteristics of phenomenal objects — charles ferraro

Phenomena are “the undetermined objects of empirical intuition.” (A20/B34)

The empirical characteristics of any intuition is the matter of the object that affects sensibility, and is called sensation.

Phenomenal objects of intuition have no transcendental characteristics; they are undetermined.

“Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.” (A50/B74)

Absolute necessity and strict universality are transcendental principles contained in a priori cognitions. Undetermined objects of empirical intuition....phenomenal objects....are not a priori cognitions, therefore do not themselves exhibit these principles as characteristics.

The transcendental in phenomena, is “that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations” (A21/B35). The transcendental in phenomenon is not a characteristic of it, but merely represents the conditions under which the content and its arrangement are related.

The fundamental epistemic criterion (properly, criteria) of phenomenal objects rests in how they are treated by the human system of pure reason, therefore the criteria does not reside in the characteristics they have, but in the determining conditions by which they are known.

Kantian transcendentalism is more a methodological justification for, and less a rational characteristic of, speculative metaphysics.

Not that anybody cares..........

F" takes it back behind the curtain. — tim wood

Never mind. I see now Charles has something else in mind.

I was going to guess space and time.

Watch the trap.

Fundamental epistemic criteria.

Ground. What comes first, not last.

Three hours, no bites.

What do you think......nobody knows, or nobody cares?

1.) Yes, but only to demonstrate a limitation.....
2.) ....because of the limitation....

....and the limitation is us.

Not sure yet what to make of it, but interesting.

one of the activities 'the system' is strongly suspected of doing is filtering and even, in some cases, completely changing, the sensations to match the expected model — Isaac

Ain’t that the truth!! Some do it more than a others, the most prevalent, I would guess, being the long-ago story embellishment......“Damn thing was THIS big, I swear, then the line broke and he was gone!!!”....which relates to purely personal aesthetic judgements whereby the ego satisfies itself. More serious are occasions of rejecting empirical evidence in dispute with personal prejudice, which relates to discursive judgements whereby the ego finds its satisfaction from outside itself and maintains it at all costs. As Paul Simon says, “Still, a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest, mmm, mmmm, mmmmmm”.

But you know as well as I, only by understanding the properly working system does its impropriety become recognized, and the simplest, easiest to recognize error in metaphysical cognitive systems, is the LNC.

The purpose of my metaphysics is, hopefully, to have “....discovered the cause of—and consequently the mode of removing—all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself in the sphere of non-empirical thought....”
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Can you hold contradictory judgements? — Isaac

Technically, a judgement isn’t something one holds, and judgements are not themselves contradictory. The relativism of truths are that which are said to be held, and cognitions are those which are contradictory. So, no, one cannot hold contradictory judgements, but under a given set of conditions, he does hold with beliefs, the judgements for which its cognitions are only contingently true hence susceptible to contradicting themselves, or, under a given set of conditions he does hold with knowledge the judgements for which its cognitions are necessarily true, hence cannot contradict themselves.

In the former, a different judgement made on the same premises is sufficient to nullify or otherwise change the cognition of the object, but in the latter, a judgement made on an entirely different set of premises is necessary to nullify or otherwise change the object of cognition. The former is a different version of the same truth; the latter is a different truth entirely.
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Judgements are necessarily recalled post hoc (one doesn't re-judge every second)..... — Isaac

Yes, agreed. Recalled post hoc, but that merely implies pre-existence, indicating they are not themselves post hoc, but occurring immediately upon their temporal standing in the system. So, no, we don’t re-judge; we constantly, continuously, judge. Think of it like....we cannot have a cognition without its dedicated neural pathway, in accordance with the physical system, we cannot have a cognition without its judgement, in accordance with the metaphysical system Even cognizing the same thing but at a different time, still requires its own pathway/judgement. It doesn’t matter that it’s the same pathway/judgement, each is temporally distinct.

....so a judgement being 'in mind' is a phenomena, an interocepted state one discovers one has. — Isaac

Hmmm....dunno, man. When I think, “every good boy deserves favor”, am I referencing a judgement, or a cognition? I rather think I’ve cognized the veracity of the proposition, which follows from the antecedent judgement. So the state I’m in, or the state I currently have, is one of truth. I have trouble seeing the state I have is, “every good boy deserves favor”.

Disclaimer: a metaphysical theory of judgement is very complex, perhaps even to the point of massive confusion and obfuscation. It’s just like science trying to explain consciousness; we know it’s something but damned if we can figure out a bottom line for it. There is a critique of judgement, a treatise in its own right, but is even more dense that the critique of reason, and I make no claim whatsoever for having grasped its instructions.
—————-

Hence - what best translates from my system as your 'reason' is only ever something which gathers inferences about sensations, not makes them. The inferences it makes are those which unify the systems below it, to better predict what they are likely to deliver next. 2+2=4 is just such a model. — Isaac

When I speak of reason without qualifiers, I speak of reason in its empirical use, properly termed a posteriori. So, yes, contrary to your system, mine does make inferences about sensations. If a thing impresses me as this and this and this, I may safely infer it as that.

As regards making inferences which unify that which is likely to be delivered next, I must qualify reason as “pure reason”, insofar as there are conditions already in play, from which what follows isn’t so much inferred, but made possible. With respect to your math example, pure reason has already made the condition “quantity” available, in order for quantifiable objects to relate to each other. With respect to the real, physical domain, pure reason makes available “existence”, “possibility”, “necessity”, “causality”, “community”, and exactly seven other similar conceptions, as fundamental grounds for the possibility for the subsequent inferences a component makes on an input from an antecedent component.

2 + 2 = 4 is an exact inferential model of the relation between a possible pair of these extant things conjoined with a possible pair of those extant things necessarily ends as that final thing. The mathematical expression not only wouldn’t work, but wouldn’t even be conceivable, absent the pure conditions antecedent to it. In effect, unifying the whole system.
——————-

At no point does your conscious, rational, system get access to the sensations from one's environment (nor from one's physiology). — Isaac

My system agrees without equivocation. Remember I mentioned a few days ago we are not conscious of parts of the whole cognitive system. My conscious rational system is the part that thinks about the phenomena given from sensation, but never about the sensation itself. In effect, thinking has no access to sensibility, but is only conditioned by it. Such is the speculative representational system writ large

to have your conscious rational judgement, it can only be done by the meta-modelling consciousness systems, whose inputs are the activity logs of the other systems actually doing the inference modelling of sensations. — Isaac

Pretty damn close. Whose inputs are activity logs is my imagination. It isn’t a consciousness system itself, but it does inference modeling from sensations and conscious rational judgement is impossible without it.

“...By the word synthesis***, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition.(...) Synthesis, generally speaking, is (...) the mere operation of the imagination—a blind but indispensable function without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious...”
(***for all intents and purposes, explanatorily synonymous with your meta-modeling)

Methinks the methods be different, but the results the same.

Thanks for sticking around, valiantly scaling The Great Wall of Text, and especially for showing another point of view.

Not to say the most important one. — dimosthenis9

I would venture to say exactly that. Would mathematical logic, and propositional logic in general, even be possible, if the human way of thinking wasn’t itself logical?

The inherent circularity in that is embarrassingly obvious, but whatcha gonna do, when the question just begs asking.

But my question is if that engine's work is cause of Intelligence or something else? — dimosthenis9

How would that determination be possible, if the very thing asked about requires the use of it?

The bane of epistemological metaphysics since Day One, not that it isn’t a worthwhile query despite having no irreducible...apodeitically certain..... answer.

the judgement is contradictory.
— Mww

...which is a type of thought, no? — Isaac

We’re......I’m......talking about a system, a cognitive system, a determined speculative methodology. It behooves understanding the system from without, to maintain its components in relation to each one’s functionality as a whole, from within. Part.....“think: puzzle pieces”; part......“don’t overthink”, that which has already been completely rendered. As such, understanding/judgment is the faculty of thought, but a judgement is not a thought. A thought is a cognition from conceptions. Conceptions arise spontaneously from understanding in relation to phenomena, judgement is the unity of conceptions in relation to each other. These together are a cognition. Reason determines the relation of conceptions to each other, that is, a cognition, to experience.

Couple things that might help....an object cannot be perceived by a single property. An object cannot be cognized by a single conception. There’s a whole slew of both, but nevertheless usually resolving into a single item of knowledge, a single experience. It gets complicated for the system because the world is complicated, but we, as conscious agents, usually have no conscious notion of the work the system does, in order to keep us out of trouble, so to speak. It seems Mother Nature realized her rationally-inclined creations work better and last longer if mentally streamlined. It’s when things don’t quite fit together, that understanding of some theoretical system makes possible the understanding of why things don’t quite fit together. And the first realization is...it isn’t that things don’t fit together, but rather, it is that we ourselves that have misfit them.

But I made a mistake. I said, Given a series of thoughts, if the judgement arising from them does not conform to them, the judgement is contradictory. I should have said, given a series of conceptions.... From the correction, it clarifies that a judgement wherein the conceptions do not belong to the phenomenon, reason finds such cognition contradicts experience, re: “That ain’t like no dog I ever seen”. It is in judgement alone, with respect to a posteriori cognitions, that errors in our thinking occurs, and it is reason alone that discovers them, and is solely responsible for the possible correction of them.

It is from all that, that this arises: “...I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself....”, which translates to, I can judge conceptions as being united with each other til the cows come home, in any manner and any combination I like.......as long as reason, finds nothing wrong with it.
—————

Logial inference is still something one 'senses' and so empirical, — Isaac

Does that, relate to this, re: interoception?

It's the sense of one's internal states. — Isaac

I’m not so sure about that. It reeks of the Homunculus Argument, in that if one senses an inference it begs the question...from whence did the inference arise, if one merely senses that there has been one? On the other hand, if one senses an inference presupposes he is the source of it, begs the other question....why would he call it something he sensed, if it was he who created it? What one senses, is the conclusion the inference obtains, which may or may not be empirical. He does not ‘sense’ the act of logically inferring from which the conclusion is given.

I think you may mean, from your point of view, that to ‘sense’ indicates that under the proper experimental conditions, evidence is presented that one does a logical thing in response to relevant stimuli, and so is empirically verified that such is the case.

If that is what you mean, do you see the problem? What else could possibly appear under such experimental conditions, if the human cognitive system is itself a logical system? Of course you’ll witness that ones ‘senses’ a logical inference, because he could not possibly do anything else, simply because that is the very nature of the system under which he does anything at all. Your system would be of great benefit, if it were demonstrated that the human system is not in fact logical, but a human still ‘senses’ logical inferences, because in that case, he would not be at the same time the source of it. If you can’t do that, in effect you’ve done nothing metaphysics hasn’t already done, 300 years go.

So...in order to reconcile the paradigmatic conflict, what I think you meant, and what you actually meant, are way more separate than laid out here. Which I grant beforehand.

Which brings up this: I’ve been telling you of my system, but you haven’t reciprocated by telling me of yours. And while all this is a proper demonstration of Socratic dialectic, it is necessarily one-sided. Just letting you know it doesn’t have to be; you could always lay some psychological counterpoints on me.

There is absolutely no empiricism in cognitive metaphysics, it being entirely a rational study under the auspices of logic alone.
— Mww

I disagree. What seems logical to you is an empirical finding from interoception. You find it logical that 2+2=4. That's not different than you finding the rocks are hard or roses smell sweet. — Isaac

We’ve been exposed to simple arithmetic since Day One, practically, so we don’t notice the fundamentals anymore. That 2+2=4 is a given, but it is merely the empirical proof, a euphemism for experience, that the logical inference “these things conjoined with those things makes a greater thing than either”.

Rote memorization is cognition, but isn’t cognitive metaphysics, which presupposes memory, albeit named by a different conception.
—————-

But surely it is either given that it is ("if it seems to me to be bacon then it is bacon") or you accept that things can seem some way yet turn out to be another. — Isaac

If it seems to be bacon presupposes what bacon seems like. What bacon seems like, to me, is my experience of it. So, all else being equal, if that which I now perceive seems like bacon, than I am justified in experiencing it as bacon.

That I am forced to admit that some things seem some way, but turn out to be quite different, is nothing but the manifold of conceptions I think as belonging to that thing, were insufficient for the valid cognition of it. These days, that’s just called “not enough information”. This is why we don’t need science to tell us empirical knowledge is both contingent, and incomplete; logic told us that eons ago.

Guy has the experience of a certain animal. He’s out for a stroll, sees an animal, perceives the same properties in the second he found in the first, says...yep that there’s a “dog”, too. Second animal does an about-face, guy then notices a stripe running the full length of its back. Oops, he says, that ain’t no dog like I ever seen. Gonna call that a “badger”.

Guy calls this thing a table. Some other guy comes along, miniaturizes him, takes him way down deep into the table, guy finds nothing but mostly empty space. Does he think his table isn’t what it seems? No, he does not, for he is no longer cognizing the table, but only that which occupies the space relative to himself, which quite obviously does not include his pre-conceived table.
—————

“...I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself....”
— Mww

So... is the thought that some thought is a contradictory thought subject to the same restrictions? — Isaac

Thoughts are not contradictory. Thoughts are singular and successive, in that no thought is of more than the one thing to which it relates, and no thought is simultaneous with any other. Given a series of thoughts, if the judgement arising from them does not conform to them, the judgement is contradictory. For me to judge blue and square, that which I conceive to be red and round, is me contradicting myself. Simple, extreme, but serves as the general principle.

Me judging a car to be doing 50, when the cop giving me the ticket proves the car was doing 60, is not me contradicting myself, but me misunderstanding the empirical conditions, which is not irrational. If I judge the car as doing 50, look at the speedometer which shows the car doing 60, but insist the car is doing only 50 anyway, then I contradict myself by denial, which is quite irrational.
————-

Interoception. Interesting concept. I never heard of it. Care to elaborate?

Did you think you added something to the conversation here? — Banno

Don’t know, don’t care. I commented on the subject matter, which is enough.

The thread is here because I have the gut feeling that there must be something wrong with the argument in the OP; it's just too obvious. But I don't see what the eror is. — Banno

Necessity relates to possibility. Something is necessary if its negation is impossible, an a priori axiomatic logical truth, which needs no account of empirical domain.

Something is necessary if it is true in every possible world. — Banno

The proposition should read...it is true a thing is necessary if its negation is impossible. It follows that a god is necessary iff the non-existence of a god is impossible. If true the non-existence of god is possible, then the necessity of god is false. If true or false, where it is true or false, is irrelevant.

Piecea cake.

The only difference then between this metaphysics and cognitive science seems to be that that we make the assumption all this happens in a brain (a good assumption, I think). — Isaac

I think the proper metaphysician grants the assumption. I certainly do, myself. Everything human happens because of the brain. Neither discipline knows the exact means by which the brain does what it does, but to say it doesn’t permits absurdities. Your system has the advantage of dispelling absurdities by experimentation in compliance to natural law, whereas my system can only argue against them in conformity to logical law. Which ventures a subtlety in itself, insofar as humans were logically endowed long before they were scientifically inclined.

In truth, all I got going for me is, “...I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict    myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities....”

I don’t want data contributed exactly because it isn’t part of the process.
— Mww

Why would it matter? — Isaac

It must be obvious I consider metaphysics a purely first-person architecture. As such, I don’t want data contributing to my metaphysical system for which I hold no responsibility. How would I trust my knowledge, if there were external influences on it not included in the constituency of the system?
—————

We've just established the investigation is post hoc, so externally derived data about it isn't going to disrupt the process we're investigating, that's already happened and we're simply gathering data about it. — Isaac

Deriving data by third-party investigation of a system’s use, seems to be something different....

In fact cognitive science has the slight edge here in that third parties can contribute some data here without their examination forming a part of the process — Isaac

....than third-party’s contribution of data, which makes explicit data not connected to the system being investigated. The first is not an issue, the second is, asked and answered by the above.

Nevertheless, I understand the ramifications. It is the case that sometimes third-party investigations reveal a physical discrepancy in the mechanics of the system, and sometimes even a rational article the system hadn’t presented to itself, re: “I never thought of it that way”. Even so, when presented with this missing piece, the system must still incorporate it into the compendium of its extant conditions, re: its relevance must still be understood by the system. If it isn’t, it has no power and thus cannot amend the system.

“....Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called stupidity; and for such a failing we know no      remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such, persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, and it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned who in the application of their science betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want....”

Kinda funny, really. Here we have you, an intelligence in one regard, and me, an intelligence in another, duking it out in a dialectical free-for-all.....with an onlooker claiming we’re both exhibiting a deficiency in judgement, you for mine, me for yours, neither of us improved from the other’s tuition, making us both stupid. Perhaps, in best-case scenario, we’ve each gained from each other, making the onlooker eat his words.
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Something's not being a science doesn't seem to me to have any bearing on whether science can investigate it. — Isaac

Science is an empirical study, or, a study under necessarily empirical conditions. There is absolutely no empiricism in cognitive metaphysics, it being entirely a rational study under the auspices of logic alone.

Sports aren't themselves a science either, but science investigates them. — Isaac

Yes, but herein, science investigates the manifestation of the sporting activity...what makes a sportsman deficient, hence to improve it. What makes a person a sportsman, better yet, a good sportsman....is not a science, but a psychological investigation, which is not an empirical science. At the extreme, me calling that sportsman a farging cheater, winning all the damn time, either immediately manifests as me being merely jealous due to my incompetency, or he actually does cheat, in which case I have found him out. Both metaphysical deductions. Amendable to mediate psychological investigation, sure, but....er....post hoc.
—————

you will find I don’t use the term “mind”. As far as I’m concerned, in the context of this discussion, all I need to talk about is the human cognitive system and its constituency.....
— Mww

I read this the requisite three times...still nothing I'm afraid. Any chance of a re-phrasing? — Isaac

Substitute any occurrence of mind, with reason.
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I am aware of the external world simply from being affected by it.
— Mww

It doesn't follow that you are aware of all that you are affected by. If I knocked you unconscious and then shaved your eyebrows off you would have been affected by the outside world but not aware of it. — Isaac

You have caused an effect, but not an affect. Affect presupposes awareness; how could I say I was affected if I never sensed that which affected me? Even if something happened to me, I still couldn’t say it had an affect, if I never knew about it. So I wake up, notice missing eyebrows.....now I am affected.

If I am unaware, the system that discerns conscious activities, is useless. Being unaware makes explicit no sensation, which eliminates every single downstream constituent of the system which follows from it. This emphasizes the previous stipulation, whereby the input to the system is not part of it, while still being absolutely necessary for it.

“....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses....”

Bad example, really. If there’s no mirror, or it’s my day off and I have no outside contacts, I, at least temporarily, might not know I’m missing my eyebrows. Hence.....for the duration of such temporality, their being missing has no affect. But I see your point.
—————

I don’t need mind to tell me there is something in my visual field.
— Mww

You absolutely do. Absent of a mind all you have is a chaos of staccato signals, which tell you nothing, not even if there's something. — Isaac

Mostly correct, insofar as all I would have is signals which tell me nothing......except that there are signals. So, yes, I am informed of something. But those signals would be there irrespective of my reception of them, iff I grant the reality of the external world, which I, personally, do.

Now, it may be said mind is that which grants such reality, but that’s a different argument, consisting of ontology rather than cognitive metaphysics, which is an epistemological investigation. Again, I don’t care that there is something (chaotic signals); I want to know if that something is this or that (red, or, bacon, or, gunfire).
————-

What is "Honey-Do time"? — Isaac

Honey, do take out the trash, please?; Honey, do mow the lawn, please?; Honey, do the dog-poop pickup, please? Etc, etc, etc.........

The diagram is not in the system, it's an outside view.
— Kenosha Kid

An outside view viewed by whom? — Isaac

Not an outside view, but an inside view at a different time. Guy goes about his business. Guy makes a mistake; guy does a good thing; guy does this; guy does that, all day, every day for his whole conscious life, all under the direct supervision of the system.

Something a guy might do, is ask about the mistake; ask about the good thing; ask about this; ask about that. It’s called reflection. Who’s he gonna ask, for certain answers that is, but himself? What’s he gonna ask, but the system. How’s he gonna ask, but with the system. Only the system can ask and answer, because the system did, what the system’s asking about.

Silly as that seems, it is in fact what we do all the time. Happens so fast we don’t notice, and is so common as to be unnoticeable most of the time, but once in awhile, we are forced by some relative severity, to actually think about something we did. Didn’t do. Said or didn’t say. Thought or didn’t think.

Not that hard to imagine, that given sufficient methodological reduction from some undeniable reality, we can actually arrive at some example or other, that represents our cognitive system, such that all the above is explained. Explained but not proven.

And the rest, as they say....is history.

Information is the only thing that fits in mind, so it is the only thing that can cause a thought ( The deeper question though is what causes the information to integrate?). — Pop

Which could be considered as just another iteration of what I’m talking about. If it is information responsible for causation and we still need to query the cause of the cause....we remain contending with that damnable infinite regress.
————-

This information must be interpreted. — Pop

Absolutely.

The mind is working with "raw information" — Pop

Common consensus, yes. Pretty much given something is working with the information. One camp says brain works with it, the other camp says mind works with it.

As it ever was......

Me: The cause of my thought can only be a thought.
You: What makes you think this?
Me: Simple: I don’t know the cause of my thought. I know I start with this (something), I know I end up with that (“basketball”), but whatever happens in between, is part of the system itself, and can never be examined except by the very system of which it is a part.
You: You're saying that you know you start at 1 and end up at 9, but you can't examine the boxes inbetween using the system itself. But how can you know that without having at least taken a glance at the diagram - you must have 'examined' the system to some extent to even be able to report as much as you have.
Me: EXCEPT by using the system itself. Examining the system, reporting on it, post hoc, is not the use of the system for its intended purpose.
——————

Not sure how this relates to the difference between cognitive science and metaphysics. Both are post hoc. — Isaac

It doesn’t, insofar as they are both post hoc. Yours is post hoc from an external perspective, mine is post hoc from my own internal perspective.

In fact cognitive science has the slight edge here in that third parties can contribute some data here without their examination forming a part of the process — Isaac

Which is exactly the problem. I don’t want data contributed exactly because it isn’t part of the process. Metaphysics is not and never was a science, hence cannot be examined scientifically. The system can only examine itself, with itself.
—————

But we are conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain, at least I am. I've seen it with my own eyes in both fMRI and EEG. — Isaac

Then you are only conscious of the the representation of the transfer, and infer the correspondence between them.
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I'm not conscious of it at the time, but I've no reason at all to believe that all the times I'm not in a machine capable of detecting such things my body works differently to the times when is is, that would be unreasonable skepticism. — Isaac

Correct, you’re not conscious of it at the time of it, but you are also not conscious of it merely because of its visual representation. Also correct, in that there is no reason to think the body works differently pursuant to different representations of it. The body works as it works, however that is.
—————-

The first box is the instantiation of it, the last is the culmination.
— Mww

This seems to be making an arbitrary distinction. — Isaac

It would be, if not for its logical necessity. It is indubitable that whatever is in our heads is not the same as whatever is in the world outside our heads. Doesn’t matter what is, only that what is here is distinct from what is there.
—————

The System' in the context of our discussion is the mind and it's contents. — Isaac

If you look back, you will find I don’t use the term “mind”. As far as I’m concerned, in the context of this discussion, all I need to talk about is the human cognitive system and its constituency, which cannot include mind. Even if we say the system is metaphysical, and “mind” is metaphysical, doesn’t mean they are the same thing.
(In the 700 pages of the CPR, mind is mentioned exactly four times, and then only as a general transcendental idea)

If you are aware of the instantiation and you are aware of the culmination, then by definition both must be part of 'The System' because you have no other means by which you can be aware of either than your mind. — Isaac

I disagree. I am aware of the external world simply from being affected by it. I don’t need mind to tell me there is something in my visual field. It is certain the reason makes mistakes, so it is irrational to suppose Mother Nature would require us to reason about whether or not we see something.

It is not the business of reason to tell me that there is something, but always and only to tell what the something is. Which also suffices for the distinction from another point of view, for that I am affected by a thing from its perception, is of a different time that being told what it is from the process of the cognitive system.

To be continued......Honey-Do time, doncha know.

With Hangar One, of course. Shaken, not stirred.

Tangueray for me, while you’re at it. Preferably Rangpur.

Noticed, and for which he owes you a cocktail of your choice.

HA!! Boy-howdy. I can’t even imagine total sense deprivation. I’m not even sure such a thing is possible at least while being conscious.

a song "playing" in your head isn't just a representation of the real thing (which is true of hearing it for the first time), but an approximation (recall is imperfect) to a representation (memory) of an approximation (memorisation is imperfect) of a representation (what I heard) of a real thing (what was played). — Kenosha Kid

Ahhh....another closet Kantian. YEA!!!!! C’mon, admit it. Release yourself to the Force, padawan!!!

“...For the manifold representations (recall, memory, what I heard) which are given in an intuition (what was played) would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one consciousness, that is, as my representations (...), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me (be in my head)....”

That’s not at all what I’m saying. I have no wish to be attacked by a bus, anymore than my ancestors wished to be attacked by a grizzly. Considering the relative possibilities of each, I’d say my survival is less the problem than his.

Exceptions to a rule say nothing whatsoever about the rule.

but you can't examine the boxes inbetween using the system itself. — Isaac

EXCEPT by using the system itself. Also, as you must be aware, examining the system, reporting on it, post hoc, is not the use of the system for its intended purpose. When thinking about something, in the common course of cognitive events, to ask myself how it is I’m thinking it, isn’t in that common course. I may inquire afterwards, in which case I would retrospect using the very same system by which the original thought occurred. Check out how a car drives, whether it drives properly or there’s something wrong with it, by driving it, right? Check out the fit of a shoe......ehhhh, you get the picture.

In addition, part of the system is not in our awareness. Just as in the physical nature of brain mechanics, there is a gap between the sensing of a thing and the apprehension of it, that part in which the perception is transformed into material for the system. Much like we are not conscious of the transfer along nerves of the output of sensation and the input to the brain. Metaphysically speaking, the output of sensation into the nerve endings is phenomena, the transfer along nerves is imagination, the input to the brain is apperception. You know.....case you were wondering.

Are not 'start' and 'end up with' nodes in the system? — Isaac

Technically, no, they are not. The first box is the instantiation of it, the last is the culmination. Empirically, the first is perception, the last is experience. Rationally, the first is thought, the last is reason.
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I don't know what goes on in between"

Is that not a description of the system despite being a partial one? — Isaac

Description, yes, but not necessarily knowledge. Metaphysics describing the human cognitive system is a logical interpretation only. Say, experience is this, but only if that and that and that, are consistent with the possibility. But we do not know if the conditions speculated, are the conditions in fact. But that's ok, because science doesn’t know either. Hence.....the inescapable dualism.
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The object is a model itself — Isaac

This is exactly right, and oh so Kantian, for it is the purpose of his entire tripartite treatise, to show the objects we perceive are given their modeling by us. The only way it could be otherwise, is to deny the representational nature of the human system. Science will never be able to do that, because the very laws which promise the certainty of its paradigm, automatically prevent its denial, re: conservation of energy. Thing is, in the physical system, the energy is the same throughout and compensation for energy loss in the transfer from one medium to the other occurs downstream, but in the metaphysical system, where the energy of sensation is completely lost, everything downstream is prevented from being a direct correspondence to the object perceived. This is how we are allowed to claim we don’t know what a thing is, immediately upon the sensing of it. It merely constructs as an internal representation, in accordance with the affect the energy of the perception, has. And that which is constructed, is a phenomenon. The object becomes a model.

Philosophy.....ain’t it grand????

Still all good, but having to do with anthropology and sociology and such. Just because I’m trapped in some relative influences of them, doesn’t mandate a personal interest.

allow me to give the short version — Olivier5

I’m good with that version.

But still, there are other uses for thinking than survival alone, aren’t there, at least nowadays, when survival isn’t as big a deal as it used to be.

Information is the cause of your thought. — Pop

Not from this armchair. Information is what the thought is about, not the cause of it.

Information, if anything, is the affect on the brain from perception, which we call sensation.

The cause of my thought can only be a thought
— Mww

What makes you think this? — Isaac

Simple: I don’t know the cause of my thought. That which cannot be known, can still be thought, hence, the cause of my thought can only be a thought, or, it is nothing. Hence....infinite regress, if the former, and from either, no answer is at all possible.

I know what a thought is. As a scientist, a thought euphemistically represents the relation of a stimulus to a reaction by means of an electrochemical medium. As a metaphysician, given a specific theory, a thought is the relation of an object to its cognition by means of a speculative rational system. To say I know the relation between a cognition and an object, which may or not be true, does not give me warrant for claim to know the cause by which the relation is brought about. All I can say is....that’s how this particular rational system works. I know I start with this (something), I know I end up with that (“basketball”), but whatever happens in between, is part of the system itself, and can never be examined except by the very system of which it is a part.

It is catastrophically erroneous to say the object in the relation is its cause, for the object is necessarily simultaneous with the thought of it***, which eliminates the time absolutely necessary for the principle of cause and effect. There is no such thing as an empty thought, every thought is about something, by which the notion of simultaneity (Kant calls it spontaneity) finds its support. It follows as a matter of course, that given the absence of the time necessary for cause/effect, my thoughts are not caused by nor an effect of, the relation it represents.

Nahhhhh.....cognition is the effect, object is the cause. My thought merely unites one to the other, and it is called......wait for iiittttttt......understanding. More precisely, understanding is the uniting, judgement is the united. Theoretically.

*** not to be confused with the perception of it, which is always antecedent to the thought.
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Modeling the cause of thought implies making better humans.
Modeling the content of thought implies making a human better.
— Mww

Woah - left-field, where did this spring from? — Isaac

Modeling the physical cause of thought can possibly lead to manipulation of its electrochemical constituents. Behavior modification is a real thing, right? More likely behavior modification manifests as beneficial to humanity in general, I would hope. Hence....better humans.

Me, modeling the content of my thoughts, meaning “this is what I think about that”, and providing I wish to benefit myself by rearranging what I think about that....hence making me a better human.

Where it springs from....damned if I know. Sounded profound at the time. Ego or superfluous bullshit....take your pick.
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Feel free to ignore this. — Isaac

I much favor responding to proper intellectual inquiry, rather than pathological ineptitude.

You win.

I don’t see how you end up with infinite regress. — khaled

That I must use thinking, in order to think to that which causes my thinking, is the epitome of infinite regress. The cause of my thought can only be a thought, which is caused by an antecedent thought....never to arrive at the unconditioned cause of any thought.

Pretty straightforward, I should think.

to seek its causes, is to necessarily use the very thing already caused.
— Mww

So? What’s the issue with this? — khaled

Infinite regress.

the discussion from this point and on is useless for me. I hope you can see that. — Alkis Piskas

Saw it from the beginning.

Have a good day.

it tells me specifically about myself from within
— Mww

It claims to. By what measure do you assess that it actually does. — Isaac

Cognitive prejudice. Given a set of theoretical conditions, assessing the degree of satisfaction with them. Now, one might be inclined to say, yeah right, in that case you’re no more than being led by the nose, which usually is the case, considering the lack of empirical warrant, unless the theoretical conditions are so rigid, so complete, encompassing all readily apparent circumstances......and never once contradicting Mother Nature Herself......granting to it due authority causes no harm. In short, it’s a comfortable rendering of something for which no certain knowledge yet repeals.
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Most of all, my metaphysical paradigm doesn’t need to juxtaposition disabilities or physical damage in justifications for my normative mental goings-on
— Mww

Again, that it doesn't is not evidence that it doesn't need to. — Isaac

My metaphysics is an exposition on the possibility of a priori knowledge on one hand, and an exposition on the grounds for moral determinations on the other. That being given, I have no wish to know what doesn’t work, but only that which does, and why such should be the case. Thus it is, that whatever juxtaposition does arise, merely exemplifies the consequences under which these expositions themselves are somehow defective, and not what happens when the internal physicality responsible for their manifestation, somehow are.
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It depends, I suppose, on what it is you want to achieve. If you're just looking for a story that answers "why do I think like that?" then metaphysics is certainly an easier route to find one. — Isaac

Exactly right. I am Everydayman. Makes no difference whether true or not, there seems to be a little tiny world contained in my head, and wherever it directs, I go. As do you, and even while looking to arrive at the same answer by a different story, you arrive in the exact same way as I, in whichever way that actually is.
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The task, it seems, is to model the causes of our thoughts. — Isaac

My metaphysics doesn’t do that. My thoughts are given, it makes no difference what causes them. That I think is a condition of my biology, and to seek its causes, is to necessarily use the very thing already caused. I can never ever think to a cause of thinking. Better to examine what a thought is, what a thought contains, where it fits in some overall system, rather than its causality.

Modeling the cause of thought implies making better humans.
Modeling the content of thought implies making a human better.

Then I can’t hold them responsible for the network that makes me to detest Lima beans.

what more-or-less technical aspect in philosophy shows up in your personal life? — Manuel

Reason.

I am aware of the facility of quotation marks. If I didn’t use them, I didn’t quote anybody.

Descartes/Kant 101 merely indicates a synopsis relevant to the topic.
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if you say to me that you live in Hawaii, I cannot doubt either that you are telling the truth or you are lying. I have no evidence for either case. So, I certainly can't say that it is true! — Alkis Piskas

You cannot doubt I said I live in Hawaii, so you can say it is true I said it.
You cannot doubt I am telling the truth or I am lying, so you can say it is true I am telling the truth or I am lying.
You can doubt that I live in Hawaii, so, yes, agreed, you cannot say it is true that I do. You also cannot say it is true I do not.
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By finding my reasoning agreeable, did it add to, or change, yours?

which would give you a useful picture of what going on between the ears — Isaac

Admittedly, yours gives a much more useful picture than the mathematics which grounds the elementary physical mechanisms. Between speculative cognitive metaphysics and empirical cognitive psychology, however, I will put my gambling profits on the former, for the simple reason that it tells me specifically about myself from within, whereas the latter is being told to me from without.

Most of all, my metaphysical paradigm doesn’t need to juxtaposition disabilities or physical damage in justifications for my normative mental goings-on. I mean.....the very last thing I want to know, is how something that’s broke in my head, explains something that isn’t. I understand clinical diagnosticians find that useful, but if I have a serious enough disability, my metaphysics is useless automatically, whatever the reason for it, which is ok because I won’t have a use for it anyway.

Interesting look inside, nonetheless.

Ah, I see. Useful for explaining something previously unexplained. — Kenosha Kid

I mentioned it doesn’t matter what the entailment is, that determines why one system would be thrown away before the other. From that, it can be deduced that explanation isn’t the reason. Besides, explanation implies understanding, which is quite obviously not the case in math generally, and quite apparently not the case in metaphysics generally.

It’s something else, underpinning both systems.

I'd say it is more the capacity for pattern recognition that makes us see the triangles than it is reason. — Janus

Agreed, in principle, but I don’t think pattern recognition is enough; we still have to do something with the patterns over and above recognizing them.