I'm inclined to some combination of transcendental and epistemic idealism. — Wayfarer

Question: what do you think belongs to epistemic idealism, that isn’t already included in transcendental idealism?

The mind is definitely not a thing. — Wayfarer

If it was, it must be conditioned, hence the possible invocation of infinite regress. Or, in order to relax infinite regress, some condition for mind must be allowed that is itself unconditioned. Better to just let the mind be the unconditioned placeholder, otherwise speculative theory runs away with itself and we end up with nothing.

Philosophy remains unavoidable rather than necessary or useful — Banno

What is it, then, that is at least sufficient to cause the unavoidedness of philosophy? Seems to me if philosophy remains unavoidable, it is necessarily so.

So while at first I was gladdened to see a defence of the need for philosophising, I don't think Midgley succeeds in her defence. — Banno

Perhaps because philosophizing is more an egotistical desire, than a pathological need.

The poverty of the myth of the individual is that it just fails to address the Other, and so fails to enter into moral discussion. — Banno

If there are logically coherent moral discussions predicated on the individual alone, then they are not necessarily myths. If such discussions have no need to address the Other because it is concerned with the individual alone, it is not a poverty by exclusion, but a consistency with it.

The necessity for inclusion of the Other in moral discussion makes explicit moral judgements are at least meaningless, and at most impossible, by an individual with respect to himself alone, an absurdity for which no one has argued successfully.

Rhetorically speaking.....

What’s a proper dialectician to do, with so little to work with.

Place has become a farging metaphysical kindergarten lately, I swear.

in terms of images and feelings. The essence of what we think. — Thinking

Essence of how we think. But that aside, it’s always been my contention that fundamentally, humans think in images and feelings. Tough sell, though, these days.

what I do see as being a problem is the view that there are 'experts', who have the last word. — Jack Cummins

For any situation calling for an immediate moral judgement on your part, what......you gonna query an expert? Nahhhh......I suspect you’d agree you’re the last word, and it’s you alone that has to answer to yourself, for whatever you do with that last word.

Ethics is what you learn; moral is what you are.

it is interesting to think about whether morality, or ethics can become based on empirical principles. — Jack Cummins

Maybe this is why morality is a philosophy, and ethics is a science, in that morals can have no empirical principles whatsoever, while ethics is in fact, predicated on them. This follows if it be granted ethics concerns itself with an object, in the form of community, or society, with behaviors relative to its constituency, but morality, on the other hand, does not have an object, it being nothing but a method by which any behavior of a single individual is to become justified by himself alone.

An ethical community implies a voluntary bonding among individuals, but morality determines the conditions under which an individual member determines himself bondable. Ethics authorizes a welfare state, but my moral disposition may very well disavow my participation in it.

One way to look at it, anyway.

One notion by which ethics differs conceptually from morality:

“....Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each have their empirical part, since the former has to determine the laws of nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of the human will, so far as it is affected by nature: the former, however, being laws according to which everything does happen; the latter, laws according to which everything ought to happen. Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not. (...) In this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic- a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with Ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the rational part....”

This reduces....eventually.....to morality being a philosophy for individual determinations of conduct in particular, ethics being the science of the consequences of the application of them, in general.

Good.

It’s known colloquially as the “Copernican Revolution”, although Kant never called it that. It’s found in the preface to the second edition of the first critique. Dunno about that Magee guy, but metaphysically-inclined folks been bashing or idolizing it since 1787.

Although, it’s not technically a thought experiment, per se, in that Kant theorizes as to the actual validity of the process it describes. So.....no physical science here, no Einstein or Schrodinger, but to some, every bit the paradigm shift in its field, as either of those in theirs.

That settles it. I guessed wrong, I didn’t get it, which just goes to show....you’re way too smart for me.

Two things, both of which have been covered in these comments:

One thing.....
Your diagram represents a given present, called “0”, initiating a regression of quanta, such that one of the infinite quanta is included in the totality of them. As such, three hours ago is a member of the set of all hours regressing from zero, which is the same as being included in the infinity of such hours, which is the same as being included in infinity of past hours, which is the same as being included in the infinite past. And you thought I didn’t get it. Shhheeeesh......gimme some credit, huh??

I grant the present represented by zero is synonymous with the beginning of negative hours, just as Kant’s argument stipulated the beginning of the world. It follows that there must be a time where negative hours did not exist, just as there must have been a time when the world did not exist, for that which has a beginning must have a time relative to it necessarily.

Nevertheless, do you see that these two are not compatible? And therefore cannot be used to argue that one invalidates the other? In the case of the numbers, the non-existence of negatives is subsequent to them; the non-existence of the world, is antecedent to it. Therefore, that past consistent with each, isn’t consistent with itself, insofar as the infinite past of negative numbers is yet to be past, but the infinite past of the world has already past. Now it is clear that given an infinite already past of the world, the beginning of it has no referent, hence the existence of it cannot be said to have ever occurred. But no matter its beginning, it did have one, therefore it could not have had an infinite past in which no beginning is to be found. Hence, that the world has an infinite past, is self-contradictory.

The other thing....
Your diagram represents exactly that which resides in the accusation of “confusing the measurement with the thing you are measuring“. The concept of negative hours included in an infinite past, is very far from the existential reality of the world as it was, and must have necessarily been, three hours ago. Again, Kant’s remark, that do so is “mere subterfuge”.

Your turn. How is the argument invalid?
—————

On modality.

Whatever steps are taken, it must be possible to take them. Given it is possible to take them, something must existent in order to take them. Given that steps are taken, it must been necessary for that which takes them, to exist as something capable of taking them.

“......It is to be added, that the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first. (...) necessity is nothing but existence, which is given through the possibility itself....”.

This is not to say we cannot have different notions of modality. On such occasions where it is questioned, the above is my answer.

By my reading and treatment, this thread is more about an argument's validity than about time's actual beginning or lack thereof. — InPitzotl

Agreed. I don’t care about time in and of itself. That which it conditions, or is the condition for, interests me.

To me, it's unknown whether time had a beginning. — InPitzotl

To everyone, I would think.

But it's certain that argument is invalid. — InPitzotl

There have been a few. Which one, please? Popper’s? “That argument” denotes specificity, so....

To what does the phrase "illegitimate in experience" refer? — InPitzotl

Stuff like this:

If Sam falls into an eternal black hole — InPitzotl

————

It is impossible to prove there is a point on an infinite line, if there is no possibility of an infinite line.
— Mww
...but proving the possibility is equivalent to disproving the impossibility. The original post is about challenging Popper's proof of impossibility. — InPitzotl

It wasn’t Popper’s, it was Kant’s. And it wasn’t a challenge as much as a misunderstanding by the thread’s author, of the original argument logically proving the impossibility of the world having no beginning. Still, you are correct, insofar as proving the possibility of an infinite line would at the same time prove one and all points on the line. To prove a possibility, one must prove a necessity, and to prove a necessity one needs prove an existence. Otherwise, all that’s proved is sufficiency. To prove the possibility of an infinite line one must show the existence of one. Which is impossible. So all that’s left is to represent an infinite line sufficiently, using those little dots after the uncompleted series of whatever’s. Or maybe something like “n + 1”.

In the case herein being senselessly beaten to death, the existence is given, re: the world, so the need to prove its possibility is negated, as is for the equivalency in disproving the impossibility that the world had a beginning, or, which is the same thing, that the beginning of the world is in the infinite past. The common rejoinder is, of course.....why not both. A beginning for the world and that beginning infinitely long ago. The contradictions so blatantly obvious, the counterarguments so lackluster......eventually regressing into such modern conceptual monstrosities as (gaspsputterchoke) “spagettification”

(Sigh)

My point here is that at least in some of your discussions you're confusing the measurement with the thing you are measuring. — InPitzotl

This is going on, and it is what the fighting’s all about, as my ol’ buddy Roger Waters would have you know.

Misplaced concreteness writ large, and I’m trying to demonstrate the futility of it.
————-

It's kind of irrelevant that our numbering system along that bottom ruler "never ends"... that line segment certainly has a point on it. — InPitzotl

Sure it does. It has an infinite number of them. Do you see this doesn’t relate to my arguments with respect to the thread’s original proposition? It is not contested that, given an origin, an infinite regression from it is logically possible. It follows that an infinite number of points are given by that possible infinite quantity which contains them. What I am saying, is diagrams do not prove the case, but merely represent that logical possibility. So neither of these two pictorial renditions prove the absolute necessity, of that which is grounded only in a mere possibility.

It is impossible to prove there is a point on an infinite line, if there is no possibility of an infinite line. This is a perfect example of reason in conflict with itself.....substituting what is legitimate in thought, with what is illegitimate in experience. Still, all that in itself is utterly irrelevant with respect to the thread, in which there is given the origin of a completed whole......the universe. The universe as a whole is the logical equivalent of your pictorial representation. As such, there is an infinite quantity of constituency in the universe, just as there is an infinite number of points on the line segment, 0 through -1. But the other diagram is bounded by infinity itself, no beginning and no end, which makes it absurd to locate any point on that line. I mean.....where is the access point?

Anyway.....metaphysics. Can’t prove it, can’t refute it. Best to discover the limits of what can be done with it.

For example, the concept of infinity is inherently an abstract concept, which, it seems, just simply cannot be applied to reality, and so this and similar discussions necessarily lead us to some kind of paradox, one way or another. — Zelebg

Good.

Basically, I think we cannot find satisfying resolution to this question until we first do something with our vocabulary, perhaps make definitions of concepts involved more robust or restrictive, or maybe come up with some new concepts and definitions, — Zelebg

Better.

My vote for Best......maybe we cannot find satisfying resolutions until we first do something with our metaphysics.

All I’ve contended here, is the notion of proof. I’m ok with your general thinking....and it wouldn’t matter even if I wasn’t....but I categorically reject the possibility of any proof for your original proposition, other than logical syllogism.
————-

For example, does "time" make any sense if nothing moves, if there is no change, and similarily, does "space" make any sense if there is nothing in it? — Zelebg

This, buried back in this maze of comments, is pretty much what I said. Just maybe with a couple additional reductions.

Ahhhh....ok, then. A symbolic proof. Thing is....that little squiggly thing at each end of the representational dotted line segment presupposes the very thing you’re using to prove something about it. “A” could be located at that point, or any other point, whether or not the line is infinite. Denying the antecedent comes to mind. Actually, there’s no point “A” could not be found on an infinite line, so it says nothing at all about the line itself, to say where “A” is found.
—————-

Do you think space could be infinite? — Zelebg

Sure, it could be. I also think it could be bounded by the current universe. Six of one, half dozen of the other. Mathematical/logical proofs for both, empirical proofs for neither.

That’s not an infinite line.

You must have known that, so what did you think you actually proved?

Dream. What consciousness does when it plays with itself.

So if one argues that Kant's argument “proved” that the temporal series of the universe must have had a beginning in time, by the same reasoning one could also prove that the series of negative integers must have a first term, a smallest negative integer, since otherwise the series could not end with -1, which is clearly not the case. — Amalac

Again....forward vs backward. The infinite series of negative integers doesn’t end with -1, it begins with it. The smallest negative integer is -1, in that it is the least distant from its referent. The universe, conversely, is the absolute furthest from its referent, which is its non-existence, made explicit by the consideration of its infinite past.
———-

And why would there being infinitely many finite intervals of time be impossible given a universe with no beginning in time/ infinite past, exactly? — Amalac

That there are an infinite amount of intervals of time of the universe is not contradictory, for any given whole is infinitely divisible, and the universe is itself a given whole. But how can there even be a universe with no beginning in time?

No beginning in time does not carry the same implications as an infinite past of time. Past implies backward from original present, so an infinite past just means backwards indefinitely from the present. In both of these, the present is given. But for a universe with no beginning, there cannot be a given present, hence the absurdities in connecting a non-existent, re: the universe, insofar as that which does not begin does not exist, with its past, infinite or otherwise.

To think the infinite intervals of times of the universe, does not contradict itself. To think the infinite past of the universe, from its present, does not contradict itself, but experience does show its contradiction in fact. To think the universe as having no beginning contradicts everything about the universe. To say there is an infinite time lapse before the beginning of the universe just makes the universe impossible.

Infinite time, in itself, and the universe, by itself, are incompatible. Metaphysically, this is a legitimate thesis if time is only a condition of all things and the universe is a thing. Or, it is equally legitimate if time is meaningless unless it relates things, and the universe is a thing.

Take care. Lot’s of edits here. Depending on when your response begins, in relation to my final edit.

Ever onward......

In a universe with an infinite past, one could say that there would be infinitely many finite intervals of time, which, when added, make up an infinite amount of time.

But if that's all that Kant meant when he said that:

“....up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions....”
— Mww

... then I don't see what the supposed contradiction is, he says (in my translation of the Critique):

the infinity of a series consists in that it can never be finished by means of successive syntheses.
— Kant — Amalac

Kant is working onward, you are working backward. Referencing your universe with “past” presupposes a regression in time from some other given time, otherwise “past” is irrelevant. His “up to every given moment” presupposes a progression in time from every other time, so it makes no difference what that some other time is. They are indistinguishable. Kant is working with time alone, you are working with something existing in time.

The contradiction resides in your inclusion of the universe as an uncompleted series. If it was, then the elapsed time of the universe, your “infinitely many finite intervals of time” for the universe is impossible, therefore there could be no universe, a contradiction. The universe would never be “finished by means of successive synthesis”, from which follows necessarily that talk of “in a universe with an infinite past”, is meaningless. Even if you think the universe the same as Kant thinks the world, it is still to be treated an a completed series of times, from which there arises a present condition of that which is called “universe”.
————-

in the same way in which the series of negative integers — Amalac

The set of negative integers is an uncompleted series, in which the last member is impossible to represent. Even so, the conception of integers remains. In the case of the universe, given its existence, which is the equivalent of zero for the reference of infinite negative integers, it is merely the infinite set of constituents of the universe that cannot be represented, while the conception of the universe itself remains. This shows the compatibility of arguments with respect to integers, with arguments with respect to the infinite series of times for an existent whole.

Nevertheless, while it is possible to think the infinite past of the universe in which it has no beginning, such thought is necessarily contradicted by experience. It is at the same time possible to think the infinite series of negative integers, and forever be safe from contradiction by experience. So the arguments are not compatible.

Hence.....the conflicts of pure reason, the antinomies.
—————

Hmmm......and what of the idea of a succession of a series of times that never completes? Isn’t a succession in a series of times the same as an elapse of time?
— Mww

I guess you meant to say “Isn't a succession in a series of time the same as a lapse of time?” — Amalac

No, I said what I meant to say. Time can contain nothing but intervals of itself. Things are in time, but time is not in the things. Ultra-modernists posit time as a property, such that time can be in things, but then they cannot explain how empirical things can have an infinite property.
————-

So, to make the mathematical analogy clear: — Amalac

It is clear, but I don’t think it sufficient to support the OP, which asks “can the universe be infinite towards the past”, and, of course, has nothing whatsoever to do with the antinomies.

Metaphysics.....the most fun to be had without paying for it.

what I said was that he maintained that if the past were infinite then that implies that an infinite amount of time has elapsed.

I'm not saying Kant maintained that the universe had an infinite past, I'm doubting the truth of that hypothetical proposition. — Amalac

The hypotetical I'm refering to is “If the universe has an infinite past, then an infinite amount of time has elapsed up to the present”. — Amalac

Man, this hypothetical’s got a farging mind of its own donnit? Seems “up to the present” makes an appearance in this current iteration, which changes the entire proposition.

Anywhooo.....so you doubt the truth of the proposition that if the universe has an infinite past then an infinite amount of time has elapsed up to the present.
————-

You’re equating your “if the past were infinite” with his “an eternity must have elapsed”
— Mww

No, I don't think those two mean the same thing, — Amalac

Neither do I. I was guessing you were equating them because that’s all I could find that was even close.
——————

I'm saying: The past is infinite ≠ an infinite amount of time has elapsed — Amalac

I am vindicated!!!! No where in this: If the universe has an infinite past, then an infinite amount of time has elapsed up to the present, is to be found this: The past is infinite ≠ an infinite amount of time has elapsed. YEA!!!

to say that time has elapsed implies that it elapsed since some moment in time to some other moment in time — Amalac

OK.....

hence the notion of time elapsing is not applicable to infinite amounts of time, but only to finite intervals of time. — Amalac

Hmmm......and what of the idea of a succession of a series of times that never completes? Isn’t a succession in a series of times the same as an elapse of time? A succession in a series makes no need of an amount for each time of the series. Even so, isn’t an infinite series of successive finite intervals of minutes, still an infinite amount of time?

“....up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions....”

But how, then, do you define “the past”, if not as the time previous to the present moment? — Amalac

That is how I would define it, but I didn’t use “past” in my statement. You transcribed the term into it.
———-

I'm doubting the truth of that hypothetical proposition. — Amalac

Hence, the antithesis. Or in your case, a possible antithesis, upon your presentation of a thesis self-consistent and necessary in its own right, but constructed with different initial conditions than he used.

As long as the Kantian antinomies are the ground of the discussion, best to keep in mind.....

“....Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical propositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical assertions of the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical cognitions (thesis cum antithesis), in none of which we can discover any decided superiority. Antithetic is not, therefore, occupied with one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes. Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result. If we employ our reason not merely in the application of the principles of the understanding to objects of experience, but venture with it beyond these boundaries, there arise certain sophistical propositions or theorems. These assertions have the following peculiarities: They can find neither confirmation nor confutation in experience; and each is in itself not only self-consistent, but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason—only that, unluckily, there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition....”

....so if you’re going to argue the falsity of all or parts of the series of antinomies, you should stay in the context provided by the section in which they are found.
————-

I'm not saying Kant maintained that the universe had an infinite past, I'm doubting the truth of that hypothetical proposition. — Amalac

So you’re doubting the truth of the hypothetical proposition that the universe had an infinite past. Regardless of what that has to do with Kantian antinomies, and best you refrain from referencing them when expounding on how you conclude the fallaciousness of that hypothetical, what truth contained in it is doubtful, and how is it doubted?

On the other hand, if you insist on referencing the antinomies, perhaps start with this.....

“.....Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. It follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible...”

......which, while having nothing to do with the universe, does.....er....maintain....that no infinite series can have a past, an “already elapsed”, so the truth of the hypothetical proposition “the universe had an infinite past”, is already refuted, so you are correct in doubting it.
————-

what I said was that he maintained that if the past were infinite then that implies that an infinite amount of time has elapsed. — Amalac

So is this where you’re coming from? And by association, is this the hypothetical proposition the truth of which you find doubtful?

“....up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions...”

You’re equating your “if the past were infinite” with his “an eternity must have elapsed”, probably, which is fine. Close enough. As well, your “an infinite amount of time must have elapsed” is close to his “therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions”.

So why are you doubting the truth of what he says given you are saying practically the same thing?

The problem arises upon recognition that his hypothetical proposition is prefaced by granting there is no world. You can find the truth doubtful in his hypothetical proposition, just as he himself does, from the excruciatingly sufficient reason that there is a world.

All I can do now, is grant I got the hypothetical propositions mixed up, and that’s not what you’re talking about at all. If so, you’ve successfully confused the hell outta me, and I’m at the end of my dialectical rope. So fix the confusion, or forget the whole thing.....up to you.

Yeah, my bad. I saw it, but couldn’t fix it without starting over. Compromised between making an effort and taking the heat.

I wish to know how the two concepts in Kant's definition are described: infinite and infinity. — god must be atheist

Didn’t I do exactly that? Dunno what else you want.
—————

If the infinite is an adjective as you say,
— Mww

you are using it as a noun. You used it as a noun when you quoted Kant.

Are you referencing this: “Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller”?

Ehhhh....that just means regardless of how many minutes there are in an infinite time, there will be more of them than an infinite time composed of hours.

Easy peasey — god must be atheist

Witnessing indicates observation. To witness an object from outside its limits merely indicates observing the object’s spatial boundaries.
— Mww

What is the boundary of the world then? I guess you mean something like the CMB? — Amalac

I diverge from Kant here, and adjoin Schopenhauer, re: the world as “will and representation”, in that I consider the world to be the immediate unity of phenomena, that which directly appears to my representational faculties, a much narrower view of experience proper. All else, being possible experience doesn’t change the my idea of world, but rather, enlarges its content and thereby its limits. As such, the boundary of my world is the totality of my possible experience, and, because of that restriction, the CMB is irrelevant.
—————

Assuming the absolute validity of the principle, the only reconciliation is simultaneity, in which time is no longer presupposed, yet for which account is given.
— Mww

So by simultaneously you don't mean “at the same time”, what do you mean by that then? Logically simultaneous? — Amalac

I think more the simultaneity of the initiation of phenomena, with the possibility of the representation of them, by an eventual intellect equipped with a cognitive system predicated on it. Within such a system, time is not an object so doesn’t depend on the ontology of objects, but it is used by the system in referencing objects to the system or to each other, so as soon as objects become possible, so too does the possibility of referencing them. Time is therefore irrelevant if there are no objects and if there is no system.
————-

If there's no present, and an infinite amount of time has elapsed as Kant maintains in the first thesis, since when to when did it elapse? — Amalac

Again, he doesn’t maintain it, he supposes it in order to have something to debunk. There is a world in existence, therefore an infinite time is impossible, for that world. There may be an infinite time regressively from the beginning of the world, but not from an infinite time progressively to the beginning of the world. There is no present for the world from a progressively infinite time makes no sense. From the progressively infinite time point of view, to ask what time elapsed to what time, makes no sense. What is there to reference it to?

If you read the antinomies, you should have found he did the same thing in the antithesis. In the thesis he supposed the world had no beginning then proved it did, in the antithesis he supposed the world had a beginning and proved it didn’t. They are called conflicts of transcendental ideas for just that reason; either can be proved in its own way.

therefore he can't equate the two. — god must be atheist

Make of these what you will:

“...A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot possibly exist....”
“...The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be completed....”
—————-

Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller
— Mww

This is actually not right. There is no such thing as "infinite" other than to describe a feature of infinity. — god must be atheist

If the infinite is an adjective as you say, why can’t it describe a feature of a quantity? It may have been clearer if he’d said the unit is taken to be more or less, then the infinite will be greater or smaller. Still, this must be understood as a quantity approaches infinity by means of the more or fewer units in it.

Dunno how infinity can have features anyway. All it can ever be is an uncompleted series. Then it is only a feature of the series, described by its incompleteness.

As I said, for whatever it’s worth....infinity is a conception of its own, there is no object associated with it. That which is infinite, has as many conceptions associated with it as there are infinite things.

Anyway.....this is the kinda thing that can be played with all day, no one the happier for it beyond the time used for it not wasted somewhere else.

There are two ways of thinking about infinity — god must be atheist

I will disagree. There is one way to think of infinity, and another different way to think of the infinite.

Infinity is its own thing; all that is infinite is each its own thing.

Which is Kant’s argument, among others. Fascinating or not, not wrong.

“...Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the relation to this given unit, must remain always the same, although the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized....”

we’ve witnessed it in its entirety from outside its limits — Mww

unknown parts of the world, and parts we have not observed yet or of whose existence we are not even aware at present — Amalac

Limits indicates a spatial boundary. Witnessing indicates observation. To witness an object from outside its limits merely indicates observing the object’s spatial boundaries. Observing a boundary has nothing to do with the experience of the total constituency of the object observed. In fact, the total constituency, the composition, of an object is immediately given because it is bounded, whether or not there is any experience of it.
————-

the universe, according to you, was the condition for space and time, in which case wouldn't that imply that the universe is determined by time, contrary to what you said? — Amalac

I don’t think it logically correct to grant empirical causality from simultaneity. That every effect has a cause presupposes a time by which the cause is antecedent to the effect. If the universe causes time, and time is already presupposed, the principle of cause and effect self-destructs. Assuming the absolute validity of the principle, the only reconciliation is simultaneity, in which time is no longer presupposed, yet for which account is given.
————

Assuming the universe was infinite towards the past, and that an infinite amount of time passed all the way to the present, since which moment down to the present did it pass? Since when to when did it pass? — Amalac

There is no present. Questions predicated on impossibilities are irrational.

If you are not using the words “world” and “universe” as synonyms, then what's the difference between the two? — Amalac

The world is a phenomenon, an object of experience, now that we’ve witnessed it in its entirety from outside its limits; the universe is not. If the universe is the condition for space and time, it cannot be a phenomenon determined by them. Trying to equalize them, is, as the Good Professor says, “...a mere subterfuge...”, nevermind the lengthy exposition on why this is so.
————-

we could deduce the proposition “The universe has a necessary origin in time” without experience, merely by analysis of the concept “world”, right? — Amalac

I don’t know how that would be possible, if the world is a particular thing but the universe is all particular things in general. Claiming the last because of the first would be induction, which everybody from Hume onward, epistemologically worthy of his letters, says is unreliable. Besides, claiming anything empirical without the regulation of experience is not sufficient for knowledge.
————

show me how that proposition is analytic. — Amalac

How the universe has a necessary origin in time? Hmmmm.....I don’t think that can be shown, unless it can be shown the origin of the universe is simultaneous with the origin of time.

Anyway.....does that work for you? Don’t forget we’re doing metaphysics here, not hard science.

you said before that it was a tautology, which seems untrue — Amalac

I said that the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is a tautology, a analytic truth.

Evidence that the universe is finitely existent in the past is provided by the mathematically logical necessity of singularities.
— Mww

If you have to look for evidence in support of that proposition, then it's no longer a tautology. — Amalac

I’m not supporting the proposition, but merely stating it. The solutions to the field equations support it, which are not subject/copula/predicate propositions, but mathematical formulations, and while not analytical, are nonetheless true. If otherwise, the entire human system for knowledge certainty is in serious jeopardy, regardless of its adaptability to changes in observational data.
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It (mathematically logical necessity) may be logically necessary given the laws of physics that govern the actual universe, — Amalac

Laws don’t govern the universe; they are human constructs representing how the universe appears to govern itself. In that regard, I agree you are correct, in that they are only as certain as the observation data from which they are derived. Mathematical certainty is not predicated on the apparent operation of the universe, in that they must be certain under any conditions whatsoever, no matter what we discover about the universe. Mathematics is our creation; the world is not.
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I thought you were using the words “world” and “universe” as synonyms. — Amalac

Nope. Using the concepts....the words.... as you are.
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I don't know how we could know if time exists outside of our minds or not. — Amalac

Nor do I. Theoretically it cannot, but you know what they say about theories.

That the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is an analytic...tautological....truth of logic, insofar as its negation is impossible.
— Mww

Seems to me like that would only be true if the universe were finite towards the past, which doesn’t seem tautologically true — Amalac

Evidence that the universe is finitely existent in the past is provided by the mathematically logical necessity of singularities. If singularities are real phenomena, then the existence of the universe follows the same logical criteria as is followed by the world. Thing is, experience informs us of the phenomenal reality of the world, but cannot inform us of the phenomenal reality of the universe or of singularities. Can’t use the criteria for what it is possible to know, in determinations for what is not.

With respect to Kant reflected in Popper, the world exists, which makes explicit a necessary origin in time
— Mww

Doesn't seem that explicit to me, how does that follow? (1. The world exists, 2.???, 3. Therefore, the world has an origin in time) — Amalac

That’s fine; it doesn’t have to be explicit to you. I said with respect to Kant reflected in Popper, in which there is no 2.???. That the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is an analytic...tautological....truth of logic, insofar as its negation is impossible.

As a matter of dialectical interest, though, how does the statement not follow, from your point of view?

isn't that as fallacious as arguing that the series of negative integers cannot be infinite because otherwise it could never reach -3? — Amalac

Negative integers have a necessary originating condition, so arriving at -3 is not impossible. The totality of the series of integers is infinite, but a particular member of the series is given by the mere assembly of count from whatever arbitrary origin. Now, the infinite divisibility of an aggregate quantity, represented by numbers, on the other hand, would make arriving at -3 impossible.

With respect to Kant reflected in Popper, the world exists, which makes explicit a necessary origin in time, therefore the time of the world cannot be an infinite series, even if time itself, is, irrespective of phenomena. And while space is infinitely divisible, the world is already a whole conceptual aggregate in itself which immediately defines the limits of its own finitely divisible space. The tacit understanding here is, if divided too far, in order to conform to the infinite divisibility of space in general, but regarding only that space the world inhabits, the world is no longer conceptually identical to its original, hence the incurrence of a “transcendental illusion”.....the very thing the antinomies make apparent.
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my point is that the argument he used to prove that the universe cannot be infinite to the past doesn't appear valid. — Amalac

Interesting. Where do he prove that, exactly? I don’t know of it, and couldn’t find a reference in the texts for it. As far as I understand the antinomy, he describes the confines of it, to certain determinations, of which there is the world, and there is nature...not Nature, nor reality in general, just the constituency of whatever is being considered at the moment....but only makes reference to the universe as a object in the refutation of its viability in any argument with respect to the world.

In fact, I don’t think he attempted to prove the universe cannot be infinite to the past, for to do so is to exchange a phenomenal object of sensibility, which is solely determined by the pure intuitions of space and time thus a possible experience, for an intellectual object of understanding, which cannot be so determined at all thus can never be an experience. If anything, he proved the universe cannot be argued to be infinite to the past, or infinite in any relation to time or space, under the same conditions from which the world is so argued.

But...maybe I missed something, so I’d welcome a little help.

Ok. Thanks.

I did not manage to specify the field..... — Manuel

You did specify the field, in your response to . But all that does is presuppose that to which the field belongs, but says nothing about what that entails.

I don't know how else to formulate the topic. — Manuel

The historical precedent for formulation of anything, always begins by proving the possibility of it. If successful, its possibility is always followed by proving its necessity.

Exacting criteria, to be sure, but hey.......you brought it up, so the onus is on you.

Good luck!!!

We ‘see’ with our occipital lobes. — I like sushi

Yeah......and?

I don’t care what the occipital lobe is doing. When I close my eyes I know why I can’t see.

I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake — Manuel

Nahhhh. You “took up arms in a sea of troubles” so up to you to suffer the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”.

Still, it would seem you had your dialectical legs kicked out from under you from the very beginning, for not establishing the legitimacy of the domain, prior to inquiring about the possibility of legitimate questions arising from it. And because of that, as soon as laptops and sundry post hoc ergo propter hoc foolishness writ large in language philosophy entered the field, the war was lost.

You were heading in the right direction. Or at least heading in the same direction I already went.

All well and good. Now insert time in there somehow.