Any proof of that? — Brett

Nope. Speculative epistemology holds no proofs. Examples of it......well, there lots of that, from which valid inductive inferences can be drawn.

If it’s a command of reason then why so many bad acts in the world? — Brett

Because “bad” is relative.

Can reason command anything? — Brett

Not really. A command of reason is just a metaphysical precept (Kant calls it a formula), that grounds stuff like duty, respect, self-obligation, the principle of law. It’s a guide for a particular manifestation of subjective moral determinations, a priori. And I stand by that, even if I haven’t always complied with it.

Because isn’t reason a universal human faculty and from that comes the ability to choose between possible outcomes? — Brett

Reason, the composite rational methodology, is a universal human condition, yes, but humans don’t use reason, the active procedural faculty, the same universally.

Proper morality does not choose between outcomes; it decides the one outcome that conforms to the agent’s moral constitution. Kant calls it the worthiness of being happy, but I can leave that be, myself.

the c.i. may be a command of reason, but it depends on the reason. — tim wood

Absolutely. In other words.......be careful what you wish for.

Hey......

Yeah, true, the number depending on the reference literature. Kant himself says there is only one, then goes on to alter it slightly so one becomes three: so-called the law of universality, the law of autonomy and the law of humanity. Gregor, Palmquist and Guyer say there are eleven. Hypothetical imperatives, on the other hand, are as numerous as the desires from which they arise.

Me...I stick with the Good Doctor:

“....There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only.....”
(FPMM, 1785, pagination unavailable on iPad ebook......sorry)

Let the good times roll.....

Oh go on, answer it! Pleeeeeeease? — Kenosha Kid

Ok, fine. The Rock....with or without hair?
———————

the modern world and how we live in it and how we look at it according to Kant’s Categorical Imperative and how that’s applied. — Brett

The c.i. Is not an application to the world; it is a command of reason, that conditions the subjective moral determinations applied because of the world. In effect, the c.i. has to do with the moral agent, not the world in which the agent happens to find himself.

Not to kill could be a c.i., insofar as the c.i. begins with “act only.....”, which makes explicit that if a moral agent does not kill, he is in accordance with his own principles. But that’s not the problem. The problem arises in the continuation of the c.i. to its end, which is, “....were to be a universal law”.

In other words....be very careful what you wish for, as there are no possible exceptions whatsoever to a c.i.

what is seen, is a mechanical representation of my thinking.
— Mww

Therefore:

I will admit that pure reason is an individuated closed system and by association, is inaccessible to general external inquiry.
— Mww

must be false, since observing that mechanical representation is a form of external enquiry. — Kenosha Kid

Categorical error: seeing a mechanical representation, an altogether empirical enterprise, is very far removed from the a priori originating cause it. Ther’s precious little difference between that, and this:

the description of a thing is not that thing.
— Wayfarer
Good point. — Kenosha Kid

Not to mention, given that observation implies attention, you are in the metaphysical position of turning the mechanical representation into a cognitive representation of your own. And, if that wasn’t un-scientific enough fer youse guys, you probably should invoke a judgement relative to your understanding of the mechanical representation of my thinking about fooling you by intentionally mis-tying my shoe. Which of course, you will never be able to do, for no judgement is at all possible with respect to second-hand, non-empirical predicates. You may certainly think I purposely did what I did, but such thinking on your part can have no sustaining visibility from the device you put on my head to watch my brain.

Barbarians, 42; lions, 0.
————-

In order for science to study consciousness, it must reify it, or, which is the same thing, turn it into a phenomenon
— Mww

It's still not shown why this is problematic........

It is problematic by implication, insofar as turning a thing into something else presupposes that thing never was what it’s being turned into. The question remains...is it still possible the presupposition itself is false, such that there never was any turning into, in the case at hand, consciousness always was a phenomenon so science didn’t have to reify it in order to study it.

You have sufficient reason to suppose consciousness is already a phenomenon insofar as you suppose properties belonging to it, hence available for scientific study, and I have sufficient reason to suppose consciousness is merely a quality to which no such thing as properties can ever belong, hence cannot be a phenomenon and therefore invisible to scientific study.

Given that the criterion of the truth of a conception, that is to say, the constituency of the manifold of representations possible to subsume under it without contradiction, I would ask.....how is consciousness defined from a perspective of it being a phenomenon? And a follow-up would ask...is there any doubt that being conscious-of is not the same as conscious-ness?

.......There are good methods precisely for this. — Kenosha Kid

Good methods for precisely this taken to mean methods for the scientific study of consciousness.

Are you going to bring in psychology? Or are you going to restrict scientific study to the conditions explicit in the scientific method pursuant to the hard sciences?
——————

in what sense do you say metaphysics is doomed?
— Mww

Well... who would win in a fight between Superman and The Rock? — Kenosha Kid

I don’t know what to do with that. Sorry.

Which assumes that thinking is ethereal, i.e. the mind is a closed system and anything that goes on inside it is completely transparent to outside interrogation. — Kenosha Kid

I don’t use mind with respect to thinking, mind being merely a logical placeholder having no pure functionality of its own except to arbitrarily terminate infinite regress. I will admit that pure reason is an individuated closed system and by association, is inaccessible to general external inquiry. We can talk of it post hoc, but not concurrent with it.
————————

what neuroscience sees is the opposite: we can see you think. — Kenosha Kid

No, we do not; what is seen, is a mechanical representation of my thinking. Strap a machine to my head, watch me tie my shoe. You see traces, graphs, lit sequences......I see my shoe being tied. Watch me repeatedly, set a norm, and you can subsequently see a representation of my intent to mis-tie my shoe, while I, on the other hand, will see a shoe already mis-tied.

What remains is a difficult classification problem: how we identify a particular neurological activity with a particular mental activity. — Kenosha Kid

Difficult indeed. And with a neural connectivity average of 12.9 x 10^8/mm3**, the physical process of burrowing down to specific network paths in order to correlate them to specific cognitive manifestations, may very well destroy that path.
**Alonso-Nanclares, et. al., Department of Anatomy/Compared Pathological Anatomy, Madrid, 2008)
——————-

.....no science is at all possible that has no relevant thought antecedent to it, of which consciousness itself is an integral member.
— Mww

What is the claim here, that since thinking involves consciousness, we cannot start to think about consciousness? It simply doesn't follow. — Kenosha Kid

It doesn’t follow because it’s no where near what I said.

The claim is scientific study of anything at all, necessarily presupposes both the empirical object to which it is directed, or at least its predictable possibility, and the rational means for its accomplishment. In order for science to study consciousness, it must reify it, or, which is the same thing, turn it into a phenomenon, the misplaced concreteness fallacy of which metaphysical study has no guilt. I understand science cannot abide the “fictions” of which metaphysics inevitably is guilty, but still, if we are careful in our construction of them then we have something to talk about in pure conceptual form, rather than a hodge-podge of conversational idioms.

Now don’t get me wrong. Science is the second most valuable paradigm in human life, right after the human himself.

Oh...forgot: in what sense do you say metaphysics is doomed?

And yours, too, re: the argument that the hard problem is defined into being so.

Leave it to reason to confuse itself.

we ought to be able to identify it in an object of study by what how it behaves. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, we can identify consciousness in the human object by studying how the human behaves. All that is required is acceptance that a human also “behaves” in an internal domain apodeitically known only to himself, in addition to his observable behavior known to others, behavior tacitly understood as some ends in accordance with the means sufficient for it.

The internal behavior in the human object of study, such behavior apodeitically known only to himself, is his thinking. Any characterization of the means for such behavior, by which the ends of such behavior are sufficiently, but henceforth also necessarily, given, can have no possible external explanation whatsoever, for that which is known only to the self can be explained only by the self, and then only with respect to the self.

While it is established that the brain is ultimately responsible for any human occupation, sheer accident and pure reflex excepted, it is clear the human does not think in terms of brain mechanics, which are predicated on natural law, from which follows inexorably that thinking is entirely dependent on its own nature. And if human thought is never in terms of natural law, it becomes clear that the notion.....

The scientific study of all aspects of consciousness, such as perception and identity, fall within psychology and therefore, where possible, neurology. — Kenosha Kid

.....is catastrophically false, under the predication that scientific study is itself in terms of natural law, in conjunction with the absolutely necessary condition that consciousness is a product of human internal behavior alone, which is not. The intrinsic circularity, as ground for asserting the falliciousness, is obvious, insofar as no science is at all possible that has no relevant thought antecedent to it, of which consciousness itself is an integral member.

It is current physics which must throw up its hands in defeat, and grant extant metaphysics its true purpose, for even if it should eventually come to pass that certain natural activities in the brain are proven sufficient causality for some immediately correlating thought, it never will appear as such to the possessor of both the brain and the thought. Especially as metaphysics has already explained internal behavior sufficient for use by the human in possession of it, all the while in complete disregard for his own brain. Not to mention, metaphysics has already identified consciousness, and feels no need to prove anything about it, except the logical validity of its place in a system.

“....Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account....”

Not looking for a response; just opinionatin’, doncha know. But thanks for a decent opportunity.

The bulbous center of the wheel cover on a ‘52 Chrysler is bigger than the entire hand of a 3yo.

Souvenir fabrication, my ass.

it's not determinate scientific knowledge that can be confirmed or falsified by inter-subjective observations. — Janus

Which is fine; that which is not primarily empirical has no business being addressed under empirical conditions anyway. Logical speculation remains, and carries the weight of its own law, the ground of which ought to have inter-subjective assent. Where the law is to be applied.....that’s the problem.

That being said, I agree that......

as to whether consciousness exists, and if so what kind of existence it enjoys, is a misguided question. — Janus

.....for the question should hinge on what validity it enjoys, existence being categorically moot.

Cool.

are the empirical objects the mind-independent ones realism is concerned with? — Marchesk

Yes, but Kantian epistemology is not so concerned.

Some renditions of idealism may endorse direct perception because ideas are right there in the mind, whatever that actually means, but transcendental idealism does not. T.I. endorses, in fact is necessarily predicated on, direct perception because “....For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd....”.

The fundamental initiation of all Kantian cognitive metaphysics is the statement that objects are given to us, which makes explicit perception is a direct affectation on sensing physiology. It follows that we never interpret the perception, but rather we interpret the impression the perception imparts.

Anyway....if all this is generally understood already, somebody should tell me so I don’t butt in where I don’t contribute anything.

I would say it depends on the observer. — Claude

Yes, it would, insofar as we have no warrant to stipulate that the human intuitive, representational system is the only possible means to experience. It follows that an observer operating under the auspices of a system not intuitive or representational, may include what we think as noumena to be as necessary a constituent as phenomena are for us. Still, our system immediately precludes any possibility of understanding such differentiated methodology, at least according to this particular theory.

there is no such thing as a property of language less conscious experience that we've called "redness" — creativesoul

Agreed. Quality of redness is not a property; it is the condition of the property of red. We experience the property, we merely think the relative condition of it.

Try critical self-analysis, rather than metacognition.

I don’t understand this noticing a weasel.

My problem with it is the implicit assumption that the apple is red the way it looks red to the perceiver. In my view, the awareness of red is added by the perceiver. — Marchesk

While I subscribe to that condition as well, it may be worth remarking that the schematic doesn’t qualify the real object perceived as having any color at all. There is a real object, we are aware....wordlessly in fact....of that real object. Doesn’t look to me like the implicit assumption of color is given, so I don’t see a conflict with our view.

The problem would arise if the schematic specified red apple instead of real apple, followed by awareness of red apple instead of awareness of real apple, in which case of course, red is certainly not added by the perceiver but is antecedently specified as a property of the apple, a contradiction to our philosophical d’ruthers.

Did I miss something? I hate it when that happens........

some in Kant's time said he had merely rehashed Leibniz. — Gregory

Perhaps in some respects, but the “REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION“ , A261/B316, is a 20-page destruction of Liebnitz’s monadology. Amphiboly being Kantian transcendental-speak for, “don’t mistake a noumena for a phenomena, dammit!!!!!”. And the major condition of doing so is by attributing space and time as properties of objects, not where they properly belong, as the pure a priori forms by which objects are presented to us. In other words, space and time belong to the thinker, not the object thought.

From that, it is clear a materialist understanding of Kant, with respect to space and time at least, doesn’t work. Materialism for Kant is the acknowledgement of the reality of material things, but such acknowledgement does not extend to our empirical knowledge of what those things actually are. We do not and cannot know things; we can only know the representations of things.
————-

I think Hume really disturbed Kant and the three critiques can be seen as his attempt to heal his faith and psychology — Gregory

Yeah, one could say he was disturbed. Hume said of pure reason, “consign it to the flames”, while Kant based his entire epistemology on the very thing Hume declared worthless. I’d be disturbed, too. Although I’d likely use a rather stronger word for it.

Kant’s faith didn’t need healing, and he rejected psychology as a doctrine, having “...its origin in a mere misunderstanding....”.

....another whole metaphysical can of transcendental worms.

The word "noumena" originally meant "that which is thought" and it seemed to me Kant choose this for a reason. — Gregory

He probably did, perhaps because, in the interest of a complete metaphysical system, and after positing that the understanding is the faculty of thought, he then forced himself into.....

A.).....saying just what it is that the understanding thinks,
B.).....the understanding is the source of concepts which arise spontaneously merely from the thought of them,
C.).....thus he must, to be consistent, acknowledge the understanding can think what it wants, but some of what it thinks has no application in the metaphysics he was creating from scratch with respect to human knowledge,
D.)....he couldn’t call that which the understanding thinks that is itself outside the system of knowledge “illusory” or derivatives of it, because that term had already been used against pure reason as a whole,
E.)....he couldn’t call what the understanding thinks ding an sich because that had already been assigned to real objects external to us,
F.).....he couldn’t regulate spontaneity without contradicting the validity of our conceptions’ origin,
G.)....he settled on granting the understanding the capacity to think “objects in themselves”, and called them noumena.

“...The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself*** must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence...”

***considered as a thing in itself does not mean objects in themselves are the same as things in themselves. It means only that understanding considers phenomena in the same way sensibility considers real external objects. First, real external objects are given to the faculty of representation initially as a sensation, which imagination synthesizes with intuitions to generate phenomena. Second, phenomena are given to the faculty of understanding as undetermined objects, or, as an “object in itself”. Third, understand thinks to determine what the “object in itself” is, by the only means available to it, the categories, but the categories do not have the power to determine what any kind of object is, but only sets the conditions under which real physical objects external to us, are possible.
——————

”thing-in-itself", "noumena", and "phenomena" are just different ways we perceive objects. — Gregory

The only way to perceive objects is by means of the sensations by which the cognitive system is given something to work with. None of those three listed conceptions/notions/ideas affect our sensory apparatus, only the “thing” of the “thing-in-itself”, does.
——————

there is no mention of conatus in the Critique of Pure Reason. — Gregory

The Critique is a treatise on knowledge, which presupposes whatever being it is possible to know about. While he grants ontology as one of four major domains of metaphysics in general, he has no use for it in a speculative transcendental theory of human empirical knowledge.

“....Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding...”.

Here he is saying ontology doesn’t do what its proponents attribute to it, that is, his peers and the immediately antecedent philosophy from which his peers ground theirs. It bears remembering that Kant instituted a paradigm shift in the philosophical thinking of his day, which he then used to refute everybody. Still, in the interest of keeping his job, he had to play nice.....somewhat.....because his peers also held their own respect, which required great care in besmirching indiscriminately. It is within this perspective, including the controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn with respect to pantheism, a form of dogmatic determinism itself grounded by Spinozianism that the Kantian transcendental aesthetic found its primary use. It was, in effect, the philosophical politics of the day, that Kant even got involved in the pantheism debate in the first place, and some literature even suggests the use of the first edition of the critique to support one side or the other inspired the second edition, with its changes eliminating, or at least clarifying, pertinence.

“...It is hard to comprehend how the scholars just mentioned [Mendelssohn and Jacobi] could find support for Spinozism in the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique completely clips dogmatism's wings in respect of the cognition of supersensible objects, and Spinozism is so dogmatic in this respect that it even competes with the mathematicians in respect of the strictness of its proofs....”
(Essay, “What Does It Mean.....”, fn#6, 1786)

Dating makes explicit the debate could only have used the 1781 edition, in which was included an entire section of the specifics of realism vs idealism. The 1787 edition completely eliminates that entire section, replacing it with a much shorter and less controversial rendering.
————-

Lastly,

The Critique of Pure Reason feels mechanistic to me — Gregory

As well it should, with a nod to wayfarer. It took 800 pages to create a theory, in which every possible tenet relevant to it, is named and given its place, and then, how all the tenets operate as a whole in order to arrive at something irrefutable. Knowledge.

Because of this, then necessarily that, is quite mechanistic, yes. Nevertheless, to grasp Kantian metaphysics as a complete system, rather than each as its own system, all three critiques need be understood together. Kant was, for better or worse, the ultimate dualist.

All the above, except the quotes, is my understanding alone, and I make no claim for academic standing.

It seems that phenomena is noumena. — Gregory

If that is the case, why would an entire chapter be dedicated to distinguishing one from the other?

“...That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon...”

“...If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition (...) But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition....”

Whether object impossible for us to sense, or not an object we could possibly sense, either way, noumena mean absolutely nothing whatsoever to us as intelligences with intuitive rationality, for no intuition of one can ever be held by us.
————-

The exactly what of phenomena is unknown, for it has not yet met the necessary conditions for empirical knowledge. Hence the “undetermined object”.

The theoretical what of phenomena, that is, what part does this particular member of a speculative cognitive system play.....is limited to that which affects the human sensory apparatus:

“....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses...”

Phenomena are the possibly determinable, but as-yet undetermined, representations of “the objects which affect our senses”.

The CI is one of the best philosophical renderings in history, to this day. — creativesoul

No doubt. And that has only to do with his moral philosophy. His speculative epistemology has been professionally superseded....or neglected outright......which leaves we armchair types to keep it alive.

Probably because we don’t know any better. Or just maybe...there isn’t any better.

Ehhhhh.....you know how it is, right? Somebody’s gotta show the post-moderns how they went off the epistemic rails.

Kidding. Reading a lot does not necessarily indicate learning.

“.....Don't our internal discriminative states also have some special "intrinsic" properties, the subjective, private, ineffable, properties that constitute the way things look to us (sound to us, smell to us, etc.)? No. The dispositional properties of those discriminative states already suffice to explain all the effects: the effects on both peripheral behavior (saying "Red!", stepping the brake, etc.) and "internal" behavior (judging "Red!", seeing something as red, reacting with uneasiness or displeasure if, say, red things upset one). Any additional "qualitative" properties or qualia would thus have no positive role to play in any explanations, nor are they somehow vouchsafed to us "directly" in intuition. Qualitative properties that are intrinsically conscious are a myth, an artifact of misguided theorizing, not anything given pretheoretically....”
(Dennett, 1991a, in a precursor to “Consciousness Explained”)

Not given pre-theoretically carries the implication that, if qualitative properties are possible at all, they must be given pursuant to some cognitive theory. An artifact of misguided theorizing carries the implication that, on the one hand, quality is a property, or, the consciousness of quality in and of itself, is in fact directly accessible to us because it is in fact an intuition. Taken together, it becomes clear that whichever cognitive theory predicates quality with a property, and consciousness of such as belonging to phenomena, is metaphysically empty.

Proper theorizing.....understood herein as opinion, of course, with just a hint of argumentum ab auctoritate.....attributes to quality “the order of degree in time”, as opposed to, e.g., quantity, which is “the order of content in time”. Thus it is, following that opinion, that WIL intuitions grounding WIL language, can never occur as time-determinant conditions alone (which validates “pumping” out those of that kind), for they are themselves necessarily conditioned by it, but may only be indirectly accessible iff it is conjoined to the intuition of a phenomenon which is itself conditioned by successions in time, which gives phenomena their degree. It is therefore only from such degree, that WIL language may ensue. Still, even the possibility of WIL language granted by intuition of degrees in phenomena is not sufficient for its intelligibility, for the degree of a thing..........wait for it...............does not give the order of it.

Not only are “special subjective properties” of quality not special, they are not even properties of a subject; they are merely relative understandings of a subject that thinks order in his conceptions.

Please. Hold the tomatoes. I’m only here cuz it’s too early for football.

So those who don’t perceive them are the ones who don’t trust their senses?
— Mww

Yes, in short. — Olivier5

So if I reject the notion of qualia, but insist my senses are generally trustworthy, I’m just deluding myself? Or maybe it’s the other way around...... if my senses are generally trustworthy in themselves, then I am only deluding myself in the rejection of qualia?

As much as I’m willing to admit to deluding myself upon proper grounds, it remains much more parsimonious, methinks, to allow perceiving its dependability, dismiss qualia as something conditioned by perceiving, and fault understanding a posteriori or judgement a priori, for whatever cognitive errors I make. Things just run smoother that way.

so you cannot actually point at them. But you can perceive them. — Olivier5

So those who don’t perceive them are the ones who don’t trust their senses?

I'm working on an ordinary language rendering of the (consciousness)process. — creativesoul

A worthy endeavor. Opening major will be important.

Carry on!!

The proponents of qualia and quale are the ones who attempt to decouple, sever, and/or otherwise separate some aspects of consciousness from the ongoing process, — creativesoul

Yeah......”raw feels”....”seemings”.....are themselves modes of thought, in as much as a subject can neither ask himself nor tell himself about the “seeming” of a sensation, unless he already has something with which to juxtaposition to it. Any “seeming” implicates a presupposition that must be contained somewhere in the ongoing process, hence “seemings”, or the qualia meant to represent them, cannot be detached from the process in which the juxtapositioned elements are contained, in effect, making them superfluous.
(Incidentally, which is the primary reason “the friends of qualia” needs qualia to be empirically obtained, as opposed to the standing of “a theorist’s useful interpretive fiction”, in order to justify their reality, because epistemologically they are not necessarily so.)

On the other hand, if the predicates of such seemings are pure a priori considerations, in which the subject is not consciously involved, wherein the cognitive system is asking itself about the relativity of a “seeming”, which both speculative epistemology and methodological naturalism actually require, seemings are irrelevant with respect to conscious investigations of the general nature of the system in which they are contained.
(Incidentally, if this is the case, it is why Dennett then relies on the notion that qualia are altogether too ill-conceived to be “exactly” defined.)

“....Thus, the criterion for the possibility of a conception (not its object) is the definition of it...”
(CPR, B154)
——————

On another note, assuming you’re still here.........

The arena where qualia exert their influence, tacitly granting there are such things, is the domain of sensibility. In the ongoing process, sensibility extends only from the appearance of an external object (physiological perceiving apparatus has been affected by something) to the imagination of a particular phenomenon related to it (intuition), all of which operates without the consciousness of our cognitive system, but only the requisites of the physical system, re: particular ways and means of specialized data transmission to the corresponding specific regions of the brain. Hence, there is as yet no empirical knowledge, no conscious experience (as if there was any other kind).......and absolutely no language use. Whether or not any of the speculative stuff is actually the case, the assets of it do necessarily exist in their entirety, and they necessarily consist of integral correlations. Maybe not what you’ve always had in mind, but perhaps congruent to it.

What's left? — creativesoul

Experience is a synthesis, not an aggregate. Experiences cannot be disassembled, they may only be analyzed.

Beware misplaced concreteness.

Also, it seems you didn't quite understand my take on the issue. — TheMadFool

Wasn’t trying to. You asked, I answered. Using my understanding.

I meant to say that (....) the idea of an actual infinity is...well...something doesn't add up. — TheMadFool

Ok, fine. You’re entitled to that. Still, the infinity of space or time makes perfect sense to me. Doesn’t make it a fact, only that I don’t contradict myself by thinking it, as far as my knowledge currently permits.

First a duck, then a rabbit are each seemings in themselves, yes. Easily understood. Shaded bars are not illusory seemings, insofar as I do actually intuit a shaded bar from a given appearance, and as such, some qualia (phenomenal representation) pertains to it, and will so pertain until I am shown the illusion, which suffices as a qualitatively different appearance, with different pertinent qualia (phenomenal representation), facilitating a different experience.

Nutshell?

The seeming part. — Marchesk

Ok, but some illusions are actual seemings, re: the bulging part of the checkerboard, and some illusions do not seem so but must be illustrated as such, re: the shaded square and the shaded bar. What then of qualia?

So.....qualia advocate, then? What part are they playing in these illusion scenarios, do you say?

Interesting. Still, that human sensibility is susceptible to hoodwinking, is hardly contestable. Seen one constructed illusion, seen ‘em all, right?

Just sayin’ I don’t hold the same incredulity, that’s all.

this is pretty incredible. — Olivier5

Ok.

How then the notion of an actual infinity, completed as it must be? — TheMadFool

I suppose....keyword, notion. An actual infinity would have to be thought as a concept in and of itself, merely to represent that of which the totality is either incomprehensible or altogether impossible, under the auspices of a particular cognitive system. Problem is, every conception must have an object at least thought as belonging to it, from which follows, in certain idealist doctrines, those objects may be merely another conception. But even then, metaphysical reductionism, or, which is the same thing.....logic.... mandates that eventually, we absolutely must rely on experience to ground all of those conceptions. Hence, we have the concept of actual infinity, justified by the a priori conception of time, which is justified in turn by the a priori conception of change, which can be given to us by sensibility, from which we finally arrive at experience. So...we haven’t experienced infinity, but only justified, logically validated, the conception of it, completed in itself. In effect, a bottom-up systematic rendition of the actually infinite.

On the other hand, if the complementary nature of human reason is granted, re: yes/no, right/left, right/wrong, up/down....for any conception its negation is given immediately.....then because bounded things are known with certainty, otherwise we could never even talk about that which is perceived as real, unbounded things are given necessarily by it, otherwise our cognitive system is inherently inconsistent. In such cases, what those unbounded things are is irrelevant, only that they must be possible. In effect, a top-down systematic rendition of the potentially infinite.

Amazing — Olivier5

Is it, really? Where, exactly, is the illusion? Do you see A.)....you are being TOLD there is an illusion, and B.)....you are being COERCED, by means of the subtlety of the declared illusion, in conjunction with the manufactured proofs thereof, into contradicting your own experience.

In a way, though, you’re correct. It is amazing what folks will do to convince themselves that what they know can so easily be undone.