Good catch. I like them both, but favor Kant.

Why didn’t you just say for what we CANNOT perceive and for what we cannot conceptualize (we cannot name).
— Mww

Hehe... this claims we can only name things that we can both conceptualize and perceive at the same time and at the same respect — god must be atheist

So a claim for what cannot be named is at the same time claim for what can? Nope, ain’t buyin’ it.

The first is quite obviously true insofar as that which is neither perceivable nor conceivable cannot be known to exist as far as we’re concerned, while the latter is quite obviously false insofar as we can certainly name things conceived long before that thing is ever perceived, if it ever is.

Connective consistency is important; logical consistency is paramount.

So the senses pass physical information that can be used as input, presumably for mental content, which the dictionary (sigh) terms “perception”. As well, apparently, perception can comprise mental content without the passing of physical information, insofar as at least one kind of perception doesn’t use the senses. Where does the mental content come from that isn’t passed by physical information? I suppose thinking can provide mental content, but still, what kind of content can it be, if not physical information from sensory inputs?

Perception as mental content comprised of physical information passed by the senses, and perception as mental content comprised of something other than physical information not passed by the senses. Seems like there should be a difference, so how does the mind tell the difference, and how does the mind treat one differently than the other, if there is one?

I understand all that. I’m not begrudging your definitions.

Still, granting that the senses aren’t used in your system of mental content, what part do they play?

Thinking of time perception as mental content...... — Mark Nyquist

Thinking as mental content...ok;
Thinking of time as mental content....ok;
Thinking of time perception as mental content....not ok.

Because thinking of time as mental content is already granted, the only way thinking of time perception as mental content can be consistently affirmed, is to treat perception as a function of the mind. If perception is a function of the mind.....what are the senses for?

Oh. Psychological matter.

That lets me out.

Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

Agreed. Can’t have an answer consistent with a very specific question, without a proper ground being given for it. Always best to separate the sophists from the dialecticians.

Time is how we perceive entropy. — I like sushi

True enough, but we don't care that time is how we perceive, when we wish to know how time is perceived.

Why didn’t you just say for what we CANNOT perceive and for what we cannot conceptualize, we don’t have a name. No one can beat that horse beyond its expiration date, or, as in my case, no proper yankeevirgobabyboomer can analyze that such that the logical inconsistency of what you did say, becomes glaringly obvious. (Grin)

Ok. Thanks.

emotions provide an aesthetic 'intuition' about a decision and its potential outcome based on reason. How do these aesthetic judgements arise or change in one's mind? — Shawn

By the creation of an object of desire or inclination, from practical reason, by which the subjective condition explains itself to itself. I may have feelings about something, not necessarily because of what it is, but merely from how I am inclined to think of it, or, for some affect I wish it to impart to me.

It should be noted that emotions, while prevalent, are not necessary for humans. We know there are things for which we have no feelings at all, things for which no judgement is made with respect to that thing’s affect.

I think, technically, we don’t know how aesthetic judgements arise, but only speculate on the conditions under which they become possible. It is plain they are merely subjective, because it is plain one subject may have very different feelings than another, given exactly the same circumstance. And anything purely subjective, is pretty much impossible to quantify across the board.

We don't need to perceive it directly. We can compute it, and we do — god must be atheist

No, technically, we do not; we compute duration or succession, and represent such computations with everything from clocks to scratches on a wall. Flowers bloom under conditions right for them, but it is only with respect to humans, that flowers bloom in the spring. Spring, of course, a human conception, having absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with flowers themselves. Just as the first directly visible light from the sun on Earth itself has nothing to do with “morning”.
—————-

for what we don't perceive, and for what we can't conceptualize, we don't have a name. — god must be atheist

Not “and for”. “Or for”. Your language makes explicit we must perceive all we name, which is obviously not the case. It follows that iff there is no perception of time as such, and yet time is nonetheless a name for something, it only names a conception, which can be argued to be the case without contradiction. Whereas time as a perception, is full of them, one for each and every instance of treating time as an object. Misplaced concreteness writ large? I mean....if time is perceivable, shouldn’t we be able to smell it?

What we don’t understand and for what we can’t conceptualize, we don’t have a name....is perhaps a better description of the human condition. Now, if time is something merely understood, we have reason to name it, but we have no occasion for, and are relieved of the absurdity of, smelling it.
—————-

Human language is the extension of models of reality — god must be atheist

Absolutely. Human models described by human language derived from human experience.
—————-

the very title of the thread is "How do we perceive time?" — god must be atheist

Yep, and I understand you mean that to ask that question presupposes the truth of it, in that we actually do perceive time, and the query simple asks about the means by which such perception occurs. That being the case, I must admit I don’t know how we perceive time.

does not need guidance. — Fooloso4

I see I misspoke: you said mechanistic but I wrote deterministic. Sorry....not paying proper attention.

Anyway, agreed, mechanical systems need no guidance. What ground is there or attributing extension to systems, when Descartes in Principles only attributes extension to “corporeal substance”?

I’m aware of but not well-versed in Descartes’ science, having more interest in his metaphysics. I shall have to take your word for it, that he regards the world as deterministic, so jettisons final causes. But if he claims that mind, body and god all are not responsible for guidance in the course of things, does he then claim Nature itself, is? I mean....what’s left? That, or the course of things isn’t guided at all, I guess. Excluded middle kinda thing.
—————

at once consistent with it and contrary to it. — Fooloso4

Yeah...if you’re gonna upset the applecart, ya gotta be ready to appease the owner.

I hope it makes a little sense to avoid the dichotomy of either treating emotions as "rational" or "irrational"? — Shawn

It can make sense to avoid the dichotomy, insofar as rational/irrational implies logical judgements based on reason, whereas emotions imply aesthetic judgements based on feelings alone. It follows that emotions need not be treated as rational/irrational, thus avoiding the dichotomy.

Humans, after all, reason to a logical judgement, but reason from an aesthetic judgement. On the one hand, we have to understand things about an object before we know what the object is, but on the other hand, we very well may already have feelings about something before we know what it is about it, that causes those feelings.

Expressions of emotion may be rational/irrational. But emotions themselves, as purely subjective conditions, are not.

why does he want to distinguish them? — Fooloso4

In modern parlance.....the quest for the unconditioned? The irreducible. The absolute certainty. From which the possibility of knowledge itself is given.

Recognition of the validity of thinking outside the Bible.

Humans wonder naturally, nature of the intellectual beast. It is nevertheless a fine line between wonderment and confusion.

How a term is meant to be understood is by definition a definition. — Fooloso4

Objection noted, and agreeable in principle. A definition is the complete representation of the conception, which always arises spontaneously from the understanding alone. How I define a term is represented by how it is understood by me.

Problem is, of course, there is no promise of necessary congruency between a plurality of understandings, from which follows the possible disparity between definitions, i.e., complete representation, of the same conception. I rather think how a term is meant to be understood, is the explanation of it, integral with its propositional employment.

Minor point, far deeper into the weeds than necessary.
—————

we do not gain knowledge by analysis of definitions. — Fooloso4

Correct; knowledge is far more complicated than that.
—————

Can the mind/body distinction be made if sensory awareness is a matter of thought? — Fooloso4

How about......awareness of, e.g., pain, is an indubitable certainty, a product of mind, even if its cause is not, it being a product of body. Difference between aware of, and aware-ness of. I suppose there’s all kinds of ways to distinguish one from another, right?

Is it the same to define a term, as it is to declare how it is meant to be understood? Descartes tells us what he means by the use of a term, e.g., P.P 1,9, on “thought”, insofar as when he is thinking all these listed mental occurrences are predicates of it, but he didn’t really define it, per se, as did Kant with his “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”.

As well, in P.P. 1,10, he warns against over-complicating “items of knowledge”. Then it is the case that “logical definitions for very simple and self-evident matters” should be unnecessary, because these should be taken as the very principles upon which the treatise is grounded.

Still, I would agree P.P. may very well be a response to critics, in which he is clarifying his intended use of terms, or, “items of knowledge”, rather than setting definitions of them.

What did you have in mind with “exactly what some are doing here”?

Neither gods nor commodores shall cause me to fire on such abundant perspicuity.

Be all that as it may, it remains that it is humans doing the work, therefore it is impossible to get beyond the metaphysical/empirical dichotomy with respect to the core question, which is my sole raison d’etre in attendance.

I have been thinking that it is the core question which goes beyond the dichotomies of metaphysics vs empiricism — Jack Cummins

How can it go beyond that dichotomy, when the proposition that asks about it obtains its meaning from them? Given that understanding itself is metaphysical, and reality itself is empirical, it follows that bypassing either results in reality that is not understood, or, that which is understood is not reality. In effect, nullifying the core question.

On the other hand, if there is understanding of reality, in whichever form that obtains, then the response to the core question must contain both the elements of the dichotomy, thus the question, effectively, hasn’t transcended either of them.

Just sayin’......

I don't think you guys are still talking about how we perceive time. — god must be atheist

I’ll cop to that. I reject that we perceive time in the first place, so don’t bother with talking about how we do it.

That, and I reject that missiles nest. How absurd!!!!

Would changing the words to [neurons, (mental content)] be more understandable? — Mark Nyquist

Not in my case; I understand mental content as instantiated non-physical. And neurons are just neurons in any case.

It's just normally we wouldn't note the neurons being present, but to do rigorous philosophy, we should. — Mark Nyquist

True, we don’t normally consider neurons in rigorous philosophy; that’s the purview and professional domain of empirical scientists. There’s a reason for that, I think, insofar as humans do not...and perhaps do not even possess the ability...to think in terms of the very natural laws by which the brain operates. And if that’s the case, how does the explanatory gap ever close, between the physical operation of the brain and the appearance of us as apparent manifestations of the non-physical operation of the brain?

our mental process does have full input/output capabilities and this model accounts for those capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

That was never in doubt; the problem is in translation of one input type to a completely different output type. The type of input as energy, that translates to a type of output as motion, is quite comprehensible, but the type of input as energy that translates to a type of output as “fascination”, “anxiety”, “freedom”.......well, that just doesn’t work so well, does it.

Fun stuff.....

The statement in question...... — Fooloso4

I like the “Principles of Philosophy” exposition more. Simpler, with a follow up for what he means by “think”.

Could you explain how his outcome would have been different if he had? — frank

No, not with any legitimacy. I can philosophize all day long over it, but that would never be any more than making inferences based on my understandings, which are most likely not even be close to his. He had a different mindset and different authorities to answer to than I, after all.

Is the complaint that he hasn't executed a proper ontological proof? — frank

I don’t think Descartes meant to infer his own existence, with the predicate “...therefore I am”.

I don’t think Descartes needed an ontological proof for anything, insofar as his sole intent was to prove a distinction between mind and body. The method for proving a distinction does not need an ontological proof for its elements, as much as it needs validation of an absolute necessity of one of them. All he had to do was show how the doubting one set of conditions for a thing, was impossible for doubting some other set of conditions for some other thing. It follows that if doubt of that other thing is impossible, that other thing must be absolutely necessary. He then has no need to prove the existence of it, having already proven its necessity. So it is, that because “I think” is undoubtably, “I am” is given necessarily.

Another way to look at it is, logical consistency reduces the “I” that thinks, to be the very same “I” that is thinking. “I” think, therefore “I” am. As such, “I” isn’t proven to exist, only that it is simply proven, by its thinking.

I think Descartes’ mistake was not to eliminate the extension of “I am” to phenomenal existence. So in effect, I guess you could say he failed to provide an ontological proof for the impossibility of mind as such. And he failed at that, because, as aforementioned, he didn’t consider, or at least didn’t use, the categories, as did Kant, it being reasonable to assume he knew about them, at least in Aristotle-ian form.

As an aside, there is also a standing Kantian metaphysical argument, unknown and/or not recognized as valid by Descartes, that existence cannot be a predicate in a logical proposition. So, if “I think” is true, “I am” is given immediately because of it. I mean....how could it be that “I think” but “I am not”.

Subtleties indeed. As in Tonini, I’ll wager.

to found an absolute grounding in subjectivity for science , logic and math, not an empirical one. This is in the best tradition of continental philosophy: dig deep down beneath the assumptions of math and science to those truths that are indubitably true for all, everywhere, at all times. (...) That for me is the difference between psychology and philosophy. The former is a conventionalized, conservative derivative of the latter. — Joshs

Well said.

Why would Descartes need "Everything, which thinks, exists" to be true in order to infer his own existence from the fact that he's thinking? — frank

Ahhhhh....the subtleties of philosophical investigations.

What do you think “infer his own existence” to mean?

With respect to Kant at least, there’s no philosophical laughing, but there is a basic refutation.....

“...The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings necessarily. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained—because....”

....and I say basic because it occurs in a mere footnote to B422, and I say refutation, as shown by the “ -because...”, insofar it is only so in accordance with Kant’s philosophy, which employs a conceptual scheme Descartes didn’t, re: the categories.

On the other hand, Kant congratulates Descartes for not making the same absurd claims with his idealism in general, as Berkeley made with his, so.....it’s a wash. Praise on one hand, criticism on the other.

In general, if you think your brain has mental content, you need a philosophy that accounts for this and it needs to recognize content has both input and output capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

Yep. Sounds about right.

Or you could walk around with one of those new-dangled machines strapped to your head, with a platoon of geeky lab-coated pencil-pushers in tow, taking turns telling you what’s reallyreallyreally going on between your ears.

(See? Right there! Apple tastes good = 2.5uv in zone 5 of area 2 of region 3; 14 phosphate ions over 10nm cleft!!! TaaaaDaaaaaa!!!!)

In a stimulus-free situation we still experience time. This may be explained by internal changes in the brain...... — god must be atheist

Then it may be more proper to say it is those changes that is the experience, not time itself.

What is rhythm but an event in succession to a similar event in a uniform series of such events?

Unless we can find some physics stuff that equivocally ties time to some not purely theoretical, but real phenomenon, we are at liberty to say also that time does not exist, — god must be atheist

Gonna be a long time coming, I’m thinkin’. Finding that physical stuff.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so. — Fooloso4

I followed the text, and only your commentary on it, for which I offer respect. Silently.

I've looked epiphenomenalism and I don't like it. — Mark Nyquist

You’re a member of a rather large crowd.

It's a form of dualism were the physical brain supports an immaterial mind that has no output capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

There's a metaphysical argument which posits mind as a logical causality.

Dualism might have some general solution to time perception in the form of mind but I don't see any specific mechanism. — Mark Nyquist

Yeah.....unfortunate that speculative pure reason has declined in philosophical standing, despite the fact people still think. I at least, hold that reason is sufficient “specific mechanism” for “time perception”, as you call it.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, though? — Janus

Not necessarily, I suppose. Perhaps the brush I’m painting with is too broad. Just seems to me, that which is singular represents nothing other than itself. Pluralism, being a concept of its own, then stands as the condition for any of the -isms contained in it, but stands as representation of none of them.

Interesting topic, fun to play with, but not worth a real argument, to be sure. Knuckle down, drag out fight, I mean.

”Treat others as you would NOT like others to treat you." — SpaceDweller

That doesn’t seem to solve anything, when I elect to treat you as a big fat ugly slob simply because I wish not to be treated as such. Hell, I could just as well treat you like I would Ho Chi Minh, Alan Jackson, or Bugs Bunny for that matter. In other words, the mere negation of a rule is no less a rule, and if the affirmative of that rule is faulty, so too is its negation.
—————

My point is that if you're a big fat ugly slob then you're immoral toward yourself, and as such nobody is going to help you. — SpaceDweller

So the proper criteria for morality is...appearance? Attitude? I should think you’d be the epitome of immoral if you willfully fail to help me merely because I am judged as offensive to your sensibilities. It follows from that, that one should help that ubiquitous lil’ ol’ lady cross the busy street, so long as she doesn’t smell bad.

I’m inclined to say, on the other hand, if one is immoral, as opposed to merely committing a circumstantial error in judgement from ignorance or accident, no one can help him, for his disposition is given and hence the ground of his actions is already set.

Moral philosophy is a tough business, no doubt.

Are you a ham radio operator? — frank

Nahhh....long-time communications specialist in Uncle Sam’s Canoe Club, back when it was a whole lot more fun.....and risky.....being a hippie than a sailor. Culture clash writ large.

Antennas are fascinating. I’ve worked on transmitters from .25w UHF to 2Mw VLF, where inserting a fluorescent stick bulb in the radiation field lights it up. Makes the Boy Scout tour group all giddy in amazement.

Difference, indeed.

Morality: "Treat others as you would like others to treat you." — SpaceDweller

And you don’t see the inherent nonsense in that?

You may very well have no issue in treating me as a big fat ugly slob, under the assumption such is my wish regardless of how foolish it seems to you. But it is so much more offensive than foolish, that I shall treat you as a big fat ugly slob, when you reject the insinuation explicit in the treatment.

Morality is never in the treatment, but only and always in the reason for the treatment.

if time perception is (or is not) observable evidence that our brains actually use instantiated non-physicals? — Mark Nyquist

If I read that as....does the brain use a kind of instantiated non-physical evidence, such as time....then I would say, yes it does. Thing is, though, we do not perceive time, but only perceive one occurrence in relation to another, and that relation is what we call “time”.

But yes, it does seem as if the brain constructs of its own accord, that which we as functioning rational beings, think we need.